CENTRAL

CENTRAL REGISTRY
NEW ZEALAND HIGH COMMISSION
LONDON, S.W.1.

B66/5/1A

Part No. 3 Opened SEPT 86 Closed 31/3/88
Previous papers PART 2 (SECRET)
Remarks

SECRET

Downgraded to

CONFIDENTIAL

13/8/04

Index Heading

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Subject

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

TERRORISM

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FROM 1 AUGUST 20 .....

Date: / /

for Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

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VETTING STATEMENT

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Other comments:

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Sgd.....Date: 13/8/04

for Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

PROVOS RETHINK OPERATIONS ABROAD AS SCALE OF GIBRALTAR SETBACK BECOMES CLEAR



Gunned down: (left to right) Daniel McCann, Mairead Farrell and Sean Savage who were shot by the SAS in the operation in Gibraltar (detailed right).

IRA hunts for top-level mole

by **MARY HOLLAND** in Dublin
SIMON DE BRUXELLES
in Gibraltar
and **IAN MATHER** in London.

THE IRA has launched a top-level nquiry into how Britain's intelli-ence services were able to breach its ecurity and shoot dead one of its nits in Gibraltar last Sunday.

The penetration of its 'operation' by he security services is the deadliest blow the Provos since last May when the inpoint accuracy of the SAS's informa-on about the imminent attack on the oughall lock-up RUC station resulted in ght of the IRA's most senior bombers nd gunmen being shot dead.

The IRA still has not established how e security forces penetrated it then. ecently the IRA discovered that a bomb hich it had failed to trigger in London-erry on waste ground had been inter-red with.

The IRA has killed a number of leged informers in Northern Ireland in e past 18 months and it argues that it ugged a number of gaps in its internal curity as a result.

It is now conceivable that the IRA will think any plans in hand to strike road, because virtually all efforts to ry out bombings in Britain in the past ree years have ended in failure with spects arrested and several explosives mps unearthed.

The Provisionals fear that much of the elligence about their plans must have me from an informer within their own ganisation. They believe that is why SAS was ready and waiting for the rorists and that the Government issued h a confident statement about the mb in a white Renault which later ned out not to exist.

To the IRA's leaders, the pattern of ent events indicates that the security ces are getting reliable information m someone well placed to know the ails of operations.

Republican sources discount the claim Britain and Spain that Mairead Farrell her two companions had been closely ed by the Spanish police for a period ng back to November. Farrell, they was an extremely experienced opera-who would have known she was ng followed and taken appropriate s to lose the police.

The explanation they give for what happened in Gibraltar was that Farrell probably realised immediately after they parked the car that they had walked into a stake-out and that they were trying to get back to safety across the Spanish border.

The loss of Farrell, in particular, seems a very severe blow. She was exactly the kind of recruit they want to show they can attract — middle-class, intelligent, committed and with leader-ship potential.

The Provos admit that they now face a serious dilemma. In the past an incident like Gibraltar would have brought a rush of new recruits. It is much less likely to do that now when educated young men and women can see that involvement in the IRA carries little prospect of victory.

The clinical dispatch of Farrell, Daniel McCann and Sean Savage a week ago bore the classic hallmarks of an SAS operation. Indeed, it now looks as if the three terrorists' death warrants were signed the moment the decision was made to send in the SAS.

Neither chances nor prisoners were taken. The action was over in seconds. Accounts of witnesses, several of whom literally did not believe their eyes, are confused and contradictory. The SAS, which thrives on its aura of mystique and myth, will try to keep it that way.

The Changing of the Guard ceremony in Gibraltar's main square, with its colo-nial connotations, was an obvious and symbolic target for the IRA, desperate to re-establish its credibility after a series of setbacks that included the bombing at Enniskillen and the deaths of at least 20 'active service volunteers' in the past 15 months.

McCann drove through the border checkpoint in his hired Renault 5 at about 1 pm last Sunday. He parked beside Inces Hall in what is known locally as Lovers' Lane. The car was left beside the spot where two days later the band and guardsmen of the Royal Anglian Regiment were due to form up before the short parade to The Convent, the offices of the Governor, Sir Peter Terry.

From observations carried out by the fourth, member of the gang, Mary Par-kin, he knew it would be virtually impossible to find a parking space in the town centre on any other day of the week.

According to the official account, McCann was seen making 'adjustments' to the car before meeting Savage and Farrell, who had crossed the border on foot about 90 minutes later. Together they returned to the car to make more 'adjustments' before setting off shortly before 3.30 pm for the mile-and-a-half walk back to the border.

> 'The clinical dispatch of Farrell, McCann and Savage a week ago bore the classic hallmarks of an SAS operation. It now looks as if the three terrorists' death warrants were signed the moment the decision was made to send in the SAS.'

Farrell and Savage walked in front with McCann trailing behind. Here the watchers in cars would have lost them, as the street becomes one-way only. From Main Street they took the short cut under the arches of the former fortress in Casemates Square, now a hostel for Mor-occan workers, and through the pedestri-ans-only tunnel leading to Winston Churchill Avenue, the road to the bor-der. By the time they rejoined the main road, the SAS team was in position.

Peti Celicia, a housewife watching from her bedroom window, noticed the smartly dressed couple walking along the pavement opposite by the petrol station.

Momentarily she turned away, only to hear the first shot ring out. 'When I looked round I saw the man falling and the woman already on the ground. There were five or six shots, very quick. A man was standing over them firing down. I never heard any shouting.'

At the same time, motor mechanic Derek Luise was sitting in his Audi car at the traffic lights 30 yards from the petrol station.

Just before the shooting a police car in the queue behind him switched on its siren and pulled across to the wrong side of the road, overtaking him. As it passed he heard shots and saw two men in jeans and casual jackets firing pistols at a cou-ple on the pavement from a range of about 4 ft.

'There was blood everywhere. My brother and I laughed because we thought it was just a film. There was no shouting, just shots, about five or eight, one after the other.'

Seconds later he heard more shots from around the corner, where, out of sight, McCann was being shot.

Yet another man watched from his window in the block of flats behind the petrol station. 'I looked down as soon as I heard the first shot,' he said. 'I saw a man falling to the ground and another man shooting at him . . . When I looked again, two men were walking along the pavement, putting guns into a blue and white bag along with a jacket and what I thought was a passport.

'They walked to the end of the barrier in the middle of the road, went round and started walking faster and faster and other men came running . A policeman had got out of a police car on the other side of the road and jumped across the barrier. The two men got into the back of a white car pointing towards town and were driven off. "They're getting away, the killers are getting away," I thought.'

The action was swift, economical — according to the witnesses, fewer than a dozen shots fired within a matter of sec-onds — and deadly.

So who did sign the 'death warrant'? The decision to send in the SAS was taken with the approval of Mrs Thatcher, acting on information channelled through the Cabinet's Joint Intelligence Commit-tee. A large number of government agen-cies were involved. They included the Foreign Office, Ministry of Defence and Northern Ireland Office. MI5 and MI6, who operate in Northern Ireland, liaised with the Spanish authorities through the British Embassy in Madrid.

The SAS is committed only when there is hard intelligence of a terrorist operation. Usually it is for mounting an ambush, and a successful ambush in mili-tary terms is one in which all the enemy are killed. Hence the sinister nickname of Special Assassination Squad for the SAS in Northern Ireland.

Last Sunday the men of the SAS did precisely what they were trained to do. The enemy was killed — and there were no prisoners.

B66/5/1A.

THE GUARDIAN
Saturday March 12 1988

Police seek to retrieve newspaper's document

Sarah Boseley

SCOTLAND Yard yesterday asked a judge in chambers to order the Independent newspaper to give up a classified document that officers believe it is holding, in order to establish whether there has been a breach of the Official Secrets Act.

This is thought to be the first time that officers have attempted to use the courts against a newspaper to obtain evidence of a security breach before any arrest or charge has been made.

The document was a draft report, part of it apparently confidential, circulated at a recent meeting of the Trevi group, whose members are the interior ministers of European Community nations.

Their officials meet regularly with security specialists to discuss ways of fighting terrorism and crime.

Sections of the report were contributed by different countries. It is the British section, which apparently included details of some of the IRA's operational methods and targets, with which Scotland Yard is concerned.

The information that the Independent might possess a classified document came from a Home Office official after a conversation with one of its journalists.

A police officer admitted during the hearing that an article published in the the newspaper which referred to the document did not infringe the Official Secrets Act.

Special Branch officers served notice on the Independent that they were seeking an order from the judge, Mr Justice Owen, sitting in chambers at the Old Bailey, only an hour and a half before the hearing was due to take place,

The notice of application for production of a manuscript under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act described the document as one "referred to by your employee Sarah Helm in her conversation . . . with Mr C. Walters of the Home Office."

As a result of this conversation with a Home Office official two days earlier, the police had called at the newspaper office and asked to see the document. Mr Andreas Whittam-Smith, the editor of the Independent, said: "I refused because to do so might compromise our sources."

Yesterday's hearing was adjourned, probably until early next week, to give all parties time to prepare their cases.

Mr Whittam-Smith said the paper would want to know how the Official Secrets Act could relate to a document obtained outside the United Kingdom and which is in the possession of all member countries of the Trevi group.

The Government is understood not to be enthusiastic about the proposals from the West German government in the report which would involve collating and sharing data on terrorists throughout the European community.

The British are known to prefer to deal with one country at a time.

B66/5/1A

THE GUARDIAN
Tuesday March 8 1988

Howe says car left by terrorists did not hold bomb

Gibraltar

David Rose

THE car driven and left in Gibraltar by one of three IRA members shot dead on Sunday did not contain a bomb, the Foreign Secretary, **Sir Geoffrey Howe**, told the Commons yesterday.

The two men and a woman had been challenged by security forces at the border and "made movements which led the military personnel operating in support of the Gibraltar police to conclude that their own lives and the lives of others were under threat," Sir Geoffrey said.

"In the light of this response they were shot dead. Those killed were subsequently found not to be carrying arms."

The Foreign Secretary was making a statement in response to a private notice question from **Mr George Robertson,** Labour's foreign affairs spokesman. Sir Geoffrey said that two of those shot had criminal records for terrorist activity, and that the IRA had subsequently admitted that all three were members of an active service unit.

His statement was supported by MPs on both sides of the House. Mr Robertson congratulated the security forces, saying that the incident demonstrated the "cynical outrage of the IRA, who apologised after Enniskillen". The only lesson to be drawn was that "these people must be dealt with".

Sir Geoffrey said that a fourth suspect, who had been under surveillance by the Spanish authorities, recently crossed into Gibraltar and was thought to have carried out a "reconnaissance for an act of terrorism". His activity had led the security forces to believe that an attack was being planned on the guard-mounting ceremony, which takes place every Tuesday. The police were placed on high alert, and the commissioner asked for military support.

Shortly before 1pm on Sunday, Sir Geoffrey said, one of the men brought a car into Gibraltar and left it near the bandstand used for the ceremony. Before leaving it, he was seen to make adjustments to the vehicle, and an hour-and-a-half later the remaining two entered Gibraltar and joined the first man.

Sir Geoffrey said: "Their presence and actions near the car gave rise to strong suspicion that it contained a bomb, which appeared to be corroborated by a rapid technical examination of the car."

Walking back to the border at about 3.30pm they were challenged and shot. "The parked car was subsequently dealt with by a military bomb disposal team. It has now been established that it did not contain an explosive device."

Sir Geoffrey added: "Inquiries carried out by the Spanish authorities have matched keys found on one of the bodies with a car found on the Spanish side of the border which contained an alias set of passports, and items of equipment including electrical tape, wire and an alarm clock. Keys have also been found to a third car: the search is continuing for this car and for explosives."

An inquest would be held in Gibraltar, Sir Geoffrey said.

The suspect car had been parked adjacent to a school and an old people's home, and had a bomb exploded, not only the 50 soldiers involved in the parade but a large number of civilians could have been killed, Sir Geoffrey said. "It is estimated that casualties could have run into three figures. There is no doubt whatever that by these means a dreadful terrorist act has been prevented."

He was sure that the House would share his relief and extend its gratitude to the Spanish authorities.

Mr Robertson put a series of questions to the Foreign Secretary. Could he be sure that all those involved in the conspiracy had been shot? Was protection being arranged for other targets in Europe? Was there evidence of links between the terrorists and Libya or the Basque terrorist group Eta? Could he confirm the involvement of the Metropolitan Police special branch?

Sir Geoffrey replied that besides the fourth suspect mentioned in his statement, he could not be sure that other conspirators did not remain at large. No expense would be spared on security in Europe, and while he could not comment on possible links with the active service unit, Mr Robertson would know of evidence of Libyan links with the IRA that had surfaced in the past.

Mr David Alton (SLD, Mossley Hill) asked if there was any connection between the Gibraltar group and the transport of Sam-7 missiles which were in use by the IRA in Ireland. Sir Geoffrey declined to comment.

Mr Eric Heffer (Lab. Liverpool Walton) raised the only dissenting voice. He said he condemned terrorism of every kind, but asked if Sir Geoffrey could explain why three people, although on active service, had been killed "when they didn't have guns and didn't plant a bomb?

"How will this help the fight against terrorism? Won't this help terrorism?"

Sir Geoffrey replied that it was "difficult to see how the security services could have acted other than they did".

FROM CONF BULL 1988/5.

CLAS: UNCLASSIFIED SECURE 29 FEBRUARY 1988

B66/5/1A.

FROM: OTTAWA

TO : WELLINGTON 00376-ROUTINE

AVIATION SECURITY: INSTRUMENT TO SUPPRESS ACTS OF VIOLENCE

SUMMARY

THE MONTREAL CONFERENCE HAS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED ITS WORK WITH ADOPTION AND OPENING FOR SIGNATURE OF A PROTOCOL, SUPPLEMENTARY TO THE 1971 MONTREAL CONVENTION, FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF UNLAWFUL ACTS OF VIOLENCE AT AIRPORTS SERVING INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION.

2 THE PROTOCOL, ADOPTED BY CONSENSUS, FOLLOWS CLOSELY THE TEXT PREPARED AT LAST YEAR'S SESSION OF THE ICAO LEGAL COMMITTEE. ITS KEY FEATURE IS THE EXTENSION OF THE ''PROSECUTE OR EXTRADITE'' RULE, DEVELOPED IN CONNECTION WITH EARLIER ANTI-TERRORIST INSTRUMENTS, TO COVER ACTS OF VIOLENCE COMMITTED AT AIRPORTS THEREBY ENSURING THAT THOSE WHO COMMIT SUCH ACTS HAVE NO SAFE HAVEN.

3 IN ADDITION, THE CONFERENCE ADOPTED (AGAIN BY CONSENSUS) AS PART OF ITS FINAL ACT A RESOLUTION DEALING WITH MEASURES TO PREVENT ACTS OF VIOLENCE AT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORTS.

REPORT

4 AFTER ELECTION OF CHAIRMAN OF CONFERENCE (KIRSCH OF CANADA), A GENERAL DEBATE WAS HELD DURING WHICH ALL DELEGATIONS REITERATED THEIR CONDEMNATION OF TERRORISM IN GENERAL AND AT AIRPOR IN PARTICULAR. STRONG SUPPORT WAS EXPRESSED FOR THE EXISTING ANTI-TERRORISM CONVENTIONS (AND FOR THE FORTHCOMING ROME IMO CONFERENCE). AT SAME TIME, THERE WAS BROAD AGREEMENT THAT THESE CONVENTIONS NEEDED TO BE SUPPLEMENTED BY SPECIFIC PROVISIONS DEALIN WITH AIRPORTS. IT WAS THE CLEAR PREFERENCE OF MOST DELEGATIONS THAT THESE ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS BE IN THE FORM OF A SUPPLEMENTARY PROTOCOL TO THE MONTREAL CONVENTION AND NOT A SEPARATE CONVENTION.

5 ACCORDINGLY, THE DECISION WAS TAKEN THAT THE INSTRUMENT WOULD BE IN THE FORM OF A PROTOCOL. DETAILED DISCUSSION FOLLOWED, IRED BY OATES
OF THE UK, ON A VARIETY OF KEY ISSUES.

PARAGRAPH 1 BIS

6 THE PROTOCOL ADDS A NEW PARAGRAPH 1 BIS TO ARTICLE 1 OF THE MONTREAL CONVENTION. THIS PARAGRAPH SETS OUT THE SCOPE AND DEFINITION OF THE NEW OFFENCE INVOLVING ACTS OF VIOLENCE AT INTERN IONAL AIRPORTS. THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE DEBATE ON A NUMBER OF ASPECTS OF THIS PARA.

A THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT IT WAS BETTER NOT TO DEFINE AN ''AIRPORT SERVING INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION'' IN ORDER TO PRESERVE FLEXIBILITY AND TO LEAVE THIS TO BE DETERMINED AS A MATTER OF FACT IN DOMESTIC COURTS. EQUALLY, THERE IS NO DEFINITION OF THE PHRASE ''FACILITIES OF AN AIRPORT''. THIS LEAVES STATES FREE TO DEFINE TERM TO INCLUDE CERTAIN OFF-AIRPORT FACILITIES SUCH AS NAVIGATIONAL AIDS.

B VIRTUALLY ALL DELEGATIONS SUPPORTED SOVIET PROPOSAL TO INCLUDE WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE OFFENCE ACTS COMMITTED AGAINST ''AIRCRAFT NOT IN SERVICE'' LOCATED AT AN AIRPORT. THIS FILLS ONE OF THE OBVIOUS GAPS IN THE MONTREAL CONVENTION.

IT RESULTED, HOWEVER, IN EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION AS TO WHETHER THE JURISDICTION PROVISION IN THE DRAFT PROTOCOL SHOULD CONSEQUENTLY BE EXPANDED SO THAT STATES OTHER THAN THE ''TERRIROTIRAL STATE'' (EG THE STATE OF REGISTRATION OF THE AIRCRAFT NOT IN SERVICE) WOULD BE ENTITLED TO REQUEST THE EXTRADITION OF AN OFFENDER. A VARIETY OF PROPOSALS WERE MADE INCLUDING ONE TO GO BEYOND EVEN THE HEADS OF JURISDICTION IN ARTICLE 5 OF THE MONTREAL CONVENTION (AND EXTEND JURISDICTIO TO THE STATE OF NATIONALITY OF THE VICTIM AND OFFENDER). IN THE END, IT WAS DECIDED TO KEEP TO THE LEGAL COMMITTEE'S TEXT AND LIMIT JURISDICTION IN RELATION TO THE PROTOCOL'S OFFENCES TO THE STATE IN WHICH OFFENCE WAS COMMITTED.

C PERHAPS THE WIDEST DISAGREEMENT OVER PARA 1 BIS CENTRED ON WHETHER ''THREATS'' TO COMMIT THE SUBSTANTIVE OFFENCE SHOULD BE INCLUDED. MANY OF THE LATINS WANTED THREATS INCLUDED AS DID AUSTRALIA, THE NORDICS AND SEVERAL ASIAN AND MIDDLE EASTERN DELEGATIONS, ON BASIS THAT THREATS CAN SERIOUSLY IMPAIR SAFETY AT AIRPORTS. STRONGEST OPPONENTS WERE FRANCE, JAPAN, UK AND US ALL OF WHOM THOUGHT THA PARA 1 BIS SHOULD BE RESTRICTED TO OFFENCES CONSTITUTING ACTUAL ACTS OF VIOLENCE: A THREAT WAS NOT A SERIOUS ENOUGH OFFENCE TO WARRANT BEING MADE AN INTERNATIONAL CRIME. THE LATTER VIEW WON OUT AND ACCORDINGLY THE PROTOCOL COVERS ATTEMPT TO COMMIT THE SUBSTANTIVE OFFENCES BUT NOT THREATS TO DO SO.

D AS PART OF THE DEFINITION OF THE OFFENCE, PARA 1 BIS REFERS TO AN ACT OF VIOLENCE ''USING ANY DEVICE, SUBSTANCE OR WEAPON''. THIS REFERENCE TO THE MEANS USED TO COMMIT THE OFFENCE WAS INTRODUCED INTO THE LEGAL COMMITTEE'S TEXT BY THE DUTCH. SOME DELEGATIONS ARGUED THAT MEANS USED WERE IRRELEVANT AND THEY WISHED TO INSERT ''OR BY ANY OTHER MEANS'' AFTER ABOVE ENUMERATION TO ENSURE THAT NO LOOPHOLES WERE LEFT. THOSE SUPPORTING RETENTION OF REFERENCE TO ''DEVICE, SUBSTANCE OR WEAPON'' ALONE ARGUED THAT IT ONLY RULED OUT ACTIONS WITH BARE HANDS AND ENSURED THAT THE PROTOCOL WOULD APPLY ONLY TO INDISCRIMINATE ACTS OF A SERIOUS NATURE TYPICAL OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. AS WITH OTHER ISSUES, THE LEGAL COMMITTEE'S TEXT WAS RETAINED.

E PARA 1 BIS IS LIMITED IN SCOPE TO THOSE OFFENCES WHICH ENDANGER OR ARE LIKELY TO ENDANGER ''SAFETY AT THAT AIRPORT''. IT IS THIS ''QUALIFIER'' WHICH IS SEEN LARGELY AS INTRODUCING THE ''TERRORIST'' DIMENSION TO THE CRIMES COVERED AND WARRANTING THEIR LIFTING OUT OF THE PURELY DOMESTIC SPHERE.

MOST COUNTRIES SUPPORTED THE QUALIFIER AS DRAFTED BY THE LEGAL COMMITTEE AND OPPOSED A UK SUGGESTION TO INTRODUCE A FURTHER ELEMENT OF INTENTION (INTENDING THE <u>CONSEQUENCES</u> OF THE OFFENCE) WHICH WAS AIMED - THE UK SAID - AT ENSURING THAT ACTS OF HOOLIGANISM WERE NOT COVERED.

<u>JURISDICTION AND EXTRADITION</u>

7 DURING DEBATE ON JURISDICTION REFERRED TO IN (B) ABOVE, THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION ON A PRIORITY LISTING OF THE STATES ENTITLED TO EXERCISE JURISDICTION. MOST COUNTRIES REJECTED THIS PROPOSAL (WHICH WAS IN ANY EVENT IRRELEVANT AFTER THE DECISION TO INCLUDE ONLY THE TERRITORIAL STATE) AND REJECTED TOO THE INTRODUCTION (LARGELY A SOVIET SUGGESTION) OF ANY SYSTEM OF PREFERENCE AS BETWEEN PROSECUTION AND EXTRADITION. THE TEXT OF THE PROTOCOL MAINTAINS, THEREFORE, THE DELICATE BALANCE BETWEEN PROSECUTION AND EXTRADITION ESTABLISHED IN THE MONTREAL AND OTHER CONVENTIONS.

<u>FINAL PROVISIONS</u>

A QUESTION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MONTREAL CONVENTION AND THE PROTOCOL WAS DISCUSSED. THE EASTERN EUROPEANS THOUGHT THERE SHOULD BE NO NECESSARY LINK BETWEEN THE TWO AND FAVOURED FINAL PROVISIONS WHICH WOULD ENABLE STATES NOT PARTY

TO THE CONVENTION TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PROTOCOL. THE CLEAR MAJORITY VIEW, HOWEVER, WAS THAT THIS WOULD UNDERMINE THE MONTREAL CONVENTION AND BE CONTRARY TO ICAO POLICY TO ENCOURAGE UNIVERSAL PARTICIPATION IN IT. ACCORDINGLY, THE FINAL PROVISION AS ADOPTED MAKE IT CLEAR THAT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO BECOME PARTY TO THE PROTOCOL WITHOUT FIRST BEING OR BECOMING PARTY TO THE CONVENTION.

B THE TRIPLE DEPOSITARY FORMULA OF THE MONTREAL CONVENTION HAS BEEN RETAINED - IN ITS EXACT TERMS - BUT WITH THE ADDITION OF ICAO AS ANOTHER (OPTIONAL) DEPOSITARY. THERE WAS FIRST, HOWEVER, AN EXTENDED DEBATE AS TO WHETHER IT WAS NOW TIME TO MODIFY THE WORDING PREVIOUSLY USED SO THAT IT REFLECTED ACTUAL PRACTICE (THAT IS, TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT STATES MAY DEPOSIT THEIR INSTRUMENTS IN EITHER LONDON, MOSCOW OR WASHINGTON) RATHER THAN PERPETUATING APPARENT REQUIREM TO DEPOSIT INSTRUMENTS IN ALL THREE PLACES. SOME SMALLER STATES FAVOURED THE CHANGE: LARGER ONES WERE WORRIED ABOUT ITS EFFECT ON INTERPRETATION OF EXISTING TREATIES. IN THE EVENT, THE CUSTOMARY WORDING WAS INCLUDED ON UNDERSTANDING (READ INTO THE RECORD) THAT STANDARD PRACTICE WOULD APPLY. JAMAICAN (NON-LAWYE DELEGAT MADE A BITING REFERENCE TO ''A ROOM FULL OF LAWYERS''.

PREVENTIVE MEASURES

9 USSR HAD PROPOSED THAT THE PROTOCOL INCLUDE PROVISIONS CONTAINING SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS FOR STATES IN PREVENTING THE OCCURRENCE OF ACTS OF VIOLENCE AT AIRPORTS. VERY FEW DELEGATIONS SUPPORTED THIS, MOST STATING THAT ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION ALREADY DELAT WITH THE MATTER IN A GENERAL WAY AND THAT DETAILED TECHNICAL PREVENTIVE MEASURES SHOULD RATHER REMAIN WITHIN THE AMBIT OF ANNEX 17 TO CHICAGO CONVENTION. SO SOVIETS HAD TO SETTLE FOR A RESOLUTION (INCLUDED IN THE FINAL ACT) COUCHED IN VERY GENERA TERMS. IT URGES TATES TO TAKE ALL POSSIBLE MEASURES TO PREVENT ACTS OF VIOLENCE, REQUESTS ICAO COUNCIL TO CONTINUE TO ATTACH TOP PRIORITY TO THE ADOPTION OF AFFECTIVE MEASURES AND CALLS ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO CONSIDER INCREASING TECHNICAL, FINANCIAL AND MATERIAL ASSISTANCE TO ENABLE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TO IMPROVE SECURITY MEASURES AT AIRPORTS.

CONCLUSION

10 MOST DELEGATIONS ARE WELL SATISFIED WITH THE OUTCOME OF THE CONFERENCE ALTHOUGH A LITTLE SURPRISED AT EXTENT TO WHICH THE PROTOCOL THEY HAVE ADOPTED FOLLOWS THE LEGAL COMMITTEE'S TEXT. THIS IS PARTLY DUE TO TIGHT CONTROL EXERCISED BY CANADIAN CHAIRMAN WHO GAVE DELEGATIONS AS LITTLE SCOPE FOR UNRAVELLING THE EXISTING TEXT AS POSSIBLE AND PARTLY DUE, PERHAPS, TO THE RELATIVELY UNPOLITICISED NATURE AND TRADITIONS OF ICAO.

11 THE KENYAN VICE-CHAIRMAN NOTED THAT ACCORDING TO HIS RESEARCH THIS WAS ONE OF THE VERY RARE ANTI-TERRORIST INSTRUMENTS TO BE ADOPTED BY CONSENSUS. CHAIRMAN IN HIS CLOSING ADDRESS INDICATED THAT IT WAS THE FIRST INSTRUMENT RELATING TO SAFETY OF INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION TO BE ADOPTED WITHOUT A VOTE. THIS WIDE MEASURE OF SUPPORT WAS FURTHER REFLECTED IN FACT THAT ON OPENING DAY FOR SIGNATURE, 24 FEBRUARY, 46 COUNTRIES (FOR INFORMATION OF POSTS, NOT NZ) SIGNED THE PROTOCOL.

12 THE GOOD ATMOSPHERE AT CONFERENCE PREVAILED DESPITE A REASONABLY HEATED EXCHANGE BETWEEN THE ROK AND DPRK DURING THE GENERAL DEBATE ON KAL FLIGHT 858. SOME OTHER DELEGATIONS REFERRED TO THAT ACT OF TERRORISM IN THEIR INTRODUCTORY STATEMENTS (AND US, UK AND JAPAN SPELT OUT THEIR AGREEMENT WITH ROK'S VIEWS AS TO THE RESPONSIBILITY OF DPRK). NEITHER WE, NOR CANADIANS OR AUSTRALIANS, REFERRED TO THE INCIDENT BUT ROK HEAD OF DELEGATION (VICE-MINISTER PARK) SOUGHT US OUT TO THANK US FOR THE MINISTER'S STATEMENT OF 27 JANUARY.

LONDON PRESS SERVICE

Verbatim Service

B6615/1A

VERBATIM SERVICE VS/016/88 WEDNESDAY 17 FEBRUARY 1988

PRODUCED BY LONDON PRESS SERVICE, CENTRAL OFFICE OF INFORMATION

PREVENTION OF TERRORISM

Following is an edited transcript of a speech by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Mr Douglas Hurd, at a debate in the House of Commons on Tuesday 16 February 1988 on renewal of the Prevention of Terrorism Act.

Mr Douglas Hurd: I beg to move that the draft Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984 (Continuance) Order 1988 which was laid before the House on 25 January, be approved. The effect of the order will be to renew the 1984 Act for a further 12 months from 22 March.

The House will want to discuss several aspects of the Order. But the main message should be clear enough. There is still a sombre threat of terrorism hanging over the citizens of this country including Northern Ireland, that arises not just out of the affairs of Northern Ireland but from the Middle East and the sub-continent. Our defences against that threat must not be weakened.

In Northern Ireland in 1987, 83 people were killed by Republican or Protestant paramilitary groups. The bomb outrage at Enniskillen on Remembrance Sunday is still vivid in our minds. On the mainland in 1987 we thankfully had no successful attacks stemming from Irish republican extremism. However, I have no doubt that the Provisional IRA continues to wish and to plan further death and destruction among us. We must remain totally vigilant to defend ourselves against this threat.

We cannot ignore the threat which comes from terrorist organisations.... The original Act did not cover international terrorism at all, but the world has changed for the worse since then. DUring 1987 there were six murders in Great Britain which the police attribute to international terrorism., those who died were three members of an Indian religious group at a service, two opponents of the Khomeini regime, and a Palestinian Journalist.

The prevention of Terrorism Act itself expires in March next year. Against the background that I have sketched we need to consider what should take the place of this Act when it expires. It is right that I should say something about that this evening.

In April last year, I asked my noble and learned Friend Lord

Colville of Culross, who conducted an independent review of the operation of the Act in 1986 to widen his net in 1987 and consider in greater depth the effectiveness of the legislation. His report was published in a White Paper in December. His scrutiny of the operation of the Act last year, which he concluded in January this year, was made available to Parliament on 8 February. I should like to express my gratitude and, I belive the gratitude of the House, for the effort and care that Lord Colville has devoted to these reports. He has taken a great deal of care to visit the ports and to consult many individuals and organisations who have an interest in the legislation.

I come immediately to what is undoubtedly Lord Colville's central recommendation. He says that he accepts the continuing need for legislation against terrorism. It would be foolish, he says, to pretend that terrorism in some form will not threaten lives and property in western countries for the foreseeable future, so he recommends that what he describes as the core controls enshrined in the legislation should no longer be subject to annual renewal, but should be enacted into fully permanent legislation, albeit with a continuation of the existing system of annual reviews.

We accept that the problem of terrorism in one form or another is not going to go away. We have to protect ourselves from terrorism from many sources. It is not just a matter of Irish terrorism, as the statistics show. None of the six deaths that occurred last year in Great Britain as a result of terrorist acts was the result of Irish terrorism.

We accept entirely the need for continuing legislation designed to prevent acts of terrorism in this country, but after careful reflection we do not believe that it would be right to interrupt the process by which Parliament is asked to take a positive decision each year to renew the provisions.

The BBC report today was inaccurate on one crucial point. In its hurry to get the story early the BBC got it wrong. We propose to return to the arrangement that existed when the Labour Government introduced the 1976 Act. That is to say, the new Act that we shall propose will have no limit on its time span. It will not expire after five years, like the current 1984 Act under which this order is made. But the powers in the Act will have to be renewed each year. That is the arrangement that the Government of which the Right Honourable Member (Mr Hattersley) was a member introduced in 1976, and in the light of experience we intend to return to it. I am sure with the support of the Labour party. Moreover, the powers will be renewable in whole or in part, and there is a good reason for that. Lord Colville suggested that the powers that relate especially to Irish terrorism - proscription and exclusion - should remain on a temporary basis.

By retaining the requirement for annual renewal in whole or in part, we meet that point by making it possible to drop any provisions that no longer appear necessary. Because of the exceptional nature of the powers contained in the Act, it is right that its operation should be scrutinised by an independent person, as the 1984 Act has been, and that arrangement too will continue.

I would like to deal with two points that I have heard made in the past 24 hours. There is nothing in the criticisms that have been

voiced about timing. One cannot insist on annual debates and then complain about timing when the time for the annual debate comes round. The Order had to be debated at this time, and obviously the House requires that the Minister sets out his future intentions in the debate.

There is a more fundamental point. The people of Northern Ireland suffer more from terrorism than any of the rest of us. It is overwhelmingly in their interest, in that of the citizens of the Republic, and in that of all Irish men and women living this side of the water, that terrorism should be checked and then crushed. It is inevitable that the powers needed for that purpose should occasionally bear on innocent people, causing delay, inconvenience and controversy. But the powers are not aimed at those innocent people., they are aimed at their oppressors - the terrorists.

Lord Colville points out - and I remember vividly from my time as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland - the resentment that use of these powers can produce. I would be delighted if they could be removed, but safety is the key word. While they exist, they must be carefully and intelligently used, and we must take every opportunity to prove - as we can - that they are there for the protection and not the oppression of the citizen.

We intend, in replacing the current Act, to implement Lord Colville's recommendation that the principal port powers, which are now in the order and the comparable Northern Ireland order, should be incorporated into primary legislation. Powers given to the police at ports - notably on examination and detention - are important, and like similar ones in the Immigration Act 1971, we now think that they deserve full consideration by Parliament and a place on the face of the Act.

We have considered Lord Colville's recommendation that the police powers at ports should be extended to cover ports handling traffic outside the common travel area. Those ports are covered by controls provided by the Immigration Act 1971, and we are not at present convinced that there is a case for extending police powers at those ports.

The House will have noticed Lord Colville's endorsement of the value of the powers in the prevention of terrorism legislation for the arrest and detention, for up to seven days if necessary, of people suspected of involvement in terrorist acts. In England and Wales, detention in police custody is subject to procedures laid down in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act and the codes of practice issued under it. Some of the requirements apply, with modifications, to detentions under the Prevention of Terrorism Act., others are expressly disapplied.

I see force in the changes proposed by Lord Colville to bring procedures for those detained under the Prevention of Terrorism Act closer to those detained under ordinary police powers, as long as the police investigation is not jeopardised, and we are examining the feasibility of that.

When Lord Colville's report was published before Christmas, my honourable Friend the Under - Secretary announced straight away that we could not accept the recommendation that the power of exclusion should be abolished. We thought hard about that but did not believe

it would be helpful to the House or anyone else for there to be any uncertainty on our views. Now is not the right time to give up that power. It is used sparingly, I look at every application with care and I refused, in the past year, three applications for orders from the police. I made 17 orders in respect of people who had previously been excluded, but 19 orders were not replaced when they expired. The total of exclusion orders in force at the end of 1987 was 111 in Great Britain and 23 in Northern Ireland, which is a slight rise on the previous year.

I dislike the idea of the use of Executive power to inhibit free movement of a person within his own country. I believe that other honourable Members, if confronted, case by case, with the information that is put in front of me as to the activities and intentions of these individuals, would agree with me that the restrictions placed on their freedom of movement is justified to save lives, which is what the use of the power is about.

Under section 10 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, it is an offence to make available, to invite others to do so, or to receive, funds to be used in connection with Northern Irish terrorism.

Lord Colville believes that the section could be useful in relation to international terrorism because there is evidence of fund raising by international terrorist groups in this country, to purchase arms and explosives. This is difficult. We agree with Lord Colville that it is wrong that contributions could be made in this country to international terrorist organisations and not be caught by our anti-terrorism legislation, and we are considering his proposals carefully.

We have some further work to do, but, in principle, the points I have outlined will be incorporated in the Bill which we shall introduce to replace the present Act when it expires in 1989. We mean to acccept a number of other useful recommdendations made by Lord Colville. They will be drawn to the attention of the police in a circular of guidance.

We are debating tonight the continuance for one more year of the powers in the present Act. It would be a great strength if the House could unite behind this proposal - and a great shame if it could not....

Let us look at the figures in Lord Colville's report. Anyone who doubts that we need the Act should be convinced by 27 charges of murder in Northern Ireland last year alone, some connected with the deaths of members of the security forces. But I agree with the honourable Member for Nottingham, North (Mr Allen) that figures, however convincing, do not convey the complete picture. I can give the House some deails which are no longer subject to the restraint of prejudicing court procedures.

The conviction late last year of a leading member of the International Sikh Youth Federation, who had organised some shooting of prominent moderate Sikhs in Great Britain, shows the extent of the threat against the Sikh community in this country and the value of the prevention of terrorism legislation. That man - that murderer - had been detained under section 12 of the Act after his fingerprints had been found in a car thought to have been used in the attacks, on a plastic bag used to contain a shotgun used in one

of the attacks. Without the length of detention possible under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, and the opportunities that that gave for further inquiries, examination of his correspondence and further questioning, it might well have not been possible to bring that man to justice.

Lord Colville described in his report the long and complex investigation in Scotland regarding firearms and explosives apparently destined for use by a Loyalist para military group in Northern Ireland, which culminated in the conviction of six men on firearms charges. Those men were arrested under the PTA during 1986, but their trial took place in 1987. The simultaneous investigations required by the police in several other areas could not have not taken place successfully unless the powers in the PTA had been used. That is another example to demonstrate that those exceptional powers are necessary to bring would-be terrorists to justice.

It is impossible to test the value of the Act simply by the charges brought. Last year, I noted how the Act had been used in 1986 to forestall - that is the key word - terrorism by a group of the Abu Nidhal gang, whom I deported. This year, a man suspected of working for the Libyan Govt as an intelligence officer was likewise deported. Without the powers in the Act, it would have been impossible to arrest and deport that man.

To save lives and protect our citizens, I ask the House to give its wholehearted support to the continuation of the powers in the Prevention of Terrorism Act. The reports by Lord Colville should be a reassurance that those powers are not abused or over-used. They are exercised carefully and conscientiously, with regard to the impact on the liberty and rights of the individual. We are clear that those powers must continue to remain throughout the United Kingdom if we are to conduct and succeed in a serious and sustained fight against terrorism.

END

VS/016/88

New Zealand High Commission

New Zealand House
Haymarket
London SW1Y 4TQ
Telephone 01-930 8422
Telex 24368

"YELLOW"

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(2)

Reference:
B66/5/1A

17 February 1988

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.
(DLO EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA)

c.c. DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
POLICE (PTIU)
DEFENCE (DDI DOT)

TERRORISM

Please refer to our memorandum B66/5/1A of 10 December 1987.

2. The Home Secretary, Douglas Hurd, announced yesterday that the "Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act" of 1984 is to be made permanent, although its powers are to be reviewed by Parliament annually, as at present.

3. A selection of relevant newspaper reporting of the decision, which follows the recommendation of Lord Colville's review of the operation of Act published last December, is attached for your information.

cl cl

S.W. Prior,
for High Commissioner.

Long history of 'temporary' Act

Both Houses of Parliament will be asked tonight to approve motions on the Prevention of Terrorism Act. After the Stalker-Sampson reports and the subsequent deterioration in Anglo-Irish relations, the debates are expected to reflect increased concern about the balance between civil liberties and the fight against terrorism.

By Anthony Bevins
Political Editor

THE INTENSE political controversy created by the Prevention of Terrorism Act is increased with every IRA outrage.

It is argued by the Government that Labour, by voting against annual renewal of the Act's provisions, is giving indirect comfort to the terrorists. But Labour has argued in recent years that the legislation creates so much antipathy in Northern Ireland that it builds up sympathy for the IRA cause.

The existing "temporary provisions" go back to the Birmingham pub bombings of 1974. Roy Jenkins, then Labour Home Secretary, told the Commons that the temporary legislation was both Draconian and "unprecedented in peacetime", but that the powers were 'fully justified to meet the clear and present danger".

The Birmingham bombings took place on 21 November; the Act was given Royal Assent seven days later.

Under the terms of the legislation, the IRA (and later INLA) was proscribed; exclusion orders were introduced, allowing the Home Secretary to bar individuals from either the United Kingdom or, in the case of people from Ulster, from Great Britain; the police were given wider powers of detention and arrest; and the police were also allowed to carry out security checks on all travellers entering and leaving Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

The powers of the initial Act had to be renewed every six months by affirmative resolution of both Houses of Parliament. But the Act was replaced by a new law in 1976, which had to be renewed every year. That Act was, in turn, repealed and re-enacted in 1984, with legislation which was designed to expire after five years.

Tonight's debate is therefore the final annual renewal by both Houses, and the present Act will expire on 21 March 1989.

In a review report published in December, Viscount Colville of Culross recommended that the 1984 Act should be replaced by permanent legislation, with powers which would not have to be renewed annually by Parliament.

He said that the new Act should be based on police powers to carry out checks on, arrest and detain suspected terrorists, but that exclusion orders — which have been criticised as a form of internal exile — and the offence of withholding information about terrorism should be abolished.

Douglas Hogg, Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the Home Office, announced when the Colville report was published that "it would not be wise to discontinue" the exclusion powers.

Last year, 19 exclusion orders were made against people in connection with Northern Irish terrorism, the highest figure since 1978-79, and at the end of last year a total of 112 were barred from entry into Great Britain from Northern Ireland.



Hogg: "It would not be wise" to end exclusion powers.

Of the 225 people detained under the Act last year, only 12 per cent were charged, and 176 — about 80 per cent — were not charged, excluded, deported or removed. And since the new Act came into force, in March 1984, 238 people have been examined at port of entry for more than an hour, but were not detained.

The Conservative Party's official Campaign Guide for last year's election said: "In June 1985, the Act enabled the police to prevent an IRA bombing campaign of British resorts, and to bring charges in connection with the Brighton bombing of 1984.

"In June 1986, the leaders of the Provisional IRA murder gang were sent to prison for life."

Irish attacks on arrest powers

By David McKittrick
Ireland Correspondent

THE PREVENTION of Terrorism Act will face a major international test later this year when the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg considers its seven-day detention provision.

The European Commission of Human Rights, has already ruled that seven days is too long. Finding in favour of four Northern Ireland men who had been arrested in Ulster under the Act, the Commission concluded that the Act was in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights.

Its opinion indicated that detentions of five days or more represented an unacceptable infringement of rights. The Government has contested this.

The case was the latest in a series of Irish complaints, which date back to the Act's introduction, that its provisions are unnecessarily draconian. Most of the complaints have come from nationalist sources, but there has also been Unionist resentment about the Act's "internal exile" provisions. Unionists argue that if a suspected terrorist is now allowed to live in Britain, then he is equally unfit to live in Ulster.

Within Northern Ireland the Act has taken over from the Emergency Provisions Act as the main arresting power used by the security forces. Each year more than one thousand people are detained under it.

Nationalist criticism has concentrated on the use of the Act in Britain, with the Irish government and Irish groups in England repeatedly complaining about its operation. One central criticism is that the Act gives the police enormous power, which they have used not only to question suspects but to gather low-level intelligence on the Irish community in general.

The critics cite the fact that while more than one million people have been stopped under the Act, fewer than two hundred have been convicted of an offence under it. It is acknowledged that both the exclusion and detention powers have been used more sparingly in recent years, but the Act's opponents say its use is still disruptive and causes considerable resentment.

In a number of cases Irish ministers have been held at airports, leading to diplomatic complaints.

One argument is that, because the police are said to pick up Irishmen without reasonable suspicion that a crime had been committed, a great many innocent people are alienated from the authorities. Irish groups in Britain complain that people held under the Act can, in the words of an Irish writer, suffer considerable social injury — "loss of reputation, loss of employment, domestic disturbance and community stigma."

THE GUARDIAN
Tuesday February 16 1988

Anti-terrorist move set to fan Irish row

David Hearst
and Peter Murtagh

THE Prevention of Terrorism Act, renewed annually amid acrimonious debate between government and Opposition MPs, is to be made permanent, the Home Secretary, Mr Douglas Hurd, is expected to announce today when the Act, brought in by Labour in 1974, is due to be debated in the Commons.

The Home Office said last night that Mr Hurd was "likely to be making an announcement". In December, Lord Colville examined the working of the Act and suggested it be made permanent.

The announcement will fuel the anger already generated between Britain and Ireland which has lead Ireland to halt all extradition proceedings to Britain and Northern Ireland in a dispute with Sir Patrick Mayhew, the Attorney General, about the presentation of warrants under the Republic's new extradition law.

It became clear yesterday that at least five warrants from Britain have been shelved by the Irish attorney general, Mr John Murray, since the Extradition (Amendment) Act came into force on December 10.

Irish ministers raised the extradition issue last week when they met the Northern Ireland Secretary, Mr Tom King, and it will complicate today's resumed meeting of the Anglo-Irish conference in Belfast, when Mr King will deliver the formal British response to Irish anxiety over the Stalker affair.

The Prevention of Terrorism Act allows for detention without charge for up to seven days. It was designed after the Birmingham bombs to deal primarily with terrorism emanating from Northern Ireland.

In recent years, Labour has opposed renewing the Act and the decision to make the law permanent — in effect removing guaranteed parliamentary debate every year — is also likely to infuriate the Dublin government, which was aparently unaware of the decision.

The timing of Mr Hurd's announcement, on the day that Mr King is to respond to Irish demands for the recommendation of the Stalker-Sampson report that 11 RUC officers should be prosecuted, is insensitive.

Senior Irish ministers have been angered by the recent lack of consultation despite an undertaking in the Anglo-Irish Agreement that Britain would consult on matters affecting confidence in the administration of justice in Northern Ireland.

The deputy leader of the Social Democratic and Labour Party, Mr Seamus Mallon, said that making the Act permanent would be devastating to Anglo-Irish relations.

He said: "The behaviour of the British government has been astoundingly aggressive, showing no understanding whatsoever for the sensitivities of Irish people. It's hard to believe that all of these things are co-incidential."

The extraditions Sir Patrick sought have been halted because of a British failure to meet the two preconditions which were agreed before December 10 as a compromise after Britain refused to set up three-judge instead of single-judge Diplock Courts to try terrorists in Northern Ireland.

Sir Patrick has sent a note with each warrant saying he intends to prosecute, but he has baulked at sending even a summary of the evidence, which could be then be challenged.

THE GUARDIAN
Wednesday February 17 1988

Temporary Act that looks here to stay

Stretching the law

David Hearst in Belfast

NO ACT passed by Westminster in the last 15 years has caused more controversy in Britain and Ireland than the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1974. Passed in the aftermath of the Birmingham bombings which killed 21 people, it was described by Roy Jenkins, then Home Secretary, as draconian and the label has stuck.

Since 1974 a total of 7,645 people have been detained under the act in Northern Ireland for periods of between one hour and one week. A further 2,975 have been detained in Great Britain since 1979, the Home Office said yesterday. The sweep of the legislation goes considerably wider than that, however. According to the latest available annual report of the Chief Inspector of Constabulary, a total of 59,481 were stopped and searched at British ports in 1986 for periods of less than one hour.

These are cases where port officers request searches of police records through the National Joint Unit. They are not officially classed as detentions under the Act but they are inextricably part of the Special Branch trawl for information that has become the central feature of PTA practice. Over 4,000 more searches were made at ports in 1986 than the year before, and there is no reason to suppose that that trend has not continued in 1987.

With up to 200 tons of battlefield weapons from Libya stored away in bunkers for the IRA in the Republic (including RPG-7 rocket launchers, general purpose machine-guns, AK-47 assault rifles and Semtex high explosive) the security forces in Northern Ireland argue that the PTA powers have never been needed. If the Irish Republic is horrified that the PTA will be made permanent, they argue, they only have to stop and think what would have happened in Dublin if Loyalist paramilitaries had successed in two major explosives and arms import operations planned from Scotland and the Middle East via a Scottish port in the last two years.

Of the three major reviews carried out on the Act since 1974, that conducted last year by Lord Colville QC was the only one that recommended that the temporary provisions, previously renewable every year for a fixed term of up to five years, should be enshrined in permanent legislation.

Lord Colville's reasoning was straightforward: the PTA should be permanent because terrorism, particularly international terrorism, was not going to disappear. He found there was no substitute in ordinary criminal law for the power to arrest on reasonable suspicion of terrorist activities, therefore the PTA was here to stay.

However Lord Colville, a former representative on the United Nations Human Rights Commission, found the Act's exclusion orders (which give the Government power effectively to deport people from and to Northern Ireland) unacceptable and recommended that they should be scrapped. He said they divided families and could make it difficult for reformed terrorists to get away from former associates.

There are 23 exclusion orders current in Northern Ireland and 112 in Great Britain. Lord Colville said that at the very least exclusion orders should not be made permanent. The Home Office rejected this finding.

Nevertheless, police in Britain and Northern Ireland exercise those powers at a cost. Only 33 per cent of those arrested under the PTA in Northern Ireland have been charged while in Britain it is only 8. per cent.

Mr Seamus Mallon, deputy leader of the Social Democratic and Labour Party, argues that the effect of the police's unlimited powers of stop and search on Irish nationalists is to convince them they have no constitutional role to play in the British state.

"The powers of exclusion, detention, search and arrest which exist under the PTA are draconian laws indeed and to make them permanent is to break with any attempt to instil normality in Ireland," he says.

"The Anglo-Irish Agreement is an attempt to find a political solution to the Irish problem. This appears to be going along the lines of a quasi-militarist solution based on bad law. It will not work; it has not worked; and it will play into the hands of the IRA."

Hurd confirms new terror act

John Carvel and Joe Joyce

THE Home Secretary, Mr Douglas Hurd, in a speech last night that appeared designed more to allay the fears of the Irish Cabinet than to convince a British audience, announced government plans to turn the Prevention of Terrorism Act from a temporary into a permanent law.

He stressed there would still be an annual review and called on all parties to support the legislation "to save lives and protect our citizens".

Mr Hurd told MPs: 'After careful reflection we do not believe that it would be right to interrupt the process by which Parliament is asked to take a positive decision each year." The Government proposed to return to the arrangement which existed when Labour introduced the measure in 1976.

The new act would have no limit on its time span, but its powers would have to be reviewed each year.

Mr Hurd rejected criticism voiced in Ireland about making the announcement at a time when Anglo-Irish relations were strained.

He said the renewal order had to be debated at this time of year. The vote renewing the act was passed by 261 to 162 and the new bill will be introduced in the autumn.

Mr Hurd placed emphasis on the need to combat international terrorism rather than its specifically Irish dimension.

Mr Hurd's announcement in the Commons at 11pm last night, provoked protests because an announcement had been made earlier to the Lords by Lord Ferrers, and there were repeated protests from the Unionist leader, Mr James Molyneux, and other Northern Ireland MPs that the Irish Government had been told about the change before the House of Commons.

The Northern Ireland Secretary, Mr Tom King, told the Irish Justice Minister, Mr Gerry Collins, of the change at a meeting in Belfast yesterday of the Anglo-Irish conference. Details had been leaked and Mr Collins arrived at Stormont already expressing his anger that his Government had no forewarning.

In the Commons last night the Labour deputy leader, Mr Roy Hattersley, condemned the perpetuation of a "draconian" law which had allowed the arrest for up to seven days of 103 people last year, only 10 of whom had been charged.

If the Government had wanted to prejudice Anglo-Irish relations over the last few months, it could not have behaved differently, Mr Hattersley said.

He cited its refusal to prosecute after the Stalker report, its behaviour over extradition and now the announcement about the terrorism act.

"It is a docile, a supine, indeed a craven House of Commons which is prepared to accept such a reduction in civil liberties on the unsubstantiated word of a minister alone," Mr Hattersley said.

Britain's intention to make the act permanent caused shock and dismay in Dublin and prompted Irish politicians to wonder if Britain was deliberately trying to damage the Anglo-Irish agreement.

There will be a Dail debate on Anglo-Irish relations today, which was foreshadowed by the Irish opposition leader, Mr Alan Dukes. He described the decision as "an unnecessary provocation".

People, page 2
Rearguard action, page 2
Leader comment, page 18
Stretching the law, page 19

THE GUARDIAN Wednesday February 17 1988

Extract from Press Statements No 1 - 2.2.88

B66/5/1.A.

MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

27 January 1988

BOMBING OF KAL FLIGHT 858

Foreign Affairs Minister, Russell Marshall, said today that on the evidence available, North Korea has carried out an act of wanton terrorism.

He was referring to the findings of an investigation by the Republic of Korea Government into the destruction of Korean Airlines (KAL) flight 858 on 29 November 1987, with the loss of 115 lives.

The primary finding was that a bomb had been planted on the aircraft by North Korean agents, one of whom is now helping the Republic of Korea with its investigation.

"New Zealand deplores all terrorism. The evidence that this was an act of terrorism is very persuasive, and as such it deserves the condemnation of the whole international community.

"The bombing has serious implications for all countries, including New Zealand. With the 1988 Olympic Games being held in the Republic of Korea, there will be more New Zealanders than usual flying on KAL aircraft. Threatening their safety and trying to disrupt the Games will not help North Korea to achieve the improved relationship with New Zealand that it has long claimed to be seeking."

"North Korea has committed acts of state terrorism before," said Mr Marshall. "This latest action is part of a pattern that includes the bombing of a war memorial in Rangoon in 1983 which left many South Korean ministers and officials dead. These horrendous acts are futile and only add to North Korea's isolation. Civilised countries have no choice be to condemn them in the strongest terms, and to call on North Korea to desist immediately."

Mr Marshall extended New Zealand's sympathy to the Republic of Korea and to the families and friends of victims.

"Their heartbreak is compounded by the evidence that this was a deliberate act."

B66/5/1A.

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CHIPS

LD : SFA (LGL UNC SPA)
SUBJ: TERRORISM : HOSTAGES CONVENTION : NEW ZEALAND LOBBYING
YOU WILL RECALL FROM OUR 652 (OF 16 JUNE 1987) THAT WE HAD VOLUNTEERED, AT THE LAST MEETING OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF STATES PARTIES TO THE HOSTAGES CONVENTION, TO APPROACH MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE (WITH JAPAN) TO ENCOURAGE THEIR ACCESSION TO THE HOSTAGES CONVENTION. THAT WAS IN ADDITION TO OUR LOBBYING EFFORTS WITH PACIFIC ISLAND STATES.
2 THE FRG MISSION HAS NOW CALLED ANOTHER MEETING FOR THURSDAY 21 JANUARY IN NEW YORK. GRATEFUL IF PACIFIC POSTS (APIA, HONIARA, PORT MORESBY, SUVA AND VILA), AS WELL AS KUALA LUMPUR AND SINGAPORE, COULD ADVISE RESPONSE OF DEMARCHES IN ADVANCE OF THAT MEETING.
3 WE ASSUME VILA WILL HAVE BACKGROUND INFORMATION FROM HONIARA.
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FAX FOR DESPATCH

Page 1 of 1

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B66/5/1A

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PMO

HAO ISLAND: VISIT BY FRENCH SENATE MISSION

Our cable of today's date refers.

¤ Une mission sénatoriale de la commission des Affaires culturelles séjournera en Polynésie française du 5 au 11 février prochain; elle se rendra ultérieurement en Nlle Calédonie et en Australie. Elle a pour mission d'étudier la mise en place de l'Université du Pacifique-sud ainsi que l'enseignement et la diffusion de la langue française. Cette mission, présidée par M. Paul Seramy, sénateur de Seine-et-Marne (Union Centriste), vice-président de la Commission des Affaires culturelles, est composée de MM. Jacques Pelletier, ancien ministre, sénateur de l'Aisne, Président du groupe de la gauche démocratique; Roland Ruet, sénateur de l'Ain, membre de l'Union des Républicains et Indépendants; Jacques Berard, sénateur du Vaucluse, membre du groupe RPR; Paul Loridant, sénateur de l'Essonne, membre du groupe socialiste. Une seconde mission sénatoriale, mandatée par la commission des affaires étrangères, de la défense et des forces armées se rendra en Polynésie française du 4 au 11 mars (voir USPS N°19). Elle sera composée de M. Roger Poudonson, président de la délégation, ancien ministre (Union Centriste); MM. Michel Alloncle Sénateur de Charente, membre du groupe RPR; Michel Caldaguès, sénateur de Paris, membre du groupe RPR; Charles-Henri de Cossé-Brissac, sénateur de Loire Atlantique, membre de l'Union des Républicains et Indépendants; Max Lejeune, sénateur de la Somme, ancien ministre, membre de la Gauche Démocratique; Gérard Gaud, sénateur de la Drôme, membre du groupe socialiste. M. Rotig, administrateur du sénat et le Capitaine de Vaisseau Clochard accompagneront la mission sénatoriale qui se rendra les 8, 9 et 10 mars prochain à Hao, Moruroa, et Fangataufa.

02/02/88 13:49 NO.029 001

B66/5/1A

Exclusive: Ex-priest is Libya-IRA link to Gadaffi

BRITISH intelligence sources believe a defrocked Irish Catholic priest, Patrick Ryan, may have arranged the transfer of at least 200 tons of arms and ammunition, including deadly Sam 7 missiles, to the IRA from Libya.

The IRA is now believed to have the massive armoury, including heavy machineguns, RPG-7 rocket-propelled grenades and modern automatic weapons, in the Irish Republic. If those weapons reach Northern Ireland they could significantly alter the course of the terrorist war. Border security has been stepped up to prevent them reaching the province. IRA sources claim some of the RPG-7s are already in Belfast.

by James Adams, Defence Correspondent


Ryan, 58, was ordained in 1954. He worked as a missionary in Africa and then as a priest in London in the late 1960s. His IRA involvement began around this time and he became a key figure for the organisation in Europe, operating bank accounts in Switzerland and Luxemburg, acting as a courier for funds and buying arms. Ryan also went to Tripoli several times, meeting Colonel Gadaffi and organising cash and arms shipments.

To other priests Ryan boasted of his support for IRA terrorism. Eventually, he was defrocked in 1973.

He continued his travels around Europe until the British circulated his name to European police forces. He was arrested and expelled from several countries but nobody had enough evidence to hold him. He dropped out of sight in the late 1970s.

Now, with a new identity, Ryan is thought to be part of a small IRA cell that has arranged four arms shipments to the IRA since 1984. A fifth, of 15 tons of arms on the freighter Eksund, was intercepted in November by the French police, acting on information from the British.

Continued on page 3



Gun-running suspect: former priest Patrick Ryan

IRA link to the IRA

CONTINUED FROM P. 1

tically because it is a just cause". In fact, Gadaffi has had little to do with the IRA until recently. In the early 1970s, he supplied more than £2m cash to the IRA and five tons of arms from Libya were intercepted on board the Claudia in 1973. Relations then cooled as Gadaffi became disenchanted with the IRA.

All that changed with the siege of the Libyan People's Bureau in London when WPC Yvonne Fletcher was killed, and diplomatic relations between Britain and Libya were severed.

British counter-terrorist experts believe Gadaffi then reopened links with the IRA and the first arms shipments were arranged. The relationship was cemented after Britain's support for the US raid on Tripoli in April 1986.

To counter the new threat, Ulster's security forces have been reorganised, the army has adopted new tactics, and an intensive intelligence effort has been launched to find the arms.

The flow of arms from Libya has given the IRA a new and much needed source of modern arms to replace the previous pipeline from the United States.

By far the most deadly of the arms supplied by Gadaffi is the Sam-7 missile. The IRA are believed to have 12 of the shoulder-fired ground-to-air missile which travels at around 1,000mph with a range of about two miles. Its infrared heat-seeking missile is particularly effective against helicopters, on which the British army relies for reconnaissance and resupply of vulnerable army and police posts.

For at least 10 years the IRA has made strenuous efforts to buy a Sam system in the US but every attempt has been stopped by the FBI and British intelligence.

Intelligence sources say there is some doubt that the IRA have the expertise to use the missiles. Two men are required to fire them and operators require some training. It is not thought that Gadaffi has sent instructors to the Republic or provided training facilities in Libya.

But, as a precaution, army and RAF helicopters in Ulster have been fitted with anti-missile systems including chaff dispensers and jammers. The security forces have also introduced tactics that will make it more difficult for the IRA to hit the helicopters.

Last week, Tom King, the Ulster secretary, warned that the province "could be the object of an international terror drive supported by the Libyan government". He announced that security along the border would be increased with a third army brigade to control all operations in the area. Defence ministry sources claim this reorganisation had been planned for some time but the timing of the announcement was directly related to the Libyan arms.

BG615/1A

DJBL

SCWP

21 December 1987

Mr & Mrs R A Bristow
16, Castle Drive
Summer-Hayes
WILLENHALL
W. Midlands
WV12 4QY

Dear Mr and Mrs Bristow

Thank you for your letter commenting on recent developments in the Rainbow Warrior affair. We shall ensure that your letter is passed on to the Prime Minister's Office.

Thank you for your good wishes.

Yours sincerely

R.A. FARRELL

(R A Farrell)
Acting High Commissioner

Thursday.
17.TH.
December
1987.

MR. & MRS. R. A. BRISTOW
16, CASTLE DRIVE
SUMMER-HAYES
WILLENHALL
W. MIDLANDS WV12 4QY
ENGLAND, U.K. TEL. 68957

Wolverhampton.

your excellency.

Dear Sir.

My wife & myself wish to give your Government, And your Prime Minister MR David Large our 100% full support.. And. stare his anger over the french flying Major Alain Mafart from the Pacific isle of Hao.

Withatthe Permission of your Government. And Without the Permission of your Prime Minister. MR David Large,

This was a breach of trust as well as the United Nations. ruling last year.

The Explosion of the Greenpeace ship Rainbow Warrior in 1985.

Was a act of Terrorism the same as any I.R.A. outrage here in Britain,

The french have used the lovely South Pacific as a Nuclear Dustbin for far to long.

I feel that the french cannot be trusted at all.

Every one I know did Not want the common Market, OR Britain to be in it at all,

Know we are getting the channel Tunnel, To france.

Otlear.

see 2.

MR. & MRS. R. A. BRISTOW
16, CASTLE DRIVE
SUMMER-HAYES
WILLENHALL
W. MIDLANDS WV12 4QY
ENGLAND, U.K. TEL. 68957

IF Major Alain Mafart was ill a New-Zealand Doctor or Hospital would have been better?

What has Paris got that New-Zealand etc as not?

Paris is the other side of the world. Crazy? Maybe not? But he is a Terrorist under the french flag.

A Secret service Saboteur or a Terrorist,

His crime was Murder also the crime of the french Government.

Why should New-Zegland be treated so bad by the french?

yes we blame it the Anger of your Prime Minister MR. David Lange.

And we wish MR Lange yourself. Your Goverment. And all the people of New-Zealand. A very happy Christmas. And a happy Happy New Year in 1988.

Please give MR. David Lange our support and best wishes. in New Zealand.

May God bless New-Zealand. Goverment and people.

With very best wishes.

Bobe Julie. God bless.

yours faithfully.
MR. Robert. A. Bristow.
Mrs R. A. Bristow.

MR. & MRS. R. A. BRISTOW
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17 December 1987

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs
Wellington

The Director of Security
NZSIS
Attn: Co-ordinator TIC

The Commissioner of Police
Attn: O/C PTIU

The Secretary of Defence
Attn: DOT, DDI

The Co-ordinator DESC
12th Floor Freyberg Building
Ministry of Defence

The Director
External Intelligence Bureau
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

NEW ZEALAND
LONDON
- 4 JAN 1988
CENTRAL REGISTRY
HIGH COMMISSION

SWP

cc: London
Ottawa
Canberra

COUNTER-TERRORISM : STRATEGY AND TACTICS

We attach for addressee's information a copy of a paper entitled "Counter-terrorism : Strategy and Tactics", which formed the text of an address by L. Paul Bremer III, Ambassador at Large for Counter-terrorism, before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Tampa, Florida on 4 November.

(E Halliday)
for Ambassador

Attach.

L. Paul Bremer, III

Current
Policy
No. 1023

Counterterrorism: Strategy and Tactics

United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Following is an address by L. Paul Bremer, III, Ambassador at Large for Counter-Terrorism, before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Tampa, Florida, November 4, 1987.

It's a pleasure for me to appear before such a distinguished group. You have done much to promote public understanding of the foreign policy issues facing our country, and you are to be commended for your efforts.

A recent Roper poll asked Americans to name topics on which they wished the government to take action. Terrorism was named more often than nuclear arms reductions or Middle East peace. It has become the number one foreign policy issue for many Americans.

Clearly, the people are demanding action. And in the finest American tradition, they want action right now. Today I want to describe how our government is responding to the terrorist threat.

Dealing With Terrorism Is a Long-Term Problem

In spite of the impression that many of us have, terrorism is not something new. Yes, within the past 20 years we have experienced many different kinds of terrorism, and we have seen terrorism live and in color in our living rooms. But terrorism has been around for centuries.

The group whose name gives us our word for assassin arose in Persia about 900 years ago and later flourished in Syria. The Assassins recognized that a tiny group of men prepared to die during their attack could paralyze a larger foe and that the fear of such attacks could give them power beyond their size.

During the Napoleonic wars, partisan forces pushed carts laden with explosives into the ranks of soldiers, causing significant damage. By the late 19th century, the telegraph, newspapers, and rising literacy led Russian anarchists to recognize the shock value of violence. They referred to their terrorist attacks as "propaganda by the deed."

Given the persistence of terrorism over centuries, it is unreasonable to think we can eliminate it. But we can, and must, take vigorous action to limit terrorism. And the signs are that, after an initial period of uncertainty, the West is finally getting its antiterrorist act together.

1970s: On the Defensive

When modern terrorism burst on the scene 20 years ago, the international community, especially in the United Nations, reacted in a befuddled fashion. The West lacked a strategy and was on the defensive against both domestic and international terrorism.

There are a number of reasons for this passivity.

- Many of the world's nations had recently emerged from colonialism; in some cases, they considered terrorists as fellow revolutionaries who would soon join them in the community of nations.
- The Vietnam war increased anti-American sentiment around the world and led to an intellectual environment in which anti-U.S. activism was easier to justify.
- In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the prevailing political and intellectual climate in many Western countries promoted an extraordinary tolerance of violent political action. This allowed terrorists to demand and receive public attention not just for their acts but for their "causes." Terrorist acts—including kidnaping, kneecapping, and murder—acquired an aura of romance and adventure.
- In the Middle East, Israel's stunning success in a preemptive strike in response to threats of war by Egypt, Syria, and Jordan altered the perception of Israel as a microstate struggling against the odds. It also shattered the hopes, nourished by some Palestinians, that the front-line Arab states would destroy Israel and, by military force, create a Palestinian state.
- Finally, the tremendous growth in air travel and television in the 1960s gave terrorists increased mobility, more vulnerable targets, and a readymade worldwide audience for the acts.

The West Develops a Counterterrorist Strategy

By the end of the 1970s, the outrage at terrorist acts slowly began to turn the tide of opinion in the West. In-

creasingly people realized that nothing justified what they were seeing.

Perhaps more than anything, the ever-expanding circle of targets for terrorist attack brought about change. People and governments began to realize that terrorists could and would attack anyone, including erstwhile sympathizers. Here in America, the taking of our Tehran embassy catalyzed public opinion and led to demands for effective government action.

As a result of these changes, the West began to develop a clear, overall strategy to deal with terrorism and the supporting tactics necessary to implement that strategy. Action on two levels was needed: the development of political will to counter terrorism and the allocation of more resources to the fight.

Political Vision and Political Will

We must avoid the temptation of taking the total elimination of terrorism as our goal. We can no more eradicate terrorism than we can eradicate crime.

The West's strategic objective must be to reduce terrorism to a level at which it no longer dominates world policy. We can achieve this objective with a firm, concerted counterterrorism effort sustained over 5–7 years. How? By making the general political, economic, and psychological climate in which terrorists operate more hostile. The targets of any counterterrorist measure, therefore, are not particular terrorists or groups but the community of nations and the overall political environment.

The key element in developing a counterterrorist strategy is the development of political vision and the political will to carry out the fight. And to nurture the development of political will, the West had to change the whole dynamic of the international discussion of terrorism. We had to get away from the defensive, muddled reaction to terrorist violence of the early 1970s and reassert, clearly and decisively, democracy's willingness to fight terrorism. We had to shift the public debate on terrorism from understanding "root causes" to condemning the crimes terrorists commit.

Specific Measures

The West has adopted a number of specific measures to pursue our strategic objective. For example, until recently, the international political environment made it relatively easy for terror-supporting states like Libya, Syria, and Iran to operate against the West. A major element of our counterterrorism policy, therefore, is to put pressure on states that support terrorism. If the West can make it clear that supporting terrorists is unacceptable international behavior, then terrorists will be denied important financial, military, and other support from state supporters.

Another important measure we have developed in our overall strategy is applying the rule of law to terrorists. Terrorists are criminals. They commit criminal actions like murder, kidnaping, and arson, and countries have laws to punish criminals. So a major element of our strategy has been to delegitimize terrorists, to get society to see them for what they are—criminals—and to use democracy's most potent tool, the rule of law, against them.

A third measure is expanded international discussion of terrorism. The United States has made terrorism an important issue in our overall bilateral relations, including with the Soviet Union, and in multilateral forums like the United Nations. By repeatedly pressing the issue with non-Western nations, we seek a truly global front against terrorism.

Counterterrorist Measures Succeeding

These counterterrorist measures are beginning to succeed. In a major show of collective political will last year, the nations of Western Europe took a series of concerted actions to close down Libya's terrorist infrastructure of embassies, "businessmen," and "students." These actions, combined with the U.S. military strike against terrorist facilities in Libya, led to a decline in Libyan-supported terrorism. Indeed, we have detected Libyan involvement in only five terrorist incidents in 1987. Qadhafi no longer openly brags about his use of terrorism. Most important, the political environment was shifted. The Europeans at long last had taken decisive action against a terrorist state. That was a major breakthrough in the development of a Western counterterrorist strategy.

In a similar way, last November, we and the European Community (EC) imposed sanctions on Syria after Syrian officials were proven to have supported specific terrorist operations. These steps were possible only because the countries of Europe had set the pattern of responding to state terrorism with their earlier measures against Libya. Again, the political environment had shifted. Again, we had success. Syria in June expelled Abu Nidal, a notorious Palestinian terrorist.

As a result of concerted Western pressures, terrorists are finding it harder to get refuge and overt support. The Abu Nidal Organization was expelled from Iraq in 1983 and from Syria in 1987. In Eastern Europe, efforts have been made to disrupt a network of enterprises of the Abu Nidal Organization. Newspaper stories about the terrorist links of a Syrian family named Qassar, notorious for arms trafficking with terrorists, have led to action against them by several European countries in 1987, notably in Spain where they maintained a political headquarters in Marbella.

Moreover, during the past decade, the West has elaborated an international legal structure grounded in bilateral and multilateral agreements to extradite or prosecute terrorists for their crimes. The first steps in an international legal framework were taken in the early 1970s with the Hague convention on airline hijacking. Since then, further agreements have been reached in Montreal and at summit meetings of the seven leading industrialized nations in Tokyo, Bonn, and Venice.

In spite of Lenin's insistence that the revolutionary must never abandon terrorism, the Soviet Union now says that it opposes "all terrorism." While the Soviet definition of terrorism can be convoluted from our point of view, they have specifically condemned some recent acts of terrorism, including the Pan American Flight 073 takeover in Karachi and a grenade attack last year on Israeli soldiers near the Western Wall in Jerusalem. And the Soviets have played a helpful role in drafting new counterterrorist conventions on maritime and airport safety.

Finally, where earlier attempts to cope with terrorism in the United Nations deteriorated into endless apologies for terrorists, in 1985 and 1986 the United Nations passed important resolutions condemning terrorism and hostage-taking.

So we have made a real start this decade in changing the overall environment in which the terrorists must act. Responsible countries have joined a new consensus against terror and have taken concrete steps.

No one of these measures by itself will solve the problem or reduce terrorism to a tolerable level. However, these and other measures, relentlessly pursued over time, will achieve our strategic objective.

Development of Tactics: More Resources

Just as the West had to fortify its collective political will before it could develop a coherent counterterrorist strategy, so it had to dedicate greatly increased resources to antiterrorism before our tactics could succeed. The strategy demands will; the tactics demand money.

Our tactical objective is to confound and thwart terrorists—to reduce their options and make their operations more complicated and perilous.

For the most part, antiterrorist tactics are measures that better protect the most likely targets from terrorist attacks. How do they work? In much the same way as you protect your home from burglars. Putting heavy dead-bolt locks on your doors, a bar on sliding glass doors, and keeping a dog or installing a burglar alarm will not stop a truly professional thief willing to run substantial risks. But each of them reduces the likelihood of a break-in at your home. Taken together, they can achieve your purpose—protecting your property, lowering your insurance rates, and increasing your peace of mind.

In contrast to counterterrorist measures, antiterrorist steps are largely defensive in nature and can be unilateral or taken in concert with others. The difference, if I may extend my analogy, is between stronger locks and an aggressive policy of pursuing and jailing burglars.

More Resources Contribute to Success

One of the most important developments in the 1980s has been the public outrage throughout the world with terrorist violence. This strong public reaction has pressured politicians to make more money available to the antiterrorist fight here and abroad. These new resources form the hard core of our revitalized antiterrorist tactics.

Not surprisingly, the police and intelligence agencies first dedicated these new resources to the fight against domestic terrorists. So not surprisingly, the first successes of antiterrorist measures were seen at home. In Italy, anger at the kidnaping and murder of Aldo Moro led to actions which shattered the old Red Brigades. In Germany, the Baader-Meinhof gang was broken through aggressive intelligence collection and vigorous law enforcement. The same has happened in French efforts to counter *Action Directe* and in Belgium with the Fighting Communist Cells. Just 2 weeks ago, Spanish and French officials, acting together, dealt an important blow to the Spanish terrorist group ETA [Basque Fatherland and Freedom].

As nations developed better tactics for dealing with their homegrown terrorists, they have recently turned their attention to international cooperation. For example, the countries of the European Community have established the so-called Trevi Group made up of ministers of justice and interior. The Trevi Group has considerably expanded police and intelligence cooperation among the 12 EC members. For example, the ministers now regularly produce an agreed assessment of the terrorist threat facing the EC countries. And they have developed a mechanism to exchange specific information on the movements and operating methods of terrorists. INTERPOL [International Criminal Police Organization], which had resisted dealing with terrorism because of its political overtones, finally began coordinating information on terrorism in 1985 at U.S. request. Our FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], for instance, can now notify the INTERPOL secretariat of arrest warrants we have out on terrorists. INTERPOL then sends the names by alert to all of its member countries.

Specific antiterrorist measures developed by the West include:

- Near universal screening of all airline passengers for metallic objects, so that terrorists can no longer stroll aboard a flight with a pistol or bomb in their pockets;
- Tighter security at diplomatic installations so that an attack on an embassy is likely to require the attackers to absorb casualties, thereby making an attack less likely;
- "Watch lists" of terrorists for border police to stop terrorists entering countries; and
- Measures to sow dissension within terrorist groups through black and gray covert operations.

Tactical Measures Succeeding

As we have had success in developing and implementing a counterterrorist strategy, now our tactical measures are showing signs of working.

Take, for example, the question of air travel. Over the past 15 years, the international community has developed an extensive set of antiterrorist, defensive measures to protect air travelers. Before these steps, there were 18–20 hijackings each year, with substantial casualties and damage. Last year, there were only two hijackings—the fewest since we started recording figures 20 years ago. Similarly, there has been a significant decline in terrorist attacks on our diplomatic establishments.

The "watch lists" we have developed are in the hands of border police in many countries. Border police are becoming much more attentive to suspicious travelers, too. As a result, terrorists run considerable risks crossing international borders. In January, two Lebanese terrorists were arrested on successive days trying to smuggle explosives into Italy and Germany.

Finally, because of increased attention to antiterrorism by Western governments, terrorist groups can no longer be sure they have not been penetrated by Western intelligence agencies.

And as countries dedicate more resources to the fight against terrorism, they are catching and prosecuting increasing numbers of international terrorists.

- In London, Nezar Hindawi received a life sentence for his attempt to blow up an El Al plane.
- In Paris, Georges Ibrahim Abdallah received a life sentence for his role in the murders of a U.S. Army attache and an Israeli diplomat.
- In Germany, a Lebanese terrorist named Hamadei faces air piracy and murder charges for his role in the TWA 847 hijacking.
- In New York City, Mohammed Atta, an Abu Nidal terrorist, awaits extradition to Israel to face murder charges arising from fire bombing and machinegunning of a bus.
- In Washington, D.C., a Lebanese terrorist named Fawaz Younis awaits trial on hostage-taking charges arising from the hijacking of Jordanian Airlines Flight 401 in June 1985.
- Just 2 weeks ago in Madrid, a Palestinian terrorist was sentenced to 47 years in prison for directing the June 1986 bombing attempt against an El Al airliner.

As with the strategic steps mentioned earlier, no single tactical measure, or even group of measures, will

solve the problem. But the cumulative effect of the measures helps achieve our strategic purpose.

Conclusion

Terrorism has by no means disappeared from the world scene. It is an ancient problem that will be with us for the forseeable future as terrorists constantly revise and adapt their methods of attack.

However, newspaper headlines about spectacular terrorist attacks are gradually being replaced by brief press reports on terrorist trials. This is attributable to the important gains the West has made in recent years. We have developed a coherent strategy to reduce terrorism. With a fortified political will, we are changing the overall political environment, making it less benign to terrorism. We have succeeded in pressuring states that sponsor it, and we have strengthened the legal framework for punishing terrorists. We have also developed effective tactical measures to supplement our overall strategy, such as tightening security at obvious targets.

Our counterterrorism policy is showing signs of success. If it is pursued over time, I am confident we can usher in an era when international terrorism is no longer a dominant subject on the international agenda. ■

Published by the United States Department of State • Bureau of Public Affairs
Office of Public Communication • Editorial Division • Washington, D.C. • November 1987
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NEW ZEALAND MISSION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ONE UNITED NATIONS PLAZA
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017

16 December 1987

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs
WELLINGTON

(LGL UNC MEA)

NEW ZEALAND
LONDON
12 JAN 1988
HIGH COMMISSION

c: Geneva Canberra
Ottawa Washington
London

GENERAL ASSEMBLY : 42ND SESSION

Item 126: **Measures to Prevent International Terrorism which Endangers or Takes Innocent Human Lives or Jeopardizes Fundamental Freedoms and Study of the Underlying Causes of Those Forms of Terrorism and Acts of Violence Which Lie in Misery, Frustration, Grievance and Despair and Which Cause Some People to Sacrifice Human Lives, Including Their Own, in an Attempt to Effect Radical Changes:**

(a) **Report of the Secretary-General;**

(b) **Convening, under the Auspices of the United Nations, of an International Conference to Define Terrorism and to Differentiate it from the Struggle of Peoples for National Liberation**

In August of this year, Syria wrote to the Secretary-General (A/42/193) formally requesting the inclusion of a second item on terrorism - this one specifically calling for the convening of an international conference "to define terrorism and to differentiate it from the struggle of peoples for national liberation". After a lengthy debate in the General Committee, this request was incorporated as "sub-item" (B) within the main terrorism item. In accordance with the agreement reached in informal consultations prior to the General Committee decision, sub-item (B) was introduced in a brief, low-key fashion in one session of the Plenary (our 1354 of 20 October refers) and was then referred for substantive debate, together with "sub-item" (A), to the Sixth Committee.

2 Most Western delegations saw this year's Sixth Committee debate as a "damage-limitation" exercise. In their view, they had got as much as they could get out of the UN on terrorism at the present time in the form of Resolution 40/61. They therefore hoped for a restatement of 40/61 (in terms of its clear denunciation of terrorism) and were determined to combat the Syrian proposal. In their view, Syria's proposal ran the risk of destroying the consensus achieved at UNGA 40 and was inimical to specific efforts to combat terrorism in other fora (e.g. ICAO and IMO) by spelling out, as it would inevitably do, the very real differences that exist (e.g. between Syria and the radical non-aligned on the one hand, and moderate non-aligned and Western delegations on the other) as to exactly what is "terrorism".

3 New Zealand's position is rather more moderate than most of the West. While not supporting the Syrian proposal (which we viewed as confrontational and propagandistic in its motivation), we do not wish to reject out of hand any initiative which may result in further measures to combat terrorism. Our statement delivered during the Sixth Committee debate (copy attached) was, therefore, much less dismissive (e.g. as regards any proposal along the lines of that made some time ago by the Egyptian Government) of the possibilities of further UN action.

4 As noted in our 1489 of 2 November 1987, although some of the non-aligned echoed words of caution, it was only Western countries who clearly spoke out against the Syrian proposal during the Sixth Committee debate. On the other hand, only a number of Arab delegations could be said to support it with real enthusiasm. Other delegations (such as the Eastern Europeans) who endorsed the proposal in their statements, privately acknowledged that their support was half-hearted.

5 The debate culminated on its last day with a display of
... Middle Eastern fireworks. We are attaching (for Wellington)
a copy of the superbly crafted Israeli speech which helped
the cauldron to boil. (We are also attaching, for
... Wellington's records, copies of the statements delivered by
Syria, Australia, Canada and Sweden - on behalf of the
Nordics.)

6 Early on, right at the beginning of the Assembly, Western delegations had tabled a text - L.2 - which encapsulated their position on terrorism for the purposes of the negotiation on the draft resolution under this item. (L.2 was cosponsored by all "WEO" delegations except the US and New Zealand.) The negotiations would usually have begun toward the end of October. They were considerably delayed,

however, because the non-aligned remained locked in internal debate over the Syrian proposal and could not agree on a text to table in response to the West's. After some weeks, and under pressure of time, Zimbabwe went ahead and tabled a draft - L.7 - under its sole cosponsorship as a basis for negotiation. This was a fairly moderate text which contained no reference whatsoever to the Syrian proposal. This was inserted some days later, however - in L.7/Rev.1 - which endorsed "the principle" of convening an international conference (our 1784 of 25 November refers). This revision represented somewhat of a triumph for Syria and is certainly evidence of its single-mindedness in holding out for an endorsement of its proposal despite the fact that the overwhelming majority (so we are told) of the non-aligned did not support it. (In taking this line, Syria was immeasurably assisted by the communique issued by Non-Aligned Ministers and Heads of Delegation, who met in New York in September 1987 and who, possibly without full consideration of the terrorism issue, endorsed "in principle" the convening of a conference.)

7 Negotiations on a draft resolution proceeded, then, on the basis of L.2 and L.7/Rev.1 (the texts of both these are set out in the Sixth Committee's report to Plenary contained in document A/42/832). After long and at times quite bitter negotiation, in which a leading role for "Western" delegations was played by the United Kingdom delegate (Edwards), a compromise text emerged which contained in the view of virtually all Western delegations very satisfactory language as regards the Syrian proposal. The Secretary-General was to be requested to seek the views of member States on terrorism including on the proposal to convene a conference. (Many Western delegations regard this language - somewhat unrealistically in our view - as having "buried" the conference proposal.)

8 The price for this formulation on the conference proposal was, however, Western agreement on the inclusion of an operative paragraph on self-determination (o.p.14) which went much further than the comparable language in resolution 40/61. It is as follows:

"Considers that nothing in the present resolution could in any way prejudice the right to self-determination, freedom and independence, as derived from the Charter of the United Nations, of peoples forcibly deprived of that right referred to in the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, particularly peoples under colonial and racist regimes and foreign occupation or other forms of colonial domination, nor, in accordance

with the principles of the Charter and in conformity with the above-mentioned Declaration, the right of these peoples to struggle to this end and to seek and receive support;"

9 Western views on o.p.14 are set out in our 1813 and 1815 of 27 and 28 November. Most delegations (including New Zealand) thought that its drafting was poor but that, given its reference to the Charter and Declaration on Friendly Relations, it was not inconsistent with well-known Western positions on the non-use of force and on terrorism.

10 For a while, then, it looked as though the compromise text (tabled originally without cosponsorship as L.24) could be adopted by consensus. The West's stumbling block proved, however, to be the US. While the US referred to problems with o.p.14, it was apparent that its real concern was the position that Israel would adopt toward the draft resolution. If Israel could have been persuaded not to call for a vote, Washington's instructions would have permitted the US to go along with a consensus. The Israelis could not be persuaded (because, they said, of their objection to o.p.14 and to the fact that the proposal to convene a conference had been shelved but not killed). The resolution, now under the cosponsorship of Yugoslavia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia and Malta, was therefore put to a vote and adopted in the Sixth Committee on 1 December by 128 (NZ) - 1 ... (Israel) - 1 (US). We attach a copy of the New Zealand EOV delivered in the Sixth Committee.

11 There were some hopes that the Israelis might be prevailed upon to change their position so that L.24 could be adopted by consensus in Plenary. But again, Israel insisted on a vote and this time they managed to persuade the Americans to vote with them. The resolution was adopted by the GA on 7 December by 153 - 2 (US and Israel) - 1 (Honduras). The US position was indeed more of a shift than it appears from the record: up until the morning of the vote their instructions were, in fact, to vote yes. However, last minute phone calls to Washington (from Prime Minister Shamir) succeeded in reversing their intended change.

... 12 We attach copies of the resolution (L.24) for all addressees.

Permanent Representative

Atts

New Zealand Mission to the United Nations

GENERAL ASSEMBLY : FORTY-SECOND SESSION

Item 126 : Measures to Prevent International Terrorism Which Endangers or Takes Innocent Human Lives or Jeopardizes Fundamental Freedoms and Study of the Underlying Causes of Those Forms of Terrorism and Acts of Violence Which Lie in Misery, Frustration, Grievance and Despair and Which Cause Some People to Sacrifice Human Lives, Including Their Own, in an Attempt to Effect Radical Changes: (a) Report of the Secretary-General; (b) Convening, Under the Auspices of the United Nations, of an International Conference to Define Terrorism and to Differentiate it From the Struggle of Peoples for National Liberation

Explanation of Vote by the New Zealand Representative,
Ms Dell Higgie,
in the Sixth Committee on Tuesday 1 December

My delegation commends the efforts which have been made to try to maintain the consensus of resolution 40/61. Since consensus was not in the end achieved, my delegation has voted in favour of the resolution contained in document L.24. We welcome the fact that this body has again overwhelmingly supported a condemnation "as criminal, all acts, methods and practices of terrorism wherever and by whomever committed". Operative paragraph 1 of the text we have just adopted contains an unequivocal message that terrorism is not an acceptable means to an end.

We endorse the welcome given in operative paragraphs 9 and 10 to the efforts being undertaken in other fora to further extend the web of international conventions prohibiting specific types of terrorist activity. We look forward to a successful conclusion to these endeavours in the year ahead. In our view, operative paragraph 12 provides a practical and sensible means whereby fuller consideration can be given to the proposal referred to in preambular paragraph 18 for the convening of an international conference. This takes account of New Zealand's concern that the holding of any international conference should be properly prepared for and that, accordingly, there would be a reasonable prospect of progress.

Mr Chairman, New Zealand fully supports the right of all peoples to self-determination, as referred to in operative paragraph 14, in accordance with the principles of the Charter, and the Declaration on Friendly Relations. Nothing can take away that right. But that right must be exercised in accordance with the Charter and other relevant principles of international law. No end can justify the taking of innocent human life.

* * * *

New Zealand Mission to the United Nations

GENERAL ASSEMBLY : FORTY-SECOND SESSION

Item 126 : Measures to Prevent International Terrorism Which Endangers or Takes Innocent Human Lives or Jeopardizes Fundamental Freedoms and Study of the Underlying Causes of Those Forms of Terrorism and Acts of Violence which Lie in Misery, Frustration, Grievance and Despair and Which Cause Some People to Sacrifice Human Lives, Including Their Own, in an Attempt to Effect Radical Changes

(a) Report of the Secretary-General;

(b) Convening, Under the Auspices of the United Nations, of an International Conference to Define Terrorism and to Differentiate It from the Struggle of Peoples for National Liberation

Statement by the New Zealand Representative to the Sixth Committee, Ms Dell Higgie, on Monday 26 October 1987

When the Charter of the United Nations was adopted in 1945, the illegal use of force by one state against another, was outlawed. State violence as the Charter specifically recalls had already "brought untold sorrow to mankind". But it is also true, Mr Chairman, that that form of private violence which we call international terrorism, if carried far enough, can be as disruptive of inter-state relations as is state-organised violence. Private violence as a means of influencing issues between states must be condemned as strongly as state violence against states.

Our condemnation of private violence in the form of international terrorism is not focused simply, however, on the damage it can do to international relations. Our abhorrence of any incident of international terrorism is more fundamentally based than that: world opinion is shocked and outraged because of the direct threat which international terrorism presents to innocent human lives. And the consequence of this threat, as noted in 1972 in the original request for inscription of this item, is a "climate of fear from which no one is immune".

The New Zealand Government, like many others, maintains the view strongly that no cause however just and no goal, however worthy, can justify the terrorist in taking or risking the lives of innocent people. My Deputy Prime Minister, in a recent speech, noted that "international law establishes a clear rule that, even in wartime, it is illegal and inhumane for combatants deliberately or recklessly to use force against a civilian population. It seems to us blindingly clear that what is regarded as unacceptable conduct in war is all the more outrageous if perpetrated against an innocent and unsuspecting civilian population in time of peace". There are no ends, Mr Chairman, which can justify the means which the international terrorist employs.

The consensus attained at UNGA 40 on Resolution 40/61 was important for its endorsement of that judgement - for its condemnation of "all acts, methods and practices of terrorism wherever and by whomever committed". That condemnation sends a very clear signal to anyone involved in the export of private violence and it is, accordingly another of the important steps the United Nations has taken, in the words of the Charter, to "reaffirm ... the dignity and worth of the human person". For in the field of human rights, the right to life and security of person must have first place in anyone's scale of priorities.

I have been speaking, Mr Chairman, of violence, of fear and of a direct threat to innocent human life. We recognise in these the hallmarks of the international terrorist. Perhaps I have rather taken it for granted that we know what international terrorism is. In reading my office files relating to this topic, I came upon the report of the New Zealander who had observed the first session of the ad hoc Committee on International Terrorism. At the conclusion of the session in 1973, he had written: "The majority of countries are keen to combat international terrorism and see no need to define it first (anymore than one needs to define an elephant one sees in the street)".

Well, we could all agree, Mr Chairman, that it's not much of a task to define an elephant. But that rather lighthearted comment written virtually fifteen years ago seems to my delegation to make an important point. Then as now, there are further steps we can take and further measures we can implement in the fight to eliminate international terrorism which do not require the sitting down and working out of a comprehensive definition. That is not to say that such a definition would not be a very important step forward. A definition in the context of a comprehensive convention to cover all cases where nationals of one state proceed to another state and commit acts of terrorism is essential for

the final elimination of terrorism. And my Government, for its part, has already put forward what we would regard as an appropriate definition during the debate here in the Sixth Committee two years ago. We suggested then that "any act of force in peacetime for political ends which jeopardises innocent lives or property is terrorism".

That was our suggested definition. But it was apparent during the debate then and, for that matter during this year's debate, that there are considerable differences of view on the legal confines of the concept of terrorism as we all recognise it. This suggests that it may still not be possible to settle on the parameters of a definition. Further, it is far from clear to my delegation whether the proposal contained in A/42/193 under Agenda Item 126(B) is being put forward in connection with a proposal to develop a comprehensive convention that would ensure that the international terrorist is indeed subject to sanctions no matter who his victim or what his action. New Zealand has supported the development of such a convention since 1972. We would hope that the time will soon be approaching when the international community is able and willing to look again - perhaps at expert level - at the prospects for wider concerted action. But, Mr Chairman, even if a comprehensive convention is still regarded as too ambitious a proposal there are nonetheless, as the evidence shows, further measures we can all take. And, as I have just noted, these measures do not hinge on the adoption of any abstract definition.

The Legal Counsel in his introduction to the Secretary-General's Report under this item drew our attention to the work presently being undertaken within the International Civil Aviation Organisation and in the International Maritime Organisation. The instruments now being drafted in these two bodies, one relating to unlawful acts of violence at international airports and the other to such acts directed against ships, are the latest links in the network of agreements which we have all been building up over the last few decades: they are the latest strands in the web to ensure that there is no safe haven for the international terrorist. New Zealand welcomes the efforts undertaken by ICAO and IMO - and looks forward to the successful adoption of both instruments next year. We note with interest the useful proposal put forward by the cosponsors of draft Resolution A.C6/42/L2 in operative paragraph 9 that the Universal Postal Union and the World Tourism Organisation consider what further measures could usefully be taken within their respective competences.

But we must also strengthen the application of existing legal measures. This means increasing the number of parties

to the Conventions already adopted to combat terrorism. The request to the Secretary-General set out in operative paragraph 5 of the draft Resolution to which I have just referred is particularly useful in this regard. New Zealand joins in appealing to all states that have not yet done so to become party to these Conventions. We, for our part, are a party to all five Conventions set out in the Annex to the Secretary-General's Report. And our relevant domestic legislation ensures that we are able to fulfil scrupulously our obligations under them.

Action at the national level is, as other delegations have noted here, of great importance in establishing a framework for practical cooperation between law enforcement agencies and in order to harmonise relevant extradition laws. New Zealand is in the process of an extensive review of all its extradition law. One of the areas we are looking at closely is the way in which we can harmonise our law with that of other countries to give further support to the "prosecute or extradite" rule.

Mr Chairman, regional action has shown itself very effective in the fight against terrorism. It was in recognition of this fact that the communique issued at this year's South Pacific Forum, which meets at Heads of Government level, included for the first time a statement on terrorism: "In light of the recent attempted hijacking of an Air NZ aircraft, the Forum agreed that a regional response to terrorism was appropriate to counter this emerging threat. It decided to establish a working group to examine the issue and develop ways to enhance the capacity of the Forum states to counter terrorism and hijacking."

I understand, Mr Chairman, that when this working group meets it is likely to look at a range of practical measures, including the exchange of intelligence, effective extradition arrangements etc. It may also look at the applicability to the region of those Conventions I have already referred to.

It is perhaps in the area of current regional action, Mr Chairman, that we can see the most effective example of further legal measures which we could take which, however, do not require agreement on a definition. The European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism has, I understand, been a very effective tool in efforts to suppress international terrorism. It lists specific crimes of violence in respect of which offenders will be extradited and rules out exceptions for political reasons. Perhaps now we should consider whether it is possible to take this precedent and work for its global expansion.

There is one essential element which must underlie any of these measures, Mr Chairman, be they national, regional or international. And that is the belief in the importance of the right to life and the need therefore to eliminate violence and all its causes. It is this belief that makes Governments come together and denounce terrorism in the terms that Commonwealth Heads of Government have just done. It was that same belief that led us all to speak with one voice on this issue at UNGA 40. I would hope, Mr Chairman, that we all do so again this year.

* * * *

UNITED NATIONS

A

General Assembly

Distr.
LIMITED

A/C.6/42/L.24
30 November 1987

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Forty-second session
SIXTH COMMITTEE
Agenda item 126

MEASURES TO PREVENT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM WHICH ENDANGERS OR TAKES INNOCENT HUMAN LIVES OR JEOPARDIZES FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS AND STUDY OF THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THOSE FORMS OF TERRORISM AND ACTS OF VIOLENCE WHICH LIE IN MISERY, FRUSTRATION, GRIEVANCE AND DESPAIR AND WHICH CAUSE SOME PEOPLE TO SACRIFICE HUMAN LIVES, INCLUDING THEIR OWN, IN AN ATTEMPT TO EFFECT RADICAL CHANGES; REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL; CONVENING, UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UNITED NATIONS, OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE TO DEFINE TERRORISM AND TO DIFFERENTIATE IT FROM THE STRUGGLE OF PEOPLES FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION

Draft resolution submitted following informal consultations of the delegations concerned, subject to the understanding that the matter of co-sponsorship would be settled in the course of the 60th meeting of the Sixth Committee

Measures to prevent international terrorism which endangers or takes innocent human lives or jeopardizes fundamental freedoms and study of the underlying causes of those forms of terrorism and acts of violence which lie in misery, frustration, greivance and despair and which cause some people to sacrifice human lives, including their own, in an attempt to effect radical changes; report of the Secretary-General; convening, under the auspices of the United Nations, of an international conference to define terrorism and to differentiate it from the struggle of peoples for national liberation

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 3034 (XXVII) of 18 December 1972, 31/102 of 15 December 1976, 32/147 of 16 December 1977, 34/145 of 17 December 1979, 36/109 of 10 December 1981 and 38/130 of 19 December 1983,

Reaffirming its resolution 40/61 of 9 December 1985, adopted without a vote, and its relevance in the consideration of the question of international terrorism and in particular in the strengthening of co-operation in preventing and eliminating terrorism,

Recalling the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism contained in its report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session, 1/

Recalling also the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 2/ the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, 3/ the Definition of Aggression 4/ and relevant instruments on international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict,

Further recalling the existing international conventions relating to various aspects of the problem of international terrorism, inter alia, the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, signed at Tokyo on 14 September 1963, 5/ the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at The Hague on 16 December 1970, 6/ the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation signed at Montreal on 23 September 1971, 7/ the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, concluded at New York on 14 December 1973, 8/ the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, concluded at New York on 17 December 1979, 9/ as well as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, concluded at Vienna on 3 March 1980,

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1/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 37 (A/34/37).

2/ Resolution 2625 (XXV), annex.

3/ Resolution 2734 (XXV).

4/ Resolution 3314 (XXIV), annex.

5/ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 704, No. 10106, p. 219.

6/ Ibid., vol. 860, No. 12325, p. 106.

7/ United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, vol. 24, part one (1973), p. 268.

8/ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1035, No. 15410, p. 167.

9/ Resolution 34/146, annex.

Convinced of the importance of the observance by States of their obligations under the relevant international conventions to ensure that appropriate law-enforcement measures are taken in connection with the offenses addressed in those conventions,

Deploring the continuation of all terrorist acts, including those where States are directly or indirectly involved, that spread violence and terror, may result in loss of human lives and material damage and jeopardize the normal functioning of international relations,

Deeply disturbed by the worldwide persistence of these acts of international terrorism which can pose a threat to international peace and security, and to friendly relations among States,

Convinced of the importance of expanding and improving international co-operation among States, on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis, that will contribute to the elimination of acts of international terrorism and their underlying causes and to the prevention and elimination of this criminal scourge,

Convinced that international co-operation in combating and preventing terrorism will contribute to the strengthening of confidence among States, reduce tensions and create a better climate among them,

Reaffirming the principle of the self-determination of peoples as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations,

Reaffirming also the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of all peoples under colonial and racist régimes and other forms of alien domination and upholding the legitimacy of their struggle, in particular the struggle of national liberation movements, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter and of the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

Noting the efforts and important achievements of the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International Maritime Organization in promoting the security of international air and sea transport against acts of terrorism, consistent with General Assembly resolution 40/61,

Appealing to all States to take all appropriate steps to prevent terrorist attacks against various forms of public transport,

Urging all States to take effective measures in accordance with established principles of international law, in order that all acts, methods and practices of international terrorism may be brought to an end,

Mindful of the necessity of maintaining and safeguarding the basic rights of the individual in accordance with the relevant international human rights instruments and generally accepted international standards,

Recognizing that the effectiveness of the struggle against terrorism could be enhanced by establishing a generally agreed definition of international terrorism,

Taking into account the proposal made during the forty-second session to hold an international conference on international terrorism as referred to in agenda item 126 (b),

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General, 10/

1. Unequivocally condemns once again, as criminal, all acts, methods and practices of terrorism wherever and by whomever committed, including those which jeopardize friendly relations among States and their security;

2. Deeply deplores the loss of human lives which results from such acts of terrorism;

3. Also deplores the pernicious impact of acts of international terrorism on relations of co-operation among States, including co-operation for development;

4. Calls upon all States to fulfil their obligations under international law to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in other States, or acquiescing in activities within their territory directed towards the commission of such acts;

5. Urges all States to fulfil their obligations under international law and take effective and resolute measures for the speedy and final elimination of international terrorism and, to that end, to:

(a) Prevent the preparation and organization in their respective territories for the commission within or outside their territories of terrorist acts and subversive acts directed against other States and their citizens;

(b) Ensure the apprehension, prosecution or extradition of perpetrators of terrorist acts;

(c) Endeavour to conclude special agreements to this effect on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis;

(d) Co-operate with one another in exchanging relevant information concerning the prevention and combating of terrorism;

(e) Harmonize their domestic legislation with the existing international conventions on this subject to which they are parties;

10/ A/42/519 and Corr.1 and A/42/519/Add.1.

6. Appeals to all States that have not yet done so to consider becoming party to the international conventions relating to various aspects of international terrorism referred to in the preamble to the present resolution;

7. Urges all States not to allow any circumstances to obstruct the application of appropriate law enforcement measures provided for in the relevant conventions to which they are party to persons who commit acts of international terrorism covered by those conventions;

8. Urges all States, unilaterally and in co-operation with other States, as well as relevant United Nations organs, to contribute to the progressive elimination of the causes underlying international terrorism and to pay special attention to all situations, including colonialism, racism and situations involving mass and flagrant violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms and those involving alien domination and occupation, that may give rise to international terrorism and may endanger international peace and security;

9. Welcomes the efforts undertaken by the International Civil Aviation Organization aimed at promoting universal acceptance of and strict compliance with international air-security conventions, and its ongoing work on a new instrument for the suppression of unlawful acts of violence at airports serving international civil aviation;

10. Also welcomes the work undertaken by the International Maritime Organization on the problem of terrorism aboard or against ships, and the initiative under way to draft instruments on the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation and of fixed platforms on the continental shelf;

11. Requests the other relevant specialized agencies and intergovernmental organizations, in particular the Universal Postal Union, the World Tourism Organization and the International Atomic Energy Agency, within their respective competences, to consider what further measures can usefully be taken to combat and eliminate terrorism;

12. Requests the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States on international terrorism in all its aspects and on ways and means of combating it, including, inter alia, the convening, under the auspices of the United Nations, of an international conference to deal with international terrorism in the light of the proposal referred to in the penultimate preambular paragraph of the present resolution;

13. Further requests the Secretary-General to follow up, as appropriate, the implementation of the present resolution and to submit a report to the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session;

14. Considers that nothing in the present resolution could in any way prejudice the right to self-determination, freedom and independence, as derived from the Charter of the United Nations, of peoples forcibly deprived of that right referred to in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, particularly peoples under colonial and racist régimes and foreign occupation or other forms of colonial domination, nor, in accordance with the principles of the Charter and in conformity with the above-mentioned Declaration and other relevant United Nations resolutions, the right of these peoples to struggle to this end and to seek and receive support;

15. Decides to include the item in the provisional agenda of its forty-fourth session.

B6615/11A

SWP

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17 DEC 1987

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TO: The Rt. Hon. David Lange

MESSAGE:

Please forward

DATE: 16-12-87

FROM: Mr David McTaggart

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The Rt. Hon. David Lange
Prime Minister
Parliament Buildings
Wellington
New Zealand

BY FAX

15th December 1987

Dear Mr Lange

We note with concern reports that Major Alain Mafart, the French secret service agent who was convicted in November 1985 of manslaughter for his part in the sinking of our boat the Rainbow Warrior in July 1985, has been released from the island of Hao and is at present in Paris. We note and share your expressions of outrage and condemnation of this action.

We would like to convey our concern that this is clearly contrary to the ruling of the Secretary General of the United Nations, and the subsequent agreement between New Zealand and France implementing that decision, which requires mutual consent of both countries prior to the premature release of either prisoner.

We are concerned also that this could set a precedent for the similar release of the other convicted agent, Captain Dominique Prieur, in the near future.

We would be grateful if you could let us know what steps New Zealand intend to take to ensure that France obeys in full the terms of the decision of the Secretary General.

Yours sincerely

David McTaggart
Chairman

CC Mr Perez de Cuellar, Secretary General of the United Nations

R66/5-1/1A

8 no reply needed

8

With Compliments

DEC 1987

I imagine diplomatic courtesies would prevent you putting it quite like this — but I imagine also that / you will mind someone else having a shot at it. Season's greetings!

K.W. MOODY

1 Helmsdale Ave
Ladybridge
Bolton BL3 4NZ

Tel: 0204-63701

NEW ZEALAND
HIGH COMMISSION
CENTRAL REGISTRY
21 DEC 1987

Bolton
17 decembre 1987

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur

C'est possible, du moins presque possible, que M Mafart est malade. Tout ce qu'on peut dire veri ablement est qu'il nest pas "encore enceinte".

Cependant, celui qu'il a assassine, en obeissant a l'ordre d'un ministre du gouvernement francais, celui-la reste toujours mort.

Je trouve tres interressant le fait que les terroristes politiques officiels ne poursuivent pas leur metier seulement dans le service de l'Iran.

Veuillez agreer, Monsieur le Vicomte, l'expression de mes sentiments les moins amicaux.

NEW ZEALAND HIGH COMMISSION
THE HAYMARKET
LONDON S.W.1

New Zealand High Commission

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Telex 24368

"YELLOW"

Reference:
B66/5/1A

17 December 1987

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.
(DLO EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA)

c.c. DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
POLICE (PTIU)
DEFENCE (DDI DOT)

TERRORISM : Trevi Ministerial

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Report by Home Secretary on Trevi Ministerial meeting in Copenhagen on 9 December 1987 in written answer in Hansard of 15 December 1987.

S. W. PRIOR

S.W. Prior,
for High Commissioner.

COMMONS

Trevi Ministers

Mr. Gale: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will make a statement on the recent meeting of Trevi Ministers in Copenhagen.

Mr. Hurd: A meeting of Trevi Ministers was held in Copenhagen on 9 December under the presidency of the Danish Minister of Justice, Mr. Ninn-Hansen. We discussed developments since our previous meeting in Brussels in April including terrorist incidents in a number of member states and successes against terrorist activity. We agreed that continued co-operation between countries is the most effective way of countering terrorism and specific successes of such co-operation were reported at the meeting.

A number of initiatives launched during the United Kingdom presidency have come to fruition. The coming into operation of the secure communication system has enabled a more rapid exchange of a variety of information to take place between member states, including the exchange of details of the theft and discovery of arms and explosives—an item which had been agreed in principle at our previous meeting. I reported on a successful conference of Trevi officials held in London in November on the detection of firearms and explosives especially at airports, which enabled the participants to exchange information on research into new techniques and to assess existing techniques. We also agreed an updated assessment of the terrorist threat to Community countries.

In other areas of Trevi activity we approved a detailed agreement for developing the network of drug liaison officers outside the countries of the EC for the benefit of Community countries. This is the result of an initiative taken by the United Kingdom last year. I also reported that the conference in London in October had established an international network of co-operation to prevent and deal with football hooliganism.

B6615/1A

THE INDEPENDENT Wednesday 16 December 1987

Lange fears France may free woman agent

From David Barber
in Wellington

WITH ONE of the Rainbow Warrior saboteurs back in France, the New Zealand government is concerned that the French may be planning to repatriate his female colleague from remote Hao island in the Pacific, where both were supposed to stay for a further 17 months.

The reported comment by the French Prime Minister, Jacques Chirac, to the effect that, if Captain Dominique Prieur were to become pregnant she could also be flown home, has been interpreted here as a hint of the French government's thinking.

Mr Chirac was reported here yesterday as telling correspondents at a press lunch: "When we negotiated the agreement, it was agreed that if one of the two fell ill, or as one of them is a woman and is married, became pregnant, there would be an automatic return to France."

The New Zealand Prime Minister, David Lange, said he was concerned at the reference, which was totally incorrect. "That agreement said no such thing."

A reading of the July 1986 adjudication by the United Nations Secretary-General, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, who settled the dispute between the two countries over the Rainbow Warrior attack, and ordered the two secret service agents to be detained on Hao for three years, shows that Mr Lange is right. It says only: "They should be prohibited from leaving the island for any reason, except with the mutual consent of the two governments".

New Zealand has protested against France's unilateral action in flying Major Alain Mafart from Hao to Paris on Monday, and asked Mr Pérez de Cuéllar to intervene. The French said Major Mafart was sick and needed urgent specialist medical attention.


Mr Lange said yesterday that a New Zealand doctor who examined Major Mafart in Paris found that he had been suffering from stomach pains for some time but did not need immediate surgery, or immediate evacuation.

Captain Prieur, whose husband is a military officer stationed on Hao, has previously been wrongly reported to be pregnant. But reacting to Mr Chirac's reported statement, Mr Lange said yesterday: "The people in the Pacific have had babies since time immemorial without going to France."

The New Zealand government is demanding that Major Mafart should be returned to Hao when he is fit, but commentators here are speculating that, with both agents seen as national heroes in France, there may be little chance of that. Mr Lange admitted there was not much New Zealand could do if the French refused.

He said New Zealand could only report France's "blatant and outrageous" breach of Mr Pérez de Cuéllar's ruling, but the outcome depended on the respect the French, who had formally accepted the ruling, had for the United Nations and the Secretary-General.

Mr Lange said there were two issues at stake: France's breach of the ruling and the question of when Major Mafart would go back to Hao. "That, I believe, will end up very much in the hands of the UN. We will take a position, and I've no doubt for other purposes the French will take a position . . ."


UN
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CHIRAC
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"YELLOW"

Reference:
B66/5/1A

10 December 1987

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.
(DLO EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA)

c.c. DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
POLICE (PTIU)
DEFENCE (DDI DOT)

TERRORISM

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Financial Times report of 10/12/87 concerning publication of the "Review of the Operation of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984".

S. W. PRIOR

S.W. Prior,
for High Commissioner.

FINANCIAL TIMES
10 DEC 1987

Change to terrorism act urged

BY ALAN PIKE, SOCIAL AFFAIRS CORRESPONDENT

THE PREVENTION of Terrorism Act's core features should be translated into permanent legislation when existing temporary provisions expire in March 1989, the Government is being urged

Lord Colville, in a wide-ranging review of the act carried out for the Home Office, says he accepts that there is a continuing need for legislation against terrorism. The essential core controls should no longer be subject to annual renewal, although a system of annual reviews could ensure that they were being operated "commensurately with the level of the current threat."

One of Lord Colville's recommendations is abolition of the Government's existing powers to place exclusion orders on people travelling between Great Britain and Northern Ireland if they are believed to be involved in terrorism. Lord Colville acknowledges that police forces are "ardent supporters of exclusion orders" and the Government made it clear immediately yesterday that they would remain in force.

Mr Douglas Hogg, Under-Secretary at the Home Office, told the Commons that Mr Douglas Hurd, Home Secretary, stood by a previous decision that it would be unwise to discontinue the exclusion powers. He said the Government would take full account of views expressed in Parliament and elsewhere when considering Lord Colville's other recommendations.

The original Prevention of Terrorism Act was introduced by the then Labour Government in the wake of the 1974 Birmingham pub bombings. Its provisions are annually renewable and it has been subject to three wide-scale reviews like the one carried out by Lord Colville.

A central theme of Lord Colville's report is that the particular resentment felt by Irish people about port controls against terrorism might be reduced if such controls were more generally applied. He points out that the Channel Tunnel will present "significant and difficult problems" for control of terrorism which need to be considered.

Detention of people suspected of terrorist offences, says Lord Colville, should be subject to the same safeguards as those applying to people held under the ordinary criminal law.

He says the present act is subject to much confusion, with many criticisms of the fact that there are few convictions under it. "The act is intended primarily to prevent terrorism, and where acts of terrorism have been committed, to help to bring those responsible before the courts to face whatever charges are appropriate. It is basically a deterrent, something very hard to prove or disprove."

Review of the Operation of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984. HMSO. £6.80.

New Zealand High Commission

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"Yellow"

Reference B66/5/1A

2 December 1987

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA DLO)

c.c. DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
Police (PTIU)
Defence (DDOP)

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Date	Nature of Material	Remarks
	Terrorism	
press reporting	Independent 30/10/87	
	Colville report on UK "Prevention of Terrorism" Act's renewal.	

S.W. PRIOR

S.W. Prior
for High Commissioner

THE INDEPENDENT Saturday 31 October 1987

Report says anti-terror Act should be permanent

THE PREVENTION of Terrorism Act, which grants police emergency powers of arrest and detention, should be made permanent according to a Government-sponsored report which is shortly to go before Douglas Hurd, the Home Secretary.

But certain offences which exist under the emergency provisions should be abolished if the legislation is made permanent, the report says. For example, the offence of refusing to pass information on to the police — which has in the past caught journalists who interview terrorists — should go.

It is understood that Lord Colville, preparing the report, may also be recommending abolition of the highly controversial power of "internal exile" whereby suspected terrorists may be excluded, without explanation, either from the mainland or from Northern Ireland.

The Colville report could herald the most significant shake-up of anti-terrorism laws on the mainland since the emergency provisions were introduced in 1974.

While human rights activists

By Sarah Helm
Home Affairs Correspondent

would welcome the suggestions for abolition of some sections, they will strongly contest the decision to make the other provisons of the Act permanent.

The Home Secretary is likely to support the switch from emergency to permanent legislation as part of his tough stand against terrorism on the international stage.

Sarah Spencer, the general secretary of the National Council for Civil Liberties, said: "To say we need such powers permanently is a terrible indictment of the society we live in and raises questions about our commitment to searching for a political solution."

The Prevention of Terrorism Act was rushed through under a Labour Government in 1974 in response to public outrage over the Birmingham Pub Bombings, in which 21 people were killed.

Because of the wide-ranging powers it invests in the police, ministers made clear at the time, and have repeated ever since, that the legislation was intended as a temporary and emergency measure and not as a permanent fixture of law.

As a result it is regularly debated and reviewed.

The sections which should stay for good, according to the report, include the special powers of arrest and detention.

Under the emergency provisions the police have wider than normal powers to arrest, and do not have to specify the allegations.

They must simply have "reasonable suspicion" of involvement in acts of terrorism.

The suspect can also be held for seven days without charge instead of the normal four days and he must be given access to a lawyer after 48 hours instead of the normal 36 hours.

Lawyers have objected to these powers on the grounds that they give the weakest rights to those charged with the most serious offences.

Lord Colville is also recommending making permanent the power to outlaw on the mainland organisations suspected of involvement in political violence, and the right to collect money for such organisations.

New Zealand High Commission

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"Yellow"

Reference: B66/5/1A

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.
(DLO EUR LGL SEC MEA)

c.c. DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
POLICE (PTIU)
DEFENCE (DDI DOT)
TEHRAN
PARIS

TERRORISM: FRANCE/IRAN

The decision by France to engage in what is being interpreted as hostage-trading with Tehran has aroused disquiet at political and officials level here and has evoked considerable criticism of the French Government's actions in the British press.

2. The French moves, set against earlier American involvement in 'arms-for-hostages' deals, are seen as undermining the strong stand that the British have taken on the question of negotiation and treating with terrorists.

3. A selection of relevant press and official commentary is attached for your information.

S. W. PRIOR

S.W. Prior,
for High Commissioner.

B66/5/1A.

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UNCLASS SECURE

ACTION COPY

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RR LON -TT- HAG
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CLAS: UNCLASSIFIED SECURE 1 DECEMBER 1987
FROM: NEW YORK PM CHARGE CODE: 31281
TO : WELLINGTON Ø1844-PRIORITY
RPTD: CANBERRA ØØ697-ROUTINE :WASHINGTON ØØ33Ø-ROUTINE
: LONDON ØØ262-ROUTINE :OTTAWA ØØ298-ROUTINE
: THE HAGUE ØØ1ØØ-ROUTINE
LD : SFA (LGL UNC MEA)
SUBJ: UNGA 42 : TERRORISM
DRAFT RESOLUTION (TABLED AS L.24) PUT FORWARD UNDER COSPONSORSHIP OF YUGOSLAVIA, CUBA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND MALTA, WAS ADOPTED TODAY BY 128 - 1 (ISRAEL) - 1 (US). SPAIN'S INSTRUCTIONS DID NOT PERMIT IT TO COSPONSOR GIVEN THAT ADOPTION WAS NOT BY CONSENSUS.
2 WASHINGTON'S INSTRUCTIONS DID NOT REQUIRE US DELEGATION TO CALL FOR A VOTE ON L.24 - IT WOULD HAVE PREFERRED A CONSENSUS ON THE TEXT. ISRAEL WAS ADAMANT, HOWEVER, AND COULD NOT BE PERSUADED NOT TO CALL FOR A VOTE. THEY WERE BROWBEATEN INTO NOT CALLING FOR A SEPARATE VOTE ON OP.14 BUT PR NETANYAHU REFUSED TO CONSIDER REQUESTS FROM THE US, UK AND OTHERS TO ACCEDE TO CONSENSUS ON THE TEXT AS A WHOLE.
3 MOST DELEGATIONS WERE VERY DISAPPOINTED BY THE ISRAELI ACTION. EOVS WERE NONETHELESS LOW-KEY AND NON-CONFRONTATINAL. THE COLOMBIANS WERE THE MOST STRIDENT IN DESCRIBING THE OUTCOME AS ''DEPLORABLE''. WE MADE A BRIEF EOV AFTER THE VOTES (TEXT BY BAG) AS DISCUSSED BY PHONE WITH KEATING. THE EC, US, CANADA, NORDICS AND AUSTRALIA ALSO EXPLAINED THEIR VOTES: THE FIRST TWO SPEAKING BEFORE THE VOTE.
4 THE US EOV WELCOMED THE EXCLUSION IN L.24 OF ''PERNICIOUS AND UNCONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSALS'' BUT DESCRIBED THE RESOLUTION GENERALLY A LACKING FOCUS AND AS BEING ''TOO PALLID A RESPONSE'' TO THE PROBLEM OF TERRORISM. THEY REFERRED, TOO, TO ''GRATUITOUS REFERENCES'' TO SELF-DETERMINATION CAPABLE OF MISCONSTRUCTION BY TH ILL-INTENDED OR ILL-INFORMED AND SAID THAT OP.14 HAD NO PLACE IN A RESOLUTION ON TERRORISM.
5 ISRAEL SPOKE IN A FAIRLY RESTRAINED FASHION NOTING ITS OBJECTION TO O.P.14 AND TO THE FACT THAT THE POPOSAL TO CONVENE A CONFERENCE ON TERRORISM HAD BEEN SHELVED BUT NOT KILLED.
SYRIA WAS THE ONLY OTHER MIDDLE EASTERN SPEAKER. IN A BRIEF STATE-MENT, IT SAID THAT IT WOULD HAVE LIKED A STRONGER RESOLUTION AND THAT L.24 WAS A ''MINIMAL REFLECTION OF WHAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WANTS IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST TERRORISM''. IT CHARGED TH ''IMPERIALIST INTERNATIONAL FORCES'' AS BEING THOSE THAT CONDUCT TERRORISM AND REITERATED THE IMPORTANCE OF DEFINITION OF TERRORISM TO DISTINGUISH IT FROM ACTS BY NLMS. THERE WERE NO RIGHTS OF REPLY.
6 WE ARE NOT SURE WHAT PROSPECT THERE MAY BE OF A CHANGE IN THE ISRAELI POSITION BEFORE THE RESOLUTION COMES TO PLENARY. WE TEND TO THINK IT UNLIKELY BUT SOME WEST EUROPEANS MAY BE INCLINED TO TAKE UP THE QUESTION.
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B66 15/1A

British sub 'spied on IRA arms boat'

From Philip Jacobson
Paris

A British nuclear submarine is reported to have been shadowing the coaster Eksund up to the moment that French customs boarded her on October 30 and discovered a huge cache of arms allegedly destined for the Provisional IRA.

In a special investigation published yesterday, the well-informed daily *Libération* claimed that the vessel and her five Irish crew members had been under constant surveillance since loading some 150 tonnes of assorted weaponry supplied by Libya.

The submarine never surfaced during the operation, the report added, relying on its "active-passive" sonar system to keep tabs on the elderly, Panamanian-registered ship. Though the newspaper quotes only "Irish naval service" sources for its story, it says a British hunter-killer submarine was used to shadow another vessel running arms to the IRA three years ago.

In the case of the Marita Ann, photographs of activities on the ship's bridge were taken through the periscope before the Royal Navy seized her and a seven-tonne cargo of arms

Britain's original objective in the Eksund operation, it is claimed, was to follow the weapons as far as possible along the IRA supply route, though she could have been detained at any moment after entering UK territorial waters.

Although the French secret service, the DGSE, had been closely involved in the surveillance, it appears that her seizure off Roscoff was not on the agenda.

The article quotes official sources as confirming that two tonnes of the powerful explosive Semtex, of Czechoslovakian origin, were discovered on the Eksund. The Provisional IRA is known to have used Semtex to make large bombs.

The five Irish crewmen face charges of transporting weapons for the purpose of terrorism.

French accused of being in explosives chain

Continued from page 1

unofficially, into the public domain. It is understood that they are concerned by what they consider to have been the Socialist Government's deliberate "overlooking" of a serious threat to one of France's most important allies.

According to one source in Paris, the French intelligence services had received informal complaints about this explosives traffic from opposite numbers in Britain. The French Government, it is claimed, was subsequently made aware of the problem but no action had been taken.

As ever in France, there are significant political ramifications to what could, if proven, turn into an immensely damaging *affaire*. As in the scandal of the Iranian arms shipments, the primary objective behind the allegations is to damage the standing of M Mitterrand in the run-up to France's presidential election next spring. The tone of accompanying articles in *Désinformation* makes it clear that the magazine reflects a distinctly right-wing political perspective.

The disclosures brought an immediate delighted reaction from anti-terrorist officials in Britain. One said last night: "Obviously all the bomb-making explosives in Ireland do not come from France. But a lot has; does this mean that at last the French are starting to own up?"

He confirmed that the explosives named have been identified in bomb attacks in Britain and Northern Ireland. "For example, Gelusurite 2000 was the explosive found in a very large bomb in Chelsea Bridge Road in November 1985, the planting of which was known to have been the work of the INLA. Another explosive mentioned in the article, Gomme 15, was the principal component of other bombs in Ireland around that time, and since."

"We intensively researched all these finds at the time, and were deeply suspicious about the ease with which the amounts involved had found their way into Irish terrorist hands. This was no mere pilfering, this was wholesale.

"These were a commercial version of a classic military explosive, and as such should have been subject to the most strenuous security. A small amount of any of these sustances was ideal for booby-trapping cars.

"We were as worried about this, as about the large quantities of explosives coming from Eire. But whereas you could, perhaps, understand the difficulties of keeping the lid on in southern Ireland we were less patient about this French source. And the fact is we had little or no co-operation from their security services."

IRA's explosives 'made in France'

By Phillip Jacobson in Paris and Brian James in London

Startling new allegations have linked France's biggest manufacturers of explosives, one of which is state-owned, with the IRA's bombing campaigns on the British mainland and in Northern Ireland.

In an article bitterly critical of the conduct of President François Mitterrand and the former Socialist Government, a private newsletter with known contacts in French intelligence circles claims that "the greater part" of the explosives used in IRA operations between 1981 and 1986 originated in French factories.

According to *Désinformation*, a weekly publication whose recent contributors have included several very senior French intelligence experts, the IRA has received quantities of the explosives known as Gelsurite 2000, hydrolite and N40R which are made in a plant owned by La Société Nationale de Poudres et Explosifs.

This government-controlled enterprise is known to have been involved in the large scale supply of explosives for the Iranian armed forces, normally via a chain of intermediaries, in the mid-1980s. Other French explosives which *Désinformation* claims have been used by the IRA's bombmakers include the brands Gomme F15 and Gomme BAM.

According to the magazine, all the explosives in question have simply "disappeared" from different factories.

These highly sensitive allegations are believed to emanate from past members of the various branches of the French security services. The article in question is signed by "J-F.D.", the initials of M Joel-François Dumont, a defence analyst. *Désinformation* is used for leaks of information that officials wish to place.

Continued on page 24, col 5

B6615/1A

THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 28, 1987

A borderline case for treatment

As the Irish Government cuts the strength of its security forces, PAUL WILKINSON argues that, aside from extradition agreements, IRA terrorism requires an international solution

THERE ARE some signs that what shook Dublin into action against the IRA lately was not so much the horror of Enniskillen as the dramatic new evidence of the IRA's efforts to mount a massive leap in firepower, as revealed when the Eksund was intercepted on the high seas by French police.

This was no mere gunrunner's cargo. It included large quantities of anti-helicopter and anti-tank weapons, capable of piercing four-inch steel and demolishing buildings. There were, besides: 20 SAM-7 missiles; 10 Soviet heavy machine guns with anti-aircraft gun-mounts; recoilless anti-tank rifles and ammunition; RPG-7 anti-tank rocket-propelled grenades and launchers; 600 Soviet F-1 grenades; 1,000 Kalashnikov AK-47 rifles; 50 tons of ammunition; and two tons of Semtex explosive, of the type already in use by the IRA . . . a batch of arms, in short, sufficient to start and sustain a sizeable guerilla war, never mind a campaign of urban terrorism.

Even more worrying was the confirmation by Western intelligence services that four previous shipments of arms from Libya had already slipped through the net, two in 1985 and two in 1986. They may well have included anti-helicopter and anti-armour weapons of the type discovered on the Eksund, and these may be stored in the Republic ready for IRA use when police activity in the Republic subsides.

Small wonder that the first manifestation of Dublin's new concern about the IRA should have been a massive arms search, involving a third of Ireland's security forces. If Northern Ireland security authorities have every reason to worry, the Dublin government must realise that there is a danger of its own poorly equipped and overstretched security forces being entirely outgunned by the IRA. As the Irish Justice Minister forcefully stated on televisison: "No state can tolerate a situation where arms of the volume and power we are talking about are held by any group other than the lawful security forces."

It is a truism that major cross-border terrorist campaigns can only be suppressed by international co-operation between the states involved. This has been vividly demonstrated by the recent success of the joint French and Spanish operations against Basque terrorists. The arrest of the head of ETA's military wing in France has led to a wave of captures on both sides of the border and has possibly broken the back of the organisation.

What are the chances of a similar co-ordinated crackdown north and south of the border in Ireland? The IRA constantly uses the border to secure safe haven, to carry out ambushes, and to smuggle weapons and explosives. We can hardly erect a kind of Berlin Wall along the entire border. The only feasible approach is an adequately resourced cross-border security campaign by the police and army.

The British Army and the RUC are clearly well trained and organised for this task. Their reputation for professionalism and courage is backed up by the British Government's commitment to providing adequate resources for their dangerous task. The Northern Ireland Secretary has just announced that the RUC will have an additional £40 million in the coming year. In sad contrast, south of the border, the Garda faces a two per cent budget cut in real terms at a time when it is already suffering not only from lack of equipment but also from severe management; morale and training problems.

Britain is fortunate in having not only a Government resolute in its assault on terrorism, but a political consensus which by and large crosses party lines. By contrast, the Republic's governing Fianna Fail party contains a strident wing of Republicans who seem to regard the IRA as little more than misguided "freedom fighters" and who stubbornly obstruct the extradition of IRA suspects to the north for what they regard as "political offences".

The population of neither country should be deluded: it is not the angry frustration of the Unionists but the ambivalence and weakness of the Republic which presents the greatest obstacle to effective security co-operation against the IRA.

Although its recent misfortunes may have earned the Garda a satirical cartoon in The Daily Telegraph yesterday, portraying them as the O'Keystone Cops, the joke is really rather unfair. I share the admiration of other observers for the professional dedication and individual courage of the Garda. But at its present strength, it is not a tough enough force to tackle the challenge of IRA and INLA terrorism.

Instead of further cuts in police funding and manpower, as currently planned by the Dublin Government, the situation calls for a major

enhancement of the Garda. The fiasco of the handling of the O'Grady kidnap showed vividly the need for better police training, management, communications, and contingency planning.

The regional armed task forces, scrapped for financial reasons four years ago, should be re-established. They provided the sorely needed local intelligence on paramilitaries and potential safe-houses and highly mobile and skilled detective units. The Republic also desperately needs a proper and adequately funded Secret Service to work in close co-operation with other European Community countries.

The sad fact is that even if the Irish Government sincerely wishes to honour its obligations to Anglo-Irish cooperation, extradition and mutual police assistance in countering terrorism, it lacks the basic resources to carry out these tasks.

At a recent security conference I proposed that a European Community emergency fund should be set up to assist member states experiencing acute terrorism. Ireland would be an obvious candidate. It does not belong to Nato, and bilateral cash help from Britain would be politically unacceptable. (In any case, valuable training and technical expertise in countering terrorism is already made available by Britain to the Irish police and army, for example in the training of their army's crack Rangers unit.)

But if some such means is not found to help Ireland carry out its responsibilities against the cancer of terrorism, I fear that the Republic will find itself incapable of defending its own democracy against the insidious challenge of the secret army of IRA murderers.

An ideal opportunity to address this problem arises at the forthcoming meeting of the European heads of government. The West Germans, who currently hold the presidency of the Community, have a good record on cooperation with other countries against terrorism. They are well-placed to understand the Irish predicament and to appreciate the grave international consequences of inaction.

□ *Paul Wilkinson is Professor of International Relations at Aberdeen University and Chairman of the Research Foundation for the Study of Terrorism*

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"YELLOW"

Reference: B66/5/1A

25 November 1987

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.
(EUR LGL SEC DLO AAD MEA SPA)

c.c. DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
Police (PTIU)
Defence (DDOP)
HARARE

Terrorism: British Aid to Mozambique

Attached for your information is a Times article of 25 November written by Jillian Becker the Director of the London-based Institute for the Study of Terrorism. The article argues against the current British policy of providing support for the Mozambique Government on the grounds that it owes allegiance to Moscow.

2. This, together with other writings issued under the aegis of the Institute would seem to be confirming our initial impression (for example, our memoranda B66/5/1A - not to Harare - of 15 April 1987 (para 6), and of 30 October and 20 November 1986) that it is an organisation with pronounced right-wing views and a polemical bent.

3. The Institute is not to be confused with the Research Foundation for the Study of Terrorism which also has a London office. The Foundation, which is organising the "Terrorism: Business and Industry Conference" early next month (our memorandum B66/5/1A of 19 October 1987 - not to Harare - refers) appears to have adopted a more detached and academic approach to the study of questions posed by terrorism.

S.W. Prior,
for High Commissioner.

Jillian Becker challenges Britain's policy on aid to the leftist regime in Mozambique

Backing the wrong men in Maputo?

The Soviet Union has had an ally in Mozambique since the militant communist organization, Frelimo, came to power in 1975 after the Portuguese revolution. In 1977 President Samora Machel signed a friendship and co-operation treaty with Russia, from whom he purchased $978 million of arms. At present there are some 3,500 Soviet, Cuban and East German military advisers in Mozambique.

Frelimo is being challenged by Renamo, the Mozambique National Resistance, whose leaders, headed by Afonso Dhlakama, want to bring Mozambique into the Western sphere, establish a pluralist democracy and a free-market economy. Yet they have received no Western aid.

Instead, Britain supports the Frelimo government, and now gives more aid to Mozambique than to any other country. Three reasons are given for this level of support:

- Britain owed a debt of gratitude to Machel for helping to bring about the Zimbabwe settlement;
- Aid to Mozambique and other states in the area makes them more independent of South Africa, and is a more practical option than sanctions;
- The Frelimo government will be weaned from communism and dependence on the Soviet Union and look Westward.

There is little to justify optimism that the plan will work. It was formed, apparently, after Machel made a favourable impression on Mrs Thatcher during a state visit to London in 1983. Mozambique's economy was declining rapidly, and Machel, a passsionate Marxist-Leninist but also a pragmatist, encouraged the hope he might be swung from the Soviet alliance.

After his death in an air crash in 1986, his successor, Joaquim Chissano, also inspired confidence in Mrs Thatcher. Since then British money has poured into Maputo and British officers have trained Mozambican special forces in Zimbabwe. But the civil war has raged on; starvation has spread; the economy has further weakened; and scarce resources have continued to be spent on Soviet arms.

Maputo still displays Marxist-Leninist slogans. The "re-education camps", in which tens of thousands have perished, still exist. The Roman Catholic Church is still persecuted. In the UN, Mozambique still votes with the Soviet Union against the West.

In short, there is no sign that Frelimo has even begun to change its policies, or intends changing its ideology, its form of government, nor of loosening its close ties with the Soviet Union.

This scepticism might be countered if Chissano were to demonstrate that the British government's faith, hope and charity are not misplaced. Liberalization of the economy is vital to end the famine. Frelimo admits that collectivization was a mistake and that free enterprise is needed to feed the people, and has slightly relaxed state control.

Families are allowed to grow vegetables and raise poultry in their backyards, and even sell their surplus on the market. A few multinationals are back, BP, Shell and Amoco in place to develop the off-shore oil. The state shops have been closed in Maputo, but few others are open, and they offer goods so highly priced that only top party officials, the Russians and visiting Western businessmen can buy anything.

White collar workers in Maputo are given one meal a day as part of their wages: trucks drive up to office blocks with huge pots of stew, and the clerks queue up with their plates. Only the Frelimo elite and foreign businessmen can eat the famous giant prawns, sea harvests being pledged to the Soviet Union for years to come. But even if an enterprise economy were genuinely wanted by the government, it could not function effectively in civil war.

Before all else the war must stop. To this end, Chissano could propose free elections. Such elections, in which Frelimo, Renamo and others could compete for the people's confidence would not only end one-party Communist rule, it would also settle which party represents the will of the majority, and would whatever the outcome grant Renamo sufficient of a victory at the outset to make its armed resistance unnecessary.

No elections, no liberalization, are in sight or promised. As recently as August, a US fact-finding group consisting of the representatives of several "strategy think-tanks", including the Global Strategy Council, and five Republican senators, visited Mozambique and asked Chissano whether he would consider holding elections for a multi-party democracy, or permit the extension of private enterprise, or break his links with the Soviet bloc. His reply: "No, never!"

It may be that Chissano wants peace, development, and a return to prosperity for his richly endowed country. But if not, and if all that he and his party want is dictatorial power, then he will take none of the steps which would be a sign of change, nor will he break with the Soviet Union. The testing time is now. British taxpayers need to know whether the heavy investment made on their behalf will pay the political dividends which the British government has led them to expect.

The author is director of the Institute for the Study of Terrorism.

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"YELLOW"

Reference:
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25 November 1987

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.
(EUR LGL SEC DLO AAD MEA SPA)

c.c. DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
Police (PTIU)
Defence (DDOP)

Terrorism: Conference on Aerial Terrorism

Attached for your information is advance notice of a conference to be run by the City of London Polytechnic on 29 February and 1 March 1988, entitled "Suppression of Aerial Terrorism".

2. The conference is intended to survey the existing international law on aviation terrorism as represented by the Tokyo, Hague, Montreal and other conventions, and to discuss ways in which this law might be improved and extended to cover present grey areas.

3. The fee for the conference will be pounds 250 and applications for attendance are to be received by the organisers by 16 February 1988.

S.W. Prior,
for High Commissioner.

Short Course Unit

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City of London Polytechnic

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First Secretary
Embassy of New Zealand
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LONDON SW1Y 4TQ

18 November 1987

Dear Sir,

1988 Aviation Law Conference
"SUPPRESSION OF AERIAL TERRORISM"

Please find attached details of the above Conference which will be held in London on 29 February and 1 March 1988.

Our modern world is seriously threatened by increasing incidents of terrorism. Threats to the smooth-functioning of international civil air transport, jeopardising aircraft in flight as well as the peace and safety of airports, have provoked many calls for reform and further consolidation of the legal regime governing this area.

The Tokyo, Hague, Montreal and other relevant Conventions are already in place. Nevertheless many aspects of the problems of "political" sheltering of a hijacker or saboteur, and the machinery for apprehension and punishment of aerial terrorists are still unresolved. This Conference will survey the existing law with reference to available State practice, and with the help of contributions from the participants it will explore possible reforms to the current system. For this reason, diplomats attending will strengthen their understanding of the controversies and their effectiveness in the settlement of disputes in this field.

Please pass the enclosed brochure on to any members of your staff who would find the Conference of interest. If you have any queries please contact me.

Yours faithfully,

R J ROYDS
SHORT COURSES CO-ORDINATOR

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THE SPEAKERS

Prof. Bin Cheng, Lic-en-Droit (Geneva), PHD-LLD (Lon), Honorary LLD (Chinese Uni. of Hong Kong), FRAeS

Prof. Cheng is the professor Emeritus of Air and Space Law in the University of London (1967-1986). He has been the Chairman of I.L.A. Air Law Committee (1965-1983). He is the author of THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT and GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS. He edited and contributed to INTERNATIONAL LAW: TEACHING AND PRACTICE and has written many authoritative articles on international Law, Air Law and Space Law.

John M. Balfour, MA (Oxon), Solicitor

Mr. Balfour is a partner of the leading aviation firm of solicitors, Frere Cholmeley, and has specialised knowledge of accident liability under the Warsaw regime. He is a contributing editor of SHAWCROSS AND BEAUMONT ON AIR LAW viz Aviation Competition Law and has authored a number of articles in Aviation and Insurance law journals.

Laurence C. Oates, LLB (Bristol), Barrister-at-Law

Mr Oates is Asst. Treasury Solicitor advising the Department of Transport on Aviation Law. He was the UK Delegate to the ICAO Assembly of October 1986 and the Chief UK Delegate to ICAO Legal Committee in May 1987. He is closely concerned with the ICAO work on prevention of terrorism at airports.

Dr. Amir A. Majid

Dr. Majid is an alumnus of the University College London and the Institute of Air and Space of McGill University, Montreal. He has written a number of articles on Aviation Law. He is currently researching on the Status of International Institutions in the Global Legal Order; particularly of those institutions which are concerned with aerospace activities.

CityPoly
City of London Polytechnic

AVIATION LAW

LEGAL ISSUES OF AIR TRANSPORT

Suppression of Aerial Terrorism

29 February & 1 March 1988

AVIATION LAW—Legal Issues of Air Transport

Organiser:-
AMIR A MAJID, BA(Pb.), LLB Hons - LLM (London),
DASL (Lon. Inst. of World Affairs), DASL - DCL (McGill)
Barrister-at-law, Lecturer, Faculty of Law,
City of London Polytechnic

Attendance at this two-day conference will be of special benefit to advisers and practitioners concerned with various aspects of International Civil Aviation.
Those connected with the observance and enforcement of Public Air Law in the realm of international affairs may, specifically, find it of contemporary significance and application. The officials of the regulatory agencies, airlines, airport authorities and aircraft manufactures will also acquire a working knowledge of the topics explored.

ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS

DATES: Monday 29 February & Tuesday 1 March 1988

VENUE: Conference Room
City of London Polytechnic
84 Moorgate
London EC2 (nearest underground station: Moorgate)

FEE: £250.00 per person. The fee includes refreshments and lunch each day, and all course documentation. Neither the costs of travel to or in the U.K., nor overnight accommodation is included in the course fee.

ENROLMENT: Applications should be made on the attached booking form and sent to the Short Course Unit **not later than 16 February, 1988.** Confirmation of bookings will be made after this date. We shall be happy to refund fees should cancellations reach us in writing before the closing date. Substitutions may be made at anytime.

ENQUIRIES: Rosemary Royds or Trudy Hayes on 01-283 1030 ext. 324.

CONFERENCE PROGRAMME

Monday 29 February

9.15	Enrolment and coffee
9.45	**The International Regime of Airport Security** Mr Oates
11.45	Tea
12.00	**The International Regime for the Suppression of Hijacking** Prof. Cheng
1.00	Lunch
2.15	**The International Regime for the Suppression of Hijacking (continued)** Prof. Cheng
3.15	**State Interference with Aircraft in Flight** Dr. Majid
5.15	End of Day One

Tuesday 1 March

9.45	**The Korean Plane Disaster of 1 September 1983 - A Case Study** Prof. Cheng
11.15	Coffee
11.30	**An Overview of the Air Carrier Liability Regime** Dr. Majid
1.00	Lunch
2.15	**The Compensatory Regime for the Victims of Aerial Terrorism** Mr Balfour
4.15	Tea & **Course Review**
4.45	Conference Ends

BOOKING FORM
AVIATION LAW - Legal Issues of Air Transport
29 February & 1 March 1988

1) NAME (Mr/Ms) _____

POSITION _____

2) NAME (Mr/Ms) _____

POSITION _____

3) NAME (Mr/Ms) _____

POSITION _____

NAME OF COMPANY/FIRM _____

ADDRESS _____

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_____

TELEPHONE NO. _____ EXTENSION: _____

Please book _____ place(s) on the above course. Fees in the sum of £ _____ to be paid as follows:-

* Cheque, payable to "City of London Polytechnic" for £ _____

Please debit my

* ACCESS No: _____

* VISACARD

Please give home address if using credit card

in the sum of £ _____

* Invoice to _____

SIGNED: _____ DATED: _____

PLEASE RETURN THIS FORM TO THE SHORT COURSE UNIT, CITY OF LONDON POLYTECHNIC, 84 MOORGATE, EC2M 6SQ
NOT LATER THAN 16 FEBRUARY, 1988

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cc B41/9

ZCZC
WLN 5631
RR [redacted]
GR 02548

CONFIDENTIAL

CLAS: CONFIDENTIAL 18 NOVEMBER 1987
FROM: NEW YORK PM CHARGE CODE:
TO : WELLINGTON 02702-ROUTINE
RPTD: CANBERRA 00646-ROUTINE :OTTAWA 00279-ROUTINE
: LONDON 00246-ROUTINE :WASHINGTON 00308-ROUTINE
LD : SFA (LGL UNC MEA)
SUBJ: UNGA42 : TERRORISM

30036
FAP
Chips,

IN THE EVENT, THE NON-ALIGNED HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO AGREE ON THE TE
OF A SINGLE DRAFT RESOLUTION TO ENCAPSULATE THE GROUP'S POSITION.
ACCORDINGLY ZIMBABWE (AS CHAIRMAN) HAS GONE AHEAD AND TABLED A
DRAFT (BY BAG) UNDER ITS SOLE COSPONSORSHIP (A.C6/42/L.7) AS A
BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION.
2 L.7 IS REGARDED BY WEO AS ''EMINENTLY NEGOTIABLE''. IT
PRESENTS THE NON-ALIGNED SPECTRUM OF 40/61 JUST AS L.2 PRESENTS THE
WESTERN ONE. MANY OF THE PREAMBULAR PARAS ARE IDENTICAL WITH
THOSE OF 40/61. THERE IS HOWEVER A NEW P.P.6 ON STATE TERRORISM
AND P.P.6 OF 40/61 HAS BEEN CLEVERLY REWORKED TO TALK OF
COOPERATION TO ELIMINATE THE UNDERLYING CAUSES (UNDERLINED) OF
TERRORISM. P.P.9 (HUMAN RIGHTS) AND P.P.10 (OBSERVANCE OF INTER-
NATIONAL CONVENTIONS) HAVE BEEN OMITTED. AS REGARDS THE OPERATIVE
PARAS, O.P.7 AND 8 OF 40/61 (PRACTICAL MEASURES) HAVE BEEN
DELETED. NEW O.P.7 CONTAINS A RATHER STRANGE REFERENCE (ADDED
ON TO THE END OF OLD O.P.9) TO ACTION UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE
CHARTER AND NEW O.P.13 REAFFIRMS THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION.
3 MOST IMPORTANTLY FROM THE WEO PERSPECTIVE HOWEVER L.7 CONTAINS
NO ENDORSEMENT OF SYRIA'S PROPOSAL TO HOLD A CONFERENCE OR
RECONVENE THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON TERRORISM. INSTEAD, THE
EGYPTIAN PROPOSAL REPORTED IN OUR 1608 HAS BEEN TAKEN UP SO THAT
O.P.12 OF L.7 REQUESTS THE SECGEN ''TO PREPARE A TOPICAL SUMMARY
CONCERNING THE PROBLEM OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM'' BASED ON THE
VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THIS YEAR'S SIXTH COMMITTEE DEBATE AND TO ''SEEK
THE VIEWS OF MEMBER STATES ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN ALL
ITS ASPECTS AND TO SUBMIT A REPORT TO UNGA 44''.
4 WE ARE TOLD THAT L.7 REPRESENTS THE VIEWS OF THE ''OVERWHELMIN
MAJORITY'' OF THE NAM GROUP WHO, ALTHOUGH NOT READY TO SPEAK IN THE
SIXTH COMMITTEE DEBATE AGAINST SYRIA'S INITIATIVE, STOOD OUT AGAINS
ITS INCLUSION IN THEIR DRAFT RESOLUTION. EFFORTS (PARTICULARLY
BY INDIA, ZIMBABWE AND YUGOSLAVIA) TO GET THE SYRIANS TO RELINQUISH
THEIR PROPOSAL AND SUPPORT THE MAJORITY POSITION WERE UNSUCCESSFUL
AND IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE SYRIANS AND THEIR FRIENDS WILL GO AHE
WITH A SEPARATE DRAFT RESOLUTION.
5 OVERALL, WESTERN DELEGATIONS ARE REASONABLY SATISFIED WITH THI
TURN OF EVENTS. CERTAINLY THEY CAN LIVE WITH THE PROPOSAL PUT FORW
IN O.P.12 OF L.7. THE SIGNAL SENT BY L.7 IS THAT THE NAM (MAINSTRE
WILL SETTLE, AFTER NEGOTIATION, FOR SOMETHING CLOSELY AKIN TO 40/61
AND PROVIDED THE COSPONSORS OF L.2 ARE CAREFUL DURING NEGOTIATION T
KEEP THE NAM ON SIDE (AND THEY ARE WELL AWARE OF THE IMPORTANCE
OF THIS) IT LOOKS AS THOUGH THE SEPARATE SYRIAN DRAFT RESOLUTION
COULD BE VOTED DOWN - IF SYRIA CHOOSES TO PERSIST WITH IT.
NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN A GROUP OF L.2 COSPONSORS (UK, US, FRANCE,
NETHERLANDS AND FRG), THE NON-ALIGNED (MOROCCO, EGYPT, ZIMBABWE,
INDIA AND YUGOSLAVIA) AND THE EASTERN EUROPEANS (SOVIET UNION AND
CZECHOSLOVAKIA) BEGAN YESTERDAY.
6 WE ARE KEEPING IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH NEGOTIATING GROUP WITH
A VIEW TO COSPONSORSHIP OF AMALGAMATED TEXT WHEN IT EMERGES.
SUBJECT HEADING SHOULD READ: ''UNGA 42 : TERRORISM''

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ACTION COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

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WLN 5Q37
RR LON
GR QQ282
CLAS: CONFIDENTIAL 1Q NOVEMBER 1987
FROM: NEW YORK PM
TO : WELLINGTON Q16Q8 ROUTINE
RPTD: CANBERRA QQ6Q4 ROUTINE WASHINGTON QQ29Q ROUTINE
: OTTAWA QQ271 ROUTINE LONDON QQ234 ROUTINE
LD : SFA (LGL UNC AMER)
SUBJ: UNGA 42 : TERRORISM
YOUR 1482.
THERE ARE AS YET NO FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS TO REPORT ON THE TERRORISM ITEM.
2 THE NON-ALIGNED ARE STILL LOCKED IN DEBATE OVER THE TEXT OF A RESOLUTION WHICH THEY INTEND FLOATING FOR TACTICAL PURPOSES AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE (WESTERN) COSPONSORS OF L.2. NOT SURPRISINGLY, THE DEBATE CENTRES ON THE SYRIAN PROPOSAL AND THE RECOGNITION TO BE GIVEN IT IN THIS NON-ALIGNED TEXT. THE SYRIANS OF COURSE WANT THE NON-ALIGNED DRAFT RESOLUTION TO CALL FOR A CONFERENCE BUT, ACCORDING TO THE MOROCCANS, IT IS VERY UNLIKELY THAT THE DRAFT WILL DO THAT. WE ARE TOLD THAT AN EGYPTIAN PROPOSAL (THAT THE SECGEN SHOULD WRITE TO GOVERNMENTS ASKING THEIR VIEWS ON THE HOLDING OF A CONFERENCE) IS ''GOING DOWN QUITE WELL'' WITH THE NON-ALIGNED, BUT WE WOULD BE A LITTLE SURPRISED IF THE SYRIANS LET IT GO AT THAT.
3 THE UK UNDERSTANDS THAT THE SYRIANS HAVE PRODUCED THEIR OWN TEX (WITH 15 DELEGATIONS READY TO COSPONSOR) WHICH THEY WOULD TABLE AS SEPARATE (SECOND) DRAFT RESOLUTION IF THEY DO NOT APPROVE OF THE ''OFFICIAL'' NON-ALIGNED TEXT.
4 THE UK HAS TOLD THE YUGOSLAVS THAT THEY WOULD LIKE NEGOTIATIONS TO BEGIN BETWEEN THE NON-ALIGNED AND WESTERN GROUPS BY THURSDAY OF THIS WEEK. THERE IS A FORMAL MEETING OF ALL NON-ALIGNED SIXTH COMMITTEE DELEGATIONS SCHEDULED FOR TONIGHT WHICH MAY SUCEED IN ENDING THE PRESENT DEADLOCK AND PRODUCING AGREEMENT ON A NON-ALIGNE TEXT. WE SHALL REPORT FURTHER.
=
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
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EVENING STANDARD



THE WARRIOR . . . more revelations are likely.

Sinking the president . . .



SAM WHITE reports from Paris

AS a prelude to the presidential elections next spring France has recently had a surfeit of political scandals between Left and Right. This week, however, France finds itself in the throes of a scandal of really serious dimensions which can have a decisive effect not only on the outcome of the coming elections but on President Mitterrand's decision on whether to stand for a second term.

The scandal involves the president himself and the illegal sale of arms and ammunition to Iran between 1984 and 1986 when the Socialists were in power.

The sum involved is estimated at £70 million but this does not include commission payments made to French and Iranian intermediaries through an Italian bank in Switzerland. An official report classified as secret alleges that some of it found its way back to France in the form of kickbacks to Socialist party election funds.

The report makes clear that the exports to Iran by the Armement firm of Luchaire were authorised by the then Socialist Minister of Defence, M. Charles Hernu, and that President Mitterrand was told of what was going on by the Secret Service head, Admiral Lacoste, but took no action.

The Luchaire exports, apart from being illegal in themselves, also involved, according to the report, the use of false certificates indicating that the consignments were destined to countries like Yugoslavia, Brazil, Thailand and Ecuador.

Orders

The secret of the sales was apparently agreed to, in contravention of the embargo on arms sales to Iran imposed in 1980.

So far there has been no word from President Mitterrand but M. Hernu has denied all knowledge of the sales. M. Hernu who had to resign for his role in the Rainbow Warrior affair also denied that he authorised the sinking of the Greenpeace vessel.

But the prime minister at the time, M. Fabius Freely, confessed that the sinking had been carried out by the French Secret Service "acting under orders" and accused M. Hernu of having deceived him.

This did not prevent M. Mitterrand accepting M. Hernu's resignation. But their continued friendship has led to strong suspicions that the president too was told of the intended sinking of the Rainbow Warrior.

Indeed further revelations may indicate that only M. Mitterrand and M. Hernu knew of the intended operation and kept it a secret from even the prime minister.

Hostages

M. Hernu's denials that he knew of arms sales to Iran are weakened by the then Socialist Foreign Minister, M. Roland Dumas, who confessed that he not only knew of them but that, in 1985, he persuaded the satirical weekly the Canard Enchaine not to publish the story because he feared that it would jeopardise negotiations for the release of French hostages held by Iranian sympathisers in the Lebanon.

If M. Dumas knew about it it seems highly unlikely that M. Hernu or the president himself didn't.

Now the socialists can only deny that any of the commission money found its way into socialist funds.

There has always been a recurring clamour that the sources of party funds should be made public and the sums available to each party should be limited by law. But no major party could possibly agree to revealing the identity of its benefactors.

Meanwhile it appears that the Socialists had a guilt complex in the matter as it was M. Hernu's successor as Minister of Defence, M. Paul Quiles, who initiated the official inquiry into the sales.

He did so only three days before Parliament was dissolved and it appeared certain that the Socialists would be defeated. It was a way of giving himself a clean bill of health.

Battle

Clearly M. Mitterrand must now view the prospect of standing again with considerable reluctance. It will mean descending from the heights he has achieved during the past two years of co-habitation with M. Chirac into fighting a battle which will clearly be dirty.

He will leave such a battle of which the Iran affair will be a central feature more than a little besmirched.

New Zealand High Commission

New Zealand House
Haymarket
London SW1Y 4TQ
Telephone: 01-930 8422 Ext:
Telex 24368

"YELLOW"

Reference B66/5/1A

6 October 1987

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA DLO)

c.c. DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
Police (PTIU)
Defence (DDOP)

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Date	Nature of Material	Remarks
	Terrorism: UK press reporting	

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S.W. Prior
for High Commissioner

Security co-operation stems flow of US

IMPROVED co-operation between security agencies in the United States, Northern Ireland and Britain has apparently succeeded in reducing the once-considerable flow of weapons to the IRA from America to a trickle.

In particular, the use of "sting" operations by the FBI has deterred the IRA so much that it has shifted its entire procurement strategy away from the US, their traditional source, to the European and Middle Eastern arms markets.

According to one security source: "They may manage three or four rifles a month from the States, but there has been nothing of major significance for years. Their last three or four attempts have failed."

An IRA source confirmed: "There is so much FBI infiltration that our people are paranoid about the States now."

The enforced change in the IRA's strategy was illustrated in the incident at Loughgall, Co Armagh, last May when eight IRA volunteers were shot dead by the SAS. Seven of the eight weapons recovered at the scene were of European origin, while the eighth, an American Ruger revolver, had been stolen from a policeman.

Stemming the flow of US guns has taken more than a decade, but the European arms black market, centred on Amsterdam and to a lesser extent Paris, has proved a fruitful alternative

By David McKittrick
Ireland Correspondent

source for the IRA. Less regular supplies have also been obtained from the Middle East, including Libya.

Republican sources say that gunrunning is an increasingly expensive activity, and that the US remains a valuable source of funding. The Noraid organisation, which sends funds to the IRA, collects about $300,000 (£185,000) annually, according to the accounts which it lodges with the US Justice Department.

The IRA switched most of its resources to the European market in about 1985. Previously its most frequently used weapons, which were obtained via the US, were Smith and Wesson pistols, Ruger pistols and rifles, Colt pistols, Remington sporting rifles and shotguns, and Woodmaster rifles. Various service rifles, ranging from old Springfield models to M1 carbines and M16s, were also common.

Today the weapons most in use appear to be German-made Heckler and Koch rifles, Belgian FNs, and Star pistols.

The frustration for the IRA in the US is that powerful weapons are so commonly on sale. The main Woolworths store in Boston, for example, offers Armalites for $119 (£73), M1 carbines similar to those used by the RUC for $199 (£123), and pump-action shotguns costing $168 (£104). There is no limit on the amount of ammunition which may be purchased.

In Massachusetts, police run a 30-day check for firearms permits, but other states have much more relaxed procedures. A series of over-the-counter purchases using, for example, a false driving licence would make it relatively easy to build up a large amount of weaponry. Republican sources say, however, that they also have access to heavier weapons of types which could be used against security force bases, armoured Land Rovers and helicopters.

An IRA source said: "It's not that difficult to get specialised weapons, though we may have to pay exorbitant rates for them. But there's a massive surveillance problem. There's a personnel problem too — it's very hard to get good, reliable, disciplined people.

"There's such a degree of monitoring, phone-tapping and personal surveillance. There is also some evidence of the FBI putting bugs into the weapons, so that creates a big fear. We can get the weapons, but we can't get over

King backing for new extradition law

TOM KING, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, yesterday indicated that he placed great significance on the extradition legislation which the Irish parliament is due to enact in December.

He said the new law was a very important issue "and a very important symbol indeed".

The minister was speaking in Belfast as British and Irish officials continue discussions on possible reforms of the Diplock no-jury courts in Northern Ireland.

Dublin has been urging the Government to make changes in the courts in advance of the extradition decision.

A number of sources in the Republic have urged the Irish government not to proceed with the new law in the absence of reforms. But the Secretary of State would not be drawn on the Irish government's argument that the Anglo-Irish Agreement makes a direct linkage between extradition and Diplock reforms.

He said instead that the Government had a commitment to taking any steps which it regarded as sensible or helpful to improve public confidence in the administration of justice.

He said he had noted a very significant increase in public confidence in the anti-terrorist courts since the ending of "supergrass" trials.

Commenting on his recent 11-day visit to the United States, Mr King said the Anglo-Irish Agreement had made a great impact on Irish-American political opinion.

The Minister had found that many Irish-Americans had a "pretty superficial knowledge" of Northern Ireland.

He had also found, he said, that most of those campaigning in the United States for the adoption of the MacBride principles were genuinely concerned about ending discrimination and did not want the campaign to lead to disinvestment.

The Secretary of State said they were concerned that discrimination should be tackled in a way which did not mean fewer jobs.

weapons to IRA

the sort of supply which is going to change things."

One minor source of supply was disrupted a year ago when one of eight parcels posted in Chicago burst open in a postal sorting office in Dublin. They were found to contain 11 hand guns and a highly-specialised sniper's rifle capable of bringing down a helicopter. This was a Barrett M82 special applications rifle, accurate to 2,000yds, which sells in the US for £3,500.

According to an IRA source: "We got quite a lot through in that way, though it was at exorbitant rates."

The IRA is known to have examined military mortars which are available in the US, but concluded that they represented little advance on the devices which it can make itself. The American weapons were, it found, little more accurate than the home-made variety and carried explosive charges which were too small. The IRA-made mortar bombs are packed with up to 80lb of explosives.

■ The greatest factor in the virtual close-down of the American arms market to the IRA has been greater priority given by the FBI in recent years to anti-terrorist activity.

One early result of this was the neutralising of the most important supply group, which was headed by Walter Harrison, a New York-based former armoured car guard who is now in his seventies. In a court case in 1982, Harrison and four other men were acquitted of gun-running after claiming that their operation had been sanctioned by the CIA. In a book (*The American Connection* by Jack Holland) Harrison admitted his involvement in gun-running and estimated he had supplied the IRA with more than 2,000 weapons,

The IRA confirms Harrison's importance. One source said: "He was very central to most of the main shipments, though there were other people too behind the scenes."

The FBI has specialised in inserting its agents or informants into potential IRA supply lines. Transatlantic security co-operation, which included the use of aerial surveillance by RAF Nimrod planes, led to the interception of the Marita Ann trawler with seven tons of arms off the coast of Ireland in 1985.

Last year an FBI "sting" operation led to the conviction of eight men in Boston. They had attempted to buy 100 rifles and a Redeye surface-to-air missile from a bogus arms dealer who was actually an FBI agent.

The group had earlier contacted the IRA offering to supply arms, not for financial gain but because it agreed with its aims. The IRA, already wary of American surveillance, warned them to drop the idea.

One source said: "We wouldn't touch them. When they came with the proposal we told them we were infiltrated. They were told it was a set up."

Near-perfect fake passports sell for £9,000

By John Weeks
Police Correspondent

SCOTLAND YARD has asked Interpol to help trace hundreds of copies of high-quality forged British passports circulating in South Africa, Europe and on the Indian sub-continent.

Some of the near-perfect passports have been bought for up to £9,000 each by rich white South African families wanting an escape route to England in the event of further trouble there.

The Yard have so far recovered 15 of the passports from abroad, but believe they are being printed in Britain. All have an identical flaw—a tiny part of a letter "e" is missing—and the binding is of poorer quality than genuine passports.

Jules Loth, 56, a South African consultant engineer, was jailed at the Old Bailey for three years yesterday after pleading guilty to selling three forged passports.

'Bolt-hole'

Mr Andrew Mitchell, prosecuting, said Loth had sold the passports for £3,000 each to rich white South African families worried that they may have to flee to England in a hurry.

He told the court: "This case is about the supply of passports for rich white South Africans who would like to have a bolt-hole in this country in the event of South Africa being overrun."

Loth, who holds an American passport and lives in Johannesburg, was arrested at the Sloane Club, Sloane Street, Chelsea, during a trip to London. He sold three passports to a man called Ronald First and the forgeries were spotted when two of them were submitted to the United States embassy for visas.

First was fined £2,000 at Bow Street when he admitted trying to use the forged passports.

'Profit motive

Mr Mitchell said at the Old Bailey: "As far as the immigration authorities are concerned these are the finest counterfeits ever seen."

Mr Justice McCowan told Loth: "I have no doubt at all that your motive was profit." In addition to sending Loth to prison for three years, he ordered him to pay £150 towards the prosecution costs and recommended he be deported after serving his sentence.

BG615/11A

THE TIMES THURSDAY NOVEMBER 5 1987

Libyans loaded IRA ship, say French police

By John Cooney

The arms cargo found on the freighter Eksund was loaded in Tripoli on the night of October 14 by Libyan soldiers, French police sources told Reuter yesterday.

British security had been alerted as early as February, however, according to television reports last night which claimed that British authorities were warned inadvertently when the master of the Eksund, Mr Adrian Hopkins, wrote to the commercial section of the British Embassy in Dublin seeking information about buying a British vessel.

Members of Mr Hopkins' family yesterday revealed a reply sent to him by the commercial attache on February 7 which included a list of ship brokers.

As reported in *The Times* yesterday, Mr Hopkins also arranged delivery of two other vessels this year. The authorities had no reason to believe that Mr Hopkins had any IRA connections or sympathies.

On the Eksund operation, he flew from Dublin to Amsterdam on September 15, then on to Luxembourg and to Heathrow.

He was back in Dublin on September 18. On October 4 he flew to Malta where he was joined by the four other Irishmen who were aboard the vessel when she was arrested.

The five men were charged in Paris yesterday under France's 1986 anti-terrorism law with trafficking weapons for the purpose of disrupting public order by intimidation or terror. All but Mr Hopkins and Mr Henry Cairns were charged under the names given in the passports they carried.

The third member of the crew, Mr Gabriel Cleary, who carried a passport in the name of William Finn, is described by Irish police as a senior logistic officer in the Provisional IRA. He later admitted that he had been using a passport stolen from the Department of Foreign Affairs in Dublin in 1984.

Mr Cleary, in his mid-40s from Co Dublin, was acquitted in the special criminal court in Dublin in May, 1977, of making bombs. He lived for some time in the seaside resort of Bray, in Co Wicklow, where it is understood he met Mr Cairns.

Irish police yesterday confirmed that the other two crew members, who carried stolen passports in the names of Dennis Boyle and Edward Friel, belong to the Republican movement.

They are Mr James Coll, an electrician in his late 30s from Fanad, Co Donegal and Mr James Doherty, from Letterkenny, Co Donegal.

Mr Eugene Crowley, the assistant commissionaire in charge of security has travelled to Paris to assist the French authorities with background on the five men.

The nature of the border war against the British security forces in Northern Ireland would have been dramatically transformed if the IRA had landed the 20 Sam-7 surface-to-air missiles found aboard the Eksund, security forces said last night.

The missiles would have posed a huge threat to their helicopters in the border zone where security patrols avoid travelling by road in the

Continued on page 24, col 5

Paris – Under new legislation designed to protect those responsible for trying terrorism cases, the five suspects will not appear in open court between now and the verdict (Philip Jacobson writes).

The opening of formal proceedings marked the start of what is likely to prove a long-drawn-out legal affair. The investigating magistrate may conduct his inquiries at his own pace.

'Libyans loaded IRA arms ship'

Continued from page 1

rugged countryside along the 280-mile border with the Irish Republic because of danger from land mines.

The helicopters, known as Eagle patrols, drop small units of soldiers and policemen at carefully selected spots where they launch cautious patrols through fields and woodlands.

However, the Press Association last night quoted Dublin security sources as saying that the arms were earmarked for a Provisional IRA attack on Northern Ireland's Maze prison to try to free 300 terrorists in such spectacular fashion that it would have given them a worldwide propaganda boost.

Security sources said that for several years, the IRA has been eager to purchase the Soviet made Sam-7s.

The Sam-7 has an infra-red guidance system that directs the warhead to an aircraft's exhaust. It is portable and has a range of up to 1.5 miles.

IRA attacks have made it risky for British troops to travel by road since 1979, when 18 soldiers were killed at Warrenpoint by IRA bombs.

The most recent known attempt by the IRA to obtain more sophisticated weaponry was in the autumn of 1984 when it paid £1.5 million for delivery from the United States of seven tonnes of arms. This cargo, aboard the Marita Ann, was seized off the Kerry coast.

Irish police said in Dublin that the 150 tonnes of arms and ammunition on board the Eksund, valued at £15 million, was destined for use by the IRA in a big offensive against the British security forces.

B6615/11A

THE INDEPENDENT Thursday 5 November 1987

Arms ship: five charged

FIVE IRISHMEN were charged with terrorist offences by the French authorities yesterday, following the seizure of the coaster Eksund on Friday and her cargo of 150 tonnes of arms.

The men, some of whom are known IRA activists, were remanded in custody in Paris, charged with transporting arms aimed at "disturbing public order by intimidation or terror".

The identities of two of the men have now been established — James Coll, from Fanad, and James John Doherty, from near Gweedore, both Co Donegal.

Irish security sources say both are known Republican activists.

The other men have already been named as Adrian Hopkins and Henry Cairns, who are businessmen, and Gabriel Cleary, described by Garda sources as a "senior logistics officer" for the IRA.

By David McKittrick
Ireland Correspondent

Gardai in the Republic are still reluctant to accept that the entire load was destined for the IRA, because of the sheer size of the consignment, which included surface to air SAM-7 missiles.

Some suggest the IRA may have intended to hand on part of the load to terrorist organisations in other countries — notably the Basque separatist group ETA — though this idea is not apparently backed by any firm intelligence.

The IRA has been sharply streamlined in recent years and does not possess the manpower to use the thousands of rifles carried by the Eksund.

It does, however, plan its strategy for years ahead, and it is quite in character for its leadership to think in terms of hiding most of the rifles for future use.

It was revealed yesterday that Mr Hopkins — one of the men in custody — bought 100 charts from a London maritime suppliers which included details of the North Africa coastline.

Ian Kerr-Hunter, former Eksund captain, said the coaster was carrying some Irish charts, and some for areas east of her original destination, Malta.

Dangers of the Sam-7 missile

PORTABLE surface-to-air missiles are sought after items. Sam-7s, like the 20 missiles believed to have been destined for the IRA, are easily concealed and allow one man to bring down a warplane or passenger jet.

If such weapons were fielded in Northern Ireland, the Army and Royal Air Force would have to rethink their operations. The security forces make widespread use of helicopters as troop transports and for observation duties.

The destruction of an Army "spy in the sky" helicopter, like the ones used over Republican west Belfast, would be a major propaganda coup for the Provisionals. But the effectiveness of weapons like the Sam-7 is often over-estimated.

The missile has been in service for more than 20 years and it is not as accurate or as easy to use as the more modern American Stingers or the British Blowpipes sent to guerrillas in Afghanistan.

By Mark Urban
Defence Correspondent

Much depends on the skill of the operator. It would be very difficult to become proficient with a Sam-7 under the kind of restrictions that prevail in Ireland.

However, compared with the more modern weapons, the Sam-7 — which has a two-mile range — is more widely available on the world's arms black markets.

During the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, Egyptian and Syrian forces fired about 4,000 Sam-7s which only destroyed four Israeli aircraft. The Israelis managed to decoy most of the missiles by dropping infra-red flares.

More recent models of the missile have improved target-seekers which are better able to discriminate between flares and engine heat. But the Sam-7 is still regarded by most air forces as a relatively easy missile to beat.

Equipping Army and RAF helicopters and spotter planes in Ulster with anti-missile equipment would cost thousands of pounds for each aircraft, but would present no technical difficulties.


Dangers would still remain, particularly in a well-organised ambush. The IRA has used M60 machine-guns and 12.7mm snipers' rifles against helicopters. Such weapons could be used to force a helicopter to a height where it could be more effectively engaged with a Sam-7.

There would be greater risks if a Sam-7 was fired against a military VIP transport or civilian airliner. Such aircraft are vulnerable during take-off and do not usually carry any anti-missile counter-measures.

THE INDEPENDENT Tuesday 3 November 1987

Eksund arms seizure

Scale of IRA arms haul stuns Irish authorities





Customs officials aboard the Eksund at Brest yesterday to unload the arms shipment and (right) a weapon is recovered.

Reports by David McKittrick in Northern Ireland; **Christopher Scicluna** in Malta; **David Paskov** in Paris.
Additional reporting by **Nicholas Schoon** and **Mark Rosselli.**

THE authorities in both parts of Ireland have been taken aback by the scale of the latest gunrunning attempt by the IRA.

They are still awaiting details from the French authorities on how the Eksund, with its cargo of 150 tonnes of weapons and explosives, was intercepted at sea on Friday, but the indications are that it was purely a French operation.

This clearly raises the question of how such an enormous quantity of weapons could have been assembled and shipped without the knowledge of the British or Irish intelligence services.

Although the French have not named Libya as the source of the weapons, which are thought to include machine-guns, mortars, rifles, grenades and ammunition, Col Gaddafi's regime is the prime suspect. The Eksund could easily have picked the cargo up from Libya after leaving Malta on 27 August, and the colonel has a history of helping the IRA.

Guns and money were supplied to the IRA in the early 1970s, though the Irish navy intercepted a major consignment on the Claudia in 1973.

The supply was revived after a lengthy interruption several years ago, and the IRA is thought to have received both rifles and modern plastic explosives. This explosive has played a major part in the significant increase in IRA violence over the past year.

A Libyan connection may help to explain the massive size of the consignment. It is highly doubtful that the IRA could afford to buy so many weapons which, according to some estimates, could have a black market value of £15m or more.

The guns could possibly represent a gift from the Gaddafi regime. The security authorities are unsure of the IRA's exact relationship with the Libyans: they do not know, for example, whether the organisation was required to pay for its past consignments.

Some security sources in Ireland could not initially bring themselves to believe that the IRA would attempt to bring in such an enormous consignment on one ship.

This has led to speculation that the Eksund may have intended to make an intermediate stop.

According to security sources, a previous consignment took months to get from Libya to Ireland, eventually reaching its destination by a "highly circuitous" route through Western Europe.

Certainly, the IRA would have no immediate use for so many weapons. The organisation is now highly streamlined, consisting of well under a thousand people "on active service" at any time.

Surplus weapons may, it is suspected, have been stored on the Continent, safe from searches, until actually needed in Ulster; the IRA is known to plan for years ahead. It is therefore possible that the Eksund intended to off-load some or all of its cargo.

Speculation that the IRA may have intended to sell some or all of the load on the international arms market is highly unlikely. There have been no instances of this in the past.

It has not yet been confirmed that the load included sophisticated weapons which could be used against helicopters. The IRA has been desperately seeking the means to down the helicopters which are so valuable to the Army, particularly in hostile border areas such as South Armagh.

The appearance of such a weapon — for example, Russian-made SAM-7 ground-to-air missiles — would add a completely new dimension to the IRA's armoury, and force a fundamental review of Army tactics.

The IRA can draw little consolation that the impressive size of its consignment has been exposed to public gaze, but the incident represents a major blow to its morale and prestige, and possibly its finances.

Although it has had its successes during the year, the killing of eight of its men at Loughgall, the seizure of the Eksund and a number of other setbacks will dampen its spirits considerably.

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French question crew as cargo is unloaded

THE FIVE Irish crew of the Eksund were still being questioned last night by the French authorities, as the boat's cargo of weapons was being unloaded.

A tight security cordon was thrown around the naval docks at Brest yesterday, amid reports that the unloading of the unmarked crates of explosives and weapons could take all of today.

Meanwhile, there was no indication whether the crew had been charged. French law allows charges to be laid before an examining magistrate in private, but under a new law suspects in terrorist cases can be held without charge for 96 hours, double the normal period.

The case is being handled by the Fourteenth section of the Paris public prosecutor's office, an office which handles anti-terrorist cases, as well as officers from the DST counter-intelligence agency, according to French government sources.

The flow of information to reporters was strangled as soon as officers from the DST — the French equivalent of Special Branch — arrived at the naval base to take over from local customs officials. Local journalists, who had earlier been given permission by the Brest naval base to photograph the boat and the containers in which the arms were stored, were kept out by police when they arrived at the base yesterday afternoon.

The authorities have made it clear that no exact details of the cargo will be released until it has been thoroughly examined by personnel from the French Defence Ministry. At the weekend, customs sources had said that the cargo included assault rifles (the crew were said to be armed with AK-47 assault rifles when the boat was seized), machine-guns, grenades, mortars and "rocket launchers".

Early reports suggested that these launchers could be ground-to-air missiles, a weapon which has long been sought by the IRA. But yesterday it appeared that the launchers could be anti-tank weapons instead.

Irish police officers are understood to be on their way to interview the men being held in Brest, as is Stephanie Hopkins, wife of the Eksund's skipper, Adrian Hopkins.

At her home near Dublin, Mrs Hopkins said yesterday that she was "almost speechless" at the news of the arrest of her 49-year-old husband, the former owner of a major holiday company, Bray Travel, which collapsed in 1980 with debts of more than £1m.

She said Mr Hopkins thought he was simply delivering the vessel to new owners in Gibraltar.

"Obviously he was tricked or duped into doing something. We just feel it's all a ghastly mistake," Mrs Hopkins added.

The names given by the other men detained on the Eksund were reported by security sources to be Henry Cairns, 44, of Bray, Co Wicklow, a bookseller, friend of Mr Hopkins; William Finn, 43, of Co Mayo; and two men with Co Donegal addresses, Denis Boyle, 42, and Edward Friel, 34.



Adrian Hopkins yesterday.

Mystery of ship's missing days

SHIPPING sources in Malta revealed yesterday that the five Irish crewmen arrested by the French authorities on the Eksund had joined the boat only a few days before she left Malta on 12 October. They also confirmed that the Eksund did not load her cargo of weapons and explosives while she was tied up in Malta.

The Eksund was bought four months ago from a Swedish shipping company by Coral Springs Navigation, a company registered in Panama which is apparently unknown to Lloyd's of London. She arrived in the Maltese port of Valletta on 27 August, and the master declared then that the ship contained no cargo. He said that the Eksund had docked to effect minor repairs, and to change her crew. Shipping sources said yesterday that the entire crew — whose nationality is still not known — left the island within days, putting the ship into the hands of a local shipping agent. The ship remained berthed until 12 October, when she left, ostensibly *en route* for Gibraltar.

A few days earlier, a new crew had arrived. These were the five Irishmen who were on the ship when she was seized by the French Customs. They took possession of the ship, which had until then been manned only by a watchman working for the local agent.

It seems that no cargo of any kind was loaded while the Eksund was alongside in Valletta. Yesterday, a spokesman for the Maltese government emphasised that there was "no way" that 150 tonnes of weapons could have been loaded on board without the port authorities' knowledge. In addition, local officials — including Customs men — made a tour of the ship on 11 October, the day before she sailed, and are reported as saying that the holds were empty.

It is assumed that the Eksund picked up her cargo either at sea, or after travelling to an unknown rendezvous. The distance from Valletta to the point where she was boarded off Brittany on Friday is about 2,400 miles. Sailing at, say, 10 knots, the voyage would have taken eight days, but she took 18. The crew originally told the French authorities that they were *en route* from Madeira to Kiel in West Germany, and had earlier told the Maltese authorities that they would travel to Gibraltar; but Lloyd's said yesterday that there had been no trace of the Eksund at either Gibraltar or Madeira during the time she was at sea.

The Eksund's movements before she arrived at Malta are clear, however. Lloyd's said she arrived in Lowestoft on 6 August from Nykoping in Sweden. She sailed for Shoreham six days later, then set sail the next day for Gibraltar, arriving on 15 August. She sailed five days later, arriving in Valletta on 27 August.

(1) Mr Heath (2) B66/5/1A

THE INDEPENDENT Tuesday 3 November 1987

Clues to mystery voyage of IRA weapons ship

By David McKittrick, Ireland Correspondent, Christopher Scicluna in Malta and Mark Rosselli

SECURITY sources in Dublin and Northern Ireland are now convinced that 150 tonnes of weapons and explosives seized from a ship off Brittany at the weekend were destined for the IRA, and that the seizure happened almost by chance.

Intelligence agencies in both Ulster and the Irish Republic did not know of the consignment aboard the coaster, Eksund, before it was intercepted by French customs officials. This led to initial scepticism that the load, the largest ever heard of in either part of Ireland, was actually destined for the IRA.

The security sources were not convinced of IRA involvement until yesterday morning, when key details were passed on by French police.

The French authorities are adamant that they did not, as has been suggested, act on a tip-off from a British agency. They insist that the Eksund aroused their attention by acting suspiciously.

The ship, which was bought by a Panamian-registered company four months ago, made her last official stop at Malta. Her original crew left the ship, which underwent minor repairs and remained in Valletta for six weeks.

The five Irishmen now being questioned by the French police arrived a few days before she sailed, almost certainly without any cargo on board.

The day before she sailed, local shipping officals and customs men went aboard her and reported that her holds were empty.

Where the ship picked up the arms shipment is still a mystery; she took at least a week longer than necessary to travel from Malta on 12 October to France.

The weapons were discovered when the rusting coaster was seen to put down a small boat near Roscoff.

She was subsequently boarded by customs officials.

The ship and her crew were later taken to the naval port of Brest, and an explosive booby-trap removed from the cargo. Yesterday, as the arms were being unloaded amid tight security, it was still not known whether the men have been charged.

Security sources in Belfast were yesterday still unaware of the Eksund's exact cargo, and whether it included the anti-helicopter weapons which the IRA has been seeking for some years.

They were also unsure of the origin of the consignment, though the obvious suspicion is that it came from Libya, which has supplied the IRA in the past.

At least one of the five Irishmen found on board the Eksund is now confirmed as having IRA connections. Two of the Irish passports seized were false.

These were not, as has been reported, connected with the case of Kevin McDonald, the former employee of the Irish embassy in London who is suspected of irregularly issuing passports.

They were part of a consignment of one hundred blank passports stolen from the headquarters of the Irish Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1984.

Several of these have already turned up in the hands of IRA suspects. The key evidence of IRA involvement in the Eksund affair came when it was established that the crewmen who gave their names as Edward Friel and Denis Boyle were holding forged passports.

Two passports from the same batch were seized by police at an IRA hiding place in Glasgow in 1985. It was in this flat that the Brighton bomber, Joseph Magee and four others since convicted of IRA bombings in Britain were arrested.

Garda sources say they believe one of the two men giving false names is a known IRA activist who has been missing lately from his home in Donegal.

Details and pictures, page 3

Mr Prior

No B66/5/1A

With the Compliments of the
High Commissioner for New Zealand

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sent to me by

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Jill

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THE INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY

Volume 36
1987

OFFPRINT

obligations, it is clear that the protection of the family by a State is an absolute and immediate obligation on States which is also provided for in the treaties which impose relative and progressive obligations. For example, both Covenants require this protection. For all these reasons, the provisions of the European Social Charter and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights can indeed be helpful in the interpretation of the protection of the family by the State. This positive obligation itself is the basis for a liberal construction of the right to marry and found the family in ever developing, dynamic international law. Such a construction, in conjunction with the present development of the case law on family and private life, may lead the Strasbourg institutions to accept that a citizen has the right to full respect for his family life even if he marries a non-national.

Finally, States who become the contracting parties to an international human rights treaty do so primarily for the benefit of their own citizens. If that instrument provides for the protection of private and family life, it means that citizens of State X are guaranteed the right to private and family life within the territorial jurisdiction of State X. Yet, in the cases dealt with in this paper, we have seen that the Commission has considered the possibility of a wife following her husband to country Y to benefit from the rights guaranteed by the country of her citizenship, country X. Not a very logical outcome at all. It is incompatible with the effective protection of human rights to expect an individual to leave his country to benefit from the right to family life, or any other right, which is guaranteed by that very State.[33]

GORAN CVETIC

LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE *RAINBOW WARRIOR* AFFAIR

ON 10 July 1985 an undercover operation conducted by the French military security service (DGSE) sank the British-registered *Rainbow Warrior* berthed in Auckland Harbour. Less sensational but equally intriguing are the aspects of the subsequent dispute between New Zealand and France which relate to international law. In addressing the legal significance of the *Rainbow Warrior* case, this article pays particular attention to the contravention of international law, State responsibility, reparations and resort to arbitration. Salient features of the UN Secretary-General's arbitral ruling will also be discussed under these headings.

When Javier Pérez de Cuéllar presented his ruling on 6 July 1986 the settlement was justifiably regarded as supporting the legal regime on the use of force, and confirming the duty of States to settle their disputes peacefully. De Cuéllar

33. It should be noted that the Human Rights Committee had adopted a more flexible approach in this matter. The Committee took the view that "the common residence of husband and wife has to be considered as the normal behaviour of the family". See *Aumeeruddy-Cziffra* v. *Mauritius*, para. 9.2(b)2(i)2, 1981 Report of the HRC, GAOR, 36 Session, Supp.40, p.134.

certainly brought the dispute to a rapid conclusion after protracted bilateral negotiations had faltered. On 19 June 1986 the two States had accepted a proposal that they refer their outstanding differences to the Secretary-General for a binding ruling. Within two weeks of receiving written submissions (hereafter called "the Memoranda"), the Secretary-General made a ruling to be implemented by 25 July. By then, also, France had settled payment of compensation to relatives of the deceased crew member of the vessel, and had agreed to refer for separate arbitration the question of damages payable to the Greenpeace organisation. Such a sequel provided a welcome boost to the spirit of justice and civilised behaviour.

Like the *Powers* case of 1960 the *Rainbow Warrior* affair also confounds the traditional principle of State responsibility whereby agents of a State which accepts responsibility for delicts are held to be immune. The *Rainbow Warrior* settlement went further and deserves a place in the history of international disputes for the fact that the offended state, New Zealand, secured both redress from the State which, contrary to international law, had sent agents to sink the vessel, and the criminal conviction, under municipal law, of the agents themselves.

However, this article contends that it would be prudent to recognise that the settlement was as much discretionary as legal in character, and that political factors were particularly favourable to arbitral proceedings. De Cuéllar was asked for a ruling which would be "both equitable and principled". His arbitration was based on the principle of judge's discretion to decide *ex aequo et bono* on the justice of the case. On the key issue of the treatment of agents of a culpable State a settlement was reached in spite of the lack of clear guidance in either the customary practice or structures of international law. It is suggested, therefore, that the outcome does not necessarily elucidate questions of legal principle or establish new rules, though in view of the paucity of analogous cases it has a rarity value. Neither does the affair offer much support to those anxious to maintain legalistic barriers against the use of force.

A. Outline of the Facts

Two DGSE agents using false names were arrested in New Zealand on 12 July 1985 and duly charged with passport and related offences. On 23 July they were further charged with conspiracy to commit arson, with wilfully damaging the *Rainbow Warrior* by means of explosives, and with the murder of Fernando Pereira, a crew member who drowned in the incident. They pleaded not guilty and were remanded in custody. In mid-August the French press identified them as Alain Mafart and Dominique Prieur. On 26 July New Zealand police also obtained warrants to arrest agents who had left New Zealand prior to the explosions. On 13 August New Zealand demanded extradition of all those involved, but the French government replied that it could not extradite French nationals. The other agents, including three who reported to the Paris police on 25 August, were never apprehended. The charges against Mafart and Prieur were altered to manslaughter and wilful damage at the hearing on 4 November 1985. The agents pleaded guilty and were sentenced on 22 November to ten years' imprisonment for manslaughter and seven years' for wilful damage, the terms to run concurrently. The French Defence Minister told them that the government would work for their release and on 28 November he urged negotiations for their return to France.

An investigation by the French government into the possibility of official involvement, published on 26 August 1985, recognised the identity and affiliation of the agents but found no evidence to indicate that their mission involved anything other than surveillance. On 6 September France notified New Zealand of its concern that Mafart and Prieur should enjoy all the guarantees of international law. After further press revelations France acknowledged on 22 September that the agents had obeyed orders, and protested that they should be exempted from blame.

Meanwhile New Zealand had notified France on 6 September that it would take legal steps to secure compensation from the French State. Further, the New Zealand Prime Minister, David Lange, said on 26 September that he had prohibited extradition of the agents and political interference in the legal proceedings. After the convictions he remarked on 16 December that New Zealand would consider repatriating the agents provided they continue to serve their prison sentences. Negotiations between New Zealand and France, which had begun on 23 September 1985, continued intermittently until 19 May 1986 when New Zealand suspended them in protest at continued economic sanctions by France.

Early in 1986 France began impeding New Zealand imports. New Zealand formally complained to France on 26 February 1986, and on 4 April the European Community Trade Commissioner upheld the complaint. France did not admit to imposing the trade barriers until 22 April.

Other European States were concerned to see the dispute resolved, but efforts at mediation were hardly possible until the facts had been ascertained and the New Zealand proceedings completed. On 12 September 1985 the European Parliament condemned secret service activity against the *Rainbow Warrior* and demanded a full explanation from France. The UK government took little part in the dispute but on 24 September 1985 called on France to settle compensation without delay. During a visit to Europe in June 1986 Lange indicated that various governments had impressed upon him the need for an early resolution of the dispute. Between 31 May and 2 June, Ruud Lubbers, President of the European Council of Ministers and Prime Minister of the Netherlands, explored with the parties a proposal for independent arbitration.

France and New Zealand announced on 19 June that they had agreed to refer all matters without precondition to arbitration by the UN Secretary-General. The ruling was completed on 6 July 1986 and signed on 9 July. It required France to apologise and pay a fixed sum to New Zealand; required New Zealand to transfer Mafart and Prieur into French custody; and enjoined France not to impede New Zealand exports to the European Community. The terms were carried out on 22–23 July 1986, and France subsequently abided by the ruling on New Zealand exports.

France reached a settlement with the family of Fernando Pereira on 12 November 1985, encompassing a formal apology, compensation totalling 2.3 million francs, and reimbursement of the insurers. France and Greenpeace agreed on 19 December 1985 to negotiate damages—France having admitted

legal liability on 10 December. Unable to reach agreement, they referred the matter to a panel of three arbitrators on 10 July 1986. A ruling was still awaited in May 1987.

B. Contravention of International Law

The *Rainbow Warrior* sinking did not have serious consequences for peace. It was an officially inspired military operation with strictly limited intentions. Nevertheless, since the UN Charter was signed international lawyers have increasingly addressed the problem of low-level uses of force. French action clearly fell within the broad concept of "international delinquency" encompassing acts short of belligerency such as "violation of the dignity of a foreign State, violation of foreign territorial supremacy, or any other internationally illegal act".[1] The attack and the infringement of New Zealand sovereignty were universally condemned as contrary to international law, and the French government's Memorandum presented to de Cuéllar conceded in section 5 that the abuse of New Zealand sovereignty had been illegal.

The French government initially claimed that its agents had merely engaged in "surveillance". A more accurate description, given the covert nature of the job, would be "spying". Unfortunately, as Richard Falk observed: "traditional international law is remarkably oblivious to the peacetime practice of espionage"; and while Articles 29–31 of the 1907 Hague Convention deal with spying in wartime, there is no peacetime equivalent.[2] Many jurists, however, would agree with Falk who characterised espionage as illegal but tolerated in many countries.[3] By contrast, Julius Stone argued that spying itself was not illegal—as distinct from the collateral activity such as territorial intrusion. Stone advocated "reciprocally tolerated espionage" for the superpowers as a kind of confidence-building measure.[4] But such an approach is inappropriate to New Zealand and France for whom, as far as one can tell, reciprocal spying is hardly an assumed aspect of their relationship. In the event the New Zealand authorities ignored the "surveillance" by French agents and concentrated on the attack itself.

On this issue French officials produced a justification in their Memorandum (section 5) which referred to the history of "hostile action" by Greenpeace. The group had attempted to make "illegal" penetrations into waters around the Moruroa nuclear test site in 1973 and 1982. Further, these allegedly illegal acts had occurred in the context of New Zealand's alleged intervention in the internal affairs of France with respect to nuclear tests. According to President Mitterand the DGSE had acted lawfully because "New Zealand was a platform and a relay for initiatives hostile to France".[5] The *Rainbow Warrior* was preparing to lead a flotilla of craft into the vicinity of Moruroa, a site regarded as crucial to the strategic security of the French State. The Director of Nuclear Test Centres, Admiral Henri Fages, used the term *anticiper* to urge action against Greenpeace, arguing that although the *Rainbow Warrior* might remain outside territorial waters it could disembark canoes manned by French Polynesians who would have more legitimate claims for landing on the atoll.[6]

It is doubtful whether the French agencies involved in the plot had considered justifying their anticipatory action in legal terms at all, though they were anxious that France should escape blame.[7] They might have referred to the *Caroline* incident of 1837 and the doctrine of justified force to remove the threat of an attack or abate a nuisance. Although customarily admitted until the era of the Kellogg–Briand Pact, this inherent right of States has been restricted by Article 51 of the UN Charter and subsequent declarations such as Resolution 2625 (XXV) 1970 of the General Assembly Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States.

Even Daniel Webster's *Caroline* formula required the existence of an instant, overwhelming threat, "leaving no choice of means". As Brownlie noted it is doubtful whether maritime trespassers may be subject to violent measures unless engaged in an attack, piracy, or carrying aid to rebels.[8] The I.C.J.'s Merits judgment of 1986 in *Nicaragua* v. *United States of America*, narrowed the concept of an "armed attack" which might trigger proportionate self-defence. Logistical support to rebels did not constitute an "armed attack" or grounds for self-defence.[9] In the context of protecting its Pacific nuclear test site, France had not declared itself under attack. Greenpeace, a non-violent ecology group, could not be equated with a hostile navy, pirates or armed bandits. Neither did it present a sudden, or unexpected intrusion into a territorial area analogous to the Korean Airliner, KAL 007, shot down after entering Soviet airspace in 1983. In fact the French case for anticipatory self-defence was extremely thin, and France cited no analogous instances. The French Memorandum did draw on the *Caroline* ruling—but to support the principle that State responsibility had replaced agent responsibility.

1. Brownlie, *International Law and the Use of Force by States* (1963), p.219 (citing Oppenheim).
2. Falk, foreword to Stanger (Ed.), *Essays on Espionage and International Law* (1962), p.v; Baxter, "So-called 'Unprivileged Belligerency': Spies, Guerrillas, and Saboteurs" (1951) 28 B.Y.B.I.L. 323, 329.
3. Falk, "Space Espionage and World Order: A Consideration of the Samos–Midas Program", in Stanger (Ed.), *op. cit. supra* n.2, at p.55.
4. Stone, "Legal Problems of Espionage in Conditions of Modern Conflict", in Stanger (Ed.), *op. cit. supra* n.2, at pp.29–43.
5. *Keesings Contemporary Archives* 1985, p.34564; French Memorandum §5. The spelling "Moruroa" is replacing "Mururoa" as a more phonetic rendering of the Polynesian dialect. An extended territorial limit declared by France around Moruroa in the 1970s had no legal status and the voyage of HMNZS *Otago* in 1973 into the zone might be considered analogous to the Corfu Channel incident in which a British warship was deemed to have been exercising a right of innocent passage: *Corfu Channel Case* (*UK* v. *Albania*) [1949] I.C.J. 10.
6. Derogy and Pontaut, *Enquête sur trois secrets d'Etat* (1986), extract in *L'Express*, 5 Sept. 1986, p.24.
7. *Ibid*.
8. Brownlie, *op. cit. supra* n.1, at p.374.
9. *Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua* (*Nicaragua* v. *USA*) *Merits* [1986] I.C.J. 14, at 98–106. Seizure by Spain of the warship *Virginius* in 1874 was considered illegal, though it was carrying reinforcements for insurgents in Cuba. See Brierly, *The Law of Nations* (6th ed., 1963), p.316.

C. State Responsibility and Personal Immunity of Perpetrators for Criminal Acts

Although sovereign States may be obliged to accept the jurisdiction of courts of other States, the concept of State criminality, albeit useful in propaganda, is not strongly supported in law. State responsibility for delicts is limited to liability for reparations.[10] It is also an established principle that a State which sends agents to commit an *acta jure imperii* abroad is liable rather than the agents who should enjoy immunity from local courts. As de Cuéllar noted, France and New Zealand had great difficulty in reaching an agreement on the fate of the two DGSE agents, Mafart and Prieur, who had been arrested, tried, and sentenced in New Zealand.[11]

M. Fabius, the French Prime Minister, argued that the "people who merely carried out the act must, of course, be exempted from blame" as they had "only obeyed orders".[12] After Mafart and Prieur had been charged with murder and arson but before standing trial the French government admitted responsibility for the act and was willing to apologise. Consequently, so France claimed, the trial in New Zealand was unjustified and contrary to international practice.

At variance with this is the view that individuals are increasingly recognised as subjects of international law, and that agents are liable because they are the means by which acts of State are carried out. On the question of superior orders, precepts of the Nuremburg Charter (adopted by a UN Resolution on 11 December 1946) are commonly regarded as part of positive international law. By their adherence to these precepts both France and New Zealand had accepted the liability of individuals for war crimes and crimes against peace and humanity. Mafart and Prieur had not committed crimes of such magnitude, and the question of State immunity for lesser acts contrary to international law and crimes against municipal law is considered later. But New Zealand's Memorandum to the Secretary-General cited the IMTs to support the argument that superior orders was no defence, either in international law or in New Zealand law to which the agents were subjected.

(a) Acts in time of armed conflict. The legal position is relatively clear regarding status of service personnel during hostilities, at least at the higher levels of conflict. Irrespective of a declaration of a state of war, military personnel who kill foreigners are entitled to "soldiers' privileges", conditional on obedience to the laws and customs of war which have grown up around the regulations annexed to Convention IV of the 1907 Hague Conventions.[13]

(b) Acts in time of peace. At lower thresholds of conflict (sporadic acts of violence, guerrilla activity, so-called "terrorism", and sabotage), governments "apply their own criminal law to unpopular captured guerrillas, while granting belligerents' privileges to popular guerrillas" in accordance with concepts of

10. Brownlie, *op. cit. supra* n.1, at pp.153–154.
11. *Ruling Pertaining to the Differences Between France and New Zealand Arising from the Rainbow Warrior Affair*, 6 July 1986, para.3, UN Secretary-General's Office, Vienna.
12. *Keesings Contemporary Archives* 1986, p.34565.
13. Rubin, "The Laws of War" (1982) 76 Am.Soc.I.L.Proc. 139, 140.

"just war".[14] There was no suggestion that the agents in New Zealand conformed to the requirements for POW status under Article 4 of the 1977 Geneva Protocol (I). In the absence of hostilities New Zealand treated the agents as common criminals, not as POWs to be tried for war crimes or crimes against humanity. Although various conventions deal with air piracy, and Protocol I deals with non-international conflict, international law is inadequate to cope with perpetrators of sporadic violence across State boundaries. Indeed, support has been expressed for extending the laws of armed conflict to the lower thresholds of violence.[15]

As with low-conflict thresholds the situation regarding State responsibility for covert agents of the State lacks codified legal provision. Jacob Sundberg has suggested that the application of local jurisdiction presupposes that:

1. the agent acted clandestinely or on false pretences, rather than, say, as a recognisable serviceman engaged in reconnaissance;
2. officially no connection exists between him and the foreign government benefiting from his espionage and that the foreign government will not come forward and protect him by shifting responsibility to itself.[16]

The principle of agent immunity cannot apply if "officially" spies do not exist. Sponsoring States typically disown them. In the *Powers* case of 1960 President Eisenhower broke with usual practice and admitted that Powers was spying in plain clothes in a camouflaged U2. American officials justified the espionage, but Powers still stood trial in the Soviet Union.[17]

Yet when a government seeks to protect its agents, whether engaged in spying or other acts, by claiming delictual responsibility for itself, Webster's ruling in the *Caroline* and *McLeod* cases is said to apply. In 1837 McLeod, a British officer, entered the United States to capture the ship which was running men and supplies to assist a rebellion in Canada. A man was killed and McLeod charged with murder. The American Secretary of State ruled that:

> after the avowal of the transaction as a public transaction, authorised and undertaken by the British authorities, individuals concerned in it ought not to be holden personally responsible in the ordinary tribunals for their participation in it.[18]

However, in the *Caroline* incident McLeod's presence in American territory was deemed to have been lawfully justified by the doctrine of self-defence.

In other situations, including the *Rainbow Warrior* incident, it has been

14. *Idem*, p.142.
15. In theory guerrillas considered as belligerents are liable to charges of war crimes, the definition of which was expanded in the 1977 Protocol (I) para.85(3) to include "making the civilian population or individual civilians the object of attack"; "making non-defended localities . . . the object of attack"; and "making a person the object of attack in the knowledge that he is *hors de combat*". But this regime was interpreted by the UK, for example, as applying only to a certain level of intensity of military operation comparable to that envisaged in Protocol II. See Rubin, "Terrorism, 'Grave Breaches' and the 1977 Geneva Protocols" (1980) 74 Am.Soc.I.L.Proc. 192, 194, 207 n.4.
16. Sundberg, "Legitimate Responses to Aerial Intrusion in Time of Peace" (1984) 78 Am.Soc.I.L.Proc. 33.
17. Wright, "Legal Aspects of the U2 Incident" (1960) 54 A.J.I.L. 836.
18. Cited by Sundberg, *op. cit. supra* n.16, at p.33.

impossible to establish immunity from local jurisdiction for perpetrators and instrumentalities making unauthorised, illegal entries with the official purpose of committing unlawful acts. As the leading case, *The Schooner Exchange* v. *McFaddon* of 1812 recognised, immunity from jurisdiction for acts contrary to international law derives ultimately from the consent of sovereign States to territorial access for foreign servants, and warships or aircraft. When a Soviet submarine ran aground inside a Swedish military security area which it had entered without consent on 27–28 October 1981 the local authorities assumed jurisdiction over the vessel and crew without Soviet permission—though for political reasons Sweden made only limited use of its rights. Regarding crimes committed by foreign agents against municipal law, as Quincy Wright argued, "There is no rule of international law which forbids a State to punish individuals who seek to obtain classified documents, who penetrate forbidden areas . . . or who engage in seditious or other activities which it has made illegal", provided the local laws conform to international obligations.[19]

1. Immunity from local jurisdiction: New Zealand law

In New Zealand sovereign immunity for any proceedings, civil or criminal, is governed by New Zealand law. International law does not apply directly, though it may assist the courts in interpreting New Zealand statutes, and there is a legal convention, typical of common law countries, that Parliament is presumed to legislate in accordance with international law. New Zealand has not so far enacted a State Immunity Act on the lines of the US, UK, Canadian and Australian Acts. But the common law decisions in *Trendtex Trading Corporation* v. *Central Bank of Nigeria*[20] and *I Congreso del Partido*[21] bind New Zealand courts in a restrictive approach to State immunity.[22] These applications of English law would take priority, but had the Greenpeace organisation decided to apply for damages against France in a New Zealand court, its counsel could have referred additionally to restrictive immunity decisions elsewhere relating to tortious acts such as *Letelier* v. *Chile*[23] decided under the US Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 1976. On the basis of the tort exception to State immunity established in that Act, in this case representatives of the victim of an assassination by the Chilean secret service were awarded substantial damages in a US court. The court disallowed Chile's claim that if it admitted responsibility, which it did not, the doctrine of immunity would apply.

The rules of diplomatic immunity in the 1961 Vienna Convention are in fact given expression in the New Zealand Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act 1968 (section 5). Of course Mafart and Prieur were not "diplomatic agents" as defined in the Convention, and were therefore criminally liable for their actions, unlike the "diplomatic agents" of the Libyan People's Bureau who escaped

19. Wright, "Espionage and the Doctrine of Non-Intervention in Internal Affairs", in Stanger (Ed.), *op. cit. supra* n.2, at p.13.
20. [1977] Q.B. 529.
21. [1981] 3 W.L.R. 328; [1983] 1 A.C. 244.
22. They were applied in *Marine Steel Ltd* v. *Government of the Marshall Islands* [1981] 2 N.Z.L.R. 1, and *Buckingham* v. *Hughes Helicopter* [1982] 2 N.Z.L.R. 738.
23. 488 F. Supp. 665 (1980). See Crawford, "International Law and Foreign Sovereigns: Distinguishing Immune Transactions" (1983) 54 B.Y.I.L. 75, 110–111.

British justice after a policewoman was shot in London in 1984. In dealing with the perpetrators outside the competence of international law the New Zealand authorities followed usual municipal practice.

For practical reasons, to expedite a criminal prosecution, the New Zealand police had to charge Mafart and Prieur under their pseudonyms at a time (23 July) when they were still denying any connection with the French State. They were not publicly recognised as State servants by the French government until 26 August. State immunity was not strictly an issue until Fabius admitted State responsibility for the attack on 22 September. The New Zealand government did not consider this admission altered the criminal liability of the agents for the commission of serious crimes in New Zealand.

Lange discounted returning the agents for trial in France, where the mood in official circles can be judged from the arrest of five officers for allegedly leaking secrets about the operation to the French press, a move designed to protect the DGSE and the military. However, the French government made no express and formal immunity claim for Mafart and Prieur. Indeed, French lawyers worked hard to gain a reduction in the charges, and French politicians claimed that they attempted plea-bargaining at the inter-governmental level.[24] Constitutionally, as both Lange and the Solicitor-General (a non-political officer) maintained, the New Zealand government could not interfere in the judicial process.

2. The arbitral ruling

By its *de facto* acceptance of local jurisdiction France had to resort to an equity claim. For an "equitable and principled" settlement, the agents would have to be released. Lange's readiness to concede repatriation, under the deportation terms of the Criminal Justice Act 1985 (NZ), was conditional on guarantees that they would remain in custody and not be released to sun themselves on the Côte d'Azur.[25] France replied that there was no basis in French law by which the agents could serve some portion of a New Zealand sentence in France. Neither could they be liable to new proceedings there. France and New Zealand are not bound by conventions on the transfer of sentenced offenders (e.g. that of 21 March 1983 formulated by the Council of Europe).

The Secretary-General thus played a key part in overcoming this legal and political impasse. He ruled that New Zealand should deliver Mafart and Prieur into the hands of their employers, the French military, to serve a three-year period of detention on Hao atoll, 800 km west of Tahiti. They would be permitted contact with associates and family, but not with the media. The French government would provide quarterly reports to the Secretary-General and to New Zealand, with provision for third-party verification should New Zealand request it.

Although no legal principles were cited and the ruling was based on discretionary judgment, the settlement could be said to support some aspects of current practice. Acting under orders is no defence, and securing a shift of responsibility from the agent to the State is problematic when:

24. *Guardian*, 6 Nov. 1985.
25. *Guardian*, 17 Dec. 1985.

1. the agent gained unauthorised entry and acted in clandestine fashion;
2. the sponsoring State waives agent immunity by omission or implication;
3. the victim State asserts jurisdiction for practical reasons;
4. there is an absence of political goodwill on the part of the culpable State, to the extent perhaps that expiation of any kind is unlikely to be forthcoming.

Naturally the New Zealand police and legal authorities had to satisfy an outraged public that everything was being done to bring all suspects to trial. At the political level the government had clearly determined to secure compensation in some form. The notable feature of the *Rainbow Warrior* case is that New Zealand obtained justice in respect of the agents, and redress based on firm foundations of international law from the State which sent them.

D. Reparations

A State delict, irrespective of its effect on peace, may give rise to liability for an apology and damages. International law has progressed since claims, such as those arising from American naval operations against France in 1798–1801, were disallowed because no war had broken out. In 1985 Lange inverted this argument, claiming redress precisely because his country was not at war. It can be a problem, of course, for the victim to secure reparations from a foreign State unless they form part of a peace treaty imposed by force. If the obligation is not settled diplomatically, an aggrieved State may resort to the International Court of Justice, or by mutual consent to another international tribunal or third party.

On 30 August 1985 the New Zealand government announced that it was considering legal action, probably in the I.C.J., and on 6 September New Zealand gave notice that it would seek compensation for a breach of sovereignty and the physical consequences of the act through any means available in international law or in conventions of the United Nations.

1. Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice

However, the following jurisdictional obstacles stood in the way of a New Zealand application to the I.C.J.:

1. The French declaration of acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction by the I.C.J. ceased in 1973 and was not renewed or replaced.
2. Even if there had been a declaration in force in the *Nuclear Tests* cases of 1973, France refused to accept jurisdiction on the grounds that its declaration of 16 May 1966, accepting compulsory jurisdiction under Article 36(2) of the I.C.J. Statute, reserved " . . . disputes arising out of a crisis affecting national security or out of any measure or action relating thereto, and disputes concerning activities connected with national defence".[26] Australia contended that this declaration did not revert to a subjective form of acceptance included in the superseded French declaration of 18 February 1947. The 1966 declaration reflected, therefore, an

26. (1972–3) 27 I.C.J.Y.B. 60; *Nuclear Tests* [1974] I.C.J. Pleadings, Vol.II 347 (letter of the French Ambassador in the Netherlands to the Registrar of the I.C.J., 16 May 1973).

intention to allow the Court full competence to provide an objective definition of issues affecting "national security".[27] However, France appeared to decide in 1973 that the applicability of the 1966 reservation rested upon its own assertion that the dispute was in an excluded category. If New Zealand took the *Rainbow Warrior* dispute to the I.C.J., *ceteris paribus*, it seems certain that France would have rejected jurisdiction.

This would not have prevented the I.C.J. itself deciding whether the nature of the dispute or practical difficulties in ascertaining facts affected its jurisdiction—as the Court's Merits judgment in *Nicaragua* v. *USA* established.[28] Although in the *Nuclear Tests* case the Court failed to determine its own jurisdiction, weighty dissenting opinions maintained that it was contradictory for the Court to exercise substantive jurisdiction without having first made a determination of that jurisdiction and the legal grounds for it.[29]

One should note, however, that in addressing the problem of jurisdiction for a particular case the Court may be persuaded that it is a non-justiciable, political dispute and thus not admissible (as France contended in 1973). Legal advisers to the Reagan administration argued that an ongoing conflict such as that with Nicaragua was a subject for the UN Security Council or some other political forum.[30]

3. The current New Zealand declaration of 22 September 1977 accepting compulsory jurisdiction featured a reservation which excluded:

> disputes in respect of which any other party to the dispute has accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice only in relation to or for the purpose of the dispute: or where the acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction on behalf of any other party to the dispute was deposited or ratified less than twelve months prior to the filing of the application bringing the dispute before the Court.[31]

4. New Zealand's declaration of 22 September 1977 also contained the usual condition of reciprocity in relation to other States accepting the Court's jurisdiction.

2. Negotiations and the arbitral award

Thus, New Zealand had little option but to conclude that an application to the I.C.J. was unlikely to be entertained, and so resorted to bilateral negotiations. In these discussions France was prepared to offer apologies for the moral damage caused. Citing the precedents of the *Carthage* and *Manouba* cases between France and Italy, and the *Corfu Channel* case,[32] the French Memoran-

27. *Nuclear Tests* [1974] I.C.J. Pleadings, Vol.I 307.
28. *Nicaragua* v. *USA, supra* n.9, pp.16–18.
29. *Supra* n.27, (Judgment) 477; joint dissenting opinion of Judges Onyeama, Dillard, Jimenez de Arechaga and Sir Humphrey Waldock at 324–325.
30. Cutler (1984) 78 Am.Soc.I.L.Proc. 330. See separate opinions of Judges Gros and Petrén, *supra* n.27, at 297, 302.
31. (1983–4) 38 I.C.J.Y.B. 80.
32. Permanent Court of Arbitration, *Reports of International Arbitral Awards*, Vol.xi, pp.450, 464; *UK* v. *Albania* [1949] I.C.J. 4, 25–26, 36.

dum argued (section 6) that compensation might also involve a solemn recording of a breach of international law. The violation of sovereignty could not be the subject of pecuniary compensation because it had not caused material damage to New Zealand. On the other hand, for the attack and its consequences France accepted the principle of financial redress for material damage and expenses. There remained dispute about the sum.

De Cuéllar ruled, first, that the French Prime Minister should convey a formal unqualified apology to the New Zealand Prime Minister for "an attack contrary to international law". Second, the Secretary-General awarded New Zealand US$7 million, almost splitting the difference between New Zealand's claim of $9 million and the French offer of $4 million. New Zealand received compensation "for all the damage" it had suffered, though without indication whether part of the sum was punitive. While punitive damages are probably permitted in cases of unlawful resort to force, including unlawful penetration of territorial waters, "it would be immaterial whether the surplus were regarded as a fine or exemplary damages".[33]

E. Pressures for Arbitration

Arbitration had been a realistic solution, partly because the two sides were not involved in military hostilities. Prior to the affair, relations between France and New Zealand had improved in spite of their divergent views on nuclear deterrence.[34] Although not allied with each other by treaty the two countries are linked together in the Western alliance system and have overlapping security and economic interests. During the affair their mutual ally, the United Kingdom, played a passive role designed to avoid dramatising the situation. The government refused to instigate proceedings, though the *Rainbow Warrior* was registered in the UK, and Mrs Thatcher pointedly contradicted Lange's argument that France had committed an act of terrorism. Eventually the UK government did call upon France to settle reparations quickly. But for New Zealand the negative effect of minimal support from a quarter which could have been expected to offer more should not be discounted as a factor in encouraging Wellington to seek arbitration.[35] France on the other hand was criticised in the European Parliament, which demanded a full explanation of the affair, and encouraged to arbitrate by the Netherlands Prime Minister.

There is little doubt that detention of the two agents afforded New Zealand its main controlling influence over the progress of the case. In addition, the French government was probably anxious to avoid a public inquiry in New Zealand which might reveal secret aspects of the sabotage operation.[36] Initially, President Mitterrand had promised co-operation with inquiries into an act which could not be excused for any reason and also spoke of the guilty being punished: "*les coupables, à quelque niveau qu'ils se trouvent, soient sévèrement sanctionnée*".[37] This gave way to a more Machiavellian approach when the government realised that its only salvageable dignity lay in focusing on the plight of two patriotic agents. And Mitterrand could hardly risk the political damage of a prolonged trial influencing the national elections due in March 1986.

33. Brownlie, *op. cit. supra* n.1, at pp.148 n.7, 153.
34. As reflected in: Association France–Nouvelle-Zélande (Eds.), *Où en est la Nouvelle-Zélande?* (1986).
35. King, *Death of the Rainbow Warrior* (1986), pp.193–194.
36. *The Times*, 3, 12 Dec. 1985.

Accordingly, the agents were lionised. Defence Minister Quilès paid tribute to their courage in a televised telephone call to them on 2 November 1985. The new Prime Minister, M. Chirac, continued this tactic, describing Mafart and Prieur as heroic. The manager of a touring French rugby team visited Dominique Prieur in prison. Complaints of unfair treatment—excessive use of handcuffs, psychological pressure to extract confession, maximum security measures—were circulated by French lawyers working on the case. Although these were trivial and came to naught, it is clear that French officials and politicians had begun to finesse New Zealand's end-game. It involved maximising the nuisance value of prisoners who had become celebrities as well as a security headache for the New Zealand authorities.[38] Nevertheless, Chirac was willing to seek arbitration without release of the agents as a precondition, confident that a formula would be found.

A far more serious, and perhaps ultimately decisive, pressure on New Zealand arose from the introduction of trade matters into the dispute. In view of its requirement for access to the European market, New Zealand would have fared badly in straight bilateral dealings with France over the *Rainbow Warrior*. On 3 April 1986 the French External Trade Minister said that a ban on New Zealand butter imports was being contemplated, and later admitted that New Zealand produce was being held up for non-commercial reasons. New Zealand exports to France fell by almost 40 per cent in the first four months of 1986 compared to the corresponding period in 1985.[39] Because the French government had denounced the trial of the agents as unjustified, this economic leverage might be defined as retorsion, "an unfriendly, uncourteous or unfair act in reply to another unfriendly, uncourteous or unfair act" and strictly an exercise within normal State competence and *in se* a lawful act.[40] As we have seen, however, New Zealand had a legal right to conduct a trial. Indeed, France had behaved illegally in sponsoring the *Rainbow Warrior* operation in the first place. Once arbitration was on the horizon, New Zealand withdrew its request to the Director-General of GATT for an investigation as a goodwill gesture; France lifted some of the sanctions. The Secretary-General's ruling required France not to block the arrangements for New Zealand products as determined by the European Community.

F. Law and the Rainbow Warrior

The *Rainbow Warrior* affair bolsters the notion that there is an international doctrine of non-intervention. France was obliged to recognise this, and also to

37. *Op. cit. supra* n.11, Annexes C, D, and para.3.
38. *Guardian*, 3 Mar. 1985, 2 Sept. 1986; *Evening Post* (Wellington), 26 June 1986. King, *op. cit. supra* n.35, at p.211.
39. Cassen, *Le Monde diplomatique*, July 1986, p.15; *Evening Post*, 20 June 1986.
40. Beirlaen, "Economic Coercion and Justifying Circumstance" (1984–5–I) 18 Rev. Belge de Droit Int. 57, 63–64.

make restitution for contravening the doctrine outlawing armed attack. Further, the case may have a positive long-term benefit in drawing attention to those areas of deficiency, remarked upon by Falk, Lauchterpacht, Crawford and others, in both the substantive rule of international law and its procedures, especially concerning immunity, low-level force, and peacetime espionage.[41] Certainly in government torts the international trend in State practice is to restrict State immunity and assert local jurisdiction, to the extent that it has been said to contribute to the "demystification of the State as a supreme being".[42]

Jurists will note that the outcome of the inter-government dispute was based on an individual's concept of fairness, producing a ruling rather than a legal judgment. De Cuéllar resisted any attempt to imbue the case with theoretical significance or to refer to norms—though no doubt legality as well as practicality formed part of his private deliberations. Yet in so far as the settlement can be considered as an example of State practice, it significantly challenges the principle that either a State or its agents—but not both—are liable for acts contrary to law outside the Geneva Conventions.

On a less positive note, the *Rainbow Warrior* affair occurred in the context of an international lawlessness in State behaviour, licensed by the failure of the major powers to establish a normative non-force security regime. In the correspondingly depressed context of legal opinion, Falk condemned the "mindless optimism" of his colleagues who believed that "the cumulative impact of trivia is . . . the accretion of significance".[43] It proved difficult to sustain optimism through the 1970s and early 1980s as States continued their cavalier breaching of Article 2(4) of the Charter and their manipulation of the self-defence rule. Although the USA's view that the I.C.J. had no jurisdiction in the case brought by Nicaragua may be accepted, on technical grounds, and the Court's judgment on the merits challenged for its handling of practical problems in elucidating facts,[44] the US decision of 6 April 1984 to withdraw for two years from the jurisdiction of the I.C.J. in cases involving Central American States aroused great anger amongst American jurists. It was referred to as "Black Friday", and the decision disputed on grounds that withdrawal of the 1946 declaration of acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction was unlawful on its own terms and also violated an international contractual obligation. The American Society of International Law broke with custom and passed a resolution condemning the policy.[45]

In view of this international and juridical context it is important to appreciate the particular reasons why France had to submit to legal and arbitral process—while other States committing misdemeanours have not. Obviously, the operation was bungled. Second, and deriving from the bungle, the affair became a domestic political scandal, complete with cover-up, which involved the highest State officials. Third, New Zealand's quest for justice gained strength not from military, political or economic clout, in which it is dwarfed by France, or from the weight of sympathetic international opinion, but from the detention of the two suspects. New Zealand has no clandestine agents operating overseas let alone languishing in French custody. France could not, therefore, evade justice by offering to barter agents.

Michael Pugh

41. Falk, "The Future of International Law" (1981) 75 Am.Soc.I.L.Proc. 8; Lauchterpacht, "Preserving Order and Security" (1981) 75 Am.Soc.I.L.Proc. 59; Crawford, *op. cit. supra* n.23, at p.77.

42. Feldman, "The United States Foreign Immunities Act of 1976 in Perspective: A Founder's View" (1986) 35 I.C.L.Q. 302.

43. Falk, *op. cit. supra* n.41, at p.14.

44. Kozak, (1984) 78 Am.Soc.I.L.Proc. 322. In *Nicaragua* v. *USA* it was further argued that the Court lacked jurisdiction on certain matters because it could not apply customary international law in lieu of the relevant multilateral treaties which the Court had accepted were valid: *supra* n.9, p.519, dissenting opinion of Jennings J.

45. Res. of 12 Apr. 1984 (1984) 78 Am.Soc.I.L.Proc. 137; Weiss, *idem*, pp.324–227.

TRANSNATIONAL APPLICATIONS OF *MAREVA* INJUNCTIONS AND *ANTON PILLER* ORDERS

A. General Considerations

The conduct of civil litigation in England has been radically altered by the introduction and development of the *Mareva* injunction and the *Anton Piller* order.[1] This paper reviews some of the conflict of laws issues arising from these measures.[2]

Until 1975 provisional protective measures had only a very restricted place in English law. This was in marked contrast to the situation in many other jurisdictions, notably those with civil law systems, where a wide range of such measures has always been available. English law had, in particular, never allowed for the arrest or freezing of the defendant's assets before trial to ensure that the plaintiff had something out of which to satisfy his judgment debt. By the 1970s this rule that "you cannot get an injunction to restrain a man who is alleged to be a debtor from parting with his property"[3] was providing room for widespread abuse. There was nothing more tempting, especially for foreign companies, than to evade the consequences of an adverse English judgment by simply removing all their assets from the jurisdiction before trial. In an era when telecommunications had made such transfers possible almost instantaneously, and when, at least in the English context, exchange controls did not pose a major check on cross-border flows of assets, the English plaintiff was increasingly left holding an empty judgment. The "one-ship" company provided the classic case of this type of abuse.[4]

Similarly unscrupulous behaviour was also being experienced in the collection of evidence. Especially in the context of copyright and passing-off actions, nothing was easier for the computer or video tape pirate than to destroy his illegal copies before trial.

1. The *Mareva* injunction takes its name from *Mareva Compania Naviera SA* v. *International Bulkcarriers SA* [1975] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 509. The *Anton Piller* order takes its name from *Anton Piller KG* v. *Manufacturing Processes Ltd* [1976] Ch. 55. Recent surveys of the two measures are to be found in Hoyle, *The Mareva Injunction and Related Orders* (1985) and Powles, *The Mareva Injunction and Associated Orders* (1985).

2. Discussion of some aspects of this topic is to be found in Hoyle, *op. cit. supra* n.1, at Chap.10; Collins, "Provisional Measures, the Conflict of Laws and the Brussels Convention" (1981) 1 Y.B.Eur.L. 249; and Patchett, *Recognition of Commercial Judgments and Awards in the Commonwealth* (1984).

3. *Robinson* v. *Pickering* (1881) 16 Ch.D 660, 661, CA *per* James LJ.

4. See *Supreme Court Practice*, para.29/1/5.

Printed in Great Britain
at the University Press, Oxford
by David Stanford
Printer to the University

Production co-ordination by
MM Productions Ltd
1 Brookside, Hertford, Herts.

New Zealand High Commission

"Yellow"

New Zealand House
Haymarket
London SW1Y 4TQ
Telephone: 01-930 8422 Ext:
Telex 24368

Reference B66/5/1A
19 October 1987

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

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Date	Nature of Material	Remarks
	Terrorism : press reporting	UK Conference
	Information brochure for conference 8-9 December 1987 organised by Professor Paul Wilkinson, Professor of International Relations, University of Aberdeen and Chairman of the Research Foundation for the Study of Terrorism.	

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CONFERENCE CHAIRMAN: Professor Paul Wilkinson, Professor of International Relations, University of Aberdeen and Chairman of the Research Foundation for the Study of Terrorism.

CONFERENCE PROGRAMME

Monday, 7th December

1800-1900 hrs. Pre-registration and cocktail reception.

Day 1, Tuesday 8 December

0900-1000 Registration & coffee

Session One — **The impact of terrorism on business and industry, an assessment of the threat:** Brian Michael Jenkins, Chairman, Political Science Department and Director of Terrorism Research, RAND Corporation

Session Two — **The nature of the terrorist:** Jillian Becker, Director of the Institute for the Study of Terrorism

Session Three — **The threat of left-wing terrorism to business and industry in Western Europe:** Dr Hans Horchem, former Head of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Hamburg and now Director of the Institute for the Study of Terrorism, Bonn

Lunch Speaker — T E Utley CBE, former Deputy Editor of The Daily Telegraph & Special Feature Writer for the Times

Session Four — **Kidnap and hostage:** Detective Chief Superintendent F Corcoran, Head of Covert Operations Group, New Scotland Yard

Session Five — **Product contamination:** Deputy Assistant Commissioner B R C Worth OBE, Head of Specialist Operations Crime Branches, New Scotland Yard

Session Six — **Personal protection in high risk areas:** Simon Adams-Dale, Managing Director, Control Risks Prevention Services Ltd, Control Risks Group

1800-1900 Delegates' reception

Day 2, Wednesday 9 December

0900-1000 Registration & coffee

Session One — **Keynote Address:** A French view of combatting terrorism, Raymond Marcellin, Senator du Morbihan, Ancien Ministre de l'Interior (Former Minister of the Interior), France

Session Two — **Dealing with the bomb threat:** Major Michael Coldrick MBE, GM, Bomb Disposal Officer, former Head of Weapons Intelligence Northern Ireland, & Security Consultant

Session Three — **Maritime — special operations:** Captain John Moore, RN, former Editor of Jane's Fighting Ships, Honorary Professorial Fellow, University of Aberdeen

Lunch Speaker — Yvon Chotard, Président de Monde et Enterprise, France

Session Three — **Syndicates**

1) **Civil aviation & terrorism,** Chairman: Professor Paul Wilkinson

2) **Maritime,** Chairman: Stuart Syrad OBE, MC, Head of Maritime Security, Argen Ltd

3) **Physical security of industrial plant & premises,** Chairman: Mrs Evelyn Le Chene, Risk & Crisis Analyst

4) **Insurance,** Chairman: Howard Thompson, Director H M Thompson & Co Ltd

5) **Aspects of computer security,** Chairman: Commander David Veness, Commander Royalty & Diplomatic Protection Group, New Scotland Yard

Session Four — **The media and terrorism:** Panel discussion including David Mannion, Deputy Editor, Channel 4 News, T E Utley former Deputy Editor of the Daily Telegraph, Special Feature Writer for The Times and Norris McWhirter, Founder Editor of the Guiness Book of Records and Chairman of the Freedom Association

Session Five — **The future course of terrorism:** Brian Michael Jenkins, Chairman, Political Science Department and Director of Terrorism Research, RAND Corporation.

Session Six — **Key closing address:** A N Other

1700 Close

There may be additions and/or amendments to the programme

TERRORISM, BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY — objectives of the conference

Foreword from Professor Paul Wilkinson, Conference Chairman & Chairman of the Research Foundation for the Study of Terrorism.

"You may be one of the many people who believe that terrorism 'is none of our business', that 'we should leave the whole business to governments, police forces, and other official security agencies'. You may even believe that 'terrorism will never affect us or our company', or that if it did 'the costs would be trivial' and that 'in any case there is nothing we can do about it'. If so we would be wrong on all counts.

"In recent years over 25% of international terrorist attacks have been against companies or industrial targets. In many cases the direct costs of physical damage caused by terrorist attacks run into millions of pounds. The indirect costs, in terms of the long-term effects of prolonged terrorism on business and industrial activity in whole countries and regions, can be enormous.

"In many countries in high risk areas of the world the police and government simply do not have the necessary authority, resources and capabilities to effectively prevent or reduce terrorist attacks. This is one reason why businesses have increasingly turned to the private security industry and their own security systems to achieve greater protection. **In the USA a total of 21 billion dollars is now spent annually for security hardware and services. This is 50% more than the entire US police budget. It has been estimated that by the year 2000 US industry's annual expenditure on private security will have increased to 60 billion dollars.**

"The truth is that you and your company cannot afford to ignore the trends in the growth of terrorism and its growing lethality. You need to know what can be done to prevent, or at least reduce, the danger. One of the primary aims of the newly established Research Foundation for the Study of Terrorism is to provide expert and independent briefing and advice on these matters for business leaders and top management.

"This is our first major conference for business and industry. It brings together the best available international expertise in the field. **It should be emphasised that this is a private conference. Lectures and discussions will be entirely off the record.** There is also an exhibition of some of the latest security equipment and services available to industry.

"This is a conference no company involved in international business can afford to miss."

Professor Paul Wilkinson
Chairman

TERRORISM, BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY — exhibition

As an additional service to delegates, an area has been set aside within the conference complex to show selected items of relevant security equipment and literature. Delegates will be able to view and discuss with exhibiting personnel during the evening cocktail receptions, tea, coffee and lunch breaks. Further details available from the organisers.

THE RESEARCH FOUNDATION FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM

The conference is being organised on behalf of The Research Foundation for the Study of Terrorism in association with the French organisation ,* Monde et Enterprise. The Research Foundation is an independent, non-party educational trust specifically designed to foster, sponsor and disseminate top-quality research into all aspects of terrorism. It produces briefing papers, reports and other information for industry, legislators, senior officials, professional people and the academic world.

The Foundation's Chairman is Professor Paul Wilkinson, Writer and Broadcaster, author of many books, including 'Terrorism and the Liberal State', Joint Editor of 'Contemporary Research on Terrorism' and Professor of International Relations, University of Aberdeen. He is chairing the conference.

The Advisory Council, responsible for supervising the Foundation's programme is a distinguished body of experts, including leading figures in industry, the armed services, the law and the police. The list of members is below.

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Professor Paul Wilkinson MA (Chairman), Professor of International Relations, University of Aberdeen • **Michael Ivens CBE** • **Norris McWhirter CBE** • **John Newton Scott OBE TD**

COUNCIL:

The Duke of Valderano (Chairman), Lecturer and former instructor in anti-terrorism • **Colin Beer,** Former Chief Superintendent of Police • **Don Emilio Beladiez, Marques de la Conquista Real,** Ambassador of Spain • **Lt General Jose de Bettencourt Rodrigues,** Former Minister for the Army, former Commander in Chief Portuguese Forces in Africa. Grand Cross of Military Merit of Portugal • **Sir John Biggs-Davison MP** • **Sir Ian Easton KCB DSC,** Former Commandant of The Royal College for Defence Studies • **Nicholas Elliott CBE,** Formerly Foreign Office — expert on Middle East • **Pierre Emanuelli,** Secretaire Generale, Monde et Enterprise (France) • **Ian Greig,** Former Senior Executive, Institute for the Study of Conflict • **Anthony Harrigan,** President, United States Business and Industrial Council, President USIC Educational Foundation • **Sir Arthur Hockaday KCB CMG,** Former Assistant Secretary General (Planning & Policy) NATO, former Permanent Under Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence • **Commander William Hucklesby QPM FRGS,** Former Head of Anti-Terrorist Squad • **Dr Ortwin Lowack (West Germany)** • **The Count of Nuvolara,** Professor at the University of Milan • **Monsignore Giorgio Orioli, Viscount of Oriola,** Chorepiscipus of Antioch of the Syrians and Procurator at the Holy See • **Ronald Payne,** Writer on Terrorism • **Norman Reddaway CBE,** Former Assistant Under Secretary of State, FCO and Ambassador to Poland • **Sir Julian Ridsdale CBE MP** • **Dr Edward Rozek PhD MA,** Professor of Politics and Comparative Ideologies, University of Colorado at Boulder, USA • **Dr Alan Sabrosky PhD MA** • **The Duke of St Albans OBE,** Former Colonel in Intelligence • **T E Utley CBE** • **Dr M H Waring PhD MA (Brazil)**

*Monde et Enterprise is an independent French business organisation concerned with economic and geopolitical issues. Taking part in the conference is the Président, Monsieur Yvon Chotard in association with other leading French industrialists.

TERRORISM, BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY — who will attend

Delegates will include senior representatives of industry, commerce, banking, insurance, transport and tourist industries, other specialist group representatives and government officials. Delegates would gain maximum benefit from attending on both days of the conference although there will be the facility to attend for one day only. **Full details on fees, registration and other relevant information appear overleaf.**

TERRORISM, BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY — the organisers

Terrorism, Business and Industry is organised by Offshore Conferences & Exhibitions Ltd, established as one of the leaders in the field of specialised trade conferences and exhibitions. OCE is part of the Spearhead Group of companies, organisers of, among others, Offshore Europe (Europe's largest offshore exhibition), Oceanology International Exhibition, the Latin American Petroleum Show, Helitech, International Helicopter Technology and Operations Exhibition, specialised trade events in the USA and India and publishers of major trade directories. Further information can be obtained by contacting the organisers.

TERRORISM, BUSINESS & INDUSTRY CONFERENCE BOOKING FORM

IN CONFIDENCE

Fees £350 + VAT per person per day or £650 + VAT for both days

Name of delegate | Position (where relevant) | Day 1 | Day 2 (please tick)

_____ £_____

_____ £_____

_____ £_____

☐ Cheque is enclosed payable to Offshore Conferences & Exhibitions Ltd — TOTAL £_____

☐ The above sum will be credited by direct transfer to the account of Offshore Conferences and Exhibitions Ltd at Midland Bank plc, 1 Castle Street, Kingston upon Thames, Surrey KT1 1ST, UK Account No 61050419 — VAT 15% £_____

☐ Please invoice — TOTAL £_____

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My credit card number is ☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐

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Address _____

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Post code _____ Country _____

Telephone _____ Telex _____ Fax _____

Contact name and telephone number if not as above _____

Please indicate and specify any special requirements _____

_____

Please give name(s)/address(es)/contact phone number(s) of **other members** of your party even if they are **not** attending the conference


(Please use separate sheet if necessary). _____

PLEASE INDICATE WHICH SYNDICATE YOU WISH TO ATTEND ON DAY 2 (SEE PROGRAMME FOR DETAILS): ☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5

Simultaneous translation English/French: I will/will not require this facility.

Location

The Terrorism, Business and Industry Conference will be held at the Anúgraha Hotel which is a purpose built conference centre combining all the comfort and hospitality of an English country house and hotel together with the high technology and efficiency essential to a modern conference facility. It is situated on the edge of Windsor Great Park and there is excellent access by road, with the M4, M3 and M25, as well as the A30 and A308 nearby; by rail, being only three miles from both Egham and Windsor stations; and by air, being only fifteen minutes away from London Heathrow Airport. In addition there is a Helipad in the grounds.



The Conference Room

The Conference will be held in the Upper Hall which is a fully air-conditioned facility providing the highest standard of audio-visual technology.
The language of the conference will be English with simultaneous translation into French. (Please tick on the booking form if you require this facility).

The Exhibition

The Exhibition will be in the Lower Hall which is directly under the conference room and adjacent to the syndicate rooms. Delegates will have the opportunity to visit the exhibition during the registration periods, refreshment breaks and social functions.

Confidentiality of the conference

Names of delegates registering will be treated in absolute confidence both by the organisers and venue staff.
For reasons of confidentiality there will be* **no press reporting** during the event. We hope as a result of the closed nature of the conference both speakers and delegates will be as frank and open as possible in order that all participants obtain the maximum benefit from the event.
Upon request, delegates will be able to make further contact with the speakers following the event, subject to the usual constraints of confidentiality.
***Note:** Members of the press wishing to attend as delegates must therefore observe Chatham House Rules.

Security arrangements

All necessary arrangements are being made to ensure the physical security, on site, of all participants. If there are any particular requirements with reference to these arrangements please advise us.

Delegates' fees

The fee for attendance is £350 + VAT per person per day or £650 + VAT for both days and includes morning coffee and afternoon tea, 3-course luncheon with wine, an evening cocktail reception on the evening before the conference plus a cocktail reception on the evening of the first day.

All necessary information for your participation will be forwarded upon receipt of your booking. All documentation will be collected at the conference during registration.

Hotel reservations for delegates

Delegates are offered a preferential room rate at the Anúgraha Hotel (single occupancy) — £51.30 + VAT inclusive of English breakfast. To book your rooms complete and return the form below to the organisers. We will pass on the booking to the hotel, but delegates are responsible for paying their own hotel bills direct to the hotel in the usual way on departure. However, please note that all bedroom reservations are subject to 6pm release unless a deposit of one night's rate is paid in advance. The hotel will contact you direct with confirmation of your booking.
Please do not send cheques for hotel accommodation to the conference organisers.

The hotel's full address is:
Anúgraha Hotels Ltd, Wick Lane, Englefield, Green, Egham, Surrey, TW20 0XN, U.K.
Tel: 0784 34355. Telex: 928116 Anúgraha G.

Conference bookings

To book your conference place(s) and your hotel accommodation if required, please complete the form below **(both sides)** and return it to **Offshore Conferences & Exhibitions Ltd, Rowe House, 55/59 Fife Road, Kingston upon Thames, KT1 1TA, Surrey, UK. Tel: 01-549 5831. Telex: 928042 Spears G. Fax: 01-541 5657.**
Fees do not include hotel accommodation, but a preferential rate has been arranged. See information under 'Hotel reservations for delegates'.

Booking form — Anúgraha Hotel

Price per room £51.30 + VAT (inc B'fast) (single)

Accommodation required _____ Nights December _____

Name _____

Name _____

Name _____

Name _____

Company _____

Address _____

Post Code _____ Country _____

Telephone No: _____ Telex: _____



New Zealand High Commission

New Zealand House
Haymarket
London SW1Y 4TQ
Telephone: 01-930 8422 Ext:
Telex 24368

"YELLOW"

Reference B66/5/1A

28 September 1987

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA DLO)

c.c. DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
Police (PTIU)
Defence (DDOP)

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Date	Nature of Material	Remarks
	Terrorism	
	press reporting	
	UK anti-terrorist measures	etc

S.W. Prior
for High Commissioner

Yard man leads terrorist blitz

by David Connett
and Chris Ryder

A SENIOR Special Branch officer from Scotland Yard has been drafted into the Home Office to oversee a security crackdown at British ports and airports. This follows two reports in recent years that were highly critical of weak spots in Britain's defences against international terrorism.

Now Commander Angus McKintosh, the first national co-ordinator of ports units, is to propose tighter uniform security measures. He is also expected to call for better training for police checking incoming passengers and to investigate whether facilities for holding and interviewing suspects are adequate. Although his position is officially only advisory, McKintosh will liaise with senior Home Office officials and report to a standing committee of chief police officers.

Standardised security measures will be the first priority. The need for tighter controls was highlighted during a joint RUC-Scotland Yard operation in 1985 that foiled a bomb blitz on a dozen mainland seaside resorts. The IRA bombers were travelling on unchecked coal boats between England and Northern Ireland.

Checks on passengers coming from Northern Ireland by more normal means vary. Manchester airport insists that all arrivals fill in landing cards, but at Heathrow and the Stranraer ferry terminal in Scotland passengers normally have to complete cards only if police stop them. Another weakness is the emphasis by some police officers on imagined stereotypes of terrorists.

McKintosh will investigate reports that facilities for interviewing suspects are often inadequate, and that passenger screening at some ports is cursory because of poor facilities.

Chief constables will be expected to pressurise ferry companies and port authorities that have refused in the past to improve facilities by arguing that the Prevention of Terrorism Act is a temporary measure.

One area in which improvements are not yet planned, however, is the compiling of proper records of passengers arriving in Britain. Most landing cards still end up in cardboard boxes at the south London headquarters of the Immigration Service, where cross-checking is a virtual impossibility.

● The new head of the National Drugs Intelligence Unit vowed yesterday to bring about greater co-operation between police and customs officers. Since it was set up two years ago, the NDIU has been plagued by agency rivalry.

Customs officers often distrust the Metropolitan Police, having encountered corrupt officers during drug and pornography inquiries during the 1970s. The appointment of Barry Price from an outside force – he is the Cumbria chief constable – is clearly intended to bring about a *rapprochement*. To mark his neutrality, Price will not be employed by Scotland Yard but by the government.

THE SUNDAY TIMES 27 SEPTEMBER 1987

Britain heads fight against high-tech international fraud

By Frances Gibb, Legal Affairs Correspondent

A big assault is being mounted by the Government against fraud and other international crime, Sir Patrick Mayhew, the Attorney-General, said yesterday.

Steps already taken included the Drug Trafficking Act, the Serious Fraud Office and the Criminal Justice Bill which would make it easier to obtain evidence from abroad, he told lawyers at the International Bar Association conference in London.

But there also needed to be international co-operation to combat sophisticated fraud using new technology, Sir Patrick said.

Countries needed to match the ability of fraudsters to switch money instantaneously around the world without regard for international boundaries.

"The fraudster feeds like a leech upon the technology of commerce", Sir Patrick said.

Technology had ensured that opportunities for the fraudster had never been so prolific or so tempting. "It has ensured that the task of defeating him has never been more difficult", he said.

A real act of will was needed if countries were to co-operate in investigating a fraud that operated only against foreign nationals in a foreign country.

"It is tempting when eking out a slender budget, to ask what public interest there can be in pursuing these villains when all the losers are foreigners, living overseas, all the evidence is abroad, and the time and expense needed to investigate the matter properly would be enormous", Sir Patrick said.

He added that Britain was no longer as insular as it had been. In the past it had been slow to sign mutual assistance treaties on criminal matters, but the lack of treaties had hampered British investigations.

The Government had been looking closely at the rules of evidence and procedure which had been at the root of its difficulties. Changes in society and in the criminal justice system called for a "fresh evaluation of where the public interest lies".

There had been "splendid support" internationally for the drug trafficking laws and the United Kingdom had played a leading role in formulating the Commonwealth scheme for mutual assistance in criminal matters.

A memorandum of understanding had also been signed with the United States for the exchange of information about fraudulent activities in stock market dealings.

On the domestic front, a number of important reforms recommended by the Fraud Trials Committee under Lord Roskill were being implemented. The Government had already set up the Serious Fraud Office whose work under its own director would be supervised by the Attorney-General.

The office would have streamlined powers which would drastically reduce the difficulties of investigating and prosecuting serious frauds. The Criminal Justice Bill would make it easier to obtain evidence from abroad and allow witnesses abroad to give evidence in court via a live video link.

THE OBSERVER, SUNDAY 6 SEPTEMBER 1987

'Tin can killer' joins IRA arsenal

THE IRA is using a revolutionary home-made grenade on the streets of Northern Ireland capable of ripping open armour-plated police vehicles, the RUC in Belfast has confirmed.

One policeman was recovering in hospital yesterday after an attack on Friday night on a police Land-Rover in Londonderry with what the Provos call their new 'impact grenade.'

According to a police source, the home-made grenade replaces the Soviet RPG-7 used by the IRA until the early 1980s with devastating results. All RPG-7s were eventually seized by the police.

The security forces say the IRA is using Semtex, an Eastern bloc explosive, in the grenade. It is concealed in a device modelled on the Soviet PG-1 anti-tank weapon.

An officer who witnessed a direct hit on an RUC Land-Rover recently in North Belfast said: 'This device is lethal. It simply split open the Land-Rover. It was a miracle no one was killed.'

The IRA has spent more than a year experimenting on the grenade, with the bomb-makers testing its capacity to cut through reinforced metal. Thrown underarm, it does not need a launcher and can be tossed easily at a passing vehicle. People in West Belfast claim the RUC has already changed its mobile patrol tactics.

The new grenade consists of two pieces of wood, a tin can, explosives and a strip of bin liner attached to the handle to stabilise flight.

THE TIMES SATURDAY SEPTEMBER 19 1987

New Act freezes drug cash

More than one hundred restraint orders have so far been made on drug-trafficking criminals under the new powers to stop them from salting away their assets before a trial, a Home Office official told the IBA conference yesterday.

Mr Nigel Varney, head of the Home Office's division on criminal law, said that the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986 enabled the High Court to restrain the use or distribution of an accused's assets before a trial.

"So far there have only been a few cases which have reached the stage of conviction and confiscation; but enough to show that the Act is capable of being applied effectively and with good result."

Another important provision in the Act, which came into force on January 12, was the new "laundering" offence. That prohibits helping someone keep the benefits of drug trafficking, knowing or suspecting that the person was a drug trafficker.

The Government has suggested that governments world-wide follow suit.

Computer fraud 'could drain UK of sterling in 15 minutes'

By Frances Gibb
Legal Affairs Correspondent

A fraud linking two big electronic money transfer systems could empty the United Kingdom of sterling in 15 minutes, Mr Kenneth Lindup, an inspector from Barclays Bank, said yesterday.

He told lawyers at the International Bar Association conference in London that the potential for fraud involving vast sums of money was now enormous.

In the course of the average day, some £25-30 billion was transferred between the UK clearing banks using CHAPS (clearing houses automated payments systems).

In addition the individual banks were transferring money internationally using their own networks. Sums of £2 million to £3 million a day were typical, he said.

A fraud linking CHAPS with SWIFT, the world-wide financial message switching service, could empty the United Kingdom of sterling in 15 minutes.

In the case of the fraud suffered by Security Pacific, 10.2 million dollars were shifted to Los Angeles, to New York and from there to Zurich before the fraud was even discovered.

But Mr Lindup emphasized that the incidence of computer crime was exaggerated. Much of it was not real computer crime, but was described as such because at some stage a computer was used.

Often the crime could have been committed when the records were kept manually, he said.

Computer crime was carried out by interfering with or illegally modifying a computer system for illegal gain in a way that would not have been possible with manual systems.

He said the typical computer criminal was not as the public perceived him: "a hacker penetrating a system using a home computer". The most likely perpetrator is an employee of the victim, exploiting a weakness in the system. He or she was likely to be in a well-placed job, probably using drugs and with financial difficulties.

Among the gaps in controls which give rise to computer frauds are a failure to check message authentication codes; failure to protect confidential data and a lack of adequate security training.

Another was failure to ensure adequate separation between staff carrying out transactions and those checking them.

Professor Michael Levi, senior lecturer in criminology at University College, Cardiff, told the conference that computer crime was rarer than the public imagined.

He said it was costing the United Kingdom approximately £40 million annually. But such crime constituted only a small proportion of the £2,113 million of fraud dealt with by the UK fraud squads in 1985.

He added, however, that hi-tech crimes of espionage, computer fraud and damage, and counterfeiting were a big potential risk facing any commercial or government organization.

INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION

Sir Frederick Lawton, a retired Court of Appeal judge, yesterday called for an end to trial by jury in complex fraud cases.

Sir Frederick told the conference: "The modern large-scale swindle, with its field of operation extending over many jurisdictions, is difficult enough for experienced judges to try, and probably impossible for a jury drawn at random from the electoral roll".

He said that trial by a single judge would probably not be acceptable to the British public but three judges or one judge sitting with commercial assessors might be. Abolition of juries in complex cases was proposed by the Roskill Committee on fraud trials but shelved by the Government after widespread opposition.

Attack on extradition proposals

A QC yesterday strongly attacked a government proposal to make it easier for other countries to extradite criminals from the United Kingdom.

Mr Colin Nicholls, QC, told the conference that the proposal, in the Criminal Justice Bill, would abolish the rule under which requesting states must produce "prima facie" evidence of guilt. It appeared to treat the ordeal of being arrested, removed to a distant foreign jurisdiction and kept in custody there "as a hardship of no consequence, so long as the fugitive is eventually acquitted".

The Government assumed that the Secretary of State could ensure flimsy or tenuous requests for extradition would be refused, but nowhere in the Bill was there any provision requiring him to ensure that there was evidence, or that it had been judicially examined in the requesting state.

Government arguments that an extradition treaty indicated justifiable faith in a state's criminal justice system failed to distinguish between that system and the executive.

Third World alert on Mafia money

Organized crime has moved into commerce on such a huge scale that it poses a threat to national economies, particularly in the Third World, the conference was told yesterday.

Dr Barry Rider, chief Commonwealth fraud officer, commercial crime unit, at the Commonwealth Secretariat, said that the new groups of criminals were handling such vast sums of money that their activities were undermining society like a cancer.

Money obtained through commercial and economic crime was diverted to other crimes such as drugs trafficking, smuggling, firearms and political assassination, he said.

Most policemen took the view that traditional organized crime as with the Mafia or the Triads was dead, Dr Rider said.

But increasing evidence was coming to light that "senior managements" of those gangs and their "families" had merely "legitimized" themselves and now operated from the comforts of board rooms rather than the back rooms of gambling and drug dens.

Those criminal groups had developed into tight cells beyond the reach of police and no longer needed "armies" to run their street empires.

Instead they were in management and finance business, advising both legal and illicit operations, often franchized to criminal organizations.

The sums of money involved should not be underestimated, he added. In a number of cases, advance fees, frauds and simple cases of diversion had resulted in sums in excess of 20 million dollars being misappropriated.

"The US Treasury has estimated that the illicit narcotics industry in the US alone is presently running in excess of 70 billion dollars a year."

In one case referred to his unit, Dr Rider said, a fraud thought to be in excess of 2 billion dollars apparently created by some Eastern bloc countries to strengthen a particular government had been substantially diverted into crime.

To do all that, Dr Rider said,the groups used off-shore banks, secret bank accounts, foreign nominees and "washed" the money through ordinary investment facilities.

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B66/5/1A

4/111/49

NEW ZEALAND MISSION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK

NEW ZEALAND
LONDON
-5 OCT 1987
CENTRAL REGISTRY
HIGH COMMISSION

25 September 1987

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs
WELLINGTON

(LGL UNC)

c : Canberra
Ottawa
London
Washington
The Hague
Bonn

UNGA 42 : TERRORISM

... Would you please refer to our telegram 1103 of 21 September (copies attached by bag for posts which were not addressees) and to other exchanges on this question.

2 The draft resolution on terrorism cosponsored by twenty-one Western countries under item 126 of the agenda has now been circulated as A/C6/42/L.2.

3 As yet Syria has not tabled a draft on its proposal for an international conference. Over the next three weeks we, with other Western delegations, will be talking to moderate non-aligned delegations about their thinking on this question and in particular on the scope for producing a consensus text. At this stage, no date has been set for the one Plenary meeting at which the Syrian proposal is to be introduced prior to reference to the Sixth Committee as part of item 126. However we expect the Plenary meeting will probably be on 19 or 20 October, immediately before the Terrorism item is taken up in the Sixth Committee (tentatively 21-28 October).

Permanent Representative

Att

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MASTER COPY

NYP 396

CONFIDENTIAL

CLAS: CONFIDENTIAL 21 SEPTEMBER 1987
FROM: NEW YORK PM
TO : WELLINGTON 1103-ROUTINE
RPTD: OTTAWA 184-ROUTINE : CANBERRA 390-ROUTINE
LD : SFA (LGL UNC)

SUBJ: UNGA 42 : TERRORISM

FOLLOWING PLENARY ENDORSEMENT OF GENERAL COMMITTEE REPORT, THE TITLE OF THE TERRORISM ITEM (ITEM 126) NOW READS AS PER TITLE OF RESOLUTION 40/61, WITH THE ENDING ''... TO EFFECT RADICAL CHANGES:

(A) REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

(B) CONVENING UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UN,

OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE TO DEFINE TERRORISM AND TO DIFFERENTIATE IT FROM THE STRUGGLE OF PEOPLES FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION''.

2 THE ITEM WILL BE TAKEN UP IN THE SIXTH COMMITTEE WITH SUB ITEM (B) FIRST BEING INTRODUCED AT ONE PLENARY MEETING BEFOREHAND.

3 WESTERN DELEGATIONS CONSIDER THIS OUTCOME, WHILE A LITTLE LESS THAN PERFECT, TO BE NOT BAD AT ALL. DISCUSSION AT INFORMAL GROUP MEETING LAST WEEK ON HOW IT MIGHT HANDLE THE INTRODUCTORY MEETING IN PLENARY, REVEALED SOME DIVISION OF VIEW. UK THOUGHT IT BEST FOR WESTERN VIEWPOINT TO BE ON RECORD. FRG HOWEVER THOUGHT THE WESTERN INTEREST WAS NOT/NOT TO BE ON RECORD ON THE SYRIAN PROPOSAL AND THAT THIS WOULD HELP TO KEEP THE INITIAL PLENARY MEETING BRIEF. WHILE THERE WAS GENERAL SUPPORT FOR A BRIEF MEETING, SEVERAL DELEGATIONS THOUGH THAT THERE MIGHT BE A NEED FOR ONE OR TWO WESTERN SPEAKERS DEPENDING ON WHAT SYRIA'S SUPPORTERS DID.

CONFIDENTIAL

4 IN DISCUSSING THE HANDLING OF ITEM IN SIXTH COMMITTEE SEVERAL DELEGATIONS EXPRESSED STRONG RELUCTANCE TO HAVE CHAIR (LIBYA) OR THE CZECH VICE CHAIR INVOLVED IN CHAIRING CONSULTATIONS. IT WAS FELT THAT IT WAS BEST LEFT TO COSPONSORS OF THE RESPECTIVE RESOLUTIONS TO RESOLVE THEIR DIFFERENCES.

5 A DANISH SUGGESTION ABOUT RESISTING THE SYRIAN PROPOSAL, LED FRANCE TO RESPOND THAT THE GROUP SHOULD NOT RULE OUT THE MERGING OF COMPETING TEXTS WITH A VIEW TO GETTING EVERYONE ABOARD A CONSENSUS RESOLUTION SINCE THE PROSPECT OF CONSENSUS PROVIDED THE WEST'S REAL LEVERAGE IN NEGOTIATION. BOTH THE UK (''WE'LL BE LUCKY TO ESCAPE REFERENCE TO THE CONFERENCE'') AND US AGREED ALTHOUGH THE LATTER SAID THERE WAS NO WAY IT COULD E.G. ACCEPT A PREPCOM. FINLAND EMPHASISED THAT IT WANTED ONE (CONSENSUS) RESOLUTION ONLY AND THAT THE IDEA OF EMPOWERING THE UNSG TO LOOK INTO A CONFERENCE MIGHT BE A BASIS FOR COMPROMISE.

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NYP 396
21/1645LT NWG

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UNITED NATIONS

A

General Assembly

Distr.
LIMITED

A/C.6/42/L.2
21 September 1987

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Forty-second session
Item 126

MEASURES TO PREVENT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM WHICH ENDANGERS OR TAKES INNOCENT HUMAN LIVES OR JEOPARDIZES FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS AND STUDY OF THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THOSE FORMS OF TERRORISM AND ACTS OF VIOLENCE WHICH LIE IN MISERY, FRUSTRATION, GRIEVANCE AND DESPAIR AND WHICH CAUSE SOME PEOPLE TO SACRIFICE HUMAN LIVES, INCLUDING THEIR OWN, IN AN ATTEMPT TO EFFECT RADICAL CHANGES

Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

draft resolution

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming its resolution 40/61 of 9 December 1985, adopted without a vote, in which it unequivocally condemned, as criminal, all acts, methods and practices of terrorism wherever and by whomever committed, including those which jeopardize friendly relations among States and their security,

Deploring the continuation of terrorist outrages, including those instigated or supported by States, involving assassinations, the taking of hostages, the hijacking of aircraft, bomb attacks, letter or parcel bombs and other criminal acts that spread violence and terror, may result in loss of human lives and jeopardize the normal functioning of international relations,

Deeply disturbed that terrorism has become a world-wide phenomenon and can pose a threat to international peace and security,

Taking note of the deep concern and condemnation of all acts of international terrorism expressed by numerous international organizations,

Convinced of the importance of expanding and improving international co-operation among States, on a bilateral and multilateral basis, that will

contribute to the elimination of acts of international terrorism and their underlying causes and to the prevention and elimination of this criminal scourge,

Recalling the existing international conventions relating to various aspects of the problem of international terrorism, inter alia, the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, signed at Tokyo on 14 September 1963, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at The Hague on 16 December 1970, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal on 23 September 1971, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, concluded at New York on 14 December 1973, the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, concluded at New York on 17 December 1979, and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, concluded at Vienna on 3 March 1980,

Convinced of the importance of the observance by States of their obligations under the relevant international conventions to ensure that appropriate law-enforcement measures are taken in connection with the offences addressed in those conventions,

Commending the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International Maritime Organization for their efforts and important achievements in promoting the security of international air and sea transport against acts of terrorism, consistent with its resolution 40/61,

Urging all States to take effective measures in accordance with established principles of international law, in order that all acts, methods and practices of international terrorism may be brought to an end,

Mindful of the necessity of maintaining and protecting the basic rights of the individual including those relating to procedural safeguards and guarantees, in accordance with the relevant international human rights instruments and generally accepted international standards,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General,*

1. Calls upon all States to fulfil their obligations under international law to refrain from instigating or supporting terrorist acts in other States, or acquiescing in or encouraging activities within their territory directed towards the commission of such acts;

2. Urges all States to intensify their co-operation in the struggle to prevent and eliminate all acts of terrorism, especially through the exchange of information and the apprehension of the perpetrators of such acts;

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* A/42/519.

3. Calls upon States which have apprehended perpetrators of acts of terrorism to extradite them or to submit a case to their prosecuting authorities in accordance with applicable law;

4. Urges all States effectively to apply appropriate law enforcement measures provided for in the relevant international conventions to which they are party to persons who commit acts of terrorism covered by those conventions and not to allow any circumstances to obstruct such application;

5. Appeals to all States that have not yet done so to consider becoming party to the international conventions relating to various aspects of international terrorism, and requests the Secretary-General to bring this appeal especially to the attention of those States;

6. Further appeals to all States to take all appropriate steps, as recommended in particular by the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International Maritime Organization, and as set forth in relevant international conventions, to prevent terrorist attacks against various forms of public transport;

7. Takes note with appreciation of the efforts undertaken by the International Civil Aviation Organization aimed at promoting universal acceptance of and strict compliance with the international air-security conventions, and welcomes its ongoing work on a new instrument for the suppression of unlawful acts of violence at airports serving international civil aviation;

8. Also takes note with appreciation of the work undertaken by the International Maritime Organization on the problem of terrorism aboard or against ships, and welcomes the initiative under way to draft instruments on the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation and of fixed platforms on the continental shelf;

9. Requests the Universal Postal Union and the World Tourism Organization, within their respective competences, to consider what further measures can usefully be taken to combat and eliminate terrorism;

10. Requests the Secretary-General to follow up, as appropriate, the implementation of resolution 40/61 and of the present resolution and to submit a report to the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session;

11. Decides to include the item in the provisional agenda of its forty-fourth session.

RG66/5/1A

CA1A1A

ZCZC
WLN 0761
RR LON
GR 00174

CONFIDENTIAL

CLAS: CONFIDENTIAL
FROM: WELLINGTON
TO : SUVA 02981-PRIORITY :
RPTD: CANBERRA 03361-ROUTINE :LONDON 04713-ROUTINE
: OTTAWA 01986-ROUTINE :WASHINGTON 03079-ROUTINE
LD : SFA (DLO, SPA, EIB, DIS, LGL, SEC)
: P/S MFA
: DEFENCE (DDI DOT DSIA) : DESC
: NZSIS (TIC) : POLICE (PTIU)
SUBJ: FIJI CIVIL DISTURBANCE : TERRORISM

23 SEP 87

24038

FA(P)
CLIPS

YOUR 3395 AND 3417. WE WOULD JUST LIKE TO REGISTER THE POINT IN PASSING THAT IF REPEAT IF EVENTS REACH THE POINT OF BEING DESCRIBABLE AS TERRORISM., OR IF REPEAT IF AN ACT OF TERRORISM OCCURS (INCLUDING FOR EXAMPLE AN ATTACK ON A DIPLOMATIC MISSION OR AN AIRCRAFT HIJACKING) OUR COUNTER-TERRORISM COMMUNITY WOULD APPRECIATER IT IF YOU COULD GIVE YOUR REPORTING ON THE MATTER A WELLINGTON DISTRIBUTION ALONG THE LINES ABOVE. (FULLER GUIDANCE WILL BE FOUND IN MR NORRISH'S ALL POSTS CABLE A154 OF 21 DECEMBER 1984 AS MODIFIED WITH RESPECT TO DESC BY OUR ALL POSTS A66 OF 2 APRIL 1987).
=

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CONFIDENTIAL

B66/5/1A

THE GUARDIAN Tuesday September 14 1987

Rainbow frogman arrested after television revelations

From Campbell Page
in Paris

A former secret agent, who claimed in a controversial television interview to have taken part in the French secret service operation against the Greenpeace ship, Rainbow Warrior, has been tracked down and arrested.

Mr André Giraud, the Defence Minister, said yesterday that the man had made certain admissions and had been taken into custody. He added that the man, Mr Gerald Andries, was no longer a member of the intelligence service, DGSE.

In the television interview last week, Mr Andries, who concealed his identity by keeping his back to the camera and disguising his voice, said he had been one of the frogmen who sank the Rainbow Warrior in Auckland in July, 1985.

He criticised what he called official betrayals after the incident and efforts to break up the group of frogmen. "In closing the base at Aspretto in Corsica and in moving it to Quelern in Brittany, the training base for frogmen was wiped out, " he said.

Le Monde said in a recent report that after protests by the French navy that Aspretto had become a law to itself, officials had decided to move the frogmen even before the Rainbow Warrior affair.

The Greenpeace affair embarrassed the Socialist Government in 1985, raised serious questions about the extent of government knowledge, and forced the then-Defence Minister, Mr Charles Hernu, and the head of the DGSE, Admiral Pierre Lacoste, out of office.

Mr Hernu said yesterday that it was unacceptable that secret service affairs should be aired in a public forum.

The arrest was made after the Prime Minister, Mr Jacques Chirac, said by government sources to have been shocked by the allegations, ordered Mr Giraud to carry out an inquiry to unmask the ex-agent.

The Rainbow Warrior had planned to take part in protests against French nuclear tests in the South Pacific. The Socialist Government first denied all responsibility in the affair, but was later forced to acknowledge that DGSE agents blew up the ship.

B6615/1A 22313

Date:	Precedence: ROUTINE	Page 1 of 1 Pages.

From: New Zealand High Commission, London. | Fax no. 01-839 4580 | Tlx. 21589

To: WELLINGTON 222 PARIS 150 | Fax no. | Ser no. FA (P)

Distribution: SFA (EUR, SPA, LGL) | Approved by:

CLEARED 4 SEP 1987 CONS SECT

COPY NOT

New Zealand's anger at hints of their release

US spies held on 'tropical paradise' prison island, plan sabotage school for frogmen

From BOB GILMOUR in Auckland

THE two exiled French agents, who blew up the Greenpeace ship Rainbow Warrior killing photographer Fernando Pereira, are secretly training military divers for fresh sabotage operations on their "paradise" prison island.

The agents—Major Alain Mafart and Captain Dominique Prieur—were freed by New Zealand a year ago in a deal dubbed "the lamb chop spy swap".

France agreed to buy tons of New Zealand butter and lamb—and promised to keep their two agents imprisoned on a remote Pacific atoll for three years.

But now there are signs that the agreement is crumbling as a new crisis breaks in relations between the two governments.

In New Zealand it is claimed that the French have asked 36-year-old Mafart to run a sabotage school for frogmen, appointing him the effective boss of his own "prison" on the South Pacific island of Hao.


Their exile, agreed by the United Nations, denied them any visitors and banned them from any military activities.



Mafart: Agent



Dominique: Deal



Rainbow Warrior (above) with dead photographer Fernando Pereira (left)

Holiday

Yet 37-year-old Prieur is helping to run the airfield—part of France's Pacific nuclear base—and her husband Joel has been posted there from Paris as the fire chief.

Last week, it was revealed that her mother was flown out to Hao for a sunshine holiday amid reports that the French Government is secretly planning to bring the two agents home.

Angry Greenpeace officials say France does not really care that a young Portuguese photographer died when the Rainbow Warrior was mined as it was due to sail to the Pacific to disrupt French nuclear testing.

Mafart and Prieur confessed to manslaughter and were jailed for 10 years-until the French Government admitted giving the order to sink the ship and promised to pay £1 million compensation.

Greenpeace is still challenging that amount in a lengthy court battle.

Meanwhile the two agents are said to be fed up sunbathing and windsurfing on the atoll which only has one nightclub and cinema to amuse the 110-strong French garrison.

Prieur's mother Renee Maire said yesterday: "I hope to visit her again next year if she is still there."

Advisers in Paris have told French premier Jacques Chirac that bringing the agents home would not harm his presidential chances—



particularly as France is now embroiled in a new war of words with David Lange's Government in Auckland.

The outspoken Mr Lange is accused of deliberately stirring up trouble in France's strife-torn Pacific colony of New Caledonia by publicly supporting the idea of a ballot on independence.

An angry Mr Chirac has said: "They would do better to look at the way they treat their own Aboriginies and stop meddling in France's affairs."

Mr Lange is still smarting over the embarrassment of releasing the two secret service agents.

He had originally pledged their would be no deal. But a French boycott of New Zealand lamb and a threat to ban butter exports to the EEC had Lange admitting: "There is no point in being a martyr to a principle."

Last night Col Jean-Jacques Leize, head of the French Defence Ministry, claimed he knew nothing about any frogman training school on Hao.

"These two people must be very bored," he said. "There is nothing to do their except sunbathing and surfing."

A Greenpeace spokesman said: "They should be behind bars not sunbathing.

B6615/1

New Zealand High Commission

New Zealand House
Haymarket
London SW1Y 4TQ
Telephone: 01-930 8422 Ext:
Telex 24368

Reference B66/5/1A

- 4 SEP 1987

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA DLO)

c.c. DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
Police (PTIU)
Defence (DDOP)

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Date	Nature of Material	Remarks
	Terrorism : UK	
	press reporting	

S.W. Prior
for High Commissioner

THE TIMES FRIDAY SEPTEMBER 4 1987

Car clue to IRA 'plot' as police quiz suspects

By Craig Seton

A battered Datsun car linked to a possible IRA plot to kill Mr Tom King, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, was bought for cash at a London auction and the change of ownership was not registered, Wiltshire police said yesterday.

The car was sold by its previous owner in Bethnal Green, east London, through an evening sale on July 2 by the Whitechapel Car Auction company near by.

The car was bought for £350 and the vehicle disappeared for nearly two months before its discovery by police.

Last night, as the car was being checked at the Wiltshire police headquarters at Devizes for traces of fingerprints, arms or explosives a spokesman for the auction company said the police had taken away all the documents from the sale.

The new owner failed to register the Datsun, registration number FHE 80V. Although police have the name given by the person who bought it at the auction attended by 1,000 people, they believe that it may be false.

The rusty and dented vehicle was found late on Wednesday night 25 miles from Mr King's Wiltshire home and only 1.5 miles from a campsite used by three Irish suspects.

They were arrested on Sunday close to Mr King's home at Ford, near Chippenham, under the Prevention of Terrorism Act.

Last night police applied to the Home Office for permission to hold the three suspects for questioning until Sunday as the present order expires today. It is understood the request was granted.

Detectives believe the car's discovery is their biggest breakthrough in the investigation into a possible conspiracy to murder Mr King.

Two Scotland Yard detectives from the anti-terrorist branch are working with the Wiltshire investigators.

The manner of the car's purchase has added to the police belief that they may have foiled possible plans of an IRA reconnaissance team sent to investigate security at Mr King's house in preparation for an assassination attempt.

Two of the three people being held, a man and a woman, were picked up on Mr King's land in Wiltshire "in suspicious circumstances".

Hours later, another man was arrested at the Wookey Hole campsite at Cheddar Gorge, 1.5 miles from Wells, where the Datsun car was found parked in a back street.

The man arrested at Wookey Hole had a bag containing about £3,500 in £50 notes which police believe may have been used to fund the "terror" mission.

The three suspects, in their twenties, stayed at that campsite and another site at Newton St Loe near Bath, which was searched by police for the second day yesterday. Other West Country campsites are also to be checked.

Police believe it is a possibility that the three may have been part of a bigger IRA unit which came to Britain during the summer.



The Datsun car found at Wells being examined for traces of fingerprints, arms and explosives last night.

THE INDEPENDENT Tuesday 18 August 1987

Man charged over arms cache

SCOTLAND YARD last night charged a 28-year-old Arab in connection with the discovery in Hull of a large cache of arms and explosives believed to be for a Palestine Liberation Organisation terror campaign in Europe.

Ishmail Hassan Sowan, 28, a university researcher from Hull, will appear at Lambeth Magistrates Court today. He has been in Britain since 1984 and studied at Bath University.

The explosives, guns, detonators and ammunition were found at a flat in Hull last week by detectives from the Metropolitan Police anti-terrorist squad and Hull police. They were investigating the attempted assassination

By Terry Kirby
Crime Correspondent

last month of an Arab political cartoonist in London.

Although the raid took place last Wednesday the information was not released until yesterday. The raid followed what police said were extensive nationwide inquiries into the shooting of Ali Naji Awad Al Adhami, a cartoonist and outspoken critic of the PLO leader, Yasser Arafat. He was shot at point-blank range in a London street on 22 July and is still critically ill and on a life support machine at Charing Cross Hospital in London.

At the flat, police found suitcases which contained 68lbs of Semtex high explosive, four assault rifles, seven handgrenades, bomb-making equipment, including detonators and clocks, eight magazines of 7.62 ammunition, and a large quantity of.38 and 9 millimetre ammunition.

A spokesman for Scotland Yard said: "We believe the arms and explosives were being stored for future terrorist attacks Europe-wide."

Semtex is a plastic explosive which is produced in Czechoslovakia and has been widely used by Irish and Arab terrorists. It is light, powerful and cannot be detected by conventional "sniffer" devices and X-ray scanners at airports.

Mr Adhami is one of the best known political cartoonists in the Middle East. He was shot near the offices in Chelsea of the Kuwaiti newspaper *Al Qabas International*, where he works. Mr Adhami, 42, considered himself a target since he was forced to leave Kuwait in 1985, reportedly after pressure from Mr Arafat.

Scotland Yard said last night that another Arab man, who had been arrested in London over the past few days, would be released soon.

The spokesman said the inquiries were continuing in the hunt for Mr Adhami's attacker.

ACTION COPY

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B66/5/1A.

General Registry

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WLN 8492
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GR 00392
CLAS: CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

26 AUG 87

FROM: WELLINGTON
TO : ALL POSTS 00128-IMMEDIATE :
SVNG: (VIA WLN) NIUE, VILA, SYDNEY, BRISBANE, MELBOURNE, PERTH,
: ADELAIDE, VANCOUVER.
LD : SFA (DLO DIS MEA SEC LGL)
: NZSIS (TIC) : POLICE (PTIU)
: DESC : DEFENCE (DOT DDI)
: SECLAB (IMMIGRATION)
SUBJ: INCREASED AWARENESS REGARDING VISITORS TO NEW ZEALAND OF MIDDLE EASTERN ORIGIN.

21384
FA(P)
CL.PS

POSTS WILL BE AWARE OF THE INCREASED TENSION IN THE PERSIAN/ARABIAN GULF AREA FOLLOWING US REFLAGGING OF KUWAITI VESSELS ETC AND THE DEATHS OF A LARGE NUMBER OF IRANIAN PILGRIMS IN MECCA WHICH ACCORDING TO SOME NEWS MEDIA ACCOUNTS CERTAIN IRANIAN AUTHORITIES HAVE BLAMED ON THE SAUDI AND THE US AUTHORITIES. WE ARE ADVISED THAT IS POSSIBLE THAT IRAN MAY ATTEMPT TO AVENGE THE DEATHS USING TERRORISTS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY TO TARGET SAUDI AND US GOVERNMENT OFFICES AND AIRLINES. OTHER TARGETS MAY INCLUDE BRITISH, FRENCH AND KUWAITI INTERESTS.
2. WE HAVE BEEN ASKED BY THE RELEVANT AUTHORITIES TO ALERT POSTS TO THE ABOVE AND TO ASK POSTS TO TAKE PARTICULAR CARE REGARDING TRAVELLERS TO NEW ZEALAND OF MIDDLE EASTERN (AND IRANIAN IN PARTICULAR) ORIGIN. RELEVANT GUIDANCE ON PROCEDURES WILL BE FOUND IN ANNEX 5 (AS AMENDED 7/87) OF CHAPER 4 OF THE CONSULAR INSTRUCTIONS. (PARAGRAPH 6 OF THAT ANNEX REMINDS POSTS TO CONSULT OUR MEMORANDA 109/1/4 (NZ) OF 8 SEPTEMBER 1983 AND 16 AUGUST 1984 ENTITLED QUOTE PASSPORT EXAMINATION MANUAL (A GUIDE TO THE DETECTION OF COUNTERFEIT AND ALTERED TERRORIST DOCUMENTATION) AND THE RED BOOK UNQUOTE.)
FOR CANBERRA: PLEASE ALERT OTHER AUSTRALIAN POSTS AS APPROPRIATE.
=

Q 89119
25/2323Z
WLN 8492
NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

CMO done
Can you find all the references in this to?
27/8

Date: 25 AUG 1987 | Precedence: ROUTINE | Page 1 of 1 Pages.

From: New Zealand High Commission, London. | Fax no. 01-839 4580 Tlx. 21589

To: WELLINGTON 200 RPTD PARIS 137 | Fax no. | Ser.no. 21335

Distribution: STA(LGL STA EUR) P/S MFA | Approved by:

B6615/1A

FYI

RAINBOW WARRIOR

Men and Matters

FINANCIAL TIMES

25 AUG 1987

CI
24 AUG 1987
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Paradise endured

Coconut trees and sandy beaches are not everybody's idea of Paradise.

The two French spies who were arrested for blowing up the Greenpeace protest movement ship, Rainbow Warrior, in Auckland Harbour, Major Alain Mafart and Captain Dominique Prieur, have begun their second year of enforced holiday on Hao Athol in Polynesia.

They were sentenced to 10 years imprisonment in New Zealand, but were later allowed to transfer to the more congenial Pacific island for an enforced stay of not less than three years—the French government having offered New Zealand an attractive butter sales-for-spies deal.

Prieur's mother who has just visited the two unfortunates is concerned about their plight: "It's as if they were in a desert. They have no idea what to do with all their free time."

She says the two stars of the Greenpeace scandal are tired of the pastimes the island has to offer—wind surfing, tennis, and sunbathing. Prieur's mother has appealed to David Lange to "make a gesture" in favour of Mafart and Prieur.

The New Zealand premier is, however, understandably reluctant to end the long holiday of two such zealous secret agents.

If Lange would only accept substitutes I'm sure there would be no shortage of volunteers from harsher climates to take the two French officers' place for the rest of their sentence.

Date:	Precedence: ROUTINE	Page 1 of 1 Pages.
From: New Zealand High Commission, London.	Fax no. 01-839 4580	Tlx. 21589
To: WELLINGTON 200 RPTD PARIS 137	Fax no.	Ser.no. 21335
Distribution: SFA(LGL SPA EUR) P/S MFA	Approved by:	

B6615/1A

RAINBOW WARRIOR

Men and Matters

FINANCIAL TIMES

25 AUG 1987

GCI 2 - AUG 1987

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CONFIDENTIAL

BGGIS/1A

4/111/49

NEW ZEALAND MISSION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK

21 August 1987

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs
WELLINGTON

(LGL UNC)

Copy to: Canberra
Washington
Tokyo
Paris
London
Ottawa

NEW ZEALAND
28 AUG 1987
CENTRAL REGISTRY
HIGH COMMISSION

UNGA 42 : TERRORISM : DRAFT RESOLUTION

Would you please refer to our telegram 685 of 23 June in which we reported (paragraph 2G) that Canada proposed the addition of a new paragraph to the draft resolution on terrorism which has been the subject of discussion among Western member countries. At that time Canada agreed to circulate a redrafted operative paragraph which would request the UN SG to take action to prepare a survey of legal instruments aimed at combatting terrorism.

... 2 We attach such a revised draft which has been circulated to Western member countries. Also attached (Wellington only) is a covering letter from the Canadian
... Mission. You will note that the Canadians have expanded the proposed survey to include, inter alia, "proposals for the adoption of counter-terrorist measures" which have been put forward but have not been adopted or which have not yet entered into force: the Canadian letter argues that this may give "a better perspective on what more work if any could usefully be done and what initatives have a practical chance of success".

3 We should be interested in your comments on the Canadian proposal, and on the draft resolution as a whole (bearing in mind paragraph 6 of our telegram 685) before the next Western group meeting on 9 September.

WADE ARMSTRONG

Permanent Representative

Enclosure:

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

REVISED TEXT

Requests the Secretary-General

(A) To prepare, within existing resources, a survey of international legal instruments aimed at combatting terrorism. These should include:

(I) Existing multilateral instruments relating to the suppression of specific aspects of terrorism;

(II) Measures of agreements adopted by regional organizations to combat terrorism within their own regions;

(III) Proposals for the adoption of counter terrorist measures which have been presented to the United Nations or other international bodies including agreements adopted but not yet in force.

(B) To publish the results of this survey in the form of a brochure to be circulated to governments for their information and future guidance at the earliest opportunity.

"YELLOW"

New Zealand High Commission

New Zealand House
Haymarket
London SW1Y 4TQ
Telephone: 01-930 8422 Ext:
Telex 24368

Reference B66/5/1A

17 August 1987

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA DLO)

c.c. DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
Police (PTIU)
Defence (DDOP)

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Date	Nature of Material	Remarks
	Terrorism	
	press reporting	
17 August 1987	Press: Financial Times report of appeal for funds by Research Foundation for the Study of Terrorism.	

(c

S.W. Prior
for High Commissioner

Terrorism study group to launch fund appeal

FINANCIAL TIMES REPORTER

17 AUG 1987

FINANCIAL TIMES

THE Research Foundation for the Study of Terrorism, believed to be the first independent charitable educational trust to foster research into terrorism — particularly that aimed at business—is to launch an appeal for funds this week.

Professor Paul Wilkinson, chairman of the trustees and professor of international relations at Aberdeen University, says: "The need for in-depth, impartial research bringing together such disciplines as the law, international relations, criminology and technology has been apparent for some time."

One project the trust hopes to finance from the appeal is a comparison of trends in kidnapping and other forms of terrorism, drawing on data bases throughout Europe.

Prof Wilkinson says: "In Latin America, Spain and Italy, for example, there appears to be a strong tradition of criminals kidnapping for money.

"Their victims tend to be wealthy individuals from that country, perhaps because they feel they are more likely to get away with it without involving the full force of foreign security services."

In the Middle East and south-east Asia, however, Prof Wilkinson says, the value of foreigners is seen to be so great that they are the most sought after target.

Other areas for study include the care of terrorist victims, how to cope with being a hostage and how to adjust after captivity, and the impact of international law on extradition and hijacking. A conference is planned for December.

The foundation's advisory council includes Commander William Hucklesby, former head of Scotland Yard's anti-terrorist squad and Admiral Sir Ian Easton, former head of the Royal College of Defence Studies.

New Zealand High Commission

New Zealand House
Haymarket
London SW1Y 4TQ
Telephone: 01-930 8422 Ext:
Telex 24368

"YELLOW"

Reference B66/5/1A

11 August 1987

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA DLO)

c.c. DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
Police (PTIU)
Defence (DDOP)

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Date	Nature of Material	Remarks
	<u>Terrorism</u> press reporting	
13 July 1987	Hansard report of Ministerial written answers to questions pertaining to the operation of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984 in the United Kingdom. The answers provide a listing of terrorist incidents recorded in the UK since 1981.	

S.W. Prior
for High Commissioner

Terrorism

Mr. Soley asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many extensions of detention requested by the police under the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984 have been personally considered and granted or refused by *(a)* the Secretary of State for the Home Department, *(b)* a junior Minister for the Home Department, *(c)* a Home Office official, *(d)* the Secretary of State for another Department and *(e)* a junior Minister for another Department.

Mr. Hurd: Of the requests by the police for extensions of detention under the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984 made to the Secretary of State for the Home Department *(a)* my predecessor and I have personally considered 161 and granted 159 *(b)* a Minister of State or Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department considered 14 and granted 13 and *(c) (d)* and *(e)* none were decided by a Home Office official, or Secretary of State or junior Minister for another Department.

Mr. Soley asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether there are any plans to publish in his Department's quarterly statistics on the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Acts the numbers of complaints made against the police in relation to the Prevention of Terrorism Act which are made available to the Prevention of Terrorism Act Commissioner.

Mr. Hurd: No.

Mr. Soley asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many persons excluded under the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Acts were originally detained in London.

Mr. Hurd: I shall reply as soon as possible.

Mr. Soley asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many persons excluded under the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Acts 1974, 1976 and 1984 were excluded direct from prison after completing a prison term.

Mr. Hurd: I shall reply as soon as possible.

Mr. Soley asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what criteria are used to decide whether a person requesting a review of his exclusion order made under the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974, 1976 or 1984 is granted one.

Mr. Hurd: All exclusion orders now in force have been made under the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1984. Orders made under this Act have a three-year life. Each order is reviewed about six months before it expires before I decide whether to make a new order on the expiry. In considering a request for a review of an exclusion order before that time, I take into account the factors which led to the making of the order and the time which has elapsed since it was made.

Mr. Soley asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many persons whose exclusion order made under the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Acts 1974 and 1976 and revoked during the three-year comprehensive review process had attended an interview with the Metropolitan Police.

Mr. Hurd: The information requested is not readily available.

Mr. Soley asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many individuals were successfully contacted from 1984 in connection with the comprehensive review of exclusion orders made under the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Acts 1974 and 1976 that were still in force.

Mr. Hurd: The information requested is not readily available, I will reply as soon as possible.

Mr. Soley asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many excludees had attended interviews with a Home Office adviser prior to having their exclusion order revoked as a part of making representations against their order within the specified period following removal under the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1976 and 1984.

Mr. Hurd: Only under the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984 has someone who made representations against his exclusion order following removal from Great Britain or Northern Ireland of the United Kingdom had a right to an interview with an adviser. There have been six completed cases of representations, against exclusion orders made in Great Britain under that Act, following removal. In two of these cases, in both of which the excluded person had had an interview with an adviser, the Home Secretary revoked the exclusion order.

Mr. Soley asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many persons were initially offered an interview with a Home Office adviser as part of the representations against their exclusion order under the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Acts 1974, 1976 or 1984; and how many declined to attend.

Mr. Hurd: Twelve people were offered interviews with a Home Office adviser as part of the representations made against their exclusion order made under the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974. None declined to attend. Under the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1976 there was, and there is under the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984, a statutory right for a person who has been served with notice of the making of an exclusion order to include in his or her representations against the order a request for a personal interview with an adviser. Under the 1976 Act, if the excluded person had not been removed with his consent from Great Britain or Northern Ireland or the United Kingdom, he or she had to be granted a personal interview with the adviser. Under the 1984 Act, this right extends to a person who has been removed.

Mr. Soley asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many individuals held under the international provisions of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984 and against whom an extension of detention was authorised by the Secretary of State were *(a)* subsequently charged with an offence or *(b)* deported under the Immigration Act 1971.

Mr. Hurd: I shall reply as soon as possible.

Mr. Soley asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many incidents of international terrorism there have been in *(a)* the Metropolitan police area, and *(b)* the rest of Britain during the following periods: (i) 1 January 1981 to 29 March 1984, and *(b)* since 30 March 1984 to the latest date for which figures are available.

Mr. Hurd: Statistics in the form requested are not available. The following table sets out the terrorist incidents which have taken place in Great Britain since 1981. These do not include incidents apparently caused by extremist nationalist or anarchist groups based in Great Britain, or by extremist animal rights activists.

	1981	*May-December 1982*	*1983*	*1984*	*1985*	*1986*	*January-June 1987*
Shooting incidents	—	1	—	3	2	3	—
Bombing incidents							
exploded	9	3	4	6	2	2	—
neutralised or failed to explode	1	2	1	4	4	—	5
Arson attacks	—	—	—	—	1	—	—
Kidnappings	1	—	—	1	—	—	—
Hi jacking of aircraft	—	1	—	—	—	—	—

Mr. Soley asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many individuals arrested on suspicion of involvement in international terrorism since 30 March 1984 were arrested under the ordinary criminal law rather than the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984 in *(a)* the Metropolitan police area, and *(b)* the rest of Britain.

Mr. Hurd: The number of persons suspected of involvement in international terrorism who are arrested under other legislation than the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984 is not recorded, and could not readily be obtained.

"YELLOW"

New Zealand High Commission

New Zealand House
Haymarket
London SW1Y 4TQ
Telephone: 01-930 8422 Ext:
Telex 24368

Reference B66/5/1A

24 July 1987

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA DLO)

c.c. DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
Police (PTIU)
Defence (DDOP)

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Date	Nature of Material	Remarks
	Terrorism :	Arab
	press reporting	
	London shooting of Palestinian	
	French moves against Paris bombers	

S.W. Prior
for High Commissioner

THE GUARDIAN Thursday July 23 1987

Cartoonist shot in face

By Peter Murtagh

A London-based political cartoonist with a Middle Eastern newspaper was on a life support machine last night after being shot in the face. Police arrested a man near Oxford Circus shortly afterwards but later discounted his involvement.

The shooting happened after 5 pm when Mr Ali Naji Awad Al Adhami was walking towards the offices of the Kuwaiti backed newspaper, Al Qubas in Ives Street, Chelsea.

A man, described by police as black and wearing a blue jacket, shot him with a handgun and walked away calmly towards Draycott Avenue. Police initially believed that he escaped in a stolen, gold-coloured Ford Fiesta car.

However when the car was later stopped near Oxford Circus and police arrested a white man, he was eventually ruled out of inquiries. A black man who was with him in the car ran off before he could be questioned.

Mr Al Adhmi's newspaper is an independent voice in the Middle East and has been criticised of Ayatollah Khomeini's regime in Iran. The shooting came less than a week after another anti-Khomeini activist was seriously injured when a bomb exploded under his car in Kensington. Scotland Yard

Turn to back page col. 6

Cartoonist is shot

Continued from page one

were not linking the two attacks last night.

The editor of Al Qubas, a Mr Fawaz, said last night that Mr Al Adhami had received many death threats over the years because he had spoken out against Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, although he had no formal political affiliations.

Scotland Yard's anti-terrorist squad said the shooting had terrorist overtones. The area near the shooting was sealed off for a time because police believed that Mr Al Adhami's car might have been booby-trapped.

Witnesses said that Mr Al Adhami collapsed, smothered in blood, after being shot through his right cheek.

Mr Al Adhami, who came to Britain in 1985, and has a wife and five children, and lives in Wimbledon. Mr Fawaz said that Mr Al Adhami had drawn some 15,000 cartoons but added that he did not believe the shooting was politically motivated.

Arab journalist gunned down in Chelsea street

By Stewart Tendler and Hazhir Teimourian

A leading Arab journalist was gunned down outside his office in Chelsea yesterday in the second incident of Middle Eastern terrorism on the streets of London within five days.

He was named last night as Mr Ali Naji Awad al-Adhami, aged 48, a cartoonist, of Palestinian origin, who lived in London and worked for *Al-Qabas*, a leading Kuwaiti newspaper read widely in the Middle East.

Mr al-Adhami was shot in the head by a gunman who approached him as he left his newspaper office in Ives Street, Chelsea, late in the afternoon.

After the single shot the gunman, dressed in a denim jacket, walked calmly away down Draycott Avenue, near Sloane Square, and vanished.

Mr al-Adhami was taken to St Stephen's Hospital, Fulham. Last night his condition was said to be serious but stable.

A friend of Mr al-Adhami said last night that he had been warned his life was in danger in a telephone call from Mr Abu Awad, a senior member of the Palestine Liberation Organization in Tunisia.

The telephone call, about two weeks ago, came after the publication of a cartoon attacking a female friend of Mr Yassir Arafat, the PLO leader. "The cartoon was famous in the Arab community," the friend said.

Scotland Yard's anti-terrorist squad took over the investigation of the shooting under the command of Det Supt Allan Talbot.

Mr al-Adhami, who is married with five children, came to London in 1985. He is

Bomb victim.....2

opposed to the PLO but is not identified with any other Palestinian group.

The editor of *Al-Qabas*, who gave his name only as Mr Fawaz, said Mr al-Adhami had received more than a hundred death threats over the years. "I don't know who could be responsible because Mr al-Adhami has been a critic of so many groups. But because of the way things are in Arab politics, nothing surprises me," he said.

"Our paper is an independent one and is not a strong critic of any particular group, so I cannot see why there should be an attack on us. I think it was meant as a direct attack on Mr al-Adhami."

Mr Fawaz said *Al-Qabas*, which means "The Light", is the largest independent daily paper in the Middle East.

He added that Mr al-Adhami had spoken out against Israel and the PLO. "He believes in the rights of the Palestinian people and was not a member of any political group or party."

Last Saturday, Mr Amir Hussein Amir-Parviz, a leading opponent of the Khomeini regime in Iran, was injured by a car bomb as he drove into Kensington High Street from his home. He was still recovering yesterday from the blast which is thought to be the work of Khomeini supporters.

There was no evidence to link the two incidents, which are the first indications of Middle Eastern terrorism in London since the son of another Iranian exile leader was killed in a bomb blast last summer.

After the shooting yesterday police immediately cordoned off the boutique-studded back streets near Sloane Square and officers combed the pavement for clues to the shooting.

One of the first civilians on the scene was Mr Andre Muller, aged 27, of Putney, who was working in the Peter Jones store adjacent to Ives Street. He was summoned to the scene because of his first-aid skills. He said: "I felt his pulse to see if he was breathing and a few minutes later the police came along and told me to stay with him."

THE TIMES THURSDAY JULY 23 1987

Hunt for bombers wrecks French courtship of Iran

From Brian Cathcart
in Paris

WHEN the French government severed its relations with Iran a week ago it wrote off 14 months of dogged diplomatic effort to get on cordial terms with Tehran.

From the day he became Prime Minister last year, it had been Jacques Chirac's intention to free French hostages in Lebanon and to insulate France and French trade from the effects of the Gulf war by making peace with the mullahs.

To achieve this, he was prepared to expel the leading Iranian opposition figure, Mujahedin leader Massoud Rajavi, and to do a deal on outstanding financial disputes with Iran. Iran played its part by securing the release of five French hostages held in Lebanon.

Five more hostages remain, their names and the duration of their captivity listed nightly on the news bulletins of the Antenne 2 television channel. Now, all the efforts have gone down the drain and, even worse, two abducted diplomats may well have been murdered. For what?

Ostensibly it is, in the words of one French minister, "a matter of honour". Vahid Gordji, an interpreter at Iran's embassy in Paris, is wanted for questioning in connection with bombing attacks in Paris last year. He is in his embassy and will not come out. Iran claims he has diplomatic immunity while the French, quite correctly, say he has not.

Earlier in the Franco-Iranian confrontation, the word went round that Mr Gordji was the secret No 2 in the embassy, pulling the strings of what the Americans might call Iranian-sponsored terrorism in Europe. Now, however, the French are playing down his significance.

The legal position is clear. He has been summoned to appear before Gilles Boulouque, the magistrate in charge of investigating the bombings, "as a witness" — there has been no mention of charges.

Mr Gordji is a known associate of Mohammed Mouhajer, a Lebanese Shia Muslim charged with complicity in the September bombing. Mr Mouhajer's BMW turned up in Mr Gordji's garage. Suggestions that this car was used in one of the bombings are now discounted.

As far as the French public knows, from any source that could be described as official, that is the limit of Mr Gordji's involvement in crime. The lifeline to the hostages has been cut and 15 embassy personnel in Tehran left stranded because the Iranians have refused to allow the French courts, in British parlance, to eliminate Mr Gordji from their inquiries.

That is not, of course, where the story ends. Behind the whole confrontation lies an extraordinary switch in the direction of the bomb inquiry early this year.

Mr Chirac is a law and order man, tough on terrorism. His interior minister is Charles Pasqua, a blunt Corsican who locked away his kid gloves many years ago. When, last September, the wave of bomb attacks hit Paris both men were left angry and shaken.

The attacks were claimed by a group seeking the release of three terrorists: Georges Ibrahim Abdallah, a Lebanese now serving a life sentence for his role in the killing two diplomats; Anis Naccache, another Lebanese jailed for attempting to assassinate the Shah's last prime minister, Shapour Bakhtiar, and Varoujian Garbidjian, an Armenian bomber.

The police inquiry immediately focused on Abdallah's connection. "Wanted" posters depicting his brothers went up all over France and when one brother promptly turned up at home in Lebanon a complicated itinerary was produced to show that he could still have planted the bomb.

That trail has since been all but abandoned. Instead, since March, police have been arresting Tunisians, Moroccans, and Algerians almost by the dozen. Also in the net are a number of Lebanese — four more in the last few days — who include Mr Gordji's associate Mohammed Mouhajir. They are pro-Iranian Shia Muslims, while the North Africans, though not Shias, are also said to be followers of Ayatollah Khomeini.

In Middle East terms, an ideological chasm divides these people from Georges Abdallah, a maverick Lebanese Christian closely associated with radical Palestinians rather than Shia extremists. The French lines of inquiry, in other words, now point towards Tehran's closest friends and not to an obscure Christian village in north Lebanon.

This is not the convulsion it might seem: Abdallah was, after all, not the only man whose release the bombers sought.

Interior ministry officials now speak broadly of the "Fouad Ali Saleh network", named after a Tunisian identified as the bomber's quartermaster, they insist, however, that the matter is sub judice.

Sub judice or not, the left-wing newspaper *Libération* has in the last few days published an astonishingly detailed account of the operation which cracked the network, an operation which inevitably it describes as "worthy of Jean Le Carré".

The part of the mole was played, it is said, by a man known as Lofti, a young Tunisian fundamentalist who studied in Iran's holy city of Qom. Lofti came to France in 1984, made contact with other pro-Iranian fundamentalists and then returned to Qom, coming back to Paris at the end of last year. In Iran, *Libération* alleges, he learned that the bombing campaign in Paris had been ordered by Tehran in an attempt to influence French policy. Disillusioned, he is said to have told this story to the French police who persuaded him to remain inside the pro-Iranian community in France.

In this way, the network was broken. Some of those arrested talked still more and a cache of explosives was uncovered in the Forest of Fontainebleau. *Libération* concluded its series yesterday with a bold claim that a 60-page dossier of the Tehran connection lay on Mr Chirac's desk and that it provided the real explanation of the breach with Iran.

Mr Pasqua said the report was no more than the "cogitation" of a few journalists. He could hardly say otherwise without putting the staff of the French embassy in Tehran and the hostages in Beirut in even greater danger. If there is a "smoking gun" this is not the time to produce it.

New Zealand High Commission

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Telephone: 01-930 8422 Ext:
Telex 24368

"YELLOW"

Reference B66/5/1A

20 July 1987

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA DLO)

c.c. DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
Police (PTIU)
Defence (DDOP)

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Date	Nature of Material	Remarks
	Terrorism : Iran	
	press reporting	
19 July 1987	Reports of Iranian-inspired assassination attempt in London on Iranian exile opposed to Khomeini regime.	

S.W. Prior
for High Commissioner

The Sunday Telegraph July 19 1987

Ex-Minister injured as Gulf tension rises

London bomb linked to Iran 'death squads'

By Christopher Elliott, Robert Porter, Norman Kirkham, James Langton and David Wastell in London and Anne-Elisabeth Moutet in Paris

AN IRANIAN death squad was feared to be operating in London last night after a car bomb seriously injured a leading opponent of the Khomeini regime.

A telephone caller to the Press Association news agency said later that a group calling itself the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution planted the bomb which injured Mr Amir-hussein Amir-Paruiz, 63-year-old London chairman of the National Movement for Iranian Resistance, while he was driving a car in Kensington.

Mr Amir-Parviz, a former minister in the Shah's government, was taken to St Stephen's Hospital, Fulham, where he was believed to be having treatment for burns and a broken thigh.

The bomb exploded under the front passenger seat of the Vauxhall Nova he was driving just after he had turned into Holland Road from Kensington High Street. The maroon A-registration car burst into what witnesses called a "ball of flame" and careered for 40 yards before stopping.

Commander George Churchill Coleman, head of Scotland Yard's anti-terrorist squad, said: "We are now fairly well satisfied that some form of improvised explosive device was planted in the car. The man's injuries are not as bad as we thought, and he will survive."

The anti-terrorist squad linked the bomb attack with last year's murder of a young Iranian in a bookshop just a few hundred yards from the scene of yesterday's explosion.

Scotland Yard was in close touch with French police amid fears that the explosion could be linked with the wave of bombing attacks committed in Paris by extremist supporters of the Iranian Revolution.

The Paris explosions led to a diplomatic crisis between Iran and France which worsened yesterday with threats from Teheran to arrest French diplomats for alleged spying.

Relations between Iran and the West have reached an all-time low and anti-terrorist experts fear that London could be facing a new wave of violence from Shi'ite Moslem fanatics.

After yesterday's explosion, a witness said two men pulled the driver on to the pavement and

Iran and U.S. head for clash, Page 2

gave first aid. He thought the two men may have been police in plain clothes or off duty.

Mr Renato Sorba, who runs a restaurant, said the men who dragged the victim through a window of his car probably saved his live.

The casually-dressed men had a commanding presence and immediately took charge, shouting at passers-by to move back and covering the wounded victim with blankets, he added.

"They were casually dressed in their mid-20s. One seemed very capable. He was in control," said Mr Sorba.

Mr Abdul Ayub, a cashier at the nearby Holland Service Station, said: "There was an enormous bang and I saw the guy trying to climb out of the

Anti-terrorist detectives went to the hospital to interview Mr Amir-Parviz and soon afterwards a police car arrived at the hospital with his parents and other relatives. Four women, all of them crying, and two men were shown into a room where police were waiting to talk to them.

Detectives began a detailed comparison of yesterday's bombing and the dossier on the murder of Bijan Fazeli, 22, an Iranian killed by a bomb in the basement of the bookshop owned by his father who had produced films lampooning the Tehran regime.

At the time Scotland Yard suspected a pro-Khomeini bomber had slipped into London posing as an Iran Air security guard and had returned to Tehran via Heathrow.

In Paris yesterday fears were growing that the row between France and Iran would escalate to the level of the Khomeini regime's dispute with the United States during which Americans were held prisoners.

Iran's Interior Minister, Hojatoleslam Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, said in Teheran that French diplomats would be tried as spies for helping Iranians to flee the country and for linking up counter-revolutionary splinter groups.

More than 200 French riot police are surrounding the Iranian Embassy in Paris where an Iranian official, Wahid Gordji, wanted for questioning in connection with Paris bombings, took refuge three weeks ago.

Iranian police have surrounded the French Embassy in Teheran.

THE SUNDAY TIMES 19 JULY 1987

Iranian exile in hospital

by Christine Toomey and Hezhir Teimourian

A FORMER Iranian cabinet minister and leading opponent of the Khomeini regime was the target of an assassination attempt in a car bomb explosion in the heart of London yesterday.

Amir-Hossein Amir-Parvis, a 63-year-old Iranian businessman, was seriously injured when his Vauxhall Nova exploded at the junction of Kensington High Street and Holland Road at lunchtime. A small bomb had been placed under the front seat. Only Parvis was hurt.

Scotland Yard's anti-terrorist squad was last night linking yesterday's attack with the bombing last August of a Kensington video library in which another Iranian, Bejan Fazeli, 22, was killed. The library was owned by his father, who had produced films lampooning Khomeini.

Parvis was taken to St Stephen's hospital in Fulham where he was treated for hand, head and leg injuries. A short while later his parents and other relatives were taken there. A friend said last night: "He is badly injured, but his life is not in danger."

A cousin said that after a two-hour operation on an injured hand Parvis had told them: "I am well. I am sorry I caused trouble for you people."

Parvis was minister of agriculture, governor of Hamadan province and a close associate of Dr Shapour Bakhtiar, the prime minister of Iran when Ayatollah Khomeini flew there from exile in January 1979. Bakhtiar fled to Paris and his main base has been there, though he also has a few supporters in London. There has been at least one attempt to assassinate him.

Parvis is the head of the National Resistance Movement of Iran, the anti-Khomeini organisation in London. Its offices are in Queens Court, Bayswater. Its main activities in Britain have been to build political opposition to Khomeini.

A telephone caller to the Press Association said a hithero unknown group called "Guardians of the Islamic Revolution" had planted the bomb.

Embassy war, page 12

New Zealand High Commission

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Reference B66/5/1A

26 June 1987

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA DLO)

c.c. DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
Police (PTIU)
Defence (DDOP)

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Date	Nature of Material	Remarks
	Terrorism:	Peru: Sendero Luminoso
	press reporting	
20 June 1987	Guardian report of Peruvian terrorist group Sendero Luminoso	

S.W. Prior
for High Commissioner

THE GUARDIAN Saturday June 20 1987

Day Garcia would like to forget

From Mike Reid
in Lima

FOR THE Maoist guerrillas of Sendero Luminoso, yesterday was the first anniversary of what they call " the day of the heroic deed " — the most important date in the ritualistic calendar of their seven-year insurrection.


The Government yesterday ordered 25,000 policemen in Lima and the neighbouring port of Callao to stay on duty continuously until Monday as a precaution against attacks by the guerrilla movement. Police commanders increased the number of guards at foreign embassies, government offices and strategic targets such as Lima's water reservoir.

In an almost unprecedented public appearance by the secretive guerrillas, about 20 masked youths distributed leaflets and posters recalling government " genocide " against " the prisoners of war " at a Lima rally on Thursday night.

Police, who yesterday defused a car bomb outside a Lima department store, said the car, packed with 30lb of explosives, had been left in a shopping centre in the suburb of San Miguel. Police also defused a bomb containing ½lb of TNT beside a lamp post on the main road leading north out of the city.

For Peru's President, Alan Garcia, it is an anniversary he would probably rather forget. His government banned demonstrations and placed the armed forces and police on alert. In a city braced against guerrilla attacks, rumours that the police might strike for the second time in a month added to the tension.

On June 19 last year, the



President Alan Garcia

armed forces, acting on Mr Garcia's orders, quashed a revolt by Sendero prisoners in three Lima gaols. Within hours, up to 267 inmates were dead. The exact number is still not known, and most were killed in cold blood after surrendering.

These mass executions were " perhaps the most heinous crime committed in Peru this century," Mr Garcia told the International Press Institute in Montevideo last month, in a speech his Lima press office has not released locally.

Days later the killings, Mr Garcia pledged about those responsible : " Either they all, go or I go."

A year later, no one involved, except one police general, has gone. No one in command of the operation is known to have been punished, though nine police officers, including a colonel, are in custody — the only scapegoats.

This " cover-up," as Amnesty International has called it, owes much to the fact that the armed forces can argue that they acted with due obedience to the initial order of Mr Garcia — Constitutionally their supreme commander — however much they may have employed exaggerated initiative in executing it.

For on some other issues, both before and since, Mr Garcia has shown that he is prepared to risk military wrath in asserting civilian authority.

On the surface, the government recovered quickly from the bloodbath of that grey day last June. Mr Garcia's popular standing initially remained almost intact, perhaps because of a lack of public sympathy for the Senderistas.

But the prison massacres marked a watershed. They rubbed off the lustre of near-infallibility that had surrounded the president, a 38-year-old populist nationalist who took power two years ago.

" Mr Garcia has paid a political price, and he hasn't finished paying it," Senator Javier Diez Canseco, of the left-wing opposition, says.

Some Peruvians see the continuing political crisis, triggered by last month's disorderly police strike, as part of that price. The official effort to blame the police for the executions added to discontent in its ranks and the government's hesitant handling of the strike, letting it drift on for four days, reflected the trauma of the prisons.

Sendero Luminoso now appears stronger than ever, despite the loss of the prison bases that some military sources erroneously considered to be its nerve-centre. Official figures show that " subversive acts " of killing, bombing and " armed propaganda " have increased in the past year.

What was in the narrowest sense a military defeat for Sendero in the prisons has become a political victory. The Government's over-reaction to Sendero's provocation turned the aggressors into victims. In some circles, it has given credence to Sendero's claims that Peru's democracy is a faade for an underlying militarism.

BONN 721
RR LONDON TT RR BRUSSELS, PARIS
RR WELLINGTON
ZCZC
BONN 721

CLAS: CONFIDENTIAL 26 JUNE 1987
FROM: BONN
TO : WELLINGTON 871-ROUTINE
RPTD: BRUSSELS 67-ROUTINE : PARIS 55-ROUTINE
:LONDON 139-ROUTINE
SVGS: THE HAGUE ROME WASHINGTON OTTAWA
LD : SFA (EUR DLC LGL SEC EIB)
:NZSIS
:POLICE (PTIU)
:DEFENCE (DDOPS)
SUBJ: TERRORISM : VENICE SUMMIT AND COUNCIL OF EUROPE.

WE SPOKE TO HELDT (HEAD OF THE MFA DIVISION DEALING WITH TERRORISM) ABOUT THE VENICE SUMMIT DECLARATION ON TERRORISM. HELDT COMMENTED THAT THIS HAD LARGELY FOLLOWED THE ESTABLISHED PATTERN OF PREVIOUS DECLARATIONS, AND THAT THE MAIN POINTS OF INTEREST WERE CONTAINED IN THE ANNEX. THESE WERE, FIRST THE INCORPORATION OF THE MONTREAL CONVENTION PROVISIONS ON CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY, IN FULFILMENT OF THE TOKYO SUMMIT CALL FOR MORE EFFECTIVE COOPERATION AND SECOND, THE REFERENCE TO THE MEETING OF MINISTERS OF JUSTICE AND THE INTERIOR OF THE 7 PLUS THE 12, FOLLOWING THE MEETING IN PARIS ON 28 MAY CONVENED AS A FRANCO-GERMAN INITIATIVE. HELDT COMMENTED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME FRANCE HAD ACCEPTED THE IDEA OF ''7 PLUS 12'' COOPERATION, WHICH HAD BEEN PUSHED BY THE U.S., AND WHILE NO INSTITUTIONALISED CONTACTS HAD BEEN AGREED THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER MEETINGS HAD BEEN LEFT OPEN.

2. WE ALSO ASKED HELDT ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE MEETING THAT HE WILL BE ATTENDING NEXT MONTH. HELDT SAID THE FRG HAD MADE ITSELF SOMEWHAT UNPOPULAR BY SPEAKING AGAINST THE

IDEA OF COOPERATION WITH 3RD COUNTRIES UNDER THE COE UMBRELLA. IT WAS CERTAINLY NOT THAT THE GERMANS HAD ANYTHING AGAINST COOPERATION WITH 3RD COUNTRIES BUT THAT THE COE WAS NOT THE APPROPRIATE PLACE TO DISCUSS SUCH MATTERS. THE COUNCIL HAD AT MOST A GENERAL JURIDICAL INTEREST BUT HAD ABSOLUTELY NO OPERATIONAL ROLE, AND IT WAS AT THE PRACTICAL WORKING LEVEL THAT COOPERATION AGAINST TERRORISM WAS ESSENTIAL. IN RESPONSE TO OUR QUESTION, HELDT SAID THAT FOR THIRD COUNTRIES THE ONLY WORTHWHILE CONTACT WAS DIRECT WITH THE 12 - EITHER BILATERALLY OR THROUGH THE TREVI TROIKA OR EPC (OR PREFERABLY ALL OF THESE).
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BONN 715
RR LONDON
RR WELLINGTON TT RR WASHINGTON
ZCZC
BONN 715

UNCLASS SECURE

CLAS: UNCLAS SECURE 25 JUNE 1987
FROM: BONN
TO : WELLINGTON 865-ROUTINE
RPTD: LONDON 138-ROUTINE : WASHINGTON 39-ROUTINE
LD : SFA (EUR MEA LGL SEC DLO)
:NZSIS
:POLICE (PTIU)
:DEFENCE (DDOPS)
SUBJ: FRG : HAMADEI CASE.

15932

THE FRG HAS DECIDED NOT TO AGREE TO THE EXTRADITION OF HAMADEI AS REQUESTED BY THE UNITED STATES BUT TO PUT HIM ON TRIAL HERE ON CHARGES INCLUDING THE MURDER OF THE AMERICAN SERVICEMAN. THE CHANCELLOR'S SPOKESMAN ANNOUNCED THAT HAMADEI WOULD BE SUBJECTED TO ''FULL SEVERITY'' OF GERMAN LAW AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT WANTED TO SHOW THAT IT WOULD NOT LET ITSELF BE BLACKMAILED.

2. THERE HAS BEEN AN UNEASY ACCEPTANCE OF THIS COMPROMISE (TAKEN BY THE FULL CABINET) INCLUDING THE SPD. THERE IS AWARENESS, OF COURSE, THAT THE KIDNAPPERS OF THE GERMAN BUSINESSMAN (OUR 79) DEMANDED THAT HAMADEI NOT BE EXTRADITED AND THAT THERE IS NO DEATH PENALTY IN THE FRG. RUMOURS OF EARLY RELEASE OR EXCHANGES ARE ALREADY SURFACING ALTHOUGH THERE IS CLEARLY NO FOUNDATION FOR THIS. THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION (JUSTICE SECRETARY MEESE WAS HERE YESTERDAY) SEEMS PREPARED TO GO ALONG WITH THE GERMAN DECISION (ALTHOUGH THEIR AMBASSADOR SAID HE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED EXTRADITION). ALL IN ALL, THE ASSESSMENT IS THAT BONN IS STILL PLAYING FOR TIME TO DEAL FURTHER OVER THE HOSTAGE QUESTION.
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UNCLASS SECURE

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WLN 4135
AA LON
GR 01083
SVC : H/W RPT NEW YORKS 685 TO US :
CLAS: CONFIDENTIAL 23 JUNE 1987

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: NEW YORK PM
TO : WELLINGTON 00685 ROUTINE
RPTD: CANBERRA 00221 ROUTINE OTTAWA 00107 ROUTINE
: WASHINGTON 00097 DEFERRED PARIS 00079 DEFERRED
: TOKYO 00030 DEFERRED LONDON 00074 DEFERRED
LD : SFA (LGL/UNC/DLO/MEA/EUR)
SUBJ: UNGA 42 : TERRORISM
NYP 004
SAVS: (BY BAG) THE HAGUE BONN ROME

15799
FAP
Gils

INFORMAL WESTERN GROUP MEETING ON 22 JUNE CONSIDERED DRAFT RESOLUTION, INCLUDING SOME FURTHER ADJUSTMENTS TO THE TEXT AND QUESTION OF COSPONSORSHIP. THE OUTLOOK FOR UNGA 42 WAS DISCUSSED BRIEFLY. GROUP WILL MEET AGAIN ON 9 SEPTEMBER TO FINALISE TEXT (ALTHOUGH POSSIBILITY OF A JULY MEETING WAS FLAGGED SHOULD ANY MEMBER FIND IT HAS A MAJOR PROBLEM OF SUBSTANCE TO RAISE).
REPORT

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2 MAJOR POINTS WHICH AROSE DURING DISCUSSION OF TEXT WERE AS FOLLOWS:

(A) P.P.2 : AUSTRIA PROPOSED THAT WORDING ''INCLUDING THOSE INSTIGATED OR SUPPORTED BY STATES'' BE AMENDED TO READ ''INCLUDING THOSE IN WHICH STATES ARE IMPLICATED IN WHATEVER MANNER''., BUT THIS WAS NOT GENERALLY SUPPORTED.

(B) SWEDEN WONDERED WHETHER P.P. SHOULD INCLUDE REFERENCE TO ABUSES OF DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES, BUT GENERAL VIEW WAS THAT USUAL GA RESOLUTION ON PROTECTION OF DIPLOMATS WAS A MORE APPROPRIATE VEHICLE AND THAT OVER-LAPPING WITH THAT RESOLUTION WAS UNDESIRABLE.

(C) O.P.3 : THERE WAS EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION WITH SEVERAL COUNTRIES FAVOURING REFERENCE TO ''PROSECUTING AUTHORITIES''. AMERICANS PROPOSED A REVISED BUT GENERALLY UNACCEPTABLE TEXT WHICH SPOKE OF ''ENSURING PROSECUTION''. DRAFT TEXT AS AGREED NOW READS ''... TO EXTRADITE THEM OR TO SUBMIT A CASE TO THEIR PROSECUTING AUTHORITIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE LAW''.

(D) O.P.7 AND O.P.8 : WORDING IN THESE PARAGRAPHS WAS BROUGHT INTO LINE SO THAT MEMBER STATES ''TAKE NOTE WITH APPRECIATION'' AND ''WELCOME'' ONGOING WORK IN BOTH ICAO AND IMO.

(E) O.P.9 AND O.P.10: MEETING AGREED TO COMBINE THESE TO READ ''REQUESTS THE UPU AND THE WTO WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE COMPETENCES, TO CONSIDER WHAT FURTHER MEASURES ETC.''.

(F) O.P.11: SEVERAL DELEGATIONS HAD STRONG RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE VALUE OF THIS PARAGRAPH. IF THERE IS NO STRONG ARGUMENT FROM CAPITALS FOR RETAINING IT, IT IS EXPECTED TO BE DROPPED.

CONFIDENTIAL

(G) AS FORESHADOWED AT THE LAST MEETING CANADA PROPOSED A NEW O.P. REQUESTING THE UNSG TO TAKE ACTION TO PREPARE ''A SURVEY OF EXISTING LEGAL AND OTHER ARRANGEMENTS AIMED AT COMBATTING TERRORISM'' (FULL TEXT IN TODAY'S BAG). THERE WAS GENERAL SUPPORT FOR THIS PROPOSAL BUT A STRONG FEELING THAT IT SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON A SURVEY OF JURIDICAL INSTRUMENTS RATHER THAN ON IDENTIFYING OR LISTING REGIONAL AND BILATERAL ANTI-TERRORIST ARRANGEMENTS OR TEXTS OF RELEVANT UN RESOLUTIONS, THE SELECTION OF WHICH COULD RAISE MAJOR PROBLEMS. CANADA AGREED TO CIRCULATE A REDRAFTED O.P. IN LIGHT OF THESE COMMENTS.

3 AGREEMENT TO COSPONSOR THE PRESENT TEXT WAS CONFIRMED BY FRANCE, UK, DENMARK, NORWAY. ITALY, FRG AND SPAIN. NETHERLANDS, JAPAN, FINLAND AND AUSTRIA ARE ''VERY LIKELY TO COSPONSOR'' BUT AWAITED A FINAL DECISION. CANADA EXPRESSED STRONG INTEREST IN COSPONSORSHIP AND AUSTRALIA SAID IT WAS LIKELY TO COSPONSOR ALTHOUGH IT COULD NOT TAKE ANY DECISION DURING PRESENT CARETAKER PHASE OF ITS GOVERNMENT.

4 ON TACTICS AUSTRALIA SUGGESTED THAT THE DRAFT SHOULD NOT BE PRESENTED SIMPLY AS A WESTERN TEXT. IT SHOULD BE DISCUSSED WITH MODERATE NAMS, SUCH AS THE ASEANS, BEFORE TABLING WITH A VIEW TO GETTING ONE OR TWO NON-WESTERN COSPONSORS. SEVERAL WEST EUROPEANS ON THE OTHER HAND CONSIDERED IT UNDESIRABLE TO WAIT TOO LONG BEFORE TABLING THE TEXT (BECAUSE OF CONCERN ABOUT PRECEDENCE OVER ANY COMPETING TEXTS) AND SUGGESTED THAT IN FACT IT WOULD HELP MODERATE NON-ALIGNED TO HAVE THE TEXT TABLED EARLY RATHER THAN TO BE INVOLVED IN HORSE TRADING BEFORE IT WAS TABLED. ACCORDINGLY THEY PROPOSED THAT TEXT SHOULD BE TABLED WITHOUT MAJOR CHANGES: ONCE IT WAS TABLED, AMENDMENTS COULD BE ACCEPTED SUBSEQUENTLY IN ORDER TO BRING ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS ON BOARD. FRANCE, AS CHAIR,
SUMMED UP THAT IT WOULD SOUND OUT SEVERAL MODERATE AND RELIABLE NAM., IT WOULD TRY TO GET TWO OR THREE LINED UP AS COSPONSORS BUT SHOULD NOT WAIT TOO LONG BEFORE TABLING THE TEXT. FRANCE NOTED THAT
ALL WESTERN COUNTRIES RECOGNISED THAT AMENDMENTS WOULD BE NECESSARY IN ORDER TO SECURE WIDE COSPONSORSHIP FROM MODERATE NON-ALIGNED. (IN PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS SOME GROUP MEMBERS ACKNOWLEDGE THAT WE COULD END UP WITH A TEXT WHICH INCLUDES SUCH IDEAS AS AN AD HOC EXPERT GROUP MEETING BUT THERE REMAINS NO/NO DISPOSITION AT THIS STAGE TO INCORPORATE THESE IN THE INITIAL DRAFT.)

5 FRANCE AND THE US BRIEFED THE MEETING ON THE STATE OF THE SYRIAN INITIATIVE. THE ARAB LEAGUE HAD DECIDED IN PRINCIPLE IN APRIL THAT ARAB DELEGATIONS WOULD BE ASKED TO SUPPORT THE SYRIAN INITIATIVE., TO SEEK A NEW AGENDA ITEM AT UNGA 42., AND TO PREPARE A WORKING DOCUMENT AS THE BASIS FOR PURSUING THE INITIATIVE. FRANCE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THIS DECISION HAD BEEN CIRCULATED IN NEW YORK, MANY ARAB DELEGATIONS WERE NOT KEEN TO SUPPORT THE SYRIAN PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE AND NOTHING HAD HAPPENED IN THE PAST SIX WEEKS. THE SYRIANS THEMSELVES HAVE YET TO PURSUE THE ISSUE AND HAVE NOT EVEN TAKEN THE INITIAL STEP OF ASKING THE ARAB LEAGUE OFFICE TO CONVENE A MEETING. NOTWITHSTANDING THIS INACTIVITY, THE BEST ASSESSMENT WAS THAT THE SYRIANS WOULD BECOME ACTIVE AS THE ASSEMBLY APPROACHED. THE AMERICANS DESCRIBED THE SYRIAN APPROACH, INCLUDING SEEKING A NEW ITEM, AS VERY DAMAGING AND ONE WHICH THEY EXPECTED WOULD LEAD THE UN
INTO A HARMFUL SHOWDOWN (PRESUMABLY IN THE GENERAL COMMITTEE IN THE FIRST INSTANCE). THEY SUGGESTED THAT IT WAS THEREFORE IMPORTANT
FOR WESTERN DELEGATIONS TO LOBBY MODERATE NON-ALIGNED AND ARABS EMPHASISING THE VIRTUES OF THE CONSENSUS APPROACH: IF IT BECAME CLEAR TO SYRIA THAT ITS PROPOSAL WAS ATTRACTING ONLY LUKEWARM NAM SUPPORT, IT MIGHT BE DISCOURAGED FROM PRESSING AHEAD TOO FIRMLY.

6 IT WAS AGREED THAT THE GROUP WOULD MEET ON 9 SEPTEMBER TO FINALISE THE DRAFT WITH A VIEW TO TABLING IT AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE DURING THE ASSEMBLY (WHICH OPENS ON 15 SEPTEMBER). ALTHOUGH THERE WAS A GENERAL FEELING THAT A MEETING BEFORE SEPTEMBER WAS UNNECESSARY, FRANCE SUGGESTED THAT SUCH A MEETING SHOULD BE CONVENED IF ANY DELEGATION FOUND THAT IT HAD A SERIOUS PROBLEM ON A MATTER OF SUBSTANCE WITHIN THE PRESENT TEXT.
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WLN 4135

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WLN 3455
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CLAS: CONFIDENTIAL 16 JUNE 1987

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: NEW YORK PM
TO : WELLINGTON ǪǪ653 ROUTINE
RPTD: CANBERRA ǪǪ213 ROUTINE OTTAWA ǪǪ1Ǫ4 ROUTINE
: WASHINGTON ǪǪǪ91 ROUTINE PARIS ǪǪǪ71 ROUTINE
: TOKYO ǪǪǪ28 ROUTINE LONDON ǪǪǪ71 ROUTINE
LD : SFA (LGL, UNC, DLO, MEA, EUR)
SUBJ: UNGA 42: TERRORISM
SAVS: (BY BAG) THE HAGUE, BONN

15060
FAL
Chips

OUR 597. IN A CONVERSATION WITH MID LEVEL BUT WELL INFORMED MEMBER OF THE EGYPTIAN MISSION LAST WEEK, WE DISCUSSED EGYPT'S INITIATIVE REGARDING THE PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON TERRORISM.

2 THE EGYPTIAN CONFIRMED THAT AFTER PRESIDENT MUBARAK HAD MADE THE PROPOSAL EARLY LAST YEAR, THE EGYPTIANS CAME TO THE VIEW THAT THE TIME WAS NOT RIPE TO CONTINUE TO PROMOTE THIS INITIATIVE. THIS CONCLUSION WAS APPARENTLY REACHED AFTER INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS WITH ELECTED WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. CONSEQUENTLY, THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT'S APPROACH NOW WAS SIMPLY TO CONTINUE TO TAKE SOUNDINGS AND ONLY TO PURSUE THE INITIATIVE WHEN THE TIME SEEMED APPROPRIATE.

3 DURING THE PAST YEAR, SYRIAN-SPONSORED RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE AND THE ARAB LEAGUE HAVE ENDORSED THE PROPOSAL FOR CONVENING A CONFERENCE. EGYPT BELIEVES THAT THE SYRIANS ARE CONSIDERING SPONSORING A NEW ITEM AT UNGA 42, SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSED TO THE NEED TO CONVENE A CONFERENCE WHICH WOULD SEEK TO DEFINE TERRORISM AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS. ALTHOUGH THE SYRIANS HAVE NOT YET TAKEN A FINAL DECISION, THE EGYPTIAN ASSESSMENT IS THAT THEY WILL PROCEED. THE EGYPTIANS ARE KEEN TO KEEP THE ''TRADITIONAL'' TERRORISM ITEM SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM ANY NEW SYRIAN ITEM, SINCE THE LATTER WOULD NOT ATTRACT CONSENSUS AND THERE WAS A RISK THAT IT WOULD PREJUDICE CONSENSUS SUPPORT FOR THE EXISTING ITEM. THE EGYPTIANS COMMENTED THAT IF SYRIA WERE TO PROCEED, IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL FOR THE WESTERN COUNTRIES TO TABLE THEIR RESOLUTION BEFORE ANY OTHERS ON TERRORISM SO AS TO ENSURE THAT IT HAD PRIORITY IN THE VOTING SEQUENCE.
16/2Ǫ3ǪZ

CONFIDENTIAL

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WLN 3455
NNNN

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ACTION COPY

15112
FA(P)
CLIPS

WLN 355Q
RR LON -TT- GVA
GR QQ487
SVC : RESEND OF LON 7Q AND GENEVA 151
CLAS: UNCLASSIFIED 16 JUNE 1987
FM : NEW YORK PM
TO : WELLINGTON QQ652 ROUTINE
RPTD: APIA QQQ45 ROUTINE PORT MORESBY QQQ36 ROUTINE
: HONIARA QQQ52 ROUTINE SUVA QQQ92 ROUTINE
: CANBERRA QQ212 ROUTINE LONDON QQQ7Q ROUTINE
: WASHINGTON QQQ9Q ROUTINE OTTAWA QQ1Q3 ROUTINE
: GENEVA QQ151 ROUTINE KUALA LUMPUR QQQQ7 ROUTINE
: SINGAPORE QQQQ6 ROUTINE
LD : SFA (LGL, UNC, SPA)
SUBJ: TERRORISM: HOSTAGES CONVENTION
2 WE ATTENDED THE MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF STATES PARTIES TO
THE HOSTAGES CONVENTION TO REVIEW PROGRESS IN ATTRACTING NEW PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION ON 11 JUNE. THE FOUR MOST RECENT MEMBER STATES - JAPAN, MEXICO, SENEGAL AND USSR - ALL ATTENDED.
3 WE REPORTED THE REPLIES FROM POSTS. THE NEWS FROM CANBERRA WAS PARTICULARLY WELCOMED (AND WAS REPORTED ALSO BY CANADA). FROM THE REPLIES RECEIVED BY OTHERS IT SEEMS THAT, IN ADDITION TO AUSTRALIA, ACCESSION OR RATIFICATION WITHIN THE NEXT SIX MONTHS IS LIKELY BY NETHERLANDS, NIGERIA, BELGIUM, TURKEY, VENEZUELA AND PERHAPS GREECE. THE USSR INDICATED THAT THE OTHER EAST EUROPEAN STATES WOULD ALSO SOON BE FOLLOWING ITS LEAD.
4 THERE WAS A LENGTHY DISCUSSION OF FUTURE TACTICS. THE GENERAL FEELING WAS THAT RATHER THAN HAVING THE SAME MEMBER STATES CONTINUALLY PESTERING ''TARGET'' STATES, IT MIGHT BE MORE EFFECTIVE IN SOME CASES IF A WIDER VARIETY OF MEMBER STATES COULD APPROACH NON-MEMBER STATES. CONSEQUENTLY, THE LIST OF NON-MEMBER STATES TO BE TARGETTED WAS REVISED AND ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES ALLOCATED. WE AGREED AD REFERENDUM (IN BOTH CASES ALONG WITH JAPAN) TO APPROACH MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE IN ADDITION TO OUR EXISTING COMMITMENT TO LOBBY PACIFIC ISLAND STATES. THE THREE COUNTRIES NOW ALLOCATED TO LOBBY MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE ARE THEREFORE
NEW ZEALAND, JAPAN AND THE PHILIPPINES. IN ADDITION, FRG AGREED TO MAKE DEMARCHES IN SAMOA.
FOR KUALA LUMPUR AND SINGAPORE:
5 AS YOU WILL GATHER FROM THE ABOVE, THE STATES PARTIES TO THE HOSTAGES CONVENTION ARE ENGAGED IN A CAMPAIGN TO ATTRACT WIDER SUPPORT FOR THE TREATY. MEMBERSHIP SO FAR STANDS AT 4Q AND A CONCERTED EFFORT IS NEEDED TO INCREASE THIS TO, SAY, 7Q OR 8Q (AFTER 7Q OR 8Q RATIFICATIONS, THE PROCESS USUALLY PICKS UP MOMENTUM AND IT IS NOT USUALLY NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN A CAMPAIGN OF PERSUASION). NEW ZEALAND PREVIOUSLY ACCEPTED RESPONSIBILITY TO LOBBY SAMOA, AUSTRALIA, SOLOMON ISLANDS, VANUATU, PNG, FIJI. AT LAST WEEK'S MEETING WE EXPRESSED A WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER EXTEND-
ING THESE EFFORTS TO MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE. WE WILL SEND BY BAG MATERIAL WHICH SUBJECT TO WELLINGTON'S AGREEMENT COULD BE DRAWN ON IN MAKING DEMARCHES. YOU MIGHT LIKE IN DUE COURSE TO LIAISE WITH THE JAPANESE AND PHILIPPINE MISSIONS ABOUT THE EXERCISE.
6 WE WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR A REPORT BACK ON THE OUTCOME OF ANY APPROACH. THE NEXT MEETING OF STATES PARTIES TO DISCUSS PROGRESS IS
SCHEDULED FOR LATE JANUARY IN NEW YORK.
OTT 141516/2Q45Z

TORW 17/Q6/87 Q9:47:35
WLN 355Q
NNNN

B6615/11A

ACTION COPY

14473

FAP

Clips

CLAS: UNCLASSIFIED 10 JUNE 1987
FROM: ROME
TO : WELLINGTON 591-ROUTINE
RPTD: WASHINGTON 15-ROUTINE : BONN 30-ROUTINE
:PARIS 44-ROUTINE : LONDON 82-ROUTINE
:TOKYO 06-ROUTINE : OTTAWA 10-ROUTINE
:NEW YORK(PR) 19-ROUTINE
LD : SFA(DLO EUR LGL SEC EIB UNC ECO : NZSIS(TIC)
:POLICE(PTIU) : DESC
:DEFENCE(DOT DDI) : TRANSPORT
SUBJ: VENICE ECONOMIC SUMMIT: STATEMENT ON TERRORISM
FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF ''STATEMENT ON TERRORISM'':
WE THE HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT OF SEVEN MAJOR DEMOCRACIES AND THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ASSEMBLED HERE IN VENICE, PROFOUNDLY AWARE OF OUR PEOPLES CONCERN AT THE THREAT POSED BY TERRORISM:
- REAFFIRM OUR COMMITMENT TO THE STATEMENT ON TERRORISM MADE AT PREVIOUS SUMMITS, IN BONN, VENICE, OTTAWA, LONDON AND TOKYO:
- RESOLUTELY CONDEMN ALL FORMS OF TERRORISM, INCLUDING AIRCRAFT HIJACKINGS AND HOSTAGE-TAKING AND REITERATE OUR BELIEF THAT WHATEVER ITS MOTIVES, TERRORISM HAS NO JUSTIFICATION:
- CONFIRM THE COMMITMENT OF EACH OF US TO THE PRINCIPLE OF MAKING NO CONCESSIONS TO TERRORISTS OR THEIR SPONSORS
- REMAIN RESOLVED TO APPLY, IN RESPECT OF ANY STATE CLEARLY INVOLVED IN SPONSORING OR SUPPORTING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, EFFECTIVE MEASURES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND IN OUR OWN JURISDICTIONS
- WELCOME THE PROGRESS MADE IN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AGAINST TERRORISM SINCE WE LAST MET IN TOKYO IN MAY 1986, AND IN PARTICULAR THE INITIATIVE TAKEN BYU FRANCE AND GERMANY TO CONVENE IN MAY IN PARIS A MEETING OF MINISTERS OF NINE COUNTRIES WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM
- REAFFIRM OUR DETERMINATION TO COMBAT TERRORISM BOTH THROUGH NATIONAL MEASURES AND THROUGH INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AMONG OURSELVES AND WITH OTHERS, WHEN APPROPRIATE, AND THEREFORE RENEW OUR APPEAL TO ALL LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES TO CONSOLIDATE AND EXTEND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN ALL APPROPRIATE FORA
- WILL CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE SAFETY OF TRAVELLERS. WE WELCOME IMPROVEMENTS IN AIRPORT AND MARITIME SECURITY, AND ENCOURAGE THE WORK OF ICAO AND IMO IN THIS REGARD, EACH OF US WILL CONTINUE TO MONITOR CLOSELY THE ACTIVITIES OF AIRLINES WHICH RAISE SECURITY PROBLEMS. THE HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT HAVE DECIDED ON MEASURES, ANNEXED TO THIS STATEMENT, TO AMKE THE 1978 BONN DECLARATION MORE EFFECTIVE IN DEALING WITH ALL FORMS OF TERRORISM AFFECTING CIVIL AVIATION
- COMMIT OURSELVES TO SUPPORT THE RULE OF LAW IN BRINGING TERRORISTS TO JUSTICE. EACH OF US PLEDGES INCREASED COOPERATION IN THE RELEVANT FORA AND WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE INVESTIGATION, APPREHENSION AND PROSECUTION OF TERRORISTS. IN PARTICULAR WE REAFFIRM THE PRINCIPLE ESTABLISHED BY RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS OF TRYING OR EXTRADITING, ACCORDING TO NATIONAL LAWS AND THOSE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS, THOSE WHO HAVE PERPETRATED ACTS OF TERRORISM.
ANNEX
THE HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT RECALL THAT IN THEIR TOKYO STATEMENT ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM THEY AGREED TO MAKE THE 1978 BONN DECLARATION MORE EFFECTIVE IN DEALING WITH ALL FORMS OF TERRORISM AFFECTING CIVIL AVIATION. TO THIS END, IN CASES WHERE A COUNTRY REFUSES EXTRADITION OR PROSECUTION OF THOSE WHO HAVE COMMITTED OFFENCES DESCRIBED IN THE MONTREAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF UNLAWFUL ACTS AGAINST THE SAFETY OF CIVIAL AVIATION AND/OR DOES NOT RETURN THE AIRCRAFT INVOLVED, THE HEAD OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT ARE JOINTLY RESOLVED THAT THEIR GOVERNMENTS SHALL TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION TO CEASE FLIGHTS TO THAT COUNTRY AS STATED IN THE BONN DECLARATION.
AT THE SAME TIME, THEIR GOVERNMENTS WILL INITIATE ACTION TO HALT INCOMING FLIGHTS FROM THAT COUNTRY OR FROM ANY COUNTRY BY THE AIRLINES OF THE COUNTRY CONCERNED AS STATED IN THE BONN DECLARATION.

THE HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT INTEND ALSO TO EXTEND THE BONN DECLARATION IN DUE TIME TO COVER ANY FUTURE RELEVANT AMENDMENT TO THE ABOVE CONVENTION OR ANY OTHER AVIATION CONVENTIONS RELATING TO THE EXTRADITION OR PROSECUTION OF THE OFFENDERS. THE HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT URGE OTHER GOVERNMENTS TO JOIN THEM IN THIS COMMITMENT.

"YELLOW"

New Zealand High Commission

New Zealand House
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London SW1Y 4TQ
Telephone: 01-930 8422 Ext:
Telex 24368

Reference B/66/5/1A

9 June 1987

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA DLO)

c.c. DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
Police (PTIU)
Defence (DDOP)

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Date	Nature of Material	Remarks
	Terrorism :	US/Europe Cooperation
	press reporting	
8 June 1987	Financial Times preview of	terrorism discussions at Venice summit

S.W. Prior
for High Commissioner

Financial Times Monday June 8 1987

Edward Mortimer assesses US-European efforts against terrorism

The hidden defenders make progress

AS IN TOKYO last year, terrorism and the struggle against it will be high on the agenda of the seven-nation Western summit which opens in Venice today, but will be discussed in a much improved atmosphere.

Governments on both sides of the Atlantic believe that international solidarity and effective co-operation against terrorism have made significant strides in the last 12 months—symbolised by the meeting of Interior Justice ministers in Paris on May 28.

This was the first such meeting held by the seven summit countries, who were joined by the current and incoming presidents of the European Community—Belgium and Denmark.

The Americans, who were represented by Mr Edwin Meese, the Attorney-General, are particularly pleased about it because they have hitherto been kept on the fringes of European co-operation in this matter, which has been conducted mainly through the "Trevi group", whose membership is co-extensive with that of the EC although technically unrelated to it.

They are especially pleased that the initiative was taken by the French, who not long ago were opposed even to discussing terrorism at what are still nominally "economic" summits.

The meeting was convened by Mr Charles Pasqua, the French Interior Minister, with less than 10 days' notice. Despite this all nine participants, except Denmark, were represented by cabinet ministers — including Mr Douglas Hurd, the British Home Secretary,

The Americans would dearly like to see such meeting become regular events. Indeed, most of the time the latest one is said to have been devoted to the organisation of future meetings.

What exactly was decided has been kept a close secret. In the words of Mr Gerhard Siegele, head of the anti-terrorism division of the West German Interior Ministry, "The parties decided not to publish a communique, but to inform only their heads of state and of government, so that they can discuss the results next week in Venice."

He added, however, that he would be satisfied if the summit simply confirmed the results of the Paris meeting.

Mr Francois Mitterrand, the French head of state, is said to have been privately displeased at being bounced in this way by Mr Pasqua and to be opposed to any changes in the statement on terrorism already drafted for the sumit by the "sherpas" the officials reputed to prepare the agenda.

But it is hardly possible for him openly to oppose an initiative taken by his own Interior Minister and thus expose to France's allies the awkwardness of the bicephalous "cohabitation" of opposing parties on which its present government is based.

Since Mr Pasqua is known to be keen to hold further meetings, it is quite possible that a decision to do so will be approved at the summit, though it will probably stop short of instituting them as a regular or permanent forum.

On the practical level the intensification of bilateral co-operation between European countries has been more important, so far, than the multilateral meetings. It has been particularly intense between France, West Germany, Italy and Spain.

The French and West Germans, who signed a bilateral treaty on the subject two months ago, are especially pleased with the results of their joint investigation of pro-Iranian Islamic groups, following the arrest in January at Frankfurt Airport of Mr Mohammed Ali Hamadei, who was caught trying to smuggle explosives into Germany but is also suspected of involvement in the 1985 TWA hijacking.

Mr Hamadei's brother, Abbas, was also arrested, and a large cache of explosives was found near his home in the Saarland, near the Franco-German border.

R66/5/1A

Mr Newman.

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2), 2796
ZZ LON -TT- GVA
GR ΩΩ129
CLAS: UNCLAS SECURE 9 JUNE 1987
FROM: PORT MORESBY

TO :	NEW YORK PM	ΩΩΩ23-ROUTINE	:HONIARA	ΩΩ113-ROUTINE	14265
RPTD:	WELLINGTON	ΩΩ743-ROUTINE	:APIA	ΩΩΩ58-ROUTINE	FA(P)
:	SUVA	ΩΩ1Ω2-ROUTINE	:LONDON	ΩΩΩ13-DEFERRED	CLIPS
:	WASHINGTON	ΩΩΩ33-DEFERRED	:OTTAWA	ΩΩΩΩ5-DEFERRED	
:	GENEVA	ΩΩΩΩ3-DEFERRED	:CANBERRA	ΩΩΩ99-ROUTINE	

LD : SFA (LGL, UNC, SPA)
SUBJ: TERRORISM : HOSTAGES CONVENTION : PNG
YOUR ΩΩΩ34 (ΩΩ588 TO WELLINGTON).
2. ERI, ASSISTANT SECRETARY (TREATIES) IN DFA, HAS TOLD US THAT PNG IS IN FAVOUR OF SIGNING THE CONVENTION BUT, AS A ''MATTER OF FORMALITY'', IT MUST BE APPROVED BY THE NEW PARLIAMENT. THE EARLIEST IT CAN BE REFERRED TO PARLIAMENT IS THE FIRST SITTING IN AUGUST FOLLOWING THIS MONTH'S GENERAL ELECTION.
9/1140LT/PMY

TORW Ω9/Ω6/87 13:39:Ω5
WLN 2796
NNNN

UNCLASS SECURE

"YELLOW"

New Zealand High Commission

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London SW1Y 4TQ
Telephone: 01-930 8422 Ext:
Telex 24368

Reference B66/5/1A

8 June 1987

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA DLO)

c.c. DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
Police (PTIU)
Defence (DDOP)

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Date	Nature of Material	Remarks
	Terrorism	
	press reporting	
7 June 1987	Sunday Times	preview of Venice Summit and of new SAS terrorism unit.

S.W. Prior
for High Commissioner

Computer link in offensive on terrorists

THE Venice summit intends to agree on a series of new measures to combat terrorism. The most important will be an initiative on intelligence-sharing that could be the most significant development in the terrorist war in recent years.

According to senior American sources, the summit will establish a computer system allowing information on suspected terrorists entered by one country to be available to others.

In addition, consuls from the seven nations who process visa applications around the world will be able to gain access to another computer that will show if an applicant has visited any other Western country, if a similar visa application has been refused in the past, and why.

The new measures follow the meeting in Paris last month of European Community justice and interior ministers, under the auspices of the Trevi group, (an acronym standing for Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism and Violence). The ministers agreed to improve intelligence-sharing and police co-operation.

The Venice summit will endorse these policies; but its pious intentions will rapidly be put to the test.

After the summit, President Reagan will fly from Italy to Berlin, where he will meet Helmut Kohl, the West German chancellor. The two will then fly together to Bonn where Reagan will raise the case of the suspected terrorist, Mohamed Ali Hamadei, who is under arrest in West Germany.

Hamadei is suspected of being responsible for the hijacking of the TWA airliner to Beirut last year, when a US Navy diver, Robert Dean Stetham, was killed. The Americans have asked for Hamadei's extradition to face charges of air piracy and murder.

Shortly after Hamadei was arrested in West Germany in

● Action to counter terrorism will be high on the world leaders' agenda. JAMES ADAMS reports from Bonn

January, two West German businessman were kidnapped in Beirut. But since then, the Bonn government has blocked the American request for extradition and, despite pretending to be opposed to deals with terrorists, has secretly negotiated for the release of the businessmen.

Since news of the negotiations, which included approaches to the Syrian and Iranian governments, was revealed, the United States has told the Germans that they must extradite Hamadei for trial in America. If the Germans decide to try Hamadei themselves, the Americans insist, there must be no question of giving him a short sentence (if he is found guilty) in exchange for the two kidnapped businessmen.

The United States accepts that Kohl has a difficult decision to make, but they see Hamadei as a symbol of Western determination to stand firm against terrorist blackmail.

The West can claim some success against terrorism in the past year. In 1986, there were almost 800 terrorist incidents which resulted in more than 2,000 casualties. But Paul Bremer, the United States' ambassador-at-large for counter-terrorism, says: "Our preliminary figures show that international terrorist incidents in 1986 were about the same as 1985 – a considerable change from previous years which saw annual increases of 30-40%."

There have also been impressive successes against European terrorist movements. Last week, the French police carried out raids in nine cities and detained 57 people who they believe were planning bomb attacks. Much of the intelligence on the latest raid came from the West German police with whom the French now have a bi-lateral agreement on the sharing of terrorist information.

Also last week, the Italians arrested eight members of the Red Brigades including the head of the Rome cell. Last month, the leader of the Portuguese terrorist organisation FP25 was jailed; in February the four key leaders of the French terrorist group Action Directe were arrested; leaders of Belgium's CCC are awaiting trial, and last September West German police arrested three hard-core members of the Red Army faction.

But, as fast as arrests are made there are willing recruits to fill the ranks and Western security officials are concerned that unless the counter-terrorist momentum is maintained, the terrorists will regain the initiative.

THE SUNDAY TIMES 7 JUNE 1987

Link-up for SAS to fight terror

by James Adams
Defence Correspondent

BRITAIN'S elite special forces – the Army's Special Air Service and the Royal Marines' Special Boat Squadron – are being restructured and expanded to improve their ability to fight terrorism.

From next month, a new command centre known as the Special Forces Group Headquarters will be set up at the Duke of York's Barracks in Chelsea, London. It will have a staff of about 20, controlling SAS and SBS operations and reporting to a special cell in the Ministry of Defence, known as the Joint Operations Centre or JOC.

The Royal Marines' Comacchio group, which is responsible for protecting oil rigs, countering terrorism at sea and guarding the nuclear submarine base on the Clyde, will be reorganised. Around 200 men will be moved from Arbroath, Scotland, to join the 350-strong SBS in Poole, Dorset.

The changes will shorten the response time of the units to a terrorist emergency such as the 1982 seizing of the Iranian embassy in London or the 1985 hijacking of the Italian Achille Lauro liner.

The rest of the Comacchio group will continue to protect the Clyde base. A study last year showed security at nuclear installations and at the submarine base was inadequate. There was concern that terrorists or Soviet commandos might be able to penetrate the defences. Now, the Comacchio group will be expanded to meet the increased threat and to protect the Trident submarines being introduced in the early 1990s.

"YELLOW"

New Zealand High Commission

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Telephone: 01-930 8422 Ext:
Telex 24368

Reference B66/5/1A

5 June 1987

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA DLO)

c.c. DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
Police (PTIU)
Defence (DDOP)

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Date	Nature of Material	Remarks
	Terrorism: Syria: Abu Nidhal	
	press reporting	
5 June 1987	Independent report of closure of Abu Nidhal office in Damascus.	

S.W. Prior
for High Commissioner

THE INDEPENDENT Friday 5 June 1987

Abu Nidal offices in Syria closed

By John Bulloch
Middle East Editor

REPORTS from Damascus last night said that Syria had taken the one vital step that Britain was demanding before the two countries could resume diplomatic relations, broken over the Hindawi case.

According to information which seemed to have been deliberately leaked in Damascus, Syria has closed down the offices of the arch-terrorist Abu Nidal in the Yarmouk refugee camp outside the Syrian capital. Syrian security men were said to have taken over the offices and removed their contents.

The Syrians were also said to have ordered members of the Abu Nidal group holding non-Syrian travel documents to leave the country immediately, and to have told those with Syrian papers to stop their activities or face imprisonment.

In London, British diplomats said they knew the Syrian security forces had been tightening up on activities of groups in the Yarmouk camp. They did not know of any action against Abu Nidal, but regarded the reports as credible.

Ever since the Hindawi affair, when the Syrian Ambassador was expelled for his involvement in an attempt to blow up an El Al airliner, Britain has said that "a litmus test" of Syria's desire for a new chapter in relations with London would be the expulsion of Abu Nidal from Damascus.

In fact, Abu Nidal himself has not been seen in the Syrian capital for some time, and is believed to have moved to Libya. Abu Nidal — real name Sabri al Banna — has in the past worked for the Iraqis and the Libyans as well as Syria.

Syria has been anxious to re-establish relations with Britain as a means of improving its standing with the European Community. With the Syrian economy in tatters and largely dependent on Russian charity, President Assad and his ministers need all the help they can get.

Syria has already demoted Loutof Allah Haydar, the former Syrian Ambassador, and dismissed General Mohammed Kholy, the Air Force intelligence man reputed to have been responsible for the attempt on the Israeli plane.

The action taken against Abu Nidal, if shown to be true, will mark Syria's final and complete acceptance of guilt, and its determination to work its way back into proper relations with Britain, and thus with Europe.

It has already promised to limit the number of its diplomats in London to seven, and has said those appointed will be professional diplomats and not intelligence officers.

RG615/1A

ACTION COPY

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ZCZC
WLN 2434
RR LON -TT- PAR
GR Q1Q73
CLAS: CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

3 JUNE 1987

FROM: NEW YORK PM
TO : WELLINGTON QQ597 ROUTINE
RPTD: CANBERRA QQ196 ROUTINE OTTAWA QQQ95 ROUTINE
: WASHINGTON QQQ77 ROUTINE PARIS QQQ6Q ROUTINE
: TOKYO QQQ23 DEFERRED LONDON QQQ6Q DEFERRED
LD : SFA (LGL UNC DLO MEA EUR)
SUBJ: UNGA 42 : TERRORISM
SAVS: (BY BAG) THE HAGUE, BONN
YOUR QQ566, NOT TO ALL.
SUMMARY
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2 ALTHOUGH THE DRAFT TEXT ATTRACTED SOLID SUPPORT THE WESTERN GROUP MEETING WAS UNABLE TO FINALISE AGREEMENT ON IT AND WILL MEET AGAIN ON 11 JUNE. THERE WAS SOME SUPPORT FOR OUR VIEW THAT THE PRESENT DRAFT COULD PROVIDE A MORE ADEQUATE RESPONSE TO THE EGYPTIAN/SYRIAN PROPOSALS BUT EVEN THOSE DELEGATIONS SUPPORTED THE PRESENT DRAFT AND WERE CONCERNED THAT IT SHOULD NOT OFFER ANY ENCOURAGEMENT TO THE HOLDING OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE.

REPORT
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3 DESPITE CHAIRMAN'S CONCERN TO TRY TO TIDY AWAY A DRAFT TEXT BEFORE THE USUAL JULY/AUGUST INTERRUPTIONS, THE WESTERN GROUP WAS NOT ABLE TO ADVANCE VERY FAR AT LAST WEEK'S MEETING AND THERE WERE SIGNS OF FURTHER DEBATE AHEAD.

4 WE SPOKE EARLY AND, AS INSTRUCTED, EXPLAINED OUR INABILITY TO RESPOND IN DETAIL AT THIS STAGE. WE REITERATED OUR DISAPPOINTMENT IN THAT WE CONSIDERED THE WESTERN POSITION WOULD BE STRENGTHENED, PARTICULARLY IN THE UN CONTEXT, WERE THE GROUP ABLE TO AGREE TO INCLUDE A MORE SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE TO THE EGYPTIAN PROPOSAL FOR THE HOLDING OF SERIOUS CONSULTATIONS WITH THE VIEW TO PREPARING FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. OUR COMMENTS DREW NO IMMEDIATE REACTION.

5 REACTION TO THE TEXT FROM THE US, AUSTRALIA, CANADA, UK, NETHERLANDS, GREECE, FINLAND, FRG, NORWAY, ITALY, BELGIUM AND FRANCE WAS VERY POSITIVE: ALL FOUND THE TEXT A SOLID BASIS ON WHICH TO MOVE FORWARD. SWEDEN AND JAPAN WERE STILL LOOKING AT THE TEXT IN CAPITALS BUT EXPECTED FIRM SUPPORT. ON COSPONSORSHIP MOST REPRESENTATIVES CONSIDERED IT TOO EARLY TO REACH A DECISION ALTHOUGH CANADA AND DENMARK WERE BOTH ABLE TO COSPONSOR THE PRESENT TEXT AND BELGIUM AND FINLAND EXPECTED THAT THEY WOULD DO LIKEWISE. NORWAY SUGGESTED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO MOVE ON QUICKLY FROM DISCUSSING THE TEXT TO EXAMINING TACTICS, IN PARTICULAR THE NEED TO IDENTIFY SELECTED NAM DELEGATIONS WHO MIGHT BE CANVASSED AT AN EARLY DATE.

13797
FA(P)
CLIPS

6 THE MEETING THEN EXAMINED THE TEXT PARAGRAPH BY PARAGRAPH. WE ARE REPORTING SEPARATELY ON THE AMENDMENTS WHICH EMERGED. THE MOST INTERESTING COMMENTS/PROPOSALS FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW CAME FROM IRELAND, DENMARK AND CANADA. THE IRISH INSTRUCTIONS SAID THAT WHILE BROADLY HAPPY WITH THE TEXT ''WE AGREE WITH THE NEW ZEALANDERS THAT THE SYRIAN/EGYPTIAN PROPOSAL REQUIRES A RESPONSE, THE MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF WHICH SHOULD BE A REAFFIRMA-
TION OF THE PRINCIPLE THAT ACTS OF TERRORISM ARE ALWAYS CONDEMN-ABLE IRRESPECTIVE OF THE PERPETRATORS OR THEIR MOTIVES. EFFORTS TO AGREE ON A GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE DEFINITION OF TERRORISM WOULD HOWEVER BE POINTLESS AND PUT AT RISK THE CONSENSUS ON WHICH 4Q/61 IS BASED''.

7 THE DANES (WHO WERE NOT PRESENT) PROPOSED THROUGH THE CHAIR A NEW PREAMBULAR 7(BIS) WHICH WOULD READ ''BEARING IN MIND THE NEED TO EXTEND THE EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM THROUGH THE ELABORATION OF APPROPRIATE NEW INSTRUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW''. THE UK, SWEDEN, ITALY, THE US AND FRANCE IMMEDIATELY POUNCED, ARGUING THAT WHILE THEY AGREED IN PRINCIPLE WITH THE BASIC THOUGHT, THIS WAS DANGEROUS LANGUAGE WHICH COULD BE EXPLOITED BY THOSE WHO WISHED TO OPEN UP THE PROSPECT OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. OTHERS SAID THAT THEY WISHED TO STUDY THE PROPOSAL AND IT WAS AGREED TO TAKE IT UP AGAIN WHEN DENMARK IS PRESENT. THE DANISH MISSION HAS TOLD US SUBSEQUENTLY
THAT IT IS AWAITING INSTRUCTIONS WHETHER TO PURSUE THE PROPOSAL IN THE LIGHT OF THIS REACTION.

8 AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE MEETING, CANADA SAID THAT WHILE OTTAWA
OPPOSED THE IDEA OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, IT CONSIDERED THAT A
PROPOSAL FOR A MEETING TO EXAMINE THE GAPS, IF ANY, IN EXISTING INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS, COULD APPEAL TO SOME GOVERNMENTS AND THAT
THE DRAFT RESOLUTION WAS INADEQUATE IN THAT IT DID NOT OFFER A REAL ALTERNATIVE TO THE GYPTIAN PROPOSAL. CANADA SUGGESTED THAT A PARAGRAPH COULD BE ADDED WHICH, FOR EXAMPLE, MIGHT INVITE THE
UNSG TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY TO PREPARE A SURVEY OF EXISTING COUNTER-TERRORISM MEASURES INCLUDING MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS AND VARIOUS REGIONAL AND BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR COUNTER-TERRORIST
COOPERATION, WITH A VIEW TO REPORTING BACK TO UNGA 44. CANADA CONSIDERED THAT, BY PLACING RESPONSIBILITY WITH THE UNSG, SUCH A PROPOSAL WOULD AVOID THE PRESSURES THAT MIGHT OTHERWISE ARISE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. IN VIEW OF THE HOUR IT WAS AGREED TO DISCUSS THE CANADIAN PROPOSAL NEXT TIME.

COMMENT

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9 THE CANADIAN AND IRISH COMMENTS WERE WELCOME IN THAT THEY PROVIDED SUPPORT FOR OUR VIEW THAT THE WESTERN GROUP TEXT NEEDS TO GO FURTHER TOWARDS MEETING THE EGYPTIAN PROPOSAL. BOTH COUCHED THEIR REASONING IN TACTICAL TERMS: NEITHER SEES ANY SUBSTANTIVE MERIT IN A CONFERENCE AND THE CANADIAN COMMENT SEEMED TO BE AIMED AT HEADING OFF OUR PROPOSAL FOR AN EXPERT MEETING. NEVERTHELESS THE GROUP WILL NOW BE FACED WITH DEBATING THE NEED FOR A FLESHED-OUT TEXT AND THIS MAY PROVIDE A BETTER OPPORTUNITY TO PROMOTE OUR OWN VIEWS.

10 DISCUSSIONS WITH OTHER DELEGATIONS OUTSIDE THE MEETING REFLECT A PRETTY CONSISTENT ATTITUDE TOWARDS OUR POSITION. JAPAN (HAYASHI) FOR EXAMPLE ENQUIRED WHETHER WE WOULD IN FACT BE WILLING TO SEE AN (UNSUCCESSFUL) INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. WE RESPONDED IN TERMS OF PARA 4 YOUR 00479, I.E. OUR CONCERN WAS TO BUILD ON THE CONSENSUS ACHIEVED TO DATE BY EXPLORING THE SCOPE FOR FURTHER AGREEMENT (WHICH IN FACT WAS NOT FAR FROM WHAT EGYPT PROPOSED). WE HAD SUGGESTED AN EXPERT MEETING TO EXPLORE THE ISSUES WITHOUT THE POLITICAL RISKS ATTACHED TO MOVING TO A FULL CONFERENCE, THEREBY TO PROVIDE A READING AS TO WHAT FURTHER CONCERTED ACTION WAS FEASIBLE. HAYASHI, LIKE FRANCE, SOUGHT TO ARGUE THAT OUR DIFFERENCES WERE TACTICAL., OUR IDEAS WERE ONES WHICH THE WESTERN GROUP MIGHT AGREE TO INJECT INTO ITS RESOLUTION BUT ONLY IF PRESSURE AROSE AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. HAYASHI WISHED TO KNOW IF WE WOULD FLOAT THE PROPOSAL OURSELVES AT UNGA 42: WE REPLIED THAT IT WAS TOO EARLY TO SAY. HAYASHI ALSO COMMENTED (YOUR PARA 3) THAT THE EGYPTIANS WERE NOT PRESSING AND INDEED WERE NOT PARTICULARLY KEEN TO PURSUE THEIR PROPOSAL. WE HAVE ALSO HAD THIS MESSAGE FROM THE EGYPTIAN MISSION.

11 WE LOOK FORWARD TO COMMENT SOUGHT IN PARA. 10 OUR 541.

OTT 0963
03/2100Z

TORW 04/06/87 10:13:38
WLN 2434
NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

B66151A
SOP
FW

VA1A1A

ZCZC
WLN 2323
ZZ LON -TT- GVA
GR QQ181

UNCLASS SECURE

CLAS: UNCLASSIFIED SECURE 2 JUNE 1987

ACTION COPY

FROM:	NEW YORK PM					
TO :	WELLINGTON	QQ588	ROUTINE			
RPTD:	APIA	QQQ42	ROUTINE	PORT MORESBY	QQQ34	ROUTINE
:	HONIARA	QQQ49	ROUTINE	SUVA	QQQ87	ROUTINE
:	CANBERRA	QQ194	ROUTINE	LONDON	QQQ58	DEFERRED
:	OTTAWA	QQQ92	DEFERRED	WASHINGTON	QQQ74	DEFERRED
:	GENEVA	QQ135	DEFERRED			

13671
FA(P)
CLIPS

LD : SFA (LGL/UNC/SPA)
SUBJ: TERRORISM : HOSTAGES CONVENTION
SAVS: (BY BAG) BONN
YOUR 93(M)
THE NEXT INFORMAL MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF MEMBER STATES OF THE
HOSTAGES CONVENTION HAS BEEN CALLED BY FRG FOR THURSDAY 11 JUNE.
THE MEETING IS TO REVIEW PROGRESS IN ATTRACTING NEW PARTIES TO
THE CONVENTION, WHICH NZ RATIFIED IN NOVEMBER 1985. SO FAR THIS
YEAR WE HAVE SEEN REPORTS FROM APIA AND CANBERRA OF HOST GOVERN-
MENTS' POSITION (APIA'S 45/5/1 OF 3 FEBRUARY, CANBERRA'S 167
TO YOU REFER). FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE MEETING NEXT WEEK
GRATEFUL, IF POSSIBLE, FOR UPDATE ON THESE REPORTS AS WELL AS
BRIEF COMMENTS OF HONIARA (INCLUDING VANUATU) AND PORT
MORESBY. SUVA MAY WISH TO REPORT IN SLOWER TIME.
Q2/1935Z

TORW Q3/Q6/87 Q8:45:Q7

UNCLASS SECURE

WLN 2323
NNNN

New Zealand High Commission

"YELLOW"

New Zealand House
Haymarket
London SW1Y 4TQ
Telephone: 01-930 8422 Ext:
Telex 24368

Reference B66/5/1A

28 May 1987

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA DLO)

c.c. DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
Police (PTIU)
Defence (DDOP)

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Date	Nature of Material	Remarks
	Terrorism:	Trevi Group Meeting
29 May 1987	press reporting Reports of Trevi Group meeting in Paris 28 May 1987.	

"S.W. Prior"
for High Commissioner

Western nations close ranks against terrorism

BY PAUL BETTS IN PARIS

THE LEADING industrialised countires agreed yesterday to forge closer and more regular high level government links to reinforce their efforts to fight against terrorism. This was the main outcome of a meeting of interior ministers and senior security officials from nine countries including the US, Japan, Canada, Britain, France, Italy, West Germany, Belgium and Denmark held in Paris yesterday.

Mr Douglas Hurd, the British Home Secretary, said the ministers had agreed to establish close links between the 12 West European countries in the so-called Trevi Group set up to co-ordinate anti-terrorist collaboration in Europe with the US, Canada and Japan.

However, he added "that no one wants to set up a new bureaucracy, a new system, or a new institution," but to improve contacts at ministerial level between European countries and the other leading industrialised nations. The ministers agreed that there should be meetings at ministerial level at least once a year.

Although little discussion appears to have been devoted to new practical steps to combat terrorism, Mr Hurd claimed the agreement to forge closer links between European and other industrialised countries had "filled a gap into which practical proposals will be made."

The meeting was called largely at the initiative of France. After years of standing apart, Paris has shown increasing willingness to co-operate with other countries in the fight against terrorism. This collaboration, especially with neighbouring countries like West Germany and Italy, has started to bear fruit with a series of breakthroughs against such left-wing terrorist groups as Action Directe in France, the Red Army Fraction in West Germany and the Red Brigades and sister groups in Italy.

There also appears to be a shift in the French Government's attitude towards the issue of whether terrorism should be included in the discussions at the forthcoming summit of the seven leading industrialised countries in Venice next month.

Before yesterday's special anti-terrorist meeting, France had indicated that it was keen to see the Venice summit restricted to economic issues. However, it is now likely to agree to discussion on terrorism.

Financial Times Friday May 29 1987

Wavering against terrorism

Michael Evans on the West's latest attempt at joint action against resurgent violence

Next week President Reagan is expected to join six other leaders from the West and Japan in condemning terrorism and calling for renewed efforts to counter it. But the unanimity of the leaders of the seven leading industrial nations at their summit in Venice will inevitably have a hollow ring.

For the issue of terrorism has created both consensus and division among Western governments. It is easy publicly to condemn acts of terrorist outrage, far more difficult to stick rigidly to the principle of "no deals" when individual countries are placed under extreme pressure to surrender to blackmail.

Last year there were almost 800 incidents of international terrorism, causing more than 2,000 casualties.Some Western intelligence sources fear that it could get worse, particularly as many of the leading organizations are attempting to forge better links. Would the West be prepared for such a threat?

In the past 12 months there has been a concerted effort by West European governments to improve co-operation. Under the aegis of the so-called Trevi group of European Community interior ministers – which met in Paris yesterday – practical measures have been taken to accelerate the exchange of intelligence information about known terrorists. A special "hotline", based on a secure facsimile system, is being set up in each West European capital, to ensure that the latest information is transmitted to all police authorities without delay.

Douglas Hurd, the Home Secretary, played an important part in encouraging the other interior ministers to adopt the new measures when Britain held the presidency of the European Council of Ministers for the second half of last year.

But although the hotline and other co-operative measures have undoubtedly helped, there is no real practical consensus among Western governments. The disaster of America's Iran arms deal is only one example, though by far the worst, of a government undermining the West's counter-terrorist policy, supposedly embraced at such august meetings as the annual economic summit.

But Europe, too, has faced setbacks in maintaining credibility in its campaign against the terrorists. For example, the Italian government set free the Palestinian terrorist chief, Mahmoud Abbas Zaidan, better known as Abu Abbas, who masterminded the operation that ended in the hijack last year of the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro, and the murder of an elderly American passenger in a wheelchair. Abu Abbas was reappointed in April to the executive committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

France has also frequently caused alarm within Europe over its apparent double-handed approach to terrorism. The prime minister, Jacques Chirac, has made very positive statements about France's determination never to give in to terrorist demands. Yet there are senior officials in the French bureaucracy who are still privately pushing the government to do a deal to gain the release of five hostages in Lebanon.

French ambivalence over the right response to terrorist blackmail was highlighted in the trial of Georges Ibrahim Abdullah, leader of the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction, in February. After his arrest in 1985 a series of bomb attacks was carried out in Paris which killed 13 people and injured 250.

There were allegations of secret attempts to buy off the terrorists, which the government denied. Yet at the end of Abdullah's trial, the French advocate-general appealed to the judge to give a lenient sentence of no more than 10 years. The judge ignored him and handed out a life sentence, which was warmly welcomed by the French public.

Even the West German government, which has backed Britain's strong stand against terrorism, has begun to wilt because of the emotional pressure caused by the businessmen who were kidnapped in Beirut. Only this week a West German emissary was in Tehran speaking to the Iranian government about the two men, who have now been held for four months.

Bonn has also still failed to make up its mind about a United States request to extradite the suspected terrorist Muhammed Hamadi, alleged to have masterminded the TWA hijacking in 1985, because of fears for the lives of the two Germans in Beirut.

But while hostage-taking has driven a wedge between Western governments like Britain, who insist that there can be no deals with terrorists, and those who feel tempted to compromise, there have been some breakthroughs on the ground to demonstrate that the terrorists are not getting it all their own way.

The French, for example, arrested key members of the Action Directe terrorist group earlier this year. This was important because all the left-wing European terrorist organizations have international units linked with one another, and the Action Directe members arrested were major link men.

It is this linkage and the terrorists' ability to operate across national frontiers and to lay their hands on large sums of money, arms and equipment which make even more urgent the need for Western governments to operate together. The terrorists will only take comfort from the divisions they cause in European capitals.

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SCRP

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ZCZ[redacted]
WLN 2Q42
RR LON -TT- PAR
GR QQ431
CLAS: CONFIDENTIAL 27 MAY 1987 **CONFIDENTIAL**
FROM: NEW YORK PM
TO : WELLINGTON QQ567 IMMEDIATE
RPTD: CANBERRA QQ186 ROUTINE OTTAWA QQQ9Q ROUTINE
: WASHINGTON QQQ67 ROUTINE PARIS QQQ9Q ROUTINE
: TOKYO QQQ18 DEFERRED LONDON QQQ52 DEFERRED
LD : SFA (LGL/UNC/DLO/MEA/EUR)
SUBJ: UNGA 42 : TERRORISM
OUR 541 AND 563 FAX.
DUE APPARENTLY TO AN OVERSIGHT WE DID NOT RECEIVE DRAFT RESOLUTION IN OUR 563 FAX UNTIL TODAY WHEN WE CONTACTED FRENCH MISSION TO OBTAIN
THE TEXT. IN FORWARDING THE REVISED DRAFT TO MEMBERS OF WESTERN DELEGATIONS LAST FRIDAY, SCHRICKE DREW ATTENTION IN A COVERING LETTER
TO THE NEW ELEMENTS IN THE TEXT AS COMPARED WITH RESOLUTION 4Q/61 NAMELY PP'S 2, 3, 4, 8, 9 AND OP'S 3, 8, 9 AND 1Q. HE HAS ALSO INDICATED THAT AT THE WESTERN MEETING ON 29 MAY HE HOPES TO GET A STEER ABOUT UNGA 42 TACTICS AND ABOUT POSSIBLE SPONSORSHIP OF THE RESOLUTION (ALTHOUGH ON THE LATTER POINT HE TOLD US IT IS POSSIBLY TOO EARLY FOR MOST MEMBERS TO HAVE COMPLETED THE NECESSARY DOMESTIC CONSULTATIONS).
2 IN REGARD TO TACTICS, PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION AT THE 14 MAY MEETING OF WESTERN DELEGATIONS WAS THAT THEY SHOULD BE READY TO TABLE A DRAFT RESOLUTION IN THE VERY EARLY DAYS OF UNGA 42. TO THIS
END IT WAS SUGGESTED THAT WESTERN DELEGATIONS SHOULD PLAN TO MEET IN
THE WEEK PRECEDING THE OPENING OF THE GA SESSION. (A POSSIBLE DATE WAS 1Q SEPTEMBER.)
3 SHCRICKE'S COVERING LETTER ALSO SUGGESTS THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL
IN THE MEANTIME ''TO SEIZE ANY OPPORTUNITY TO DRAW THE ATTENTION OF THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES IN NEW YORK AND AS APPROPRIATE IN CAPITALS TO THE PRIORITY WE ASSIGN TO SAFEGUARDING THE ACHIEVEMENT REPRESENTED BY THE ADOPTION BY CONSENSUS OF RESOLUTION 4Q/61 AND ON THE SERIOUS RESERVATIONS THAT THE PROPOSALS FOR A WORLD CONFERENCE, ESPECIALLY THE SYRIAN PROPOSAL, CALL FOR''. THE LETTER ALSO EMPHASISES THE NEED TO PRESERVE CONFIDENTIALITY ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION SINCE PREMATURE DISCLOSURE MIGHT REDUCE THE PROSPECTS OF SUCCESS.
4 IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE BY FRIDAY YOUR COMMENTS ON THE POINTS RAISED IN OUR 541. GRATEFUL ALSO YOUR VIEWS ON THE DRAFT RESOLUTION. ON THE LATTER POINT IF YOU CONSIDER THERE TO BE A REAL POSSIBILITY THAT WE COULD NOT ACCEPT THE WESTERN TEXT AS IT STANDS ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT DOES NOT GO FAR ENOUGH IN SEEKING TO ACCOMMODATE THE EGYPTIAN/SYRIAN PROPOSALS (AND WE RECOGNISE THAT CIRCUMSTANCES WILL NOT ALLOW YOU TO OBTAIN AN APPROPRIATE STEER), IT
MIGHT BE PREFERABLE SIMPLY TO RESERVE OUR POSITION ON THE GROUNDS THAT WE HAVE NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO SECURE YOUR CONSIDERED INSTRUCTIONS.
NYP 343
27/223QZ NYP

TORW 28/Q5/87 Q9:48:56
WLN 2Q42
NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION COPY

13262
FA(P)
CLIPS

CONFIDENTIAL

B66/5/1A
12977
FAP.
Chris

CLAS: CONFIDENTIAL 25 MAY 1987
FROM: BRUSSELS
TO : WELLINGTON 658 -ROUTINE
SVGS: (VIA LON) ATHENS : BONN : HAGUE : LONDON : PARIS : ROME
LD : SFA (DLO EUR LGL SEC)
: NZSIS
: POLICE (PTIU)
: DEFENCE (DDOPS)
SUBJ: EC : MEETING OF TREVI MINISTERS AND OF MINISTERS OF JUSTICE AND INTERIOR

WE ARE FORWARDING BY BAG, A COPY OF A DECLARATION BY BELGIUM IN ITS CAPACITY AS EC PRESIDENT ON THE MOST RECENT MEETINGS OF EC MINISTERS OF JUSTICE AND INTERIOR, AND OF THE TREVI GROUP AT THE END OF LAST MONTH. THE DECLARATION NOTES, AS YOU WILL SEE, THE FACT OF INCREASING CONTACT BETWEEN THE TREVI GROUP AND LIKE-MIND THIRD COUNTRIES BOTH AT MINISTERIAL AND AT DIPLOMATIC LEVEL. AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL, THE DECLARATION REFERS TO THE RECENT SEPARATE MEETINGS AT THEIR REQUEST BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES, CANADA AND AUSTRIA, AND THE SO-CALLED TROIKA OF COORDINATING COUNTRIES, UK, BELGIUM AND DENMARK. IT ALSO REFERS TO CONTACT WITH OTHER COUNTRIES SUCH AS SWITZERLAND, SWEDEN AND AUSTRALIA.

2. SPREUTALS, DEPUTY CHEF IN THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE'S CABINET TOLD US WHEN WE CALLED ON HIM RECENTLY THAT THE LIST OF COUNTRIES WAS NOT EXCLUSIVE AND, THROUGH THE INTEREST WE HAD ALREADY SHOWN, NEW ZEALAND WAS CERTAINLY DESIGNATED WITHIN TREVI AS LIKE-MINDED. HE TOLD US THAT ARISING FROM THE SORTS OF BILATERAL CONTACTS THAT HAD OCCURRED, TREVI MINISTERS HAD CONSIDERED AND AGREED IN PRINCIPLE THAT ON THE EXPRESSION OF THEIR INTEREST, DESIGNATED COUNTRIES SHOULD BE AUTHORISED TO ATTEND TECHNICAL SESSIONS OF THE GROUP. SPREUTALS MENTIONED TWO OPPORTUNITIES DURING THE COURSE OF THIS YEAR, THE DATES FOR WHICH HAE YET TO BE FINALLY SET. THESE ARE:

- A MEETING OF THE HEADS OF SPECIAL INTERVENTION UNITS IN BRUSSELS IN JUNE., AND
- A MEETING OF HEADS OF AIRPORT SECURITY IN BRITAIN DURING THE AUTUMN.

3. THE QUESTION OF THIRD COUNTRY CONTACT MAY BE DISCUSSED AGAIN THIS WEEK BUT YOU WILL NO DOUBT LET US KNOW IF YOU HAVE ANY INTEREST IN THESE MEETINGS.

4. OTHER MATTERS AGREED BY THE TREVI MINISTERS INCLUDED:

- THE EXPERIMENTAL ESTABLISHMENT OF ''A LIGHT ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE AS THE FIRST STAGE OF AN INSTITUTIONAL MEMORY.,
- MEASURES TO IMPLEMENT EFFECTIVELY THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON UNDESIRABLE FOREIGNERS CONSTITUTING A TERRORIST THREAT.,
- THE ORGANISATION WITHIN TREVI OF AN INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION EXCHANGE ON STOLEN ARMS AND EXPLOSIVES.,
- THE PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT OF AN EVALUATION PROCEDURE OF THE TERRORIST THREAT, VIA THE SECURE COMMUNICATION SYSTEM.,
- A PRELIMINARY ARRANGEMENT FOR THE SHARING OF INFORMATION AMONGST EC DRUGS ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS STATIONED IN THIRD COUNTRIES (FURTHER COORDINATION ON DEPLOYMENT WILL BE CONSIDERED UNDER THE DANISH PRESIDENCY).

5. IN THEIR SEPARATE CAPACITY AS MINISTERS RESPONSIBLE FOR IMMIGRATION, THERE WAS AGREEMENT TO MOVE GRADUALLY TOWARDS A COMMON VIA POLICY AND TO REINFORCE EXTERNAL BORDERS. OF SOME INTEREST TOO IS THE FACT OF GROWING CONCERN IN EC MEMBER STATES OF INCREASING ABUSES OF REFUGEE STATUS. MINISTERS AGREED AS REGARDS CLAIMANTS FOR REFUGEE STATUS:

(A) TO STRENGTHEN THE OBLIGATION ON TRANSPORT OPERATORS TO ENSURE THAT TRAVELLERS POSSESS THE REQUIRED TRAVEL DOCUMENTS. IT WAS AGREED THAT OPERATORS WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR RETURNING UNDOCUMENTED TRAVELLERS.

(B) TO SIMPLY THE EXAMINATION PROCEDURE OF CLAIMANTS FOR REFUGEE STATUS WHOSE CASES ''ARE CLEARLY NOT WELL FOUNDED OR IF (HE) COULD BE A MENCACE TO PUBLIC ORDER OR NATIONAL SECURITY''. THERE WAS ALSO AGREEMENT TO REJECT APPLICATIONS BY CLAIMANTS ALREADY REFUSED BY ANOTHER MEMBER STATE, AND TO FIGHT THE PROBLEM OF SIMULTANEOUS APPLICATIONS.

THE STATEMENT COMMENTS THAT ''MEMBER STATES MIGHT FACILITATE THE DEPARTURE TO A THIRD COUNTRY BY GIVING A CERTAIN MATERIAL AND'' (EXCLAM. MARK) FINALLY, MINISTERS AGREED TO STRENGTHEN COOPERATION ON THE QUESTION OF FRAUDULENT DOCUMENTS.

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION COPY

SWP
R66/15/1A

QW1A1A

ZCZC
WLN 1606
ZZ LON -TT- PAR
GR 01442
CLAS: CONFIDENTIAL 21 MAY 1987
FROM: NEW YORK PM
TO : WELLINGTON 00541 ROUTINE
RPTD: CANBERRA 00176 ROUTINE OTTAWA 00084 ROUTINE
: LONDON 00047 DEFERRED PARIS 00051 DEFERRED
: WASHINGTON 00056 DEFERRED TOKYO 00016 DEFERRED
LD : SFA (LGL UNC DLO MEA EUR)
SUBJ: UNGA 42 : TERRORISM
YOUR 00464 AND 00479 (NOT TO ALL).

CONFIDENTIAL

12792
FA(P)
Chils

SUMMARY

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2 WE RAISED CONCERNS OUTLINED IN YOUR MESSAGES AND SPECIFIC PROPOSAL FOR AN EXPERT MEETING AT LAST WEEK'S WESTERN COORDINATION MEETING BUT FOUND NO SUPPORT AND A STRONG PREFERENCE TO AVOID COMPLICATIONS OF UN INVOLVEMENT IN THE ONGOING WORK OF ELABORATING ANTI-TERRORISM INSTRUMENTS, NOW BEING PURSUED IN VARIOUS BODIES. THERE WAS ONLY A MARGINAL WILLINGNESS TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE TACTICAL SITUATION COULD AT SOME POINT REQUIRE WESTERN COUNTRIES TO ACQUIESCE RELUCTANTLY IN ESTABLISHMENT OF A WORKING GROUP.

REPORT

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3 IN ADDRESSING GENERAL COMMENTS TO THE DRAFT RESOLUTION (OUR FAX 11) WE EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE WEST, NOT LEAST BECAUSE IT WAS FACED WITH THE EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN PROPOSALS, SHOULD TAKE STEPS TO MAINTAIN ITS HOLD ON THE HIGH GROUND GAINED IN A/RES/40/61 AND THAT TACTICALLY IT WOULD APPEAR DESIRABLE FOR THE WESTERN COUNTRIES TO GIVE A LEAD ON THE ISSUE RATHER THAN BE SEEN SIMPLY TO REJECT OUTRIGHT PROPOSALS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. WE OUTLINED OUR CONCERN THAT THE DRAFT TEXT MIGHT NOT BE SEEN AS AN ADEQUATE RESPONSE TO THE CALL IN PREAMBULAR PARA 9 FOR ACTION ON EFFECTIVE MEASURES AND THAT THE WEST SHOULD TAKE A MORE FORCEFUL INITIATIVE AT UNGA 42 THAN IS ENVISAGED IN THE PRESENT DRAFT TEXT.

4 WE NOTED THAT THE EGYPTIAN PROPOSAL REGARDING THE HOLDING OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WAS CAUTIOUSLY PHRASED (AND THAT EGYPT'S RECENT APPROACHES IN CAPITALS WERE, IT APPEARED, SPARKED BY ITS ANNOYANCE AT SYRIA'S ''HIJACKING'' OF THE INITIATIVE). WE PLACED EMPHASIS ON THE FIRST PART OF THE PROPOSAL CONTAINED IN THE LETTER OF 3 JANUARY FROM THE EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER - ''THE HOLDING OF SERIOUS CONSULTATIONS''. WE CONSIDERED THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO MEET EGYPT HALF-WAY BY HOLDING SUCH CONSULTATIONS BUT IN A WAY WHICH WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE SEEM AS LEADING DIRECTLY TO AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. WE THEREFORE SUGGESTED THAT THE MEETING CONSIDER INCLUDING IN THE DRAFT TEXT A PROPOSAL TO CONVENE A MEETING OF A GROUP OF EXPERTS TO IDENTIFY GAPS IN THE EXISTING COVERAGE OF INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT SUFFICIENT CONSENSUS EXISTED ON KEY ISSUES (E.G. A DEFINITION OF TERRORISM AND CONCERTED INTERNATIONAL ACTION) TO JUSTIFY THE CONVENING OF A CONFERENCE.

5 IN MAKING THIS PROPOSAL WE SAID THAT WE RECOGNISED THE CONCERNS OF OTHER COUNTRIES OVER THE POTENTIAL DANGERS OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, AND THAT WE WERE NOT SUGGESTING THAT OUR PROPOSAL FOR THE CONVENING OF AN EXPERTS MEETING (OR GROUP OF EXPERTS) SHOULD BE THE FIRST STAGE IN AN INEVITABLE PROCESS LEADING TO SUCH A CONFERENCE. OUR THINKING WAS SIMPLY FOR A ONE-OFF MEETING, WHICH COULD HOWEVER BE PRESENTED AS PART OF A PROCESS TO DETERMINE WHETHER AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WAS FEASIBLE. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT WESTERN COUNTRIES WERE NOT PORTRAYED AS RESPONSIBLE FOR FRUSTRATING WIDER INTERNATIONAL ACTION AGAINST TERRORISM AND WE WERE CONFERNED THAT THE PRESENT DRAFT MIGHT BE DEFICIENT IN THAT REGARD.

6 SPAIN, UK, SWEDEN, CANADA AND FRANCE IMMEDIATELY OPPOSED OUR PROPOSAL. THE UK SAID THAT PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH 9 HAD BEEN DRAFTED VERY CAREFULLY. WHEN IT NOTED THAT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S DETERMINATION ''TO ENCOURAGE THE TAKING OF EFFECTIVE MEASURES'' IT WAS SPECIFICALLY IMPLYING THAT THOSE MEASURES SHOULD BE TAKEN OUTSIDE THE UN. AS FAR AS THE UK WAS CONCERNED IT STRONGLY WISHED TO LIMIT DAMAGE THAT COULD BE DONE IN THE UN ON THE COOPERATION IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM THAT WAS TAKING PLACE WITHIN REGIONAL GROUPS AND WITHIN TECHNICAL AGENCIES. HE AGREED THAT THE PRESENT DRAFT WAS STILL TOO LEAN IN RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN AND EGYPTIAN PROPOSAL, AND IDEAS WERE NEEDED TO BEEF IT UP. BUT IT WAS SLANTED TOWARDS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MEASURES AND WAS NOT SIMPLY A REAFFIRMATION OF 40/61. HE WAS STRONGLY OPPOSED TO THE NZ SUGGESTION.

7 SPAIN (WHICH HAD REFERRED BRIEFLY TO THE POSSIBILITY OF AN AD HOC WORKING GROUP AT THE PREVIOUS WESTERN GROUP MEETING) ALSO SPOKE TO CLARIFY ITS POSITION. IT WAS OPPOSED TO AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE AND TO ANY SUGGESTION OF AN EXPERT OR WORKING GROUP MEETING. ONLY IF THE LATTER PROPOSAL WERE INSISTED ON BY ENOUGH OTHER COUNTRIES AND THERE WAS NO ALTERNATIVE MIGHT THE WESTERN

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GROUP HAVE TO CONSIDER SOME FALLBACK, LIKE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A WORKING GROUP WITHIN THE SIXTH COMMITTEE, BUT IT WOULD BE STRONGLY OPPOSED EVEN TO THIS. SWEDEN SPOKE AGAINST THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OR ANY PROPOSAL TO RECONVENE THE UN SPECIAL COMMITTEE AND SAID IT THOUGH STOCKHOLM WOULD BE OPPOSED TO ANY KIND OF EXPERT GROUP. FRANCE SUPPORTED THE UK. IT DID NOT BELIEVE THAT ANYTHING CONCRETE COULD OR SHOULD BE DONE IN THE UNITED NATIONS. THE UN WAS SIMPLY TOO DETACHED FROM THE DETAIL OF WHAT WAS REQUIRED IN PARTICULAR AREAS TO PLUG LOOPHOLES IN EXISTING LAW. IT WAS SIMPLY NOT EQUIPPED FOR THAT KIND OF PROCESS, WHICH SHOULD BE LEFT TO THE SPECIAL BODIES SUCH AS ICAO, THE IMO AND THE IPU. NO DELEGATION SPOKE IN OUR SUPPORT.

COMMENT

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8 IT SEEMS TO US THAT COMMENTS MADE AGAINST OUR PROPOSAL DELIBERATELY IGNORED ITS REAL PURPOSE. IN PARTICULAR THE COMMENT THAT THE UN COULD HAVE NO FURTHER ROLE IN ELABORATING SPECIFIC MEASURES AGAINST TERRORISM REVEALS A MISUNDERSTANDING IN THAT OUR PROPOSAL IS LIMITED TO A STAGE BEFORE THE CONVENING OF A CONFERENCE, AND IT WOULD BE THE OUTCOME OF THE MEETING WE HAD PROPOSED WHICH WOULD IN FACT DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS ANY POINT IN HOLDING THE CONFERENCE. BE THAT AS IT MAY, THE OTHER DELEGATIONS WERE UNIVERSALLY OF THE VIEW THAT THE PROSPECTS OF OBTAINING FURTHER WORTHWHILE PROGRESS WITHIN THE UN FRAMEWORK ON EITHER A DEFINITION OF TERRORISM OR IDENTIFYING GAPS IN EXISTING COVERAGE WERE VERY LIMITED. THE EFFORT WAS NOT WORTH TAKING. FURTHER, THE DANGERS OF MAKING SUCH AN ATTEMPT WERE CONSIDERABLE AND SUCH THAT IT SHOULD BE AVOIDED. IN PARTICULAR (CF. PARA 3 YOUR 0Q475) THERE WAS CONCERN THAT THE FAILURE OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE (WHICH WAS CONSIDERED ''INEVITABLE'' IN VIEW OF THE ABILITY OF SYRIA AND OTHERS TO ATTRACT NAM SUPPORT OVER THE ISSUE OF DEFINING TERRORISM) WOULD DAMAGE THE STATUS OF RESOLUTION 4Q/61 AND REPRESENT AN UNNECESSARY SETBACK TO THE PRESENT SITUATION IN WHICH PROGRESS WAS BEING MADE STEADILY ON A NUMBER OF FRONTS.

9 IT IS CLEAR THAT IF WE ARE GOING TO SUCCEED IN OBTAINING ANY SUPPORT FROM WEO FOR THE PROPOSAL, WE WILL HAVE TO DO MORE WORK IDENTIFYING IN SPECIFIC TERMS THE GOALS AND MODALITIES OF THE PROPOSED EXPERT MEETING. SOME WEO MEMBERS MAY BE ABLE TO BE SHIFTED FROM THEIR PRESENT OUTRIGHT OPPOSITION ALTHOUGH WE HAVE RECEIVED NO HINT OF THAT AND ATTITUDES IN NEW YORK ARE PRETTY FIXEDPM IN PARTICULAR, COUNTRIES SUCH AS THE UK, FRG, ITALY AND THE US ARE STRONGLY OPPOSED TO THE IDEA. IN SUMMING UP AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE MEETING THE CHAIRMAN (SCHRICKE) ACKNOWLEDGED ONLY THAT THERE WERE TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVED AND THAT THE NZ VIEW WOULD NEED TO BE BORNE IN MIND AND VIEWS MIGHT BE SOUGHT AS NECESSARY FROM CAPITALS.

1Q WE SHOULD WELCOME YOUR FURTHER THOUGHTS ON WHERE WE GO FROM HERE AND ADVICE IN PARTICULAR AS TO WHAT ADDITIONAL (SUBSTANTIVE AS OPPOSED TO TACTICAL) CONSIDERATIONS WE MIGHT EMPHASISE IN FAVOUR OF OUR PROPOSAL. WE MAY ALSO WISH TO CONSIDER SEEKING REACTIONS IN SELECTED WESTERN GROUP CAPITALS. A REVISED DRAFT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT COMMENTS AT THE MEETING WILL BE CIRCULATED LATE THIS WEEK. THE GROUP IS SCHEDULED TO MEET AGAIN IN WEEK OF 1 JUNE.

11 YOUR 0Q475 ALSO SOUGHT AN ASSESSMENT OF AUSTRALIA, CANADA AND NORDIC VIEWS ON THE PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OR RECONVENING OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE. THE FINNS WHO WERE INVOLVED IN PREPARING THE WESTERN DRAFT HAVE SIMILAR VIEWS TO THOSE OF SWEDEN REPORTED ABOVE. ALTHOUGH AUSTRALIA AND CANADA DID NOT SPEAK ON THE BROAD ISSUE AT THE GROUP MEETING, THEY TOLD US BEFOREHAND THAT THEY DO NOT LIKE THE IDEA OF AN INTERNATION-
AL CONFERENCE OR RECONVENING THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE, AND DOUBTED THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE TO GET MUCH MORE OF A CONSENSUS THAN RESOLUTION 4Q/61. CANADA CONSIDERED THAT BECAUSE THE SYRIANS HAD THEIR OWN AGENDA AND WOULD ATTRACT A CERTAIN LEVEL OF NAM SUPPORT, A CONFERENCE WOULD INEVITABLY FAIL AND DETRACT FROM THE EXISTING CONSENSUS.

CORRECTION: PARA 8 : LINES 6 AND 7 SHOULD READ
''CONFERENCE, AND IT WOULD BE THE OUTCOME OF THE MEETING WE HAD PROPOSED WHICH WOULD IN FACT DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS.....'

21/153QZ

TORW 22/Q5/87 Q5:39:45

WLN 16Q6

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

"YELLOW"

New Zealand High Commission

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Telephone: 01-930 8422 Ext:
Telex 24368

Reference B66/5/1A
B66/1/12
18 May 1987

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

c.c. DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
Police (PTIU)
Defence (DDOP)

(EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA DLO)

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Date	Nature of Material	Remarks
	Terrorism : press reporting	Northern Ireland, Middle East
17 May 1987	Observer article on Abu Nidhal group's operations in Europe	
17 May 1987	Sunday Telegraph item about SAS protection of PM Thatcher from possible IRA attack.	

S.W. Prior
for High Commissioner

THE OBSERVER, SUNDAY 17 MAY 1987

Arab terror truce pledge

by FARZAD BAZOFT

THE world's most notorious terrorist, Palestinian Abu Nidal, apparently has agreed to suspend his campaigns in Europe.

Abu Nidal, whose war cry is ' blood not negotiation,' made the undertaking at secret talks with the Palestine Liberation Organisation's top military chief, Abu Jihad, during the eighteenth session of the Palestine National Council in Algiers last month.

During the talks, he is said to have declared : ' I will not carry out any operations in Europe this year.'

He has come under pressure from more moderate Palestinian leaders, including PLO chairman Yasser Arafat, to stop his campaigns while progress is being made towards an international conference on Middle East peace.

But he laid down conditions. He has extracted from Arafat the mandate and the financial support to reorganise the crumbling Fatah organisation in Lebanon. Fatah's power and influence in Lebanon has never recovered from the damage done to it by the Israeli invasion in 1982.

Abu Nidal and his group, the Fatah Revolutionary Council, are backed by Syrians, with low-key support from Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Qadhafi. Terror is an inherent part of Abu Nidal's philosophy.



Abu Nidal : Peace deal.

Abu Nidal, whose real name is Sabri el-Banna, is believed to have been responsible for the massacre of travellers at Vienna and Rome airports in 1985, in which 20 people died, and for the attempted assassination of the Israeli ambassador to London, Sholomo Argov, outside the Dorchester Hotel in 1982.

In Britain he is believed to have been associated with the attempt to smuggle a bomb on to an El Al plane in April 1986, for which a Syrian, Nezar Hindawi, was jailed for 45 years.

In an interview in an Arab newspaper last year, he was quoted as saying : ' We are working with the anti-Thatcher forces, such as the IRA. She got away with it in the Brighton attack, but I can assure you she will not escape next time. I do not want to say more more about the bitch.'

B66/5/1A

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LON 955

B60/13 B66/5/1A

11843
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clips

CONFIDENTIAL

CLAS: CONFIDENTIAL 13 MAY 1987
FROM: LONDON
TO : WELLINGTON 4203 - PRIORITY
LD : SFA (DLO EUR UNC PER)
: POLICE (DIRECTOR, INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES)
SUBJ: NZ/UK POLICE RELATIONS : VISITOR BY INSPECTOR JONES

YOUR 1436.
2. WE HAVE RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING SELF-EXPLANATORY REPLY FROM DUNKLEY PRINCIPAL F5 DIVISION OF THE HOME OFFICE CONCERNING THE PROPOSED ATTACHMENT OF INSPECTOR JONES:

''I AM PLEASED TO BE ABLE TO CONFIRM THAT WE WOULD BE HAPPY TO ACCEDE TO THIS REQUEST AND HAVE ACCORDINGLY WRITTEN TO THE METROPOLITAN POLICE. INSPECTOR JONES SHOULD THEREFORE CONTACT MR JOHN SENNETT, ASSISTANT RECEIPTION OFFICER AT NEW SCOTLAND YARD (TEL 230 2209) ON HIS ARRIVAL IN THE UK TO DISCUSS CONVENIENT DATES. I UNDERSTAND THAT THESE ARE LIKELY TO BE FROM EARLY JULY ONWARDS AND THAT AN ATTACHMENT FEE OF POUNDS 37.82 PER DAY WOULD BE PAYABLE.

IF YOU FEEL THAT WE CAN BE OF ANY FURTHER ASSISTANCE, PLEASE CONTACT MY ASSISTANT, MR J WHEATLEY (213 5007), WHO WOULD BE PLEASED TO HELP YOU.''

LON 955
NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

K

"YELLOW"

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Telex 24368

Reference ~~B66/5/1A~~ B67/1/12

15 May 1987

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA DLO)

c.c. DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
Police (PTIU)
Defence (DDOP)

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Date	Nature of Material	Remarks
	Terrorism:	Northern Ireland: IRA/Libya
	press reporting	
14 May 1987	Independent article investigating the links between Libya and the IRA and implicating the	former in the supply of explosives.

S.W. Prior
for High Commissioner

"Yellow"

New Zealand High Commission

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Telex 24368

Reference B66/5/1A
B67/1/12

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA DLO)

c.c. ~~PMD~~ DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
Police (PTIU)
Defence (DDOP)

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Date	Nature of Material	Remarks
	Terrorism : press reporting	Northern Ireland
10 May 1987	Sunday Telegraph report of terrorist squad.	SAS involvement in ambush of IRA

S.W. Prior
for High Commissioner

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ZCZC
WLN 0399
RR LON
GR 00970

CONFIDENTIAL

CLAS: CONFIDENTIAL 7 MAY 1987
FROM: NEW YORK PM
TO : WELLINGTON 00464 ROUTINE
RPTD: CANBERRA 00145 ROUTINE OTTAWA 00071 ROUTINE
LD : SFA (LGL/UNC/DLO)
SUBJ: UNGA 42 : TERRORISM
LONDON 37 -ROUTINE-

11326

WE ATTENDED AN INFORMAL MEETING OF WESTERN COUNTRIES CALLED LAST WEEK TO CONSIDER THE WESTERN APPROACH TO THE TERRORISM ITEM THAT WILL BE ON THE AGENDA OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY THIS YEAR, FOLLOWING ON RESOLUTION 40/61. THE MEETING CONSIDERED THE EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN PROPOSALS FOR A WORLD CONFERENCE ON TERRORISM, AND THE POSSIBLE BASIS FOR A WESTERN DRAFT RESOLUTION.

REPORT:

2 MUBARAK FIRST RAISED THE IDEA IN AN ADDRESS TO THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE IN EARLY 1986. IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY FAVOURABLE WESTERN REACTION, EGYPT HAS NOT PURSUED THE INITIATIVE. THE SYRIANS, HOWEVER, ADOPTED THE PROPOSAL AS THEIR OWN, AND OBTAINED THE ENDORSEMENT OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE IN KUWAIT EARLIER THIS YEAR. RECENTLY IT WAS ENDORSED IN THE SOVIET-SYRIAN COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AFTER ASSAD'S VISIT TO MOSCOW. AS THE SYRIANS SEE IT, A PRIME PURPOSE OF A CONFEREENCE WOULD BE TO DEFINE TERRORISM, DISTINGUISHING IT FROM THE ACTIVITIES OF NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS.

3 AT LAST WEEK'S MEETING MOST WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES WERE CAUTIOUS ABOUT THE WORLD CONFERENCE PROPOSAL. IT WAS THOUGHT THAT THERE WAS VIRTUALLY NO POSSIBILITY THAT AN AGREED DEFINITION OF TERRORISM COULD BE ARRIVED AT - IT WAS A SUBJECT WITH WHICH THE UNITED NATIONS HGAD BEEN GRAPPLING FOR MANY YEARS WITHOUT SUCCESS. THE PROBLEM OF STATE TERRORISM WAS ANOTHER MAJOR DIFFICULTY. THE EGYPTIAN PROPOSAL HAD BEEN DIRECTED TOWARDS FILLING IN GAPS THAT MIGHT EXIST AMONG THE VARIOUS ANTI-TERRORISM MEASURES BY PRODUCING A CONSOLIDATED TERRORISM CONVENTION. THE FRENCH, BRITISH AND AMERICANS CONSIDERED THAT TO BE OVERLY AMBITIOUS., IT HAD BEEN ONE OF

THE FUNCTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON TERRORISM WHICH HAD MET BETWEEN 1972 AND 1979 WITHOUT ACHIEVING MUCH PROGRESS.

4 FRANCE, WHICH CALLED THE MEETING AND WILL BE COORDINATING THE WESTERN APPROACH TO THE ITEM THIS YEAR, SUGGESTED THAT THE MOST PRODUCTIVE AVENUE OF PROGRESS IN COMBATTING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM WOULD BE TO CONTINUE TO TAKE A ''SECTORAL'' APPROACH TO PROBLEMS - FILLING GAPS IN EXISTING INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS AS THESE WERE SHOWN TO EXIST, AND THROUGH BILATERAL MEASURES.

5 SOME NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES HAD PROPOSED TO FRANCE THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UN SPECIAL COMMITTEE, AS BEING AN ALTERNATIVE TO AN OUTRIGHT REJECTION TO THE SYRIAN/EGYPTIAN PROPOSAL. FRANCE AGREED THAT ALTHOUGH THIS WOULD BE A LESS PUBLIC FORUM (AND THEREFORE ITS EVENTUAL INEVITABLE FAILURE LESS OF A SETBACK) IT WOULD BE A FURTHER USELESS BURDEN ON THE UN CALENDAR AND ITS RE-ESTABLISHMENT WOULD THEREFORE BE OPPOSED BY FRANCE. OTHERS AGREED.

6 FRANCE, FRG AND ITALY ALL AGREED THAT GORBACHEV'S ENDORSEMENT OF THE SYRIAN PROPOSAL WAS A NEW AND TROUBLING DIMENSION. THEY THOUGHT THAT, EVENSO, THE USSR MIGHT STILL BE ASSESSING ITS ATTITUDE TO IT, SINCE THE RUSSIANS HAD MADE A NUMBER OF APPROACHES IN WESTERN CAPITALS TO ASSESS WESTERN REACTION TO THE PROPOSAL.

7 IF THE WEST WAS TO REACT NEGATIVELY TO BOTH THE SYRIAN AND EGYPTIAN PROPOSAL AND TO THE SUGGESTION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE, THEN HOW BEST COULD IT MAINTAIN THE INITIATIVE ON THE ISSUE WHICH IT HAD TAKEN AT THE 40TH SESSION? IT WAS AGREED THAT THE WEST SHOULD PRESENT A DRAFT RESOLUTION THIS YEAR, THOUGH IT WAS DIFFICULT TO SEE WHAT FURTHER ELEMENTS COULD BE INCORPORATED IN A TEXT WHICH WOULD BE SUFFICIENTLY APPEALING TO THE OTHER GROUPS TO COUNTERBALANCE THE SYRIAN/EGYPTIAN PROPOSAL. THE UNITED KINGDOM, WHILE AGREEING THAT THE WEST MUST APPEAR TO BE ACTIVE, THOUGHT THAT THE UNITED

NATIONS, IN ADOPTING RESOLUTION 40/61, HAD GONE ABOUT AS FAR AS IT REASONABLY COULD. THERE WAS REALLY NO FURTHER AREA FOR UN ACTION, ALTHOUGH IT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL SOMETIMES PLAYED A USEFUL ROLE IN CONDEMNING SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF TERRORISM.

8 THE MEETING AGREED IN THE FIRST PLACE THAT THE SHAPE AND TEXT OF THE RESOLUTION SHOULD BE PRETTY MUCH THE SAME AS ITS PREDECESSOR. POSSIBLE NEW ANGLES MIGHT INCLUDE ADVOCATING WORK ON WAYS TO STOP THE ABUSE OF DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES FOR TERRORIST PURPOSES., WAYS TO DEVELOP EXISTING NORMS, FOR EXAMPLE THE DECLARATION ON FRIENDLY RELATIONS., MAKING EXISTING CONVENTIONS MORE EFFECTIVE., THE PROBLEM OF BOOBY-TRAPPED LETTERS (THE IPU COULD BE ASKED TO UNDERTAKE WORK ON THAT ISSUE)., AND ATTACKS ON OFF-SHORE FACILITIES (THE IMO IS ALREADY LOOKING AT THE PROBLEM).

8A. THE MEETING AGREED THAT A DRAFTING GROUP SHOULD MEET OVER THE NEXT FEW WEEKS TO PREPARE A DRAFT WESTERN RESOLUTION. IT WOULD REPORT BACK TO THE WESTERN GROUP ON THURSDAY, 14 MAY. IN THE MEANTIME ANY PROPOSALS FROM CAPITALS FOR INCLUSION IN THE DRAFT RESOLUTION WERE CALLED FOR.

COMMENT:

9 IN OUR SPEECH TO THE SIXTH COMMITTEE ON THIS ITEM AT UNGA 40, WE ENDORSED THE IDEA OF THE ELABORATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE CONVENTION. WE RAISED, AT LEAST BY INFERENCE, THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE UNITED NATIONS' SPECIAL COMMITTEE MIGHT BE RE-ESTABLISHED. THE AVERSION OF OTHER WEO MEMBERS TO THESE PROPOSALS IS TRONG. GRATEFUL ADVICE WHETHER YOU WISH US TO TAKE THEM FURTHER AT THE MEETING IN MID-MAY.

10 DO YOU HAVE ANY SUGGESTIONS FOR THE TEXT OF THE RESOLUTION ITSELF? WE NOTE IN THIS REGARD PARAS. 12 - 14 OF THE BRIEF PREPARED FOR THE COMMONWEALTH LAW MINISTERS CONFERENCE. WE COULD SUGGEST THE INCLUSION OF A GENERAL PARAGRAPH CALLING ON STATES E.G. TO COOPERATE IN TAKING FURTHER STEPS TO IMPROVE THE COVERAGE OF INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS RELATING TO TERRORIST ACTS., HOWEVER, MORE CONCRETE PROPOSALS ALONG THE LINES OF PARAS 11 - 13 OF RESOLUTION 40/61 WOULD SEEM PREFERABLE. GRATEFUL YOUR VIEWS.

"Yezcow"

New Zealand High Commission

New Zealand House
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Telephone: 01-930 8422 Ext:
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Reference B66/5/1A

1 May 1987

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA DLO)

c.c. ~~EMD~~ DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
Police (PTIU)
Defence (DDOP)

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Date	Nature of Material	Remarks
	Terrorism	Libya
	press reporting	
30 April 1987	Times report of American intelligence discoveries of links between Rome airport massacre in 1985 and Libyan ammunition captured in northern Chad.	

CC

S.W. Prior
for High Commissioner

THE TIMES THURSDAY APRIL 30 1987

US produces proof of role by Gadaffi in terrorism

From Michael Binyon, Washington

The United States has found conclusive proof of Libya's direct involvement in terrorism in Europe. According to NBC News, US intelligence has linked the grenades used in at least five terrorist attacks, including the 1985 Rome airport massacre, to a batch of Soviet grenades bought by Libya from Bulgaria in 1983.

Pentagon and intelligence sources say that after Libyan forces were recently dislodged from northern Chad, they abandoned weapons and ammunition in the desert.

Among these arms were Soviet-made F 1 grenades whose serial and batch numbers showed that they were bought by Libya from Bulgaria in a $300 million (£180 million) deal.

US experts say that these numbers tally with the serial numbers found on the fragments of grenades used in terrorist attacks in Europe last year, proving conclusively either that the terrorists were directly armed by Colonel Gadaffi, the Libyan leader, or that Libya made its arsenal available to terrorist support groups.

The Pentagon yesterday refused to comment on the report. In general the Defence Department refuses to say anything about intelligence-related issues.

However, it is clear that US intelligence played a key role in recovering the grenades from the Chad desert and in tracing the batch and serial numbers of the arms originally sold by the Soviet Union to Bulgaria.

Yesterday, the State Department spokesman said: "We are convinced that Libya has been involved in a number of terrorist attacks." But he refused to talk about the intelligence sources

Last year, the Reagan Administration insisted that it knew that Libya was behind the rash of terrorist attacks on US installations in Europe and at Rome and Vienna airports. But it failed to produced the "smoking gun," and many West Europeans were sceptical of the claim.

The attacks where these F 1 grenades were used include: the US Officers' Club in Ankara; the September 1985 bombing of a Paris café; the October 1985 hijacking of an EgyptAir airliner to Malta; and the Vienna and Rome airport bombings in December 1985.

American terrorism experts say that this latest discovery makes it abundantly clear that Colonel Gadaffi has been deeply involved in promoting international terrorism, and that Washington's tough line against Libya has been fully vindicated.

B60/13

cc B66/5/1A

1 May 1987

Mr G E Dunkley
Principal F5 Division
Home Office
50 Queen Anne's Gate
LONDON
SW1H 9AT

I have been asked to draw to your attention the fact that Inspector G P Jones of the New Zealand Police is to visit the United Kingdom privately between May and September this year. Inspector Jones is the Training Officer for the New Zealand Police Anti-Terrorist Squad.

The New Zealand Police would like Inspector Jones to take advantage of his stay in the United Kingdom to study policies, procedures and practice in dealing with terrorist incidents by undertaking a short attachment to the London Metropolitan Police Anti-Terrorist Section. The period the Police have in mind is three days. During the attachment Inspector Jones would be officially on New Zealand Police duty.

I understand that the New Zealand Police have, through the Interpol connection, communicated in a preliminary way about the attachment of Inspector Jones. I am advised that the Metropolitan Police have indicated their receptiveness, for which consideration the New Zealand Police are most grateful. The attachment fee of £37.82 daily would, of course, be met by the New Zealand Police.

As matters stand now, Inspector Jones would make direct contact with the Metropolitan Police on his arrival in London towards the end of this month to make suitable arrangements for his attachment.

/I should

B66/5/1A

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UNCLASS SECURE

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UNCLASSIFIED-SECURE 1 MAY 1987
FROM WELLINGTON
TO LONDON 1426 - PRIORITY

SFA (DLO, EUR, UNC, PER)
POLICE (DIRECTOR INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES)

NZ/UK POLICE RELATIONS : VISIT BY INSPECTOR JONES

YOUR 3799: THE POLICE HAVE WRITTEN TO US AS FOLLOWS. GRATEFUL YOU ACTION AS APPROPRIATE AND ADVISE OUTCOME.

BEGINS:
WE RECENTLY MADE A REQUEST THROUGH INTERPOL CHANNELS FROM THE NEW ZEALAND POLICE TO THE LONDON METROPOLITAN POLICE FOR A NEW ZEALAND POLICE OFFICER TO BE ATTACHED FOR 3 DAYS TO THE LONDON METROPOLITAN POLICE ANTI-TERRORIST SECTION.

PROTOCOL NOW REQUIRES THIS REQUEST TO LONDON METROPOLITAN POLICE TO BE CLEARED THROUGH THE BRITISH HOME OFFICE.

THE SITUATION IS THAT INSPECTOR G P JONES OF THE NEW ZEALAND POLICE IS VISITING THE UNITED KINGDOM PRIVATELY BETWEEN MAY AND SEPTEMBER 1987. INSPECTOR JONES IS THE TRAINING OFFICER FOR THE NEW ZEALAND POLICE ANTI-TERRORIST SQUAD. WE WISH TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF HIS STAY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM TO STUDY POLICIES, PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES IN DEALING IN TERRORIST ATTACHMENT TO THE LONDON METROPOLITAN POLICE ANTI-TERRORIST SECTION. FOR THOSE 3 DAYS INSPECTOR JONES WOULD BE OFFICIALLY ON NEW ZEALAND POLICE DUTY. THE ATTACHMENT FEE OF 37.82 POUNDS PER DAY WILL BE PAID BY THE NEW ZEALAND POLICE.

INDICATIONS ARE THAT THE METROPOLITAN POLICE ARE RECEPTIVE TO SUCH AN ATTACHMENT AND WE ARE GRATEFUL FOR THEIR CONSIDERATION AND COOPERATION.

INSPECTOR JONES WILL MAKE DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE METROPOLITAN POLICE ON HIS ARRIVAL IN BRITAIN IN LATE MAY 1987 TO MAKE SUITABLE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE ATTACHMENT.

WOULD YOU PLEASE PROVIDE THIS INFORMATION TO THE NEW ZEALAND HIGH COMMISSION, LONDON SO THAT MR GORDON DUNKLEY THE F5 PRINCIPAL AT THE HOME OFFICE, CAN BE CONSULTED.
ENDS
=

UNCLASS SECURE

Q046391
WLN 1/0725Z PMG
COL: 1426

"YELLOW"

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Reference B66/5/1A

5 May 1987

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA DLO)

c.c. ~~PMD~~ DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
Police (PTIU)
Defence (DDOP)

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Date	Nature of Material	Remarks
	Terrorism ~~press reporting~~	Trevi Group Meeting 28 April
May 1987	Commons written answer by Home Secretary on results of 28 April Trevi Group meeting in Brussels on European terrorism measures.	

S.W. Prior
for High Commissioner

Trevi Ministers (Meeting)

Mr. Waller asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will make a statement about the outcome of the recent meeting of Trevi Ministers in Brussels.

Mr. Hurd: Trevi Ministers met in Brussels on 28 April under the Belgian presidency. This meeting was part of the regular pattern of Trevi business and follows on from the previous meeting in London on 9 December last, under my chairmanship, and later work by officials.

Ministers agreed to establish new arrangements for the exchange of information on significant thefts of arms or explosives, or discovery of arms or explosives, which might be of terrorist significance. We also approved practical arrangements whereby a Community country which refused to admit or deport a non-Community national for reasons connected with terrorism would inform other Community countries of its decision, together with identifying particulars. We further agreed to inform the European Commission of our view that any new measures to facilitate the free movement of goods within the Community should not inhibit national authorities making such checks as they thought appropriate on the movement of firearms across Community frontiers.

Ministers welcomed progress towards full operation of a secure communications link between police forces, and approved plans for the regular updating of the assessment of the terrorist threat to Community countries which had been adopted at our meeting in London last December.

The United Kingdom will organise and host two Trevi conferences later this year: one of directors of forensic and scientific laboratories to discuss the detection of firearms and explosives at airports; the other of national correspondents of member states dealing with the problem of football hooliganism.

We agreed principles for the sharing of information and practical co-operation so that a drugs liaison officer representing one Community country in a country outside the Community could, by agreement, conduct inquiries on behalf of, and provide information to, other Community countries. More detailed arrangements will be developed further by officials.

For obvious reasons, much of what Trevi discusses, especially on terrorism, cannot be made public. But this was a productive meeting which carried still further the co-operation within the Community on matters of crimes of terrorism.

The growing importance of Trevi was shown by the fact that the US Attorney-General, the Canadian Solicitor-General and the Austrian Minister of the Interior came to discuss in the margins of our meeting how their countries should be associated with our work.

"WELCOW"

New Zealand High Commission

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Reference B66/5/1A

29 April 1987

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA DLO)

c.c. ~~PMD~~ DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
Police (PTIU)
Defence (DDOP)

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Date	Nature of Material	Remarks
	Terrorism : press reporting	UK/India Treaty
29 April 1987	Independent report on progress on UK/India extradition treaty - to cover terrorists.	

"S.W. Prior"
for High Commissioner

THE INDEPENDENT Wednesday 29 April 1987

Britain, India near accord on terrorist treaty

By Michael Fathers
Asia Editor

BRITAIN and India have reached agreement in principle on an extradition treaty to cover terrorist violence and are now completing the small print before the draft is finalised by both governments.

However, while Whitehall appears confident that the negotiations are at an end, Indian officials say the treaty will still need to be considered by "interested parties" in New Delhi before it can go into force. This may mean merely that it must be approved by the Indian cabinet, or it could reopen the debate after nearly seven months of difficult negotiations.

India's deputy Foreign Minister, Natwar Singh held two rounds of talks with Timothy Renton, the Foreign Office Minister of State, in London yesterday and is due to meet Douglas Hurd, the Home Secretary, today to discuss the issue further.

India demanded an extradition treaty nearly two years ago, charging that Britain had become a "safe haven" for Sikh extremists. The New Delhi government blames much of the violence in the Punjab on support given to Sikh separatists in India by their co-religionists abroad, particularly in Britain and Canada.

Britain's first reaction — to insist that present laws were sufficient to cover the problem and to refuse to consider an extradition treaty — contributed to a significant deterioration in relations.

Realising the strain the issue was causing to British interests, the government presented a draft treaty in September last year and offered to negotiate further. Lawyers from both sides have met several times since in London and New Delhi to bridge differences which have centred on conflicting definitions of "deportation" and "extradition".

New Delhi wants extremist Sikhs living in Britain who advocate violence in India deported so they can stand trial in India. Britain has always insisted it cannot allow the deportation of its citizens.

The treaty has gone some way towards meeting the Indian position and the Indian government appears to have accepted the limitations of English law. Mr Singh said yesterday that relations between the two countries were back to normal.

The treaty proposes that incitement and conspiracy to commit a terrorist act are grounds for extradition. But if the conspiracy to commit a crime in India takes place in Britain, those accused must be tried in Britain and may not be deported.

The agreement removes the political factor from crimes of violence as a defence against extradition. It also holds that any crime which carries a sentence of 12 months or more would be a case for extradition.

"YELLOW"

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Telex 24368

Reference B66/5/1A

28 April 1987

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
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c.c. ~~PMD~~ DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
Police (PTIU)
Defence (DDOP)

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Date	Nature of Material	Remarks
	Terrorism - press reporting	European Measures
27 April 1987	Times preview of meeting in Brussels 28/4.	of EC Interior and Justice Ministers

S.W. Prior
for High Commissioner

THE TIMES MONDAY APRIL 27 1987

New anti-terrorist measures for EEC

By Michael Evans Defence Correspondent

New ways to track down terrorists operating in Europe are to be recommended at a meeting of Common Market Interior and Justice Ministers in Brussels tomorrow .

Police throughout Europe are to be told to pass on details of any thefts or uncovered caches of firearms and explosives which have terrorist connections, to all EEC capitals on a new secure communications network.

Counter-terrorist officials met last week to draw up the agenda for the EEC Ministers of the so-called Trevi Group, which will include Mr Douglas Hurd, the Home Secretary.

A dossier on all known terrorist leaders and gun-runners is already held by EEC police after a Trevi Group decision last year to co-ordinate information.

A secure facsimile "hot line" was set up so that intelligence information of terrorist activities and movements could be relayed quickly to every European capital.

Tomorrow's meeting of Trevi Ministes is expected to approve the recommendation that all terrorist-related arms thefts should be included in the dossier.

Most European Intelligence services are not convinced there is a co-ordinated terrorist "high command" in Europe. But it is known that there are links between some of the organizations and there is a degree of arms-swopping.

Criminals engaged in weapons thefts are increasingly selling into the terrorist market.

The Trevi Group is also expected to call for tighter checks at border points on travellers supposedly licensed to carry guns.

Other methods to increase European counter-terrorist co-operation to be discussed will include:

- Immediate exchange of information on the secure hot line about any person prevented from entering an EEC country on grounds of suspected terrorist involvement.
- A possible conference in Britain in October of aviation security officials to pool information on screening methods at airports.

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CLAS: CONFIDENTIAL 28 APR 87
FROM: LONDON
TO : WELLINGTON 3738 - ROUTINE
LD : DESC COORDINATOR (HENSLEY)
SFA (NORRISH)
DEFENCE (SECDEF CDS)
SIS (DIRECTOR)
POLICE (COMMISSIONER)
SUBJ: ANTI-TERRORISM
MY 2609 PARA 2.

2. WE HAVE RECEIVED NOW FROM THE HOME OFFICE THEIR COMMENTS ON OUR DRAFT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM (EMERGENCY POWERS) BILL, TOGETHER WITH A BACKGROUND HOME OFFICE BRIEFING DOCUMENT ON THE BRITISH PREVENTION OF TERRORISM (TEMPORARY PROVISIONS) ACT OF 1984, WHICH WE ARE FAXING SEPARATELY.

3. THE FOLLOWING ARE THE SUBSTANTIVE COMMENTS MADE BY THE HOME OFFICE:

''OUR GENERAL IMPRESSION IS THAT THE POWERS THE BILL WOULD CONFER ON THE GOVERNMENT AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ARE MUCH WIDER THAN THOSE THAT ARE LIKELY TO BE ACCEPTABLE IN THIS COUNTRY. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE POWERS GIVEN TO THE POLICE ARE OF THE KIND THAT WOULD BE GIVEN TO THE POLICE IN PEACE (OR WAR TIME) HERE.

''WITH RESPECT TO THE POWER IN CLAUSE 12 TO PROHIBIT THE BROADCASTING OR PUBLICATION OF CERTAIN MATERIAL, OUR EXPERIENCE HAS BEEN THAT IT IS DURING A TERRORIST INCIDENT THAT THE MEDIA INTEREST IS MOST INTENSE RATHER THAN AFTERWARDS. THAT IS WHEN THE POWERS MIGHT BE OF VALUE IN PROTECTING LIVES.

''JOURNALISTS AND THEIR SUPPORTING TEAMS WILL DESCEND ON THE SCENE IN VAST NUMBERS AND FROM ALL OVER THE WORLD. AT THE LIBYAN PEOPLES BUREAU INCIDENT IN LONDON IN 1984 WE HAD BETWEEN 500 AND 700 PRESS PEOPLE ON SCENE THROUGHOUT THE 11 DAYS THE INCIDENT LASTED. MOST OF THESE WERE FROM OVERSEAS AND THEY WOULD NOT BE INCLINED TO LET GENTLEMANLY CONDUCT - OR EVEN THE PROSPECT OF A HEFTY FINE OR SHORT

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(F. CLARKSON, PRINCIPAL F4 DIVISION, HOME OFFICE)

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Fascimile Transmission	Date: 28 APR 1987	Precedence: ROUTINE	10439 Page 1 of 3 Pages
CLEARED From: London	To: WELLINGTON 3743		Serial no: FA(P) CWPS
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PREVENTION OF TERRORISM (TEMPORARY PROVISIONS) ACT 1984

Anti-terrorism

R66/5/1A Home Office briefing document

Background

ACTION COPY

The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974 came into force on 29 November 1974. It was introduced following the bombing, on 21 November 1974, of two public houses in Birmingham which resulted in the deaths of 21 people and injuries to over 180 others. These incidents were the culmination of a campaign of terrorist attacks by the IRA which had been extended in 1972 from Northern Ireland, where activity had previously been concentrated, to the mainland of Great Britain. In the 10 months before the Birmingham bombs there had been 110 incidents in which 23 people had died and 180 been injured.

2. The main provisions of the 1974 Act strenghtened powers in four broad areas: it proscribed the IRA and made support of it illegal; it enabled the Secretary of State to make orders excluding suspected terrorists from Great Britain or from the United Kingdom; it gave the police powers to arrest and detain suspected terrorists; and to carry out security checks on travellers.

3. Since 1974, the Prevention of Terrorism legislation has twice been revised by Parliament in 1976 and 1984. There have also been two major reviews of the operation of the legislation. These reviews were carried out by Lord Shackleton and Lord Jellicoe, whose reports were published in 1978 and 1983 respectively. All but one of their recommendations were accepted by the Government.

The 1984 Act

4. The current Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act came into force on 22 March 1984. It proscribes the IRA and INLA, makes contibuting to acts of terrorism and withholding information about acts of terrorism criminal offences, and gives the police powers to carry out security checks on travellers. It also contains powers of detention and exclusion which are described in more detail in paragraphs 6 to 10.

5. The 1984 Act has to be renewed annually after a debate in both Houses of Parliament if it is to remain in force. (It will expire anyway in 1989.) Before each renewal, Parliament has the benefit of a brief report by an independent person on the operation of the legislation during the preceding year. These arrangements reflect the exceptional nature of the powers

contained in the Act, and indicate the Government's concern that it should only remain in force as long as Parliament is satisfied both that the powers it gives continue to be necessary, and that they are being properly used.

Powers of detention

6. A new feature of the 1984 Act was the explicit extension of the powers of arrest and detention (section 12) to suspected international terrorists. (In practice these powers in the 1976 Act were only used against suspected terrorists whose activities were connected with Northern Irish affairs.) This arose from the increasing threat in Great Britain from terrorism totally unconnected with Northern Ireland. Lord Jellicoe, in his review of the 1976 Act, was satisfied that the arrest powers in it had been of considerable benefit in dealing with Northern Irish terrorism and recommended that they should also be available for dealing with internationl terrorism. (Acts of terrorism connected with the affairs of the United Kingdom apart from Northern Ireland are excluded from the scope of these provisions.)

7. Section 12 gives the police the power to arrest without warrant a person whom they have reasonable grounds for suspecting of involvement in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism related to Northern Irish or international affairs, of being the subject of an exclusion order, or of having committed certain offences under the Act. A person arrested under Section 12 may be detained for up to 48 hours, and with the authority of the Secretary of State, for up to a further 5 days. The power in section 12 is not a punitive one. It is essentially investigatory, designed to assist the police in their fight against terrorism by enabling them to arrest someone whom they suspect of involvement in it and to detain that person, subject to the Secretary of State's approval if necessary, for long enough to be able, if their suspicions are confirmed, to take appropriate action.

8. The guidance issued to the police about the exercise of this power says: 'The prime objective of the exceptional powers in section 12 is to enable proceedings to be instituted against persons involved in terrorism as a result of the additional investigations they make possible'. If such proceedings cannot be brought, a person whose involvement in Northern Irish terrorism is established might be recommended for exclusion (see paragraphs 9 and 10). In the case of people suspected of international terrorism, these powers should only be used where there is some prospect that a charge would be made before a United Kingdom court, or that the person would be deported under the Immigration Act 1971.

Powers of exclusion

9. If the Secretary of State is satisfied that a person is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of Northern Irish terrorism, or is attempting or may attempt to enter Great Britain or Northern Ireland for such a purpose, he may make an order excluding him from Great Britain, Northern Ireland or the United Kingdom. However, a British citizen cannot be excluded from the United Kingdom, nor can he be excluded from Great Britain or Northern Ireland if he has been ordinarily resident there throughout the last three years. If someone objects to an exclusion order being make against them, the Secretary of State has to refer the matter to a special adviser. All the exclusion orders in force when the 1984 Act came into operation expired in March 1987, if they had not already been revoked, and orders made under that Act have a three-year life. A new order can however be made against someone whose exclusion order has been revoked or expired.

10. The Home Secretary has recently re-emphasized that this exclusion power is of a kind which can only be used very sparingly in a free society. He personally considers all applications made by the police for exclusion from Great Britain and applies strict tests. He only makes an exclusion order if there is a clear indication that the person concerned is actively involved in terrorism, or has been so, in most cases within the previous three years. It is not sufficient for them to have been seen in the company of known terrorists or have certain political views.

Statistics (Great Britain)

11. By the end of 1986, 6246 persons had been detained in Great Britain under the 1984 Act and its predecessors in connection with Northern Irish terrorism; and 171 persons had been detained under the 1984 Act in connection with international terrorism. Of those detained, 286 were made subject to exclusion orders under the Act; 40 were deported or removed under the Immigration Act 1971; and 543 were charged with offences. In 1986 28% of those detained in Great Britain were charged, excluded, deported or removed. At the end of March 1987, 99 persons were currently excluded from Great Britain, or from the United Kingdom by the Home Secretary.

28 April 1987

B66/5/1A

Mrs F Clarkson
Principal F4 Division
Home Office
Queen Anne's Gate
LONDON
SW1H 9AT

Thank you very much for your letter of 27 April 1987. Your comments on our draft "International Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Bill" will, I am sure, prove most interesting to Wellington. Your assistance is much appreciated.

I shall, of course, let you know the fate of our Bill in due course when it has completed the parliamentary process.

Yours sincerely

Stuart Prior
First Secretary

B66/5/1A

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Direct line 01-213 3249
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28 APR 1987

Stuart Prior Esq
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New Zealand High Commission
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Your reference

B66/5/1A
Our reference

Date

27 April 1987

Dear Mr Prior

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM (EMERGENCY POWERS) BILL

Further to my letter of 23 March, I have now had a chance to consult my colleagues who deal with matters covered by this Bill.

As general background I attach a note on our Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984. This Act covers the whole of the United Kingdom, but there is also special legislation in Northern Ireland, the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978, and the Northern Ireland Office would be able to give you details of that legislation.

Our general impression is that the powers the Bill would confer on the Government and other authorities are much wider than those that are likely to be acceptable in this country. We do not believe that the powers given to the police are of the kind that would be given to the police in peace (or war time) here.

With respect to the power in clause 12 to prohibit the broadcasting or publication of certain material, our experience has been that it is during a terrorist incident that the media interest is most intense rather than afterwards. That is when the powers might be of value in protecting lives.

Journalists and their supporting teams will descend on the scene in vast numbers and from all over the world. At the Libyan Peoples Bureau incident in London in 1984 we had between 500 and 700 press people on scene throughout the 11 days the incident lasted. Most of these were from overseas and they would not be inclined to let gentlemanly conduct - or even the prospect of a hefty fine or short term of imprisonment - stand in the way of a good story.

The powers proposed under clauses 16-18 on the interception of private communications are similar to those in our Interception of Communications Act 1985. But under our legislation the product of the authorised interception is precluded from being adduced in Court. This is intended to protect the Crown from being required to disclose whether or not authorised interception has taken place.

As we understand it, Part II of the Bill seeks to enshrine in law our system of common law powers for the provision of military aid to the civil power (MACP). With one exception, what it seeks to provide is no more than is

Mr S Prior

27 April 1987

provided for under our arrangements. The exception relates to subsection (4) of clause 22 which seeks to protect members of the armed forces from civil and criminal liability when dealing with incidents by treating them as if they were police officers. We have no knowledge of the New Zealand system but it is fundamental to our arrangements that the police and members of the military are no more protected under the law than the ordinary citizen when dealing with crime - whether terrorist-related or not. This means that any commitment of the military to an assault on a terrorist stronghold must be the minimum force that is reasonable in the circumstances, and, for example, any soldier who kills someone - whether terrorist or hostage - in the course of such an assault would have to justify his actions before a court of law. We believe that the sort of exemption envisaged in the New Zealand Bill would be unthinkable here.

I hope this is helpful.

Yours sincerely

Felicity Clarkson

Felicity Clarkson

PREVENTION OF TERRORISM (TEMPORARY PROVISIONS) ACT 1984

Background

The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974 came into force on 29 November 1974. It was introduced following the bombing, on 21 November 1974, of two public houses in Birmingham which resulted in the deaths of 21 people and injuries to over 180 others. These incidents were the culmination of a campaign of terrorist attacks by the IRA which had been extended in 1972 from Northern Ireland, where activity had previously been concentrated, to the mainland of Great Britain. In the 10 months before the Birmingham bombs there had been 110 incidents in which 23 people had died and 180 been injured.

2. The main provisions of the 1974 Act strenghtened powers in four broad areas: it proscribed the IRA and made support of it illegal; it enabled the Secretary of State to make orders excluding suspected terrorists from Great Britain or from the United Kingdom; it gave the police powers to arrest and detain suspected terrorists; and to carry out security checks on travellers.

3. Since 1974, the Prevention of Terrorism legislation has twice been revised by Parliament in 1976 and 1984. There have also been two major reviews of the operation of the legislation. These reviews were carried out by Lord Shackleton and Lord Jellicoe, whose reports were published in 1978 and 1983 respectively. All but one of their recommendations were accepted by the Government.

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5. The 1984 Act has to be renewed annually after a debate in both Houses of Parliament if it is to remain in force. (It will expire anyway in 1989.) Before each renewal, Parliament has the benefit of a brief report by an independent person on the operation of the legislation during the preceding year. These arrangements reflect the exceptional nature of the powers

contained in the Act, and indicate the Government's concern that it should only remain in force as long as Parliament is satisfied both that the powers it gives continue to be necessary, and that they are being properly used.

Powers of detention

6. A new feature of the 1984 Act was the explicit extension of the powers of arrest and detention (section 12) to suspected international terrorists. (In practice these powers in the 1976 Act were only used against suspected terrorists whose activities were connected with Northern Irish affairs.) This arose from the increasing threat in Great Britain from terrorism totally unconnected with Northern Ireland. Lord Jellicoe, in his review of the 1976 Act, was satisfied that the arrest powers in it had been of considerable benefit in dealing with Northern Irish terrorism and recommended that they should also be available for dealing with internationl terrorism. (Acts of terrorism connected with the affairs of the United Kingdom apart from Northern Ireland are excluded from the scope of these provisions.)

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CLAS: CONFIDENTIAL 28 APR 87
FROM: LONDON
TO : WELLINGTON 3738 - ROUTINE
LD : DESC COORDINATOR (HENSLEY)
SFA (NORRISH)
DEFENCE (SECDEF CDS)
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POLICE (COMMISSIONER)
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(F. CLARKSON, PRINCIPAL F4 DIVISION, HOME OFFICE)

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Reference B66/5/1A

27 April 1987

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA DLO)

c.c. ~~RMD~~ DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
Police (PTIU)
Defence (DDOP)

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Date	Nature of Material	Remarks
	Terrorism - Northern Ireland	
	press reporting	
26 April 1987	Sunday Telegraph commentary on most recent IRA actions.	

S.W. Prior
for High Commissioner

IRA murder of marked man

Patrick Bishop and **Donald Macintyre** on yesterday's outrage on the Northern Ireland border—the killing of Judge Gibson and his wife

THE PLACE where Lord Justice Gibson and his wife were literally blown to pieces yesterday is a nondescript stretch of road that climbs into the hillocks of South Armagh. Despite its unremarkable appearance, things happen there.

It was here in 1981 that the Irish businessman Ben Dunne was kidnapped by the IRA. A few months ago the bullet-riddled body of an Irish National Liberation Army informer was found dumped nearby. Most significant of all it was along this road, almost exactly two years ago, that an IRA bomb blew up an RUC patrol vehicle, killing four of the officers inside.

It was for this reason that the RUC patrol due to meet Judge Gibson failed to advance all the way to the border to rendezvous with their opposite numbers in the Gardai and why he met his death unescorted.

Yesterday's killings are dramatic proof that, despite the trend towards political activity by the IRA in recent years, the organisation remains as committed to murder, and as capable of carrying it out, as ever. It also shows that despite apparent improvements in cross-border security and the massive experience that the Army and RUC have gained since the troubles began in 1969, the IRA is still capable of striking at the heart of the establishment.

The assassination also provides grim evidence of the length of the IRA's memories. Judge Gibson has been a marked man since 1982 when he acquitted three RUC officers of the murder of three IRA men who were shot dead as they drove, unarmed, near the town of Lurgan. At the end of the hearing the judge—who unlike many Ulster lawyers avoided involvement in politics—commended the police for their courage, and also made a remark to the effect that the dead men had met their "final judgment" This observation the Provisionals have never forgotten.

The IRA statement claiming responsibility for the killings yesterday gloated that "he acted as judge and jury and supported the IRA executioners, but there are other judges in Ireland beside those imposed by Britain."

Lord Justice Gibson, the senior judge in the Northern Ireland High Court, is the IRA's most distinguished victim since the Brighton bombing of October 1984. Two Roman Catholic county court judges have been murdered by the IRA and there have been two attempts on the life of Lord Justice Robert Lowry, the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland.

Despite the recent security forces, successes against the Provos in the Belfast and Londonderry, the IRA's rural units remain as resourceful and deadly as ever. The attack was almost certainly the work of the IRA's South Armagh Unit, which since 1971 has reduced the border area to a semi-war zone.

Good discipline, intimate knowledge of the locale and the complicity of the local Catholic population has meant that the rural IRA has suffered relatively lightly from arrests and informers and many of the members—there are perhaps 30 serious "operators" in South Armagh—have been continuously involved in IRA activities for many years.

Over the years, too, they have developed highly effective tactics and sophisticated improvised weaponry, such as the radio-controlled bomb. These were seen with grim effect in 1979 when on the same day members of the South Armagh unit in separate attacks killed 18 British soldiers at Warrenpoint, near Newry and a few miles away from the spot where Judge Gibson died, and blew up Lord Mountbatten as he sailed off Sligo, killing him and three others.



Flashback to Warrenpoint: 18 British soldiers died here in a truck blown up by the IRA in 1979

The most devastating aspect of yesterday's attack, however, was the quality of the IRA's intelligence. There is no doubt that the bomb killed its intended target. The fact that the statement claiming responsibility was issued from Dublin and signed with the traditional pseudonym of "P. O'Neill" suggests that it was sanctioned in advance and possibly planned by the IRA's ruling "Army Council."

The killings are bound to revive the controversy over the level of cross-border security between Northern Ireland and the Republic. Security co-operation was one of the two main items discussed in last week's intergovernmental conference, the first under the Anglo-Irish agreement since Charles Haughey's Fianna Fail Government was returned to power. The conference agreed to commission a detailed report on the subject for its next session.

British ministers have been pleased to find that fears that Mr Haughey would slow down the level of co-operation between the two Governments have not been realised. "Of course, you have to start to build up relationships again when there is a change of government," said one British source, "but there is every sign that the Fianna Fail Administration intends to co-operate to the full."

The incident will undoubtedly be taken by security chiefs and Protestant politicians as showing that despite the claims of rising standards of cross-border security, links between the two sides are still dangerously feeble. According to senior army officers, improving border security has been hampered by the fact that the Garda Siochana and the Irish Army are inadequately trained for their border duties, and badly equipped.

British security sources also complain that Irish border commanders are under direction from Dublin to "keep some distance between the republic's security forces and those north of the border." Nevertheless, the killings took place inside Northern Ireland territory. One of the first consequences of the attack will undoubtedly be the retention of the two emergency battalions in the Province that were added to the army's strength there last year, despite the large strain that this will place on Britain's defences elsewhere in the world.

The units—about 1,500 men in all—were deployed last year to protect the RUC after a spate of attacks on police barracks. Army chiefs have recently been petitioning politicians to have the battalions withdrawn because of the strain it puts on other military duties.

The recent upsurge of IRA violence, with nine RUC men, one soldier, two members of the Ulster Defence Regiment and 19 civilians killed since the start of the year, as well as a revival in Belfast of bombings, is being seen by the British Government and some members of the security forces as proof that the emphasis in the IRA's professed "Armalite and ballot box" strategy has shifted to military activity.

British ministers have been fearing an upsurge of killings since the poor showing of Sinn Fein in the Republic's elections, in which they collected less than two per cent of the vote.

Ministers also fear that the potential loss of the West Belfast seat held by the Sinn Fein President, Gerry Adams, at the forthcoming general election will also weaken the position of the advocates of the ballot box.

On past performance the scale of IRA activity should drop dramatically once a general election is announced, to minimise the damage that violence does to the Provisionals' electoral credibility.

The IRA success by three criteria: the level of attacks it is mounting in Northern Ireland; the amount of violence it is able to wreak on the mainland; and the level of electoral support it can muster. Reversals on one front mean increased effort on the others. At the moment the IRA's political fortunes are at their lowest ebb since the "Armalite and ballot box" strategy was invented in the late 1970's; and, as the recent spate of letter bombs suggests, it has been incapable of bringing off another Brighton-style spectacular on the mainland.

The latest killings, mean that the Provisionals will go into the election with their morale high and with the young gunmen's motivation and enthusiasm, for political activity restored at least for the time being.

If Adams loses, his position is unlikely to be threatened, but he will probably find it politic to bow to a return to the old IRA strategy of violence for its own sake, while the political campaign is rethought.

BG6151A

How Gadaffi's chicken came home to roost

THE AMERICAN bombing of Libya was celebrated as a "victory" by Colonel Gadaffi last week on the anniversary of the raid.

The Alice-in-Wonderland atmosphere of his "peace conference" was apparent in the opening ceremonies, which consisted of a march by thousands of youths displaying the results of their hobbies.

Then, in the rear, came boys in combat uniforms carrying live chickens and a few rabbits. When they reached the reviewing stands, the youths tore open the chickens' bodies bare-handed, threw the entrails to the ground and bit bloody chunks from the still-quivering birds.

Western peaceniks who were present in numbers — young women with braids and headbands, scruffy youths with peace buttons, and speakers who described themselves as "citizens of the world" — watched in paralysis. One of the gentler government minders, realising the public-relations effect of opening a peace conference with the slaughter of chickens, ran out yelling, "No. no, no". The commando boys, he was told, were demonstrating they could live off the land.

Later in the week, Gadaffi gave a victory party at his bombed-out house in the Azizziya barracks. Groups toured the rubble of what has become a national shrine, sniggering at the master bedroom's round double bed with consoles for radio and bedside lights on either side, and the double tub in the adjoining bathroom.

The host made the briefest of appearances. Gadaffi walked through a back gate into the crowd and pressed outstretched hands for just under two minutes as a man yelled hysterically into the microphone, over and over: "Colonel Gadaffi is shaking the hands of millions of supporters."

Then the leader disappeared abruptly out of the same gate. His 13-year-old son, Sahedi, took the podium and spoke well, if without Gadaffi's fire.

The confusion and obfuscation last week were indicative of the situation in Libya today, a year after the bombing. The American raid failed to unseat Gadaffi and he is still firmly in control. But, combined with other events, it has left Libya in a far weaker position than it was 12 months ago.

In that period, Libya's economy has been shaken by the collapse in oil prices, its army has been decisively defeated in Chad, and its foreign policy has been radically reshaped. Although

by Marie Colvin
Tripoli

there is no sign of a rebellion against Gadaffi, Libyans are increasingly unhappy about the economic shambles and their country's political isolation.

Many observers forecast that the American raid would help Gadaffi to rally suppport in the Arab world. But Libya is now more isolated than ever. It has no relations with Egypt and the border with Tunis is closed; a pact with Morocco ended this year.

Gadaffi has gradually dropped his radical pro-Syrian line and is now trying to cosy up to more moderate Algeria, the only neighbour to whom he is speaking. He has



Safiya: Gadaffi's wife at the ceremony

also begun to denounce Iran. Diplomats think he will soon back Iraq in the Gulf war.

The most serious problem he faces is in Chad. Libyan forces have retreated to the Tibesti region and dug in there, although Gadaffi denies he is at war in Chad. When I pressed him in an interview last week, he would say only: "Numbers are not important. What is important is our stand. We are with the revolutionary forces." He described the military situation as "not static".

Even so every Libyan knows about the Chad defeat and it causes the most vocal criticism heard in Libya. "Everyone talks about it," a Libyan businessman told me. "You can't hide it. We have good communications here, you know. I think it is a disaster. Everyone is asking, 'Why are we spending all this money on the military? Why are we killing our brothers? Why do we have to fight everybody?'."

Some 4,000 Libyans have died in Chad since January and another 900 have been taken prisoner.

The cost of military adventurism has been heavy at home. No one in Libya is starving, but shelves in state-run stores are empty and people are increasingly angry that there is nothing to buy. Few products are manufactured in Libya, but those that are rarely make it to the stores. They are bought by the lucky few with the right connections.

Gadaffi has acknowledged for the first time that his system is not working and promised to allow private enterprise. This underlines the seriousness of the crisis, as private enterprise is equivalent to sin in Gadaffi's Third Universal Theory, the alternative to capitalism and communism.

He told me that he would allow private shops to open in order "to guarantee good distribution because the public markets have failed to cover the needs of the Libyan people". In vintage Gadaffi-speak, he found a silver lining even in the many queues one sees around Tripoli. They prove, he said, that "Libyans have money and want to buy things".

There is no obvious alternative to Gadaffi. Maj Abdel Salaam Jalloud, his number two, has just returned from four months in Damascus and is keeping a low profile.

Gadaffi has systematically eliminated any organised internal oppositon. His power base lies in a parallel system of secret security forces and revolutionary committees that police the government.

The army, often mentioned as the only real alternative to Gadaffi, has been demoralised by the bombing and its defeat in Chad. Gadaffi has contributed to its feebleness, perhaps all too aware of the danger of a restive and powerful army since he himself came to power as a young rebel colonel.

All top army officers earlier this year "volunteered" — at Gadaffi's suggestion — to be reduced to the rank of colonel. In a speech last month he said: "Those who have been responsible for the country's defence for 17 years should take a rest." The defections last month of five air force officers are further evidence of discontent.

Despite Gadaffi's new moderate line in foreign policy, no one in Libya is banking on it. He is a man of brief enthusiasms. Two months ago, he announced Libyans should take up individual sports and reject spectator activities. For two weeks joggers were everywhere. Even housewives in their long skirts and scarves jogged down Tripoli streets. Then he abandoned the idea and the jogging fad discreetly ended. His craze for a moderate foreign policy could be equally short-lived.

THE SUNDAY TIMES 19 APRIL 1987

Western intelligence net drawn tighter

by James Adams
Defence Correspondent

PRESIDENT Reagan sent planes to bomb Libya a year ago mainly to stop Colonel Gadaffi bombing other people. But the raid also served notice on America's European allies that the United States would take firm action against terrorism if no common policy could be agreed.

One result has been a dramatic improvement in the West's joint intelligence effort. Immediately after the raid four big terrorist operations planned by Libya were foiled because of this increased sharing of intelligence.

"For two years prior to the raid we had been trying to get the Europeans to do something about terrorism and they just wanted business as usual," said one State Department source. "But the raid acted as a catalyst which forced them to do something."

In the past year more information on the movement of terrorists has been passed between countries than ever before. Lists of known suspects and their planned movements are regularly circulated and the targeting of terrorists and their known supporters now receives a higher priority from organisations such as GCHQ in Britain and the American National Security Agency that regularly tap international telephone calls.

"That co-operation has continued and a lot more acts have been stopped that you have never heard about," said one intelligence source. There have also been a number of arrests of leading terrorists in Europe.

Improved intelligence work and the shock of the raid itself have had a marked effect on Gadaffi. Although the State Department estimates Gadaffi is responsible for at most 5% of world terrorism, he has withdrawn his support for some terror groups since the raid and pulled back some of his own agents around the world (even though last week he boasted to The Sunday Times that he was still helping the IRA).

"I think he was shocked at how many of his operations had been blown and how incompetent his men were," said one intelligence source. "He is simply waiting until he has better-trained people and for the world to stop scrutinising his every move. Then he will start again."

If the raid is judged on simple statistics, its effect was limited. The Rand Corporation, which monitors terrorism around the world, says there were 47 attacks against American targets in the four months before the April raid and 49 in the four months after the raid. In 1985 there were 117 attacks against US targets in which 27 Americans were killed, and in 1986 the number of attacks rose to 118, although only 11 people died.

But there have been no *major* acts of terrrorism — apart from the Karachi hijack. And other state sponsors of terrorism, such as Syria and Iran, appear to have been less keen to support big attacks. Instead, terrorists have concentrated on small bombings and the occasional assassination.

Even stabilising the growth of terrorism is an achievement. Since the beginning of the 1980s, terrorist attacks have been increasing at between 5% and 10% a year and the increase had been expected to continue at that rate.

But terrorism needs publicity to flourish and that can only be achieved through the spectacular attack which results in heavy loss of life. "A sophisticated attack can take two years to plan and execute and we expect one of those any time," said one American intelligence source.

B66/5/1A

15 April 1987

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The Secretary of Foreign Affairs
WELLINGTON

(DLO)

cc NZSIS (TIC)
Police (PTIU)
Defence (DDOP)
DESC (Co-ordinator)
PM's Office

WILTON PARK CONFERENCE ON NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: 26-30 JANUARY 1987

Please refer to your memorandum 109/1/4(w) of 8 April 1987.

2 We have obtained, and attach for your information, copies of the list of participants in the above conference and, probably more usefully for your purposes, background information about the speakers which includes a record of their involvement in and work on terrorist related issues.

3 We have sought also from the FCO Research Department representative (Janet Hancock, Middle East Section) who attended impressions of the conference.

4 Hancock confirmed that no transcripts of the individual speeches had been produced though a document with brief resumes of them had been handed out to delegates. We could, if you wished, seek to obtain a copy from the Wilton Park authorities.

5 Hancock went on to comment that the principal value of the conference had lain in the opportunities for participants to meet and exchange views, rather than in the set speeches. These, she added, had on the whole been rather disappointing, predictable, and biassed rather too much along academic lines.

/Hancock

6 Hancock added that the representative - and co-founder - of the Institute for the Study of Terrorism, Jillian Becker, was a particular disappointment. Her presentation had been tendentious, factually inaccurate, and disposed to categorise terrorists as bad people who did bad things.

7 On the other hand, Hancock reported that the Australian representative, Andrew Selth, had made an effective speech. She drew attention to the fact that his book "Terrorism and Diplomacy: An Australian Perspective" is due for publication later this year.

(S W Prior)
for High Commissioner

Enc

Amended 23.1.87

PROGRAMME

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM:
CAUSES OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND RESPONSES OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES

CONFERENCE 301 — 26 - 30 JANUARY 1987

MONDAY 26 JANUARY

1500-1600 — Participants arrive at Wiston House.

1700 — Introduction to the Conference

1730-1900 — I — Jillian BECKER
Director, Institute for the Study of Terrorism, London
OPENING SESSION
THE ROOTS OF CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL TERRORISM

2030-2200 — Open Discussion

TUESDAY 27 JANUARY

0915-1045 — II — Paul WILKINSON
Professor of International Relations, University of Aberdeen
NATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM: CAN IT BE COUNTERED WITHOUT DANGER TO DEMOCRACY?

1115-1245 — DISCUSSION GROUPS 1
with the participation of:
Valerie Seward Jim Starkey Robert Sturrock

1700-1830 — III — Gerd LANGGUTH
State Secretary and Representative of the Land Berlin to the Federal Government in Bonn
A EUROPEAN NEXUS OF TERRORIST COLLABORATION?

2030-2200 — IV — Alan PROTHEROE MBE TD FBIM
Assistant Director General, British Broadcasting Corporation
POLITICAL VIOLENCE: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MEDIA

WEDNESDAY 28 JANUARY

0915-1045	V	Andrew SELTH Former Head of the Counter-Terrorism Policy Section, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs **INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND THE CHALLENGE TO DIPLOMACY**
1115-1245		DISCUSSION GROUPS 2
1730-1900	VI	Cosmas DESMOND Author; sometime Director, British Section, Amnesty International **INTERNAL STATE TERRORISM: THE ULTIMATE WEAPON OF TYRANNY**
2030-2200	VII	Paul BEW Reader in Politics, Queen's University of Belfast **NORTHERN IRELAND: A TERRITORIAL CASE STUDY**

THURSDAY 29 JANUARY

0915-1045	VIII	Yonah ALEXANDER Professor of International Studies and Director, Institute for Studies in International Terrorism, State University of New York **U.S. RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM**
1115-1245		DISCUSSION GROUPS 3
1730-1900	IX	Timothy RENTON MP Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office will open discussion on **INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: A POLITICAL VIEW**
1930 for 2000		Formal Dinner and Vin d'Honneur

FRIDAY 30 JANUARY

0915-1045	X	Major-General Richard CLUTTERBUCK CB OBE Non-Executive Director, Control Risks Ltd **THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM**
1115-1245		CLOSING SYMPOSIUM
1400		Participants leave Wiston House.

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FINAL LIST

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WILTON PARK CONFERENCE 301

26 - 30 January 1987

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
Causes of Political Violence and Responses of Democratic Societies

PARTICIPANTS

ALEXANDER, Yonah (Speaker)	United States of America Professor of International Studies and Director, Institute for Studies in International Terrorism, State University of New York
ATAÖV, Türkkaya	Turkey Professor of International Relations and Chairman of the Division of International Relations, Faculty of Political Science, Ankara University; author
BALLENTYNE, Donald F	United Kingdom HM Consul-General in Los Angeles; previously served in East Berlin, Bonn, The Hague, Havana, Luxembourg, Cape Town, Stanleyville, Munich, Ankara and Berne
BARRIE, David	United Kingdom Head of Section, Republic of Ireland Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London; previously served in the Cabinet Office and in Dublin
BARTSCH, Hans-Jürgen	Council of Europe Principal Administrative (Legal) Officer, Directorate of Legal Affairs, Council of Europe, Strasbourg; Professor of Law, Free University of Berlin; German national
BECKER, Jillian (Speaker)	United Kingdom Director, Institute for the Study of Terrorism, London
BERGIN, J Noel	Republic of Ireland Colonel; Brigade Commander involved in internal security duties, Army Headquarters, Dublin; previous service with UN peacekeeping missions in Congo, Cyprus and Lebanon
BEW, Paul (Visiting Speaker)	United Kingdom Lecturer in Political Science, Queen's University of Belfast

BINSTEAD, Jane R	United Kingdom Principal, Army Secretariat dealing with Northern Ireland and counter-terrorism, Ministry of Defence, London; previously served in Military Personnel Management and Central Logistics Staff
van CALSTEREN, Rob H B	Netherlands Police Superintendent and Chief of the Intelligence Group of the The Hague City Police Force
CLUTTERBUCK, Richard (Visiting Speaker)	United Kingdom Non-Executive Director, Control Risks Ltd, London
CRENSHAW, Martha	United States of America Associate Professor of Government teaching international politics and foreign Policy, Wesleyan University, Middletown, Connecticut; former Analyst in International Relations, Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, Washington DC
CROOME CARROLL, Michael	United Kingdom Naval Lieutenant (Mine Clearance Diver); Assistant Mine Clearance Diving Officer to Flag Officer, Scotland and Northern Ireland Clearance Diving Unit, Rosyth
DESMOND, Cosmas (Visiting Speaker)	United Kingdom Author; sometime Director, British Section, Amnesty International
DOUGLAS, Ian C	Canada Brigadier General; Deputy Chief, Operational Research Analysis Establishment, Department of National Defence, Ottawa; currently studying International Terrorism
ERGIL, Doğu	Turkey Professor of Political Sociology, Faculty of Political Science, Ankara University; Adviser to the Government on terrorism; weekly newspaper columnist; Fulbright Scholar, School of Advanced International Studies, Washington DC (1984-85)
FEC, Julio J	Spain General Secretary of the Presidency of the Spanish Government; sociologist
FREND, Nigel W	United Kingdom Manager Security International, Lloyds Bank plc, London; formerly with Chubb and Son Ltd; previously served in British Army

GRAAE, Sidsel — Denmark
Product Manager, Guarding and Executive Service, ISS Securitas A/S (largest security company in Denmark), Copenhagen; former Economist with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Copenhagen

GRANT, Richard L — North Atlantic Assembly
Director, Political Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly, Brussels; formerly served as Information Officer; US national

GUILLET, Bernard — France
Diplomatic Counsellor to the Minister of the Interior and Vice-Minister for Security, Ministry of the Interior, Paris; formerly Chargé de Mission in the Office of Prime Minister Chirac

HANCOCK, Janet — United Kingdom
Member of Research Department, Middle East Section, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London

HANSEN, Herluf W — Denmark
Head of Division, Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Copenhagen; previously served in the Danish Mission to the UN, in Oslo and in Dublin

HARDING, Alfred R — United Kingdom
Security Manager, BAT Industries plc, London; former Army Officer, Intelligence Corps

HELLNERS, Vidar — Sweden
Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm; former Swedish Ambassador to Hungary and to Nigeria; also served in Rome, Jeddah, Ankara, London and Warsaw

HUGHES, Malcolm E — United Kingdom
Detective Chief Superintendent; Head of the Criminal Investigation Department, Avon and Somerset Constabulary, Bristol; has held various post both in Uniform and CID since 1957

HUSSEY, John — United Kingdom
Area Coordinator for North Africa, Egypt, Levant, Arabian Peninsular and Indian Sub-Continent, British Petroleum Co plc, London; previously General Manager in BP's Africa companies; was a hijack victim in 1986

KENNEDY, George A — United States of America
Counsellor for Public Affairs, United States Mission to the European Communities, Brussels

KJESAETH, Arnulf	Norway Inspector of Constabulary, Ministry of Justice and Police, Oslo; has served in local and national Police forces since 1955 including service in the Secretariat General of the ICPO-INTERPOL
LANGGUTH, Gerd (Visiting Speaker)	Federal Republic of Germany Secretary of State and Representative of the Land Berlin to the Federal Government in Bonn
LANDELIUS, Örjan	Sweden First Secretary and Head of Legal Section, Swedish Embassy, London; previously served as Head of Section, Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm
LOPEZ-DORIGA, Juan	Spain Diplomat serving in the Office of the Under-Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Madrid; previously served in the Latin American Section
MAGNUS, Per L	Norway Head of Division responsible for international cooperation in the combat against terrorism, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo; previously served in Brasilia, Copenhagen and Teheran; Norwegian representative to the 6th Committee of the UN General Assembly 1985/86
MASON, Brian J	United Kingdom Academic Director, Senior Command Course, Police Staff College, Bramshill; former Head of Politics and Public Administration Department
MILES, R Oliver	United Kindom HM Ambassador to Luxembourg and formerly to Libya; previously served in the Middle East, Cyprus and Greece
MULVANEY, Sean T	Republic of Ireland Principal Officer in charge of legislation, Overseas Section, Department of Defence, Dublin
MURPHY, Thomas A	Republic of Ireland Lieutenant Colonel; Staff Officer, Army Headquarters, Dublin; previous service at Staff and Operational level
NASSICA, Ekaterini	Greece American Desk Officer, Political Directorate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens

NOGUEIRA, Wally	Switzerland Diplomat; Federal Ministry of External Affairs, Bern; previously served in Brazil, Indonesia and the Philippines
OJANEN, Pekka A	Finland Counsellor, Bureau for Western Europe and North America, Political Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Helsinki; previously served in Geneva, Vienna, Stockholm and Tel Aviv
PEIFFER, Marc E R	Belgium Officer of the Belgian Military Security Service and Head (Commissioner), Analysis Unit of the Counter-Intelligence Section, Ministry of Defence, Brussels
PROTHEROE, Alan (Visiting Speaker)	United Kingdom Assistant Director General, British Broadcasting Corporation
RENTON, Timothy (Visiting Speaker)	United Kingdom Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London
ROLLINGER, Robert N	Luxembourg Counsellor in the Prime Minister's Office, Luxembourg; former Legal Adviser to the Chamber of Commerce; lawyer
RUA, Jose	Spain Assessor of the General Secretary of the Presidency of the Spanish Government, Madrid; lawyer
SANTOS PITEIRA, Mário	Portugal Commander, Special Operations Group of the Portuguese Police (GOE); Army Major; served in Special Commando Forces
SCHENK, Dieter	Federal Republic of Germany Director, Special Branch, Counter-Criminal Division of the Berlin Police
SCHNIGULA, Jürgen	Federal Republic of Germany Assistant Secretary, Federal Ministry of Justice, Bonn; Deputy Head, International Criminal Law Section responsible for questions concerning international terrorism; Judge; Public Prosecutor
SCHUUR, Harmannus J	Netherlands Captain Royal Netherlands Army; Teacher at a military training school for Warrant Officers; previous service as Platoon Commander, Company Commander and Staff Officer Logistics and Personnel

SECK, M Mansour	Senegal Brigadier General; Special Chief of Staff and Military Adviser to the President; former Chief of Staff of the Air Force and Flight Captain
SELTH, Andrew W (Speaker)	Australia Visiting Student, St Antony's College, Oxford; former Head, Counter Terrorism Policy Section, Department of Foreign Affairs, Canberra
TAKKINEN, Eero	Finland Deputy Inspector of the Finnish Police, Helsinki
VAN DER HEIDE, Roald	Netherlands Brigadier; Inspector in the Legal Service of the Royal Netherlands Army, The Hague; Honorary Criminal Court Judge; former Legal Adviser to the Netherland Forces in Germany and with the Ministry of Defence
VANNESTE, Christian	Belgium Major of the Gendarmerie and Commander of the Anti-Terrorist Joint Group, Ministry of Justice, Brussels; responsible for the coordination of information on national and international terrorism
VARVESI, Gianfranco	Italy First Counsellor (Political), Italian Embassy, London; formerly Consul-General in Tripoli; previously served in Rome, Nairobi and Washington
WHITE, Bryan O	United Kingdom HM Ambassador to Honduras and (non-resident) to El Salvador; previously served in London, Paris, Havana, Rio de Janeiro, Conakry, Vienna and Kabul
WILKINSON, Paul (Visiting Speaker)	United Kingdom Professor of International Relations, University of Aberdeen

eh/28.1.87

DR GERD LANGGUTH

Dr Gerd Langguth was born in 1946 in Wertheim am Main, in Baden-Württemberg in the Federal Republic of Germany. He studied Politics, Law and History and obtained his doctorate in 1975 with a thesis on the development of the Protest Movement in the Federal Republic. Afterwards he was Director of a Cultural Education Institute, lecturer in sociology at a university, Member of the Federal German Parliament and Director of the Federal Centre for Political Education. From 1 January 1986 he has had the rank of State Secretary, representing the interests of Land Berlin with the Federal Government in Bonn.

His publications include: Jugend ist anders - Portrait einer jungen Generation (Freiburg-Basel-Wien) 1983; Protestbewegung - Entwicklung, Niedergang, Renaissance - Die Neue Linke seit 1968, Köln 1984; Der Grüne Faktor - Von der Bewegung zur Partei? Zürich 1985; The Green Factor in German Politics (Boulder/Colorado-London 1986).

Wiston House
January 1987

WP 301

MR ALAN PROTHEROE MBE TD FBIM

Mr Alan Protheroe is Assistant Director General of the British Broadcasting Corporation.

Mr Protheroe was born in 1934 at St David's, Pembrokeshire and was educated at Maesteg Grammar School, Glamorgan.

After three years as a reporter/sub-editor on the Glamorgan Gazette he carried out his National Service with the Welch Regiment.

He joined the BBC in 1957 as a contract reporter for BBC Wales. In 1960 he was appointed Industrial Correspondent, Wales, and in 1963 he became News Editor, Wales. In 1969 he was redesignated Editor, Wales (News and Current Affairs). He moved to London in 1970 to be Assistant Editor, Television News. He was appointed Editor, Television News, in 1977 and became Assistant Director, News and Current Affairs, in 1980.

As Assistant Director General of the British Broadcasting Corporation, (appointed in April 1982), he is responsible for the standards of the BBC's journalism, exercising, on the Director General's behalf, the day-to-day responsibilities of Editor in Chief across the entire spectrum of the BBC's immense radio and television news and public affairs programming.

In 1980 Mr Protheroe was appointed a Member of the Order of the British Empire (Military Division) for services to UK Reserve Army. He also holds the Territorial Decoration, and serves as a Colonel (late Royal Regiment of Wales) at the Ministry of Defence.

He is Chairman of the Association of British Editors, a member of the Council of RUSI (Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies), and a Director of Visnews.

Mr Protheroe is married and has two sons.

Wiston House
January 1987

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WP 301

MR ANDREW SELTH

Mr Selth holds degrees in history and international relations from the Australian National University. In 1973 he joined the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and has served in Rangoon (1974-1976), Seoul (1977-1981) and Wellington (1985-1986), reaching the rank of First Secretary. In 1986 he helped establish, and was appointed the first Head of the Department's Counter Terrorism Policy Section. He is now a member of the Australian Department of Defence.

Mr Selth has been invited to lecture at a number of higher level educational and professional institutions in Australia, including the Royal Military College (Duntroon) and the Australian Defence Force Academy. In a private capacity, he has published widely on different aspects of political extremism and contemporary Asian affairs. Since 1984 his primary field of interest has been the terrorist threat to diplomats and diplomatic facilities, and his book Terrorism and Diplomacy: An Australian Perspective is due to be published later this year.

In 1986 Mr Selth was awarded a Foreign and Commonwealth Office scholarship to continue his terrorism studies in the United Kingdom. He is currently a Visiting Student at St Antony's College, Oxford. He is attending the conference in a personal capacity and not as a representative of the Australian Government.

Wiston House
January 1987

PAUL BEW

Paul Bew was born in Belfast in 1950 and educated there and at Cambridge where he read modern history and took a PhD in 1974.

He is the author of six books on modern Irish history and politics, including most recently (with Henry Patterson) The British State and the Ulster Crisis (London 1985) and Conflict and Conciliation in Ireland (Oxford 1987).

In 1982/3 he was a visiting lecturer at the University of Pennsylvania and he is currently Reader in Politics at Queen's University, Belfast.

Wiston House
January 1987

MP4AKR

WP 301

PROFESSOR YONAH ALEXANDER

Yonah Alexander is a Distinguished Scholar in Terrorism Studies at the National Forum Foundation. He is also Professor of International Studies and Director of the Institute for Studies in International Terrorism, State University of New York; Director of the Institute for Social and Behavioral Pathology, University of Chicago; and a Senior Research Staff member, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University.

Educated at Columbia University (PhD) and the University of Chicago (MA) in International Affairs, Dr Alexander has been a Visiting Professor at Hebrew University in Jerusalem since 1968. He also lectured at such institutions as the University of California (Berkeley and Los Angeles), Columbia, Harvard, Princeton, McGill, Victoria, British Columbia, Warsaw, Mexico and Yagiollonian. His research experience includes appointments such as Senior Fellow, the Institute for Advanced Studies in Justice (American University), and Research Associate, Columbia University School of Journalism.

Professor Alexander is Editor-in-Chief of Terrorism: An International Journal, and Political Communication and Persuasion: An International Journal. He has published twenty-eight books on the subjects of international affairs, terrorism, and psychological warfare. He serves as Editor-in-Chief of a series of books on terrorism for Martinus Nijhoff (the Netherlands).

In the last decade, Professor Alexander has lectured at numerous conferences, including those held in Ankara, Auckland, Berlin, Brussels, Buenos Aires, Caracas, Dubrovnik, Geneva, Istanbul, Jerusalem, London, Melbourne, Montreal, Oxford, Pretoria, Rome, Seoul, Sydney and Tel Aviv.

Among Professor Alexander's many television and radio appearances, he has been a guest on: Nightline, Good Morning America, the Today Show, Crossfire, Nightwatch, all network evening news shows and all network and wire service radio syndicates. His many print interviews include: The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, USA Today, The Los Angeles Times, The Washington Times, Time magazine, Newsweek, US News and World Report and foreign press.

Wiston House
January 1987

MP4AKS

WP 301

MR TIMOTHY RENTON MP

Mr Timothy Renton is Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and has been Conservative Member of Parliament for Mid-Sussex since February 1974.

Ronald Timothy Renton was born in May 1932. He was educated at Eton College and Magdalen College, Oxford, where he read History.

In 1954 he joined C Tennant Sons & Co Ltd, London, and from 1957 to 1962 worked with Tennants' subsidiaries in Canada. He was a Director of C Tennant Sons and Managing Director of Tennant Trading Ltd from 1964 to 1973; and has been a Director for Silvermines Ltd since 1967, Australia and New Zealand Banking Group (1967-76) and J H Vavasseur & Co Ltd (1971-74). In 1982 he became a member of the BBC General Advisory Council.

Since becoming a Member of Parliament Mr Renton has been Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Rt Hon John Biffen MP (1979-81) and the Rt Hon Geoffrey Howe (1983-84); a member of the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries (1974-79); Vice-Chairman of the Conservative Parliamentary Trade Committee (1974-79); Chairman of the Conservative Commonwealth and Overseas Council; Vice-President, and later President, of the Conservative Trade Unionists; and a Fellow of the Industry and Parliamentary Trust (1977-79).

Mr Renton has published a number of articles in various periodicals and newspapers.

Mr Renton is married and has two sons and three daughters. His recreations are gardening, tennis and growing trees.

Wiston House
January 1987

MP4AKT

WP 301

MAJOR-GENERAL RICHARD CLUTTERBUCK CB OBE MA PHD

Richard Clutterbuck is a non-executive director of Control Risks Ltd, an international security management consultancy. He served for 35 years in the army, retiring in 1972 as a Major-General, and then as Lecturer and Reader in Political Conflict at the University of Exeter until 1983.

Born in 1917, he graduated with an MA in Mechanical Sciences at Cambridge in 1939 and later took a PhD in Economics and Politics at London University in 1971.

As a soldier he saw war service from 1939 to 1945 in France, Ethiopia, the Western Desert and Italy and subsequently in anti-terrorist operations in the Middle East and South-East Asia. He took part in four nuclear tests on Christmas Island, became Engineer-in-Chief of the Army and taught at both the British and US Army Staff Colleges and at the Royal College of Defence Studies.

He has written 12 books, currently gives about 120 lectures each year (mainly to the police and business) and has taken part in about 250 radio and television broadcasts. He served on the BBC General Advisory Council from 1975 to 1981.

His most recent books are The Media and Political Violence (1983), Industrial Conflict and Democracy (1984), Conflict and Violence in Singapore and Malaysia (1985) and The Future of Political Violence (1986). His next book, Kidnap, Hijack and Extortion is with the printers and is due out in 1987.

He is married with 3 sons and lives in Devon.

Wiston House
January 1987

MP4AJJ

WP 301

JILLIAN BECKER

Jillian Becker is Director of the Institute for the Study of Terrorism. She has lectured to academic and general audiences in Europe, North America, the Middle East and southern Africa, and has been an invited speaker at many international conferences. In 1978 she served in a multi-party working group to advise the British Parliament on measures to combat international terrorism. Her numerous publications include Hitler's Children: The Story of the Baader-Meinhof Terrorist Gang, Michael Joseph, 1977, and Granada (Panther), 2nd edition, 1978 (translated into eight languages, including Japanese); The PLO: The Rise and Fall of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1984; The Soviet Connection: State Sponsorship of Terrorism, Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies, 1985; and, as Editor, The Soviet Union and Terrorism by Roberta Goren, Allen & Unwin, 1984. She has contributed an entry on Terrorism to the forthcoming edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica. With Lord Chalfont, she founded the Institute for the Study of Terrorism in 1986.

Wiston House
January 1987

MP4AKN

WP 301

PROFESSOR PAUL WILKINSON

Paul Wilkinson is Professor of International Relations at the University of Aberdeen.

His books include: Political Terrorism (1974), The New Fascists (revised and enlarged edition, 1983), and Terrorism and the Liberal State (revised and enlarged edition, 1986). He jointly edited Terrorism: Theory and Practice (1978) and edited British Perspectives on Terrorism (1981). Since 1980 he has been General Editor of Key Concepts in International Relations, Academic Editor of Kraus Reprints on the history of political violence, and Editorial Adviser to the Contemporary Review.

In 1986 he was appointed Special Consultant to CBS, America, and Chairman of the Trustees of the Research Foundation for the Study of Terrorism.

Wiston House
January 1987

BIOABU

WP 301

COSMAS DESMOND

Cosmas Desmond trained as a Roman Catholic priest in England. He spent some twenty years (1959-1978) in South Africa first as a missionary and later as a political activist.

He was particularly concerned with the enforced resettlement of African communities. Following the publication of his research on this subject, he was banned and house arrested for four and a half years. On his return to England he was Director of the British Section of Amnesty International for two years.

His publications include: The Discarded People, Christians or Capitalists? and Persecution East and West.

Wiston House
January 1987

MP4ALJ

INTERNAL STATE TERRORISM: THE ULTIMATE WEAPON OF TYRANNY

The main thrust of the session can be summed up in the following quote from Paulo Freire:

> "Every relationship of domination, of exploitation, of oppression, is by definition violent, whether or not the violence is expressed by drastic means. In such a relationship, dominator and dominated alike are reduced to things - the former dehumanised by an excess of power, the latter by lack of it. And things cannot love. When the oppressed legitimately rise up against their oppressor, however, it is they who are labelled 'violent', 'barbaric', 'inhuman', and 'cold'. (Among the innumerable rights claimed by the dominating consciousness is the right to define violence, and to locate it. Oppressors never see themselves as violent.)".

MP4ALK

"YELLOW"

New Zealand High Commission

New Zealand House
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London SW1Y 4TQ
Telephone: 01-930 8422 Ext:
Telex 24368

Reference B66/5/1A

10 April 1987

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA DLO)

c.c. ~~PMD~~ DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
Police (PTIU)
Defence (DDOP)

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Date	Nature of Material	Remarks
	Terrorism	: British Act.
	Our FAX 2608 of 18 refer.	March 1987 and associated telegram
8 April 1987	Lords written answer concerning review procedures for the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984 to be conducted by Lord Colville. Submissions on the Act to be received until 31 July 1987.	

"S.W. Prior"
for High Commissioner

PREVENTION OF TERRORISM (TEMPORARY PROVISIONS) ACT 1984: REVIEW

Lord Renton asked Her Majesty's Government:

What plans they have to review the Prevention of Terrorism legislation before the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984 expires in March 1989.

Lord Beaverbrook: My right honourable friend has asked Viscount Colville of Culross QC, who carried out the 1986 annual scrutiny of the operation of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1984 and will perform the same function in 1987, to carry out a general review of the Act. We are pleased to announce that Lord Colville has accepted this invitation. The terms of reference of his inquiry will be based on those given to Lord Shackleton and Lord Jellicoe when they reviewed the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Acts, 1974, and 1976, and will be as follows:

"Accepting the continuing need for legislation against terrorism, to assess the operation of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1984, with particular regard to the effectiveness of the legislation and its effect on the liberties of the subject, and to report.".

Lord Colville's report will be published as a Command paper.

Any individual or organisation who wishes to submit written observations on matters relevant to Lord Colville's terms of reference should write to him, before 31st July, at: Room 14, Hepburn House, Marsham Street, London SW1P 4HW.

PP's FA → B66/5/1A

109/1/4 (W)

Copy on B42/120.

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

WELLINGTON

To > S. Prior
FA

NEW ZEALAND
LONDON
13 APR 1987
CENTRAL
HIGH COMMISSION

8 April 1987

The High Commissioner
New Zealand High Commission
LONDON

cc: NZSIS (TIC)
Police (PTIU)
Defence (DDOP)
Coordinator Domestic
and External Security
PM's Office

WILTON PARK CONFERENCE ON NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: 26-30 JANUARY 1987

... Please see the attached copy of our memorandum to you 109/1/4 (W) of 8 December 1986 on the above.

2 We should be interested to learn whether the papers/materials referred to in our memo are available yet.

(M F Watkins)
for Acting Secretary of Foreign Affairs

Encl

B66/5/1A of 21/11/86

Checked with Janet Hancock
Rec FCO.
- material etc. supplied

15 APR 1987

P.R. Watkins
after despatch

MFW:SJH

109/1/4(W)

DISPATCHED
9 DEC 1986
MINISTRY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS

8 December 1986

The High Commissioner
New Zealand High Commission
LONDON

cc: PMD
NZSIS(TIC)
Police(PTIU)
Defence(DDOP)
SFA(EUR,LGL,SEC,AAD,MEA,SPA)

WILTON PARK CONFERENCE ON NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
26-30 January 1987

Thank you for your memorandum B66/5/1A of 21 November 1986 on this matter. It does not appear likely at this stage that there will be anyone passing through London at the time of the above conference who would be in a position to attend. We would like to take up your offer however to obtain on our behalf copies of materials published as a result of the conference. We would also appreciate your endeavouring to obtain on our behalf copies of papers presented at the conference though not subsequently published.

(M F Watkins)
for Secretary of Foreign Affairs

BU 25 March 87

301st Conference
26-30/1/87
Wilton Park
Wiston House Steyning West Sussex BN4 3DZ

"Yellow"

New Zealand High Commission

New Zealand House
Haymarket
London SW1Y 4TQ
Telephone: 01-930 8422 Ext:
Telex 24368

Reference B66/5/1A

8 April 1987

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA DLO)

c.c. ~~PMO~~ DESC
NZSIS (TIC)
Police (PTIU)
Defence (DDOP)

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Date	Nature of Material	Remarks
	Terrorism	
	press reporting	
	Abu Nidhal — Times Spectrum serialisation from book to be published 16/4/87 "The Master Terrorist: The True Story behind Abu Nidhal" (Yossi Melman).	

S.W. Prior
for High Commissioner

SPECTRUM

Killer without a gun

Terrorism is more often than not faceless, none more so than the brand practised by Abu Nidal, which is both a group and a *nom de guerre*. But who is the man behind some of the worst terrorist outrages? **Yossi Melman** unravels the life and works of Sabri al-Banna

The Abu Nidal group revolves around one person, Sabri al-Banna, who boasts of being a "true revolutionary" and the world's most faithful representative of the Palestinian movement.

Al-Banna, who will be 40 next month, is cautious to the point of paranoia. He never speaks on the telephone or radio for fear that he might be traced or liquidated by a remote-controlled explosive charge like those used by Israeli agents to kill a number of Black September members in the early 1970s.

He refuses to drink anything served to him by others, even in friendly countries such as Syria and Libya. His wife and children — two daughters and a son — live in Baghdad, but Abu Jihad, Yassir Arafat's top military chief, once said: "Abu Nidal even suspects his wife of being a member of the CIA."

There is no evidence that he has killed anyone personally — unlike Yassir Arafat, he does not carry arms, relying instead on his guards — but he is known for his cruelty, and many of his attacks have been distinguished by viciousness. After a dispute with one of his relatives in 1985, for example, he ordered a hit team to booby-trap the cooking-gas canister in a nephew's home in Amman, Jordan. The explosion killed his nephew's Czech wife and two children

Al-Banna was born in Jaffa in May 1937, during the British mandate, the son of rich Palestinian Arabs. The wealth of his father, Khalil, lay primarily in more than 6,000 acres of orchards bordering the Gaza Strip. All the al-Banna land was confiscated by Israel in 1948.

When the fighting between Jews and Arabs increased that year, the al-Banna family fled and spent nine months in a refugee camp. Perhaps these childhood experiences sowed the seeds of Sabri al-Banna's terrorism. From unlimited wealth he was forced into abject poverty; from large houses and rooms filled with toys, he had to adjust to a tent; instead of having servants at his beck and call, he watched his mother and brothers make their way to the United Nations Relief and Welfare Agency offices to receive their weekly allowance of oil, rice and potatoes.

At some time in the 1960s, Sabri oined the main PLO organization, Fatah, but the turning point in his life came in 1970, when he was sent to Iraq and became involved in consolidating the Fatah offices there.

Although he was officially the PLO delegate in Iraq, in fact he worked only on behalf of Fatah. Abu Nidal – his *nom de guerre*, which can be translated as "father of the struggle" – showed such loyalty to the leadership that he was one of the first members of Fatah to be sent for military training in North Korea and China. Another member of the Fatah delegation was Muhammad Daud Awda (Abu Daud), later one of the Black September commanders who planned the murder of the 11 Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics.

Abu Nidal studied guerrilla tactics and the use of explosives, accompanied by heavy doses of Marxist-Maoist ideology. The four months he spent in the two countries made a tremendous impact on him, and, after returning from the training camps, he constantly spoke in awe of the amazing order and organization of the Communist Party in China.

Arafat and the other "founding fathers" of Fatah believed that it should depend on the Arab states as little as possible, and certainly not on any single state. However, throughout the time he was in Iraq, al-Banna consolidated his position both with the Iraqi authorities and the Palestinian community until he became "the number one Palestinian in Iraq".

Al-Banna sees himself as carrying the torch of Fatah ideology, and all his opponents as betraying Fatah's aims. "Our programme is based on Fatah's programme," he declared in one of his rare interviews. "Total destruction of the Zionist entity. Participation in Arab unity. The path of pan-Arabism. Building a democratic people's regime in which Palestine is a homeland."

The group supports any Palestinian faction willing to continue the armed struggle, a view echoed at the London trial after the attempted assassination of the Israeli ambassador in 1982. When asked if he supported Palestinian terrorism, Naif Rosan, commander of the operation, answered: "I believe all guerrilla groups are justified in their struggle if they fight against their enemy, the Zionist movement."

After the idea of armed struggle at any price, the next most important motif in the group's doctrine is opposition to "Arafat's and the PLO leadership's progressive moderation". In an interview with *The Times*, the group's spokesman said: "Yassir Arafat and his men betrayed the Palestinian revolution. They are prepared to negotiate with the Zionists and therefore their fate will be the same as that of the traitor

HOW BRITAIN GRASPED THE TERRORIST NETTLE

With the 1982 attempt to assassinate Israel's ambassador in London, the British intelligence community became aware that Britain had changed from a base country to an objective of the Palestinian terrorist organizations and that it was necessary to improve their knowledge of such groups.

In 1982, precious time was wasted because investigators were unfamiliar with the fine differences between one organization and another – they could not distinguish between Abu Nidal and Fatah. Now, thanks partly to the recruitment of Arabic-speaking police officers, these groups have been penetrated.

Security has been stepped up at airports and greater attention paid to foreigners from the Middle East entering Britain. In addition to the SAS, several contingents have been trained to fight terrorism; and ties between Britain and Israel have been strengthened.

Yet terrorism remains a dominant factor in our daily lives, and many countries – refusing to follow the strong lead given by Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher – pay only lip service to the war against it, finding their own excuses to do nothing. Most airports throughout the world use X-ray machines that have been shown to be ineffective in detecting plastic explosive and plastic guns.

They refuse to learn from the Israeli experience, which relies on people rather than machines to spot danger – as in the use of body searches and sky marshals on El Al flights.

Words are not always backed by deeds; double standards and blatant hypocrisy are commonplace among governments. Early last year, for example, France freed two Abu Nidal terrorists after a "bloody Christmas" of explosions in Paris. The French believed they would be taking out insurance against further attacks; yet terrorism was renewed and intensified in the summer. In September there were 11 attacks in Paris, killing 10 people.

A group such as Abu Nidal cannot modify its behaviour; terror is an inherent part of its philosophy. It appears that the West has been sentenced to live with terrorism for many more years to come.

Sadat. We have announced clearly and sincerely that whoever betrays the Palestinian cause will not be permitted to implement his betrayal against the Palestinian and Arab masses."


The third most important doctrine of the group is freeing the Arab nation from various "reactionary" regimes. Al-Banna believes that the Arabs are one people and have one homeland, which was divided up by imperialist plots into separate geographical, political and economic entities, all artificial. "In the future, after its liberation, Palestine will be an integral part of Syria," he says.

It was before the 1973 Yom Kippur war that the Fatah branch in Baghdad, under al-Banna, began to act without the authorization of the movement's leadership. Abu's first independent action was on September 5, 1973, when five of his men occupied the Saudi Arabian embassy in Paris and took 11 hostages. The gunmen were eventually flown to Kuwait, and later to Libya.

The attack on the embassy apparently had a double motive: it was intended by Abu Nidal to embarrass Arafat and by the Iraqis to intimidate Saudi Arabia. Responsibility for the attack was taken by a group called "Al Iqab" (The Punishment), later revealed to be one of the names used by Abu Nidal.

Whatever the motive for the attack, it began a reign of terror which non-Arab states have only recently begun to counter.

Adapted from The Master Terrorist: The True Story Behind Abu Nidal, *by Yossi Melman, to be published by Sidgwick & Jackson on April 16 at £12.95*



Behind the mask: thought to be the first picture of Sabri al-Banna (right), training in North Korea in the 1970

"YELLOW"

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Reference B66/5/1A

1 April 1987

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA DLO)

c.c. PMD
NZSIS (TIC)
Police (PTIU)
Defence (DDOP)

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Date	Nature of Material	Remarks
	Terrorism	Libya
	press reporting	
1 April 1987	Times article by Chairman pf Research Foundation for the Study of Terrorism on the American air raids on Libya and their relationship to Libyan terrorism.	

S.W. Prior
for High Commissioner

Paul Wilkinson on a BBC film which questions American intentions

Their excuse for bombing Tripoli

BBC coverage of the bombing of Libya in April last year has attracted political attacks even more bitter than the criticism of its reporting of the Suez crisis 30 years earlier. In America the raid is still enormously popular, but in Britain the government is still sensitive to criticismof its decision to allow F1-11 bombers to take off from Britain.

In the light of Mr Norman Tebbit's long diatribe against the BBC's coverage and the current pre-election atmosphere, the BBC has taken the brave decision to show a controversial programme, *Twelve Minutes Over Tripoli*. The film investigates the origins of the crisis and powerfully challenges President Reagan's claim that the US had "irrefutable evidence" that the Gadaffi regime ordered and planned the terrorist bombing of a discothèque in West Berlin in which two people, including an American serviceman, were killed, and 230 injured. This was used by the US as a warrant under Article 51 of the UN Charter to make "an act of self-defence".

The programme exposes gaping holes and contradictions in the public presentation of America's case that Libya was to blame for the attack in West Berlin, and for previous attacks on American citizens, such as the Rome and Vienna airport massacres of December 1985. Its producer, Tom Bower, suggests that the wording of the intercepted messages between the Bureau of External Affairs in Tripoli and the Libyan Peoples Bureau in East Berlin was extrapolated from a mass of raw data, and given a misleading interpretation to the effect that Libya had controlled the attack in West Berlin.

Bower shows convincingly that the US government statement claiming that it attempted to warn American facilities in West Berlin shortly before the bombing was false. He puts forward the theory, popular in West Germany, that the discothèque bombing was connected with Syria rather than Libya. Hasi Hindawi, brother of Nezar, who tried to bomb an aircraft from Britain, is a prime suspect for the West Berlin bombing. A senior Italian official interviewed on the programme points out that the one terrorist captured after the Rome airport massacre claims he was trained in Syria and flew from Damascus. The programme also has little difficulty in showing that the White House wished to get rid of Gadaffi as early as 1981, and that Reagan had become the prisoner of his own rhetoric by promising decisive action against terrorists. After the 1983 Beirut bombing and the 1985 TWA hijack and the Achille Lauro hijack, this pressure became almost irresistible.



Tripoli after the attack: victim of retribution or an easy scapegoat?

The problem with "intercepts" and other intelligence data is that the contemporary historian does not have access to sufficient information to establish the true facts, because by its very nature the full intelligence material is kept secret. Even if Libya is exonerated over the West Berlin attack, we have powerful evidence proving Gadaffi's responsibility for numerous other acts of international terrorism, such as the murder of WPC Fletcher in London in 1984. We also know that Gadaffi has assisted the Abu Nidal terrorists, for example by providing them with the Tunisian passports stolen in Libya which were found in the hands of the terrorists who committed the airport massacres.

The BBC was unable to interview the handful of Western officials who have actually seen the raw data from which the published intercepts were drawn. Moreover, the West Germans, Italians, Austrians, and the Israelis have all got their own strong reasons for putting the blame on Syria rather than Libya.

Assuming, as I believe we must, that the publicly available intelligence is at best ambiguous, judgements about the justifiability of the Libyan raid must hinge on other considerations. It could be argued that the raid had a general exemplary value. Some observers point to the dramatic decline in Libyan acts of terrorism in Western countries, though it is not the case that Gadaffi has abandoned terrorism. He still boasts of aiding the IRA, for example.

It can also be argued that the alarm created by the raid on Tripoli galvanized West Europeans into taking more effective action against state-sponsored terrorism, for example at the Tokyo summit. But of course it may be precisely this improved Western co-operation and Gadaffi's fear of further sanctions that has led to the drop in Libyan terrorism, and not the raid itself.

In my view, however, the decisive argument against air strikes as a method of dealing with terrorism is not political or strategic, but moral. Even if we had established beyond any reasonable doubt that Gadaffi planned the bombings in West Berlin and the massacres at Rome and Vienna, would that have fully justified a major air attack on Tripoli and Benghazi in which innocent civilians were killed and injured? It may have assuaged the US public's desire for vengeance, but is it ever right for a democracy to return terror for terror? I hope and believe that the answer of the British people would be no.

The author is Professor of International Relations, Aberdeen University, and Chairman of the Trustees of the Research Foundation for the Study of Terrorism. Twelve minutes over Tripoli *will be shown on BBC1 on Friday.*

"YELLOW"

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Reference B66/5/1A

27 March 1987

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA DLO)

c.c. PMD
NZSIS (TIC)
Police (PTIU)
Defence (DDOP)
TEHRAN

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Date	Nature of Material	Remarks
	Terrorism	
	press reporting	
27 March 1987	Guardian report of Tunisian severance of diplomatic relations with Iran for reasons connected with terrorism.	

"

S.W. Prior

for High Commissioner

THE GUARDIAN Friday March 27 1987

Tehran embassy 'go-between for extremist organisations'

Tunisia cuts Iran ties after finding 'terror' links

From Simon Ingram in Tunis and Campbell Page in Paris

The Tunisian Government is severing diplomatic relations with Iran following the discovery of evidence linking the Iranian embassy in Tunis to acts of terrorism inside Tunisia and abroad.

A statement issued yesterday by the Tunisian Foreign Ministry said the embassy had served as an intermediary between Iranian elements and a group of Tunisian extremists loyal to the ideals of the Iranian revolution.

It said they and other individuals — presumably tunisians — had been recruited by propaganda and by the promise of funds to carry out acts designed to spread "ideological confusion, anarchy and confessional sedition" on Tunisian soil.

According to the communiqué, these activities amounted to a flagrant violation of the rules governing diplomatic activity, and the Tunisian Government had therefore decided to break diplomatic ties with Iran. Government sources say diplomats at the Iranian embassy, which has been headed by a chargé d'affaires since 1980, have been given three days to leave the country.

The statement also linked the embassy with attempts to damage Tunisia's relations with friendly states by recruiting Tunisians living in those countries to carry out subversive acts, an apparent reference to recent investigations in France and Djibouti which have produced evidence of Tunisian involvement in terrorist attacks in both countries.

Six Tunisians were among eight suspets charged in Paris yesterday with possessing weapons and explosives and taking part in a criminal conspiracy to carry out terrorist acts. They were arrested last weekend after the French secret service discovered the arms cache.

Among the eight are Fouad Ali Salah, a Tunisian, and Mohamed Mouhajer, a French citizen of Lebanese origin. They are believed to be the leaders of the group, and are suspected of working for Iranian intelligence.

Of the remaining six, five are also Tunisians. The only woman, Salah's wife, is a French citizen of Algerian origin.

The French Interior Ministry said yesterday that the group had been preparing to commit dangerous acts of terrorism. It also said that investigations would continue to discover whether the group had been involved in recent terrorist incidents in France.

The Tunisian Government, which has traditionally projected an image of moderation in the Arab world, has been embarrassed by the recent disclosures of Tunisians being involved in international terrorism. On Tuesday, President Habid Bourguiba issued a statement condemning terrorism, and deploring the efforts of unnamed foreign powers to enlist Tunisians abroad in subversive activities.

Diplomatic sources in Tunis point out that while there is a well-established link between Iranian groups and North African students in Europe, no clear proof of Iranian infiltration of campuses in Tunisia has ever emerged. However, the authorities have been alarmed lately by a series of clashes at university faculties in and around Tunis involving Islamic militants.

In the past two weeks a number of student leaders have been arrested, including the leader of the Islamic Tendency Movement, Rached Gannuchi, and senior officials allege that mosques on the campuses have been used to store weapons and to distribute subversive literature brought in from abroad. An even tougher crackdown on the fundementalist movement now seems inevitable.

CCC

CLAS: S E C R E T 25 MARCH 1987

SECRET

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RPTD: LONDON 41 - ROUTINE
LD : SFA (SEC LGL EUR CCO), DEFENCE (GCSB)
SUBJ: TECHNICAL SECURITY INSPECTION

YOUR 143. PRIOR TO OUR CALLING ON MFA WE RECEIVED A THIRD PERSON NOTE ADDRESSED TO ALL EMBASSIES (COPY BY BAG) ADVISING OF NEW AIRPORT PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED WITH REGARD TO DIPLOMATIC BAGS, TO ACCOMMODATE THE PROPOSED X-RAY SYSTEM (THE X-RAYING ITSELF IS STILL NOT IN EFFECT BUT, WE GATHER FROM PROTOCOL, IS LIKELY TO BEGIN NEXT MONTH). THE NOTE ALSO SAYS THAT - ''IN THE CASE OF INCOMING OR OUTGOING DIPLOMATIC POUCHES CONTAINING SENSITIVE MATERIAL OR EXCEEDING THE SIZE LAID OUT IN THE SAID THIRD PERSON NOTE N. 021/11569 (CM 90 WIDE AND CM 70 HIGH), DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS ARE KINDLY REQUESTED TO INFORM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS WHENEVER SUCH A DIPLOMATIC POUCH IS EXPECTED TO ARRIVE OR LEAVE. THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS RESERVES THE RIGHT OF GRANTING A SPECIFIC AUTHORISATION EACH TIME, WHICH SHOULD BE REQUESTED WELL IN ADVANCE THROUGH A THIRD PERSON NOTE ADDRESSED TO THE 'CERIMONIALE DIPLOMATICO'.''

SWP

PKMOR

2 BEFORE SENDING IN SUCH A NOTE WE THOUGHT WE SHOULD INFORMALLY TEST THE WATERS WITH MFA, AS YOU HAD SUGGESTED, AND CALLED ON DARMIS, PROTOCOL DIVISION, WHO IS DEALING WITH THE NEW PROCEDURES. DARMIS WAS OBVIOUSLY SOMEWHAT RELIEVED THAT WE WERE NOT CARRYING INSTRUCTIONS TO LODGE A GENERAL PROTEST ABOUT THE X-RAYING. HE SAID THAT THE ITALIANS HAD ENVISAGED SITUATIONS IN WHICH EMBASSIES WOULD NEED TO HAVE EXEMPTION FOR ''SPECIAL'' SAFEHAND BAGS, AND THAT THE PROCEDURE FOR ''SENSITIVE MATERIAL'' (ABOVE) WAS INTENDED

TO CATER FOR THIS. THEREFORE WE SHOULD NOW SEND IN A THIRD PERSON NOTE. IN ANSWER TO OUR QUESTION HE SAID THAT, INFORMALLY, WE COULD PROCEED WITH OUR PLANNING ON THE CONFIDENT ASSUMPTION THAT OUR BAGS WOULD NOT BE X-RAYED.

3 WE WILL THEREFORE PREPARE A THIRD PERSON NOTE TO PASS TO PROTOCOL. TO TIE THINGS UP, IT WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE DESIRABLE FOR US TO CITE IN OUR NOTE THE INSPECTION TEAM'S FLIGHT ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE TIMES (SEE OUR 231, PARA 2), AND THE NUMBER AND SIZE OF THEIR SAFEHAND BAGS. GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD ADVISE US OF THIS ASAP.

4 FOR LONDON : IN LIGHT OF THE ABOVE, COMMSTECH MAY WISH TO FIRM UP PLANS TO SERVICE OUR EQUIPMENT WHEN CONVENIENT., AND ADVISE US OF FLIGHT DETAILS ETC IN DUE COURSE. GIVEN OUR NEED TO OBTAIN EXEMPTION FROM X-RAY PROCESS BY FORMAL NOTE TO FOREIGN MINISTRY, GRATEFUL YOU ENSURE WE HAVE MAXIMUM ADVANCE NOTICE OF PLANNED VISIT.
=

ROM 470
25/1643 LT
NNNN

SECRET

B66/5/1A

HOME OFFICE

Queen Anne's Gate London SW1H 9AT

Direct line 01-213
Switchboard 01-213 3000

26 MAR 1987

Mr Stuart Prior
First Secretary
New Zealand High Commission
New Zealand House, Haymarket
LONDON SW17 4TQ

Your reference
B66/5/1A

Our reference

Date

23 March 1987

Dear Mr Prior

Thank you for sending me on 17 March a copy of the draft of New Zealand's International Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Bill.

As I explained on the telephone several of my colleagues deal with matters covered by the Bill. When they have had a chance to look at it, I will write to you again.

Yours sincerely

Felicity Clarkson

Felicity Clarkson

New Zealand High Commission

New Zealand House
Haymarket
London SW1Y 4TQ
Telephone: 01-930 8422 Ext:
Telex 24368

"YELLOW"

Reference B66/5/1A
23 March 1987

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA DLO)

c.c. PMD
NZSIS (TIC)
Police (PTIU)
Defence (DDOP)

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Date	Nature of Material	Remarks
	Terrorism	
	press reporting	
22 March 1987	Observer article.	

S.W. Prior
for High Commissioner

THE OBSERVER, SUNDAY 22 MARCH 1987

Hunt for mole as Italy faces terror onslaught

DAVID WILLEY ■ Rome

TWO VITAL questions remain unanswered as police helicopters buzz over Rome as part of a massive, and so far fruitless, search for the killers of General Licio Giorgieri, the man in charge of development of Italy's entire missile arsenal and air defence system.

Who was the mole in the Defence Ministry who enabled Red Brigades terrorists to identify an obscure soldier-boffin who was one of Nato's leading experts on the planning and construction of space weapons?

And why did the Italian Government apparently fail to act upon intelligence provided by the French secret services earlier this month, when leaders of the Action Directe terrorist group were captured near Orleans with evidence of plans for joint operations with the Red Brigades? General Giogieri was killed by a two-man assassination team who fired five shots through the windows of the car in which he was being driven home last Friday night. His driver escaped unhurt. It was a precision killing.

The general's body was taken to a special room in the ministry to lie in state until the funeral. Hundreds of people began filing past the bier when it was open to the public. Members of the Government —including Defence Minister Giovanni Spadolini — and leading personalities also paid their last respects.



Defence Minister Giovanni Spadolini facing the media at the scene of the general's murder.

The timing of the assassination was calculated for its maximum destabilising effect when Italy is virtually without a government. As the politicians continue long-drawn-out negotiations to try to set up a new coalition to replace the Craxi administration, which resigned three weeks ago, Italy has to face the gravest resurgence of domestic terrorism since the late 1970s.

Police investigators are concentrating on possible international links of the 'Union of Communist Combatants' the military wing of the new Red Brigades.

The leaders of the old Red Brigades, active during the late 1970s and early 1980s, are mostly in jail serving long sentences for terrorist crime. The old Red Brigades were responsible for the kidnap and murder of former Prime Minister Aldo Moro in 1978 and subsequently a whole series of leading public figures in journalism, the universities, and the law.

The 'Union of Communist Combatants' first appeared as an identifiable splinter group of the new generation of the Red Brigades in October 1985, when an attempt to kill one of Prime Minister Craxi's chief economic advisers failed.

A woman member of the terrorist group, Wima Monaco, was killed by police in a shoot-out when she bungled the attack.

Italy's leading daily, the *Corriere de la Sera*, pointed out in a sobering editorial yesterday that although the Red Brigades had been defeated politically 'the armed struggle is not over. Terrorism has become pathological in contemporary society,' the newspaper said.

'The Red Brigades are no longer trying to encourage the masses to strike at the heart of the state; they now want to destabilise western defence. And Middle East terrorism has the same strategy.'

General Giorgieri came from Trieste, where he held a chair of aeronautical and missile engineering at the university. On the door of his spacious flat in a Rome suburb he is described as 'General Professor Giorgieri.' For the past four years he had been in charge of an office through which passed all orders for aircraft and missiles for the Italian armed forces.

His work was highly classified, but it is known that in one point in his career he had worked with the aircraft and military vehicle division of Fiat. According to some reports, the general was Italy's leading expert on military research contracts for President Reagan's Star Wars project.

B66/1/22
c.c. B66/5/1A

20 March 1987

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs
WELLINGTON

(Att : UNC, EUR, DLO)

c.c. EIB, WELLINGTON

DRUG MISUSE

... Attached for your information is an F.C.O. Background Brief "International Response to Drug Misuse". It is dated March 1987.

2. As may have become apparent from some of the material we have been sending in recent weeks, there is considerable interest here in the question of drugs misuse and, in particular, the links between drug trafficking and terrorism. Health aspects - especially the connection between drugs misuse and the transmission of the AIDS virus - are also of concern.

3. Reflecting the Government's concern, a special "Narcotics Control and AIDS Unit" has been set up within the F.C.O. charged with collecting and disseminating information on the problem. It works closely with the C5 Division (responsible for health matters) of the Home Office and with the Cabinet Office.

4. It would be helpful to us, in sorting through the increasing quantity of drugs-related information available from official sources here, to have an indication of your interest in these matters. In particular, we should be grateful for guidance in due course as to whom we should address such material (in the manner of the full guidance you have supplied for terrorism-related matters).

S. W. PRIOR

S.W. Prior
for High Commissioner

Att.

New Zealand High Commission
New Zealand House
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London SW1Y 4TQ
Telephone 01-930 8422 After hour (01) 930 4697
Telex 24368
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NUMBER OF PAGES IN TRANSMISSION (INCLUDING COVER SHEET)

PAGE 1 OF 12

7043

B66/5/1A

COVER SHEET FOR FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

UNCLASSIFIED

DATE: 18 March 1987

FROM: NEW ZEALAND HIGH COMMISSION, LONDON.

TO: Wellington

SERIAL NUMBER: 2608 (FAX)

PRECEDENCE: Priority

DISTRIBUTION: PMD (Hensley)
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CLEARED
COMUNICATIONS SECTION

ANTI-TERRORISM

The following is the Commons report by the Home Secretary on 10 February 1987 on the Prevention of Terrorism(Temporary Provisions) Act 1984 and the subsequent parliamentary examination of his request for the Act's renewal for a further year mentioned in our telegram of today's date.

AUTHORISING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE: D Urquhart

NAME: S.W. Prior

[Continuation from column 262]

Prevention of Terrorism

10.16 pm

The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Douglas Hurd): I beg to move,

That the draft Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984 (Continuance) Order 1987, which was laid before this House on 27th January, be approved.

The effect of this order will be to renew the 1984 Act for a further 12 months from 22 March.

Since the House debated the similar order a year ago, there have been no major terrorist incidents on the mainland of Great Britain, and for that we should all be thankful—and grateful in particular to those who have worked tirelessly to keep us safe. The danger continues to hang over us—we should make no mistake about that. In Northern Ireland, terrorism continues to haunt the life of the Province, although the terrorist is no nearer reaching his objective, and fails to prevent the great majority of the people of Northern Ireland from going about their lives in peace.

The main change which has occurred in the past 12 months is the growing international understanding of the nature of terrorism, and co-operation in dealing with it. No longer, when European Ministers meet, is terrorism considered as something peculiar to the Irish problem or perhaps to the Basque problem in Spain. Regrettably, our partners, whether it be in France, Italy, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, all now experience within their own frontiers the particular horrors of terrorism and accept fully the need to co-operate in tackling it. Of course that co-operation is still imperfect. The change which has taken place shows how sensible the House was to accept Lord Jellicoe's recommendation and extend to international terrorism as a whole some of the powers which in the original Act were reserved for terrorism originating in the problems of Northern Ireland.

No-one in this House disagrees about the distinctive evil of terrorism — the attempt to influence political thinking not by argument or persuasion but by killing, maiming or frightening innocent people. The argument in the House begins when we consider whether special powers are needed by the police and the Government in dealing with terrorism. I hope to persuade the House that this new order under the Prevention of Terrorism Act is a necessary part, although only part, of the armoury against acts of terrorism which can threaten a free society.

However, I shall not be satisfied simply to win the vote at the end of this debate. I would regard it as very serious if Her Majesty's Opposition were once again to oppose the measure. I hope the right hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman) will have the wisdom and stout-heartedness to abandon the irresponsible precedent set since 1981 and go back to the much healthier situation which prevailed before that date, when Government and Opposition were able to agree on the basic elements of our response to terrorism.

The powers in the Act are exceptional, but as a counter-balance, the Act is subject to unusually close scrutiny and frequent review. Once a year, Parliament has the opportunity to decide whether the Act should continue in force. Moreover, the operation of the Act is closely monitored by an independent person appointed specially for the task. There cannot be many other powers under which decisions made by a Secretary of State are so rigorously brought to the attention of a person appointed by the Secretary of State, but independent of him.

I accept the wisdom which led Parliament to press three years ago for this independent review of the operation of the Act. The House was, I know, grateful to Sir Cyril Philips for his thorough study of the way the Act worked in 1984 and 1985. I know the House will be grateful to my noble and learned Friend, the Viscount Colville of Culross, for having carried out his task as Sir Cyril's successor so quickly and for making himself available to receive representations both in London and in Belfast.

I hope the House will welcome the publication of Lord Colville's report in plenty of time for this debate. He has visited a number of air and sea ports during his work, some of which have not been covered in previous reviews, to see the legislation in operation. As his report shows, he examined individual files on extensions of detention under section 12 of the Act and on article 9 of the order and exclusion orders and discussed the cases with officials and police, here and in Northern Ireland. His approach has been notably thorough. Those who are worried that the exceptional powers under the Act can lead to harassment and unfairness should find much to reassure them in the report of my noble and learned Friend.

I turn now to the two important and to some extent controversial powers under the Act, those of detention and exclusion. Lord Colville's report shows that in Great Britain 202 people were detained under the provisions of the Act in 1986, and 1,309 in Northern Ireland. This represents a decrease of 64 in Great Britain and an increase of 371 in Northern Ireland compared to 1985. On the mainland, as last year, about one quarter of the detentions related to suspected involvement in international, not Irish terrorism.

In Great Britain, just under a quarter of those detained were detained for more than 48 hours. In Northern Ireland, there were more detentions for a longer period; three quarters of the 483 detentions were for five days or more. But this year there has been less use of the whole period of detention permitted by the Act; whereas, in 1985, 54 people were detained in Great Britain for the whole seven days, in 1986 that figure was 25.

But of course numbers do not tell the whole story. I cannot give details of many of the cases which occurred during the year, because some are still sub judice, but I would like to point out one particular example of the use of these powers in respect of international terrorism. I choose this example because it illustrates a point strongly made by Lord Colville, although it is not an example he quoted—a point which I urge the Opposition to take on board.

The justification of these powers, as opposed to the ordinary powers of the criminal law, is that they enable the police to prevent horrors before they happen. In September and October of last year, six people were detained under the Act on suspicion of membership of the Abu Nidhal group, an international terrorist organisation. Five of the six have now left the United Kingdom. Three were deported and I agreed that a further two should be allowed to make a supervised departure. The sixth is still detained awaiting the outcome of a review by the three

[Douglas Hurd]

advisers. It is clear that, without the Prevention of Terrorism Act, the police would have had no power to detain these people.

It is certainly possible that after a time there would have been evidence which would have enabled the police to detain, interview and perhaps charge the people. But I do not think the Opposition would seriously argue that the police should in such cases be content to wait until evidence became available. That evidence might well have taken the form of corpses, maimed bodies and devastated property. It is because of the Act, and because of the vigilance of the authorities, that we were able to be rid of this group before they did us any harm. I believe that must be right.

Ms. Clare Short (Birmingham, Ladywood): Will the right hon. Gentleman confirm that the extension of the Prevention of Terrorism Act to include international terrorism is new? Secondly, will he explain exactly on what grounds those people were detained, so that we may judge whether they could have been detained under other powers in the criminal law or in immigration legislation? My belief is that the Government have extended the Act to international terrorism to justify legislation that does not stand up in its own right.

Mr. Hurd: The hon. Lady knows better than that. The hon. Lady knows that the extension of the powers to international terrorism was approved by the House in the 1984 Act as a result of Lord Jellicoe's review. It corresponds to something that is clearly a reality—that the threat of terrorism in this country is not now exclusively something which comes to us across the Irish sea. It involves a considerable range of threats of international terrorism. Mention of the immigration legislation in this context is frivolous. It is only under the Prevention of Terrorism Act that the police have the powers which are necessary to detain people of the kind that I have mentioned for the period which is necessary for questioning. I stand wholly by that point.

Mr. Gerald Bermingham (St. Helens, South): Does not the Home Secretary agree that, where a person travels on a non-European passport, and where a person is known to be associated with an international group which has terrorist connections, at the normal port of entry there is the right of refusal of entry?

Mr. Hurd: It is possible, and indeed it often happens, that the information which links particular people to a terrorist group becomes available after they have entered the country. That is the reality of the situation. The Opposition are beginning to wriggle uncomfortably under the fact that it is actually the powers of the Prevention of Terrorism Act——

Ms. Clare Short *rose*——

Mr. Hurd: No; I am not giving way to the hon. Lady again.

It is the powers which are available under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, and only those powers, which enable the police to detain and question people of this kind to the extent necessary to be rid of them, as in the case I quoted, and to prevent them from committing the horrors which otherwise they might commit.

I have made my point and I hold firmly to it. May I reinforce it by saying that Lord Colville made the same point in a different way in paragraph 2.27 of his report when he wrote:

"The powers criticised are pre-emptive."

This is exactly the point.

"If they did not exist the police would have to wait until the terrorists had gone far enough in the preparation of their plot to bomb or shoot for sustainable evidence of conspiracy or an attempt to be at hand. Presumably it is not suggested that they should be allowed actually to explode the bomb or fire the gun."

Unfortunately, that is exactly what is suggested by those who oppose the powers. That might well be the exact result of failure to renew the powers.

Ms. Clare Short *rose*——

Mr. Hurd: I shall not give way to the hon. Lady again. The hon. Lady showed a remarkable lack of knowledge of the sequence of events which led to the extension of the Act to cover international terrorism.

Mr. Max Madden (Bradford, West): Will the Home Secretary confirm that immigration officers, if they have reason to believe that a person seeking to enter the country is not genuine, have powers to detain him for a period sufficient to carry out inquiries and any interviews that may be necessary? In what regard are the powers which he has advocated to the House dissimilar from the powers available to immigration officers?

Mr. Hurd: We are talking about the powers of the police to detain and question in connection with information about terrorism.

Mr. Bermingham: Why let them in?

Mr. Hurd: Because the information frequently becomes available after they are in. Hon. Members who are constantly urging that immigration officers should be more lax in the way in which they deal with these matters are in a poor position if they then say that they should be more strict. It often happens — or it occasionally happens — that foreigners are admitted on grounds which appear to be legitimate, and later it becomes apparent, from information which then becomes available, partly as a result of the increased international co-operation of which I am talking, that they are or may be engaged in terrorist activity, and that is where the powers of the PTA come in.

Lord Colville also sets out persuasively the kinds of circumstances which can justify the police applying for extra time to hold a detainee under the Act. The need to keep terrorist suspects separate, the need often to interview through an interpreter, the need to seek information from foreign police and security services are all requirements set out in his report, which Lord Colville found to be persuasive, and which I hope the House will agree are persuasive.

I come to the other controversial power under the Act —the power to exclude an individual from part of the United Kingdom. This power of exclusion is certainly extraordinary and severe. In his report last year, Sir Cyril Philips hoped that no new exclusion orders would be made, and this year Lord Colville — although his argument is somewhat different—also hopes that steps can be taken to improve port control so that the power to exclude need no longer be sought perhaps, he says, from 1988 onwards.

perating this power case by case during 1986, I had Sir Cyril Philips' point very much in mind. Indeed, I hope that even without that I would have realised that the power of exclusion was of a kind which could only be used very sparingly in a free society. I will explain how it works. I personally consider all applications made by the police for exclusion from Great Britain and I apply strict tests. I need to be satisfied that the individual concerned is or has been involved in the commission, preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism.

I would not make an order unless there is a clear indication that the individual is actively involved in terrorism or has been so, in most cases within the past three years. By involvement in acts of terrorism I do not mean that he or she has been seen in the company of known terrorists or has certain political views. I look at each application for indications of active personal involvement.

Using this strict test, I made nine new orders during the year in respect of people whom I considered to be involved in acts of terrorism connected with the affairs of Northern Ireland.

Mr. Ivan Lawrence (Burton): Is not membership of a known terrorist organisation sufficient?

Mr. Hurd: No.

Mr. Lawrence: Why not?

Mr. Hurd: In my view it is not sufficient. I apply the test more strictly than that. I am talking about active personal involvement in terrorist activity, and I believe that is the right criterion for the use of this power of exclusion.

Mr. Seamus Mallon (Newry and Armagh) *rose*——

Mr. Hurd: I will give way shortly to the hon. Gentleman, who has a deep personal knowledge of this problem.

Most of the exclusion papers which come across my desk do not deal with applications for new orders. Most of them are reviews of existing orders. As a result of these reviews, 103 existing orders were revoked and 54 orders renewed. Whereas on 31 December 1985 212 exclusion orders were made in Great Britain, that figure had dropped by almost half by 31 December 1986, to 114.

This reduction came about partly because of cases where the police did not apply for renewal of the order, but partly because, as Lord Colville reports, in about half the cases I turned down police applications for renewed orders. That is because I am clear that this power should be used sparingly.

Mr. Mallon: Could I ask the Secretary of State how many of the subjects of the nine new orders, when returned to Northern Ireland, were charged or interviewed by the police and how many of them were charged with specific acts of terrorism in Northern Ireland? If they were returned to the Republic of Ireland, how many were there charged with acts of terrorism?

Mr. Hurd: That is a different point, if I may say so. It is a legitimate question, but the hon. Member is assuming that the power of exclusion is only applicable in those cases. I have set out clearly the criteria which I apply. My hon. Friend the Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence) has shown in his intervention that he thinks the criteria that I apply are too strict. The implication of the question of the hon. Member for Newry and Armagh (Mr. Mallon) is that they are not strict enough and that I should apply them only in cases where there is evidence capable of being produced in court. But I am freely saying that this is an exceptional and severe power, and I am saying and, I think, proving to the House that I use it very sparingly indeed.

As the House knows, there is provision for the individual concerned to make representations against an order, which is then considered by an independent adviser. During 1986, 13 cases were considered by the adviser and 10 people were interviewed in London or Belfast. I accepted the opinion of the adviser in all these cases and revoked three orders as a result.

As a result of this policy, exclusion orders now cover very many fewer people than before. I do not believe that this is a conclusive argument against continuing the power. It simply shows that the power has been used with increasing strictness. In plain terms, what we are mostly talking about, of course, is a power which could prevent or deter from travelling to the mainland people who intend to carry out terrorist attacks. That is different from saying that there is evidence which could be produced to charge them, either in the Republic or in the Province. It is one thing to say that this power ought to be used very sparingly. I accept that, and I think that I have shown the House that I do. It is another thing to be sure—I think that one has to be sure—that it can be done away with altogether. I do not at present accept that.

I am not at present convinced that, by enhancing port controls, we can provide an effective substitute for the power to exclude. What is at stake here, of course, is the safety of the whole community and I do not want to propose any change which would put that safety in greater jeopardy. I am prepared to accept Lord Colville's suggestion that we should look seriously and thoroughly at this possibility between now and the time when the order comes up again next year. I hope to discuss the problem with him very shortly and after that we will consider what, if any, changes can sensibly be made.

We shall in any case look sympathetically at some of the points about the detailed administration of the power which Lord Colville goes on to make—for example, the possibility of finding better ways of letting people know when their exclusion orders have been revoked or are being reviewed.

The Prevention of Terrorism Act is now over halfway through its five-year life. We shall have to consider before long what should take the place of the Act after it expires in 1989. Lord Colville may be right in suggesting that international terrorism is now so firmly rooted, contrary to the knowledge of the hon. Member for Birmingham, Ladywood (Ms. Short) who first interrupted me, that it is sensible to regard anti-terrorist legislation as a permanent part of our law, perhaps with special flexibility in measures affecting Northern Ireland, but the Government have not yet considered the long-term future of the Act, and we will, of course, keep the House informed of our thinking.

Meanwhile, it is essential in my judgment that the House passes this order and enables these powers to continue. It is essential not because these are attractive powers but because they are necessary for the protection of the community. The determination of the House to resist terrorism will be much strengthened if the Opposition this year could bring themselves to support the order; and I appeal to the right hon. Member for Gorton to do so. He was not, I think, in charge when his party first

[Mr. Hurd]

lurched into irresponsibility by refusing to support this order in 1981 and 1982. He could add to his reputation by rescuing it from that irresponsibility tonight.

I commend the order to the House.

10.40 pm

Mr. Gerald Kaufman (Manchester, Gorton): This debate is about how we should fight terrorism. It is not about whether we should fight it. As the Home Secretary said, every hon. Member loathes terrorism and wishes to combat and destroy it. Every one of us detests the whole savage business of murder and explosions, hostages and ultimatums. All of us oppose trading with terrorists and making deals with them.

This debate does not take place each year so that one hon. Member or one party can prove that he, she or it is more anti-terrorist than another hon. Member of party. It takes place because the Government must prove to Parliament that there is a case for renewing a statute that will lapse unless Parliament agrees to renew it. In seeking renewal, the Government try to make the most of two contradictory arguments. Depending on the circumstances, they say that there is so much terrorism that they cannot do without the Act, or that at the moment there is so little terrorism that the Act has proved its worth. To put it another way, on the one hand they say that the Act is working so well that obviously we must keep it, and on the other hand they admit that the Act is working so badly that there is clearly an immense need for it.

The Home Secretary says darkly, and implied last year and this year, that if only we knew what he knows we would accept the need for the Act, but he never gives us conclusive, convincing information. He never proves that any of the much applauded successes by the police against terrorists could not have been achieved without this Act. When he says that the Act was used in such-and-such a circumstance, on so many occasions, he does not demonstrate or prove whether any other enactment could, in the absence of this Act, have been used just as successfully.

The right hon. Gentleman limply sought to provide an example relating to Abu Nidal, but his attempt to make that argument proved the point that I am seeking to establish, namely, that he cannot demonstrate that without this Act those persons would not have been dealt with.

Mr. Hurd: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Kaufman: May I just finish this argument? Let us look at the matter of dealing with people at the port of entry. I said many months ago in the House that it is easier for an international terrorist to gain entry to this House than it is for an Indian grandmother to come to Britain for a wedding. That means that Indian grandmothers are excluded and this Abu Nidal lot can get in. The Home Secretary says that he does not have the powers under the Immigration Act 1971 to deal with such people when they have entered. In that case, I suggest that he consults a Minister who has more intimate knowledge of the Immigration Act 1971.

If police or immigration officers can swoop on an innocent man, pick him up on the street without telling his wife where he is, take him away and put him in a remand centre and question him—as happened to a constituent of mine—and if I am able to get him released only after much effort; certainly those authorities ought to be able to deal with people who come from a land from which terrorists are known to come and ought to be able to deal with them in a far more stringent way.

Mr. Hurd: The hon. Gentleman is being unreal and absurd. The idea that once people have been admitted to this country the Immigration Act 1971 or the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 enables the police to do what they have to do, which is to detain and question them, is simply unreal.—[AN HON. MEMBER: "Why?"] Because the powers do not exist to detain and question for seven days. *[Interruption.]* The more the Opposition barrack, the more they show their ignorance. These powers were necessary in this case and no other powers would have done the trick.

Mr. Kaufman: I suggest that the right hon. Gentleman takes a closer look at his powers in the Immigration Act 1971 and at the way in which those powers are exercised in an extremely rigorous way on innocent people, let alone people who wish to come here to blow up, maim and murder when they arrive.

We know two things. The first is that this is a temporary Act, and that even if it is renewed tonight and again next year it will fall two years from now. The second is that last year the Prime Minister said of the Act:

"The Government believe that this legislation will be necessary as long as a substantial terrorist threat remains."
—[*Official Report*, 24 April 1986; Vol 96, c.208.]

That was an absolute statement, far more absolute than anything that any sensible Home Secretary had ever said, and far more absolute than anything contained in Viscount Colville's report. On that criterion of the Prime Minister, if the Government were returned at the next election the legislation would be enacted all over again in precisely its present form, without the Home Secretary volunteering the kind of potential re-examination of exclusion orders that he mentioned in his speech.

Mrs. Clare Short: My right hon: Friend may be aware that I worked in the Home Office from 1970 to 1975. During the latter part of that time Viscount Colville was a junior Tory Home Office Minister of not much standing. The House should be aware of that when he is quoted as some great authority on the impartiality of the Prevention of Terrorism Act.

Mr. Kaufman: I shall always accept my hon. Friend's expertise on these matters. When it comes to matching her expertise against that of the Home Secretary, I shall place my money on her any day of the week. My hon. Friend studies the material and she knows about it; the Home Secretary reads a brief. However, I have to tell my hon. Friend that I intend to quote Viscount Colville in my own interest, and therefore I shall not dismiss him totally. I hope that my hon. Friend will accept that.

We know, because Minister after Minister in the Government has said it, that this is, in successive Conservative Home Secretaries' words, an "intensely undesirable Act" whose powers

"infringe our shared concept of civil liberties".

They

"make a considerable inroad into the civil liberties of which we are justly proud".

They

"make sad inroads into our cherished tradition of civil liberties."

last year, the present Home Secretary, when he asked the House for renewal, said:

"The Act makes substantial inroads on ordinary civil liberties."—[*Official Report,* 19 February 1986; Vol. 92, c. 415.]

Clearly nobody likes the Act, so can its continuance be justified by its achievements? We should look at the record and see what it tells us about the Act's achievements. Government statistics published last month demonstrate that, starting from the introduction of the legislation to the end of last year, 92 per cent. of those detained in Britain under the Act have not been subject to any charge. Only 3 per cent. have been charged with offences under the legislation, and 38 per cent. of those have been charged only with failure to co-operate with examination at the port, which is an offence created by the Act, rather than solved by it.

Viscount Colville points out in his report that the powers are under challenge before the European Commission of Human Rights at Strasbourg, and in July 1986 the commissioners ruled that the applications were admissible. One of the issues is the length of time that a person may be detained without being charged or released.

In his report on the Act, Viscount Colville supports the continuation of the detention powers. He says that it is a "simplistic" approach to seek to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the legislation and to oppose its renewal on the basis of the small percentage of those detained who are charged with offences under it. I agree with that. Viscount Colville argues that the Act creates few offences and that they are not of a particularly serious nature. He cites other Acts as providing a fuller picture, and I agree with him about that—they do. Of those charged with offences under the Prevention of Terrorism Acts, only 2 per cent. of those detained were found guilty of any offence, and only 0·5 per cent. were found guilty of offences meriting more than one year's imprisonment.

Mr. Robert Parry (Liverpool, Riverside): My right hon. Friend has made a very relevant point. Does he agree that it is wrong that, under the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984, people who are arrested or detained and then released without any evidence being produced that they have been involved in any criminal activities should have their fingerprints and photographs retained on the files?

Mr. Kaufman: I shall deal with that point and with the proportion of those detained who are charged with any kind of offence under any type of legislation, let alone under the prevention of terrorism legislation. This is the test that Viscount Colville uses. He says that it is "simplistic" to look at offences under the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act with which people are charged and that we should look more widely.

Let us look more widely at those offences. Of those detained under the Act and charged with criminal offences under other Acts, only 4 per cent. were found guilty, and fewer than 2 per cent. received prison sentences of one year or more. All told, fewer than 2·5 per cent. of those detained were found to have committed offences of any seriousness.

Mr. Bermingham: Does my right hon. Friend agree that if people are charged, there must have been evidence for that action? If there is evidence at the time of arrest, there are adequate powers under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and various other statutes, for the police to investigate and lay charges appropriately. Therefore, there is no need for this Act.

Mr. Kaufman: I agree with my hon. Friend that the Police and Criminal Act powers would provide opportunities to detain the overwhelming majority of those who are detained, but even those powers are not required to detain the considerable majority of those who are detained. The Home Secretary cannot even use the existence of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act as an argument for the types of policies that he is pursuing.

It is up to the Government to prove that even these few persons—80 out of more than 6,400—would not have been caught, charged and convicted if this legislation had not been on the statute book. Of those detained under this legislation, 95 per cent. have been completely innocent of anything, however trivial.

Mr. Lawrence: What about the other 5 per cent.?

Mr. Kaufman: The Home Secretary has failed to demonstrate that the other 5 per cent. would not have been caught without this legislation on the statute book. Indeed, one is sometimes led to believe from the Home Secretary's arguments that the only way in which we can stop, say, the Abu Nidal group from coming to this country is not by having this Act on the statute book but by having visa requirements for terrorists.

If the Home Secretary can still seek to quote Lord Colville's report in favour of the continuance of the detention power, he certainly cannot do so with regard to the power to make exclusion orders. Last year Sir Cyril Philips, in his report on the Act, came out strongly against exclusion orders. He argued that the power to make them "should be one of the first powers in the Act to be repealed." The Home Secretary curtly rejected that recommendation. In doing so, he stated on 19 February 1986 that the exclusion power

"has sometimes been described as a power of internal exile."

He insisted firmly:

"that is misleading".—[*Official Report,* 19 February 1986, Vol. 92, c. 417.]

Yet on page six of his report Viscount Colville describes the exclusion power as a form

"a form of internal exile".

The Colville report deals with exclusion powers at some length. It states:

"The issue is essentially one for Great Britain. In practice it relates to the amount of intelligence work which has to be carried out in England, Wales and Scotland by the police and security services. If exclusion orders disappeared it is possible that port procedures, such as carding and other examination under the Order might become marginally more intrusive. By comparison with Northern Ireland, the population of Great Britain and the flow of travellers into and out of it is vastly greater. Vigilance against terrorist inroads would have to be ensured as well from Northern Ireland as from the rest of the world.

In my view this would be more acceptable than a system of internal exile; any resultant criticisms would have to be considered sympathetically but in the light of the abolition of a power which the public may have seen as necessary to restrict the movement of Northern Ireland terrorists and contain their activities, but which now is not sufficiently used to stem the tide of protest. The deterrent effect is not to be underestimated, even if it cannot be quantified; but the police have other powers to prevent outbursts of Northern Irish terrorism in Great Britain."

That is the noble Friend of the Home Secretary, whom he has quoted in his own aid.

[Mr. Kaufman]

Either after the Philips report last year, or after the Colville report this year, the Home Secretary could have prepared to remove the exclusion power in the renewal order this year. He could have used the powers that he has to discontinue only that part of the Prevention of Terrorism Act. He should have done so. He had been advised to do so twice by the persons whom he asked to review the Act. He ignored their advice. One wonders why he asks for it if he ignores it so consistently. If only because of the Home Secretary's failure to take seriously that considered advice two years running, from people whom he asked to advise him, we shall vote against this continuance order tonight.

Viscount Colville concludes his report with a carefully argued critique against the continuance of the Act as a whole. He makes the very point that the Home Secretary made, but he makes it in reverse. The Home Secretary said that we need the Act because it started as an Act to deal with terrorism in Northern Ireland, but has now been amplified to deal with other forms of terrorism and there are many other kinds of terrorism around.

Viscount Colville says that for that very reason the Act should not continue to exist any longer. He says quite simply:

"It does appear strange that the main measure which is designed to give powers against international terrorism should be annually renewable, subject to a life-span no longer than March 1989, and completely entangled with the Northern Irish problem, from which historically the legislation grew."

That is why Viscount Colville says

"In the light of all this it seems to me that HMG might like to start again."

Very soon, whichever Government are in office, the Act will be extinguished. The Act creates, in some quarters, sympathy for those thousands of people wrongfully detained on inaccurate or unreliable suspicion of terrorism. That prevalent inaccuracy of suspicion, the 95 per cent. who are not found guilty of any offence whatsoever after being detained, militates against the acceptance of the existence of terrorism where it does exist. In eroding basic civil liberties this Act hands free of charge a victory to those whose objective it is to destroy our civil liberties.

The Act is a left-over from history. It is a left-over from a special time and a special circumstance, the same special time and the same special circumstance that led to the conviction of those now in prison for the Birmingham pub bombings. The Secretary of State has had the courage to say that there must be a new and searching look at those convictions. He should have the same courage to take a new and searching look at this legislation. To encourage him to do so, we shall vote against this renewal order tonight.

10.59 pm

Sir Eldon Griffiths (Bury St. Edmunds): The attractive feature of Lord Colville's report is that there are some light moments in what is otherwise an extremely serious matter. For example, I was fascinated to discover in his report that one of the oil platforms that he visited has three legs in Scotland and one in Norway. Lord Colville certainly did a pretty thorough job and wrote a most interesting report. The important thing—

Mr. Mallon: On the matter of the thorough job done by Lord Colville, I should inform the House that when he visited Northern Ireland he made no contact with the party to which I belong, he made no contact with me as spokesman on justice for that party, and he certainly seemed to ignore the views of that section of the community that suffers most from the legislation. That is the thorough job he did.

Sir Eldon Griffiths: No doubt Lord Colville will take account of what the hon. Gentleman has said.

The important thing about the report is that, consistent with the reports of Lord Jellicoe and Sir Cyril Philips before him, Lord Colville has come to the conclusion that basically the Act remains necessary. It is true that he has some criticisms and particularly in respect of exclusion orders, his criticisms are trenchant and will need to be dealt with. I am glad that my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary has said that he will be minded to look at the recommendations on exclusion orders before the House again considers the Act. It cannot be gain said that Lord Jellicoe, Sir Cyril Philips and now Lord Colville, each of them very different men, have looked at the facts, interviewed the people concerned—

Mr. Kevin McNamara (Kingston-upon-Hull, North): They are all Tories.

Sir Eldon Griffiths: I do not think that Sir Cyril Philips would agree with that description.

In any event, all three of them, quite independently, have come to the conclusion that fundamentally the Act is necessary. They arrive at that conclusion for what I should have thought was the most obvious reason in the world. There is a terrorists threat to our country and its people. That threat is manifestly becoming greater in Europe, the middle east and elsewhere and it is almost certainly the fact that people in this country and elsewhere are alive today who would not be alive if the police had been unable to use the pre-emptive powers of the Act to arrest, detain and exclude them.

It is always difficult to prove a negative; I cannot dispute that. However, I have some access, as no doubt other hon. Members have, to the police service and to those involved in dealing with terrorism, particularly in Northern Ireland. It is the absolute conviction of those who have to deal with the terrorist problem and put their lives at risk on our behalf that if they were deprived of the Act they could not do the job. It is their conviction that there are, as I have said, people alive in our country today who, without the powers in the hands of the police, would be dead.

I hope that no hon. Member who does not have to deal with the terrorist problem will so lightly discard the judgment of those who risk their lives on our account. It is simply arrogance on the part of those—I exclude the hon. Member for Newry and Armagh (Mr. Mallon) from this—who live comfortable lives here to say that they know so much better than our police officers and other persons who risk their lives to protect us. The evidence is pretty clear——

Ms. Clare Short: What the hon. Gentleman says is serious and he has to give examples or it is worthless. Surely, throughout history, when one balances civil liberties against the need to prevent crime, those who advocate the prevention of crime will say, "If we could

arrest everybody whenever we felt like it we could prevent crime." It is no good the hon. Gentleman simply saying that; he must tell us time and day, and who are the people whose lives have been saved because of the Prevention of Terrorism Act otherwise his point is worthless.

Sir Eldon Griffiths: The hon. Lady may feel that it is worthless, but she inhabits a peculiar role if she imagines that it is possible precisely to identify those things that have not happened on account of the pre-emptive action of the police. I shall give her some facts. In Northern Ireland in 1976, 297 of our fellow citizens were done to death by terrorists. In 1977, the figure was 112; in 1978 it was 81; in 1979 it was 113; in 1980 it was 75; in 1981 it was 101; in 1982 it was 97; in 1983 it was 77; in 1984 it was 64; in 1985 it was 54; and last year it was 61. That is an appalling toll of our fellow citizens.

As the hon. Lady challenged me, I ask whether she is prepared to say that she is certain that the figure of 97 killed in 1982 would have been fewer or more had the Act not existed? How can she possibly argue in that fashion?

Mr. Ron Leighton (Newham, North-East): I have listened carefully to the hon. Gentleman. Is he attempting to prove that the Act does not prevent terrorism and, therefore, does not work?

Sir Eldon Griffiths: Not at all. Indeed, I could argue from the statistics—but I shall not—that there has been a happy reduction in the numbers killed since the Act and the emergency powers relating to Northern Ireland that flow from it have been in operation. I would not make that claim, but nor can the hon. Member for Birmingham, Ladywood (Ms. Short) make the contrary claim that, because I am unable to identify those who, as a result of the Act, are alive, the Act does not work. Her logic is not acceptable.

Ms. Clare Short *rose*——

Sir Eldon Griffiths: I must get on; the hon. Lady will wish to speak in the debate, and no doubt there will be an opportunity for her to do so.

Ms. Clare Short: The hon. Gentleman challenged me.

Sir Eldon Griffiths: I shall give way to the hon. Lady once more.

Ms. Clare Short: I wish to put to the hon. Gentleman a serious proposition that I believe to be true. Successive legislation, this Act and the emergency powers cause such disgruntlement, especially within Northern Ireland, that they are a recruiting sergeant for people who engage in terrorism. That is my serious judgment, and it is the serious judgment of many people.

Sir Eldon Griffiths: Why does not the hon. Lady make that point if she is fortunate enough to catch Mr. Speaker's eye?

Ms. Clare Short: Because the hon. Gentleman challenged me.

Sir Eldon Griffiths: It is a general point, not an argument with me.

In addition to the deaths that have occurred in Northern Ireland, and they continue, during the past year or so there has been an enormous increase in terrorist actions throughout Europe, and some of them affect us deeply. The attempt to blow up the El Al flight from London to Tel Aviv led to the conviction and imprisonment of Nezar Hindawi. Subsequently, because of the clear involvement of the Syrian embassy, including its ambassador, diplomatic relations between Britain and Syria were severed on 31 October.

Two men arrested under the Act are currently awaiting trial on charges of conspiracy to murder two leading members of the Sikh community in Britain; no one is awaiting trial charged with the attempted murder of a Sikh in Derby. On 18 December,, at Birmingham Crown court, two Sikhs were found guilty of conspiracy to murder Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, the Indian Prime Minister. So it goes on; terrorism remains an appalling threat to this country.

The question with which the House is being asked to deal is simply whether we should provide the powers that the police and the three independent examiners — Sir Cyril Philips, Lord Jellicoe and Lord Colville — have concluded, in the circumstances, to be necessary. I believe that it would be utterly derelict of us to remove from the police and security services the powers that they believe are needed to do the job.

I turn specifically to some of Lord Colville's recommendations. I should like to put two points to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State. He will have noticed that Lord Colville suggests that in the case of the extension of intention orders three new criteria should be adopted. They are the checking of an alibi, the time that is needed for the evaluation of documents which are once translated and the investigations arising from them, and where time is needed for consultation with other security services, sometimes across time zones and requiring translation. I hope that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State or my right hon. and learned Friend the Minister of State, Home Office who is to reply to the debate will be able to say that Lord Colville's recommendations find favour with Ministers because, to my mind, they make good sense.

Lord Colville has discovered—I did not know this—that those of our ports that are not designated act, in effect, as a loophole which the Act does not cover. On page 31 of his report, Lord Colville states that two practical results should be noted from the absence of certain ports from designation. He states at 5.5.2.1:

> "These powers . . . do not appear to have been extended to deal with international terrorism, so long at least as the terrorists choose to come through a non-designated port."

Surely that is absurd. I hope that my right hon. and learned Friend will deal with that point.

Lord Colville further states at 5.5.2.2:

> "Non-commercial shipping and small boats in Great Britain are not covered by the legislation at all."

Mr. Leighton: We all know that the hon. Gentleman has a special relationship with the police. However, is it right that he should monopolise the time for a very short debate when some of us would like to hear the speeches of other hon. Members who have something to say?

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Ernest Armstrong): Order. It is a short debate which will end at 11.45. The Front Bench Members are anxious to speak. However, the hon. Gentleman is not out of order.

Sir Eldon Griffiths: Thank you, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I shall conclude shortly. However, I was unfortunately detained on three occasions, twice by the hon. Member for Ladywood.

I ask my right hon. Friend if he will deal with Lord Colville's recommendations on the ports.

[Sir Eldon Griffiths]

I should like to conclude with the point on which my right hon. Friend ended. The Labour party ought not again to vote against this extension of the legislation. The right hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman) devises a new reason every year, and the one that he devised tonight was surely the weakest yet. He knows that there is a problem and that if he were in office —I do not think that he will be—he would need to deal with it. What he is doing tonight, as he has done before, is to lead the Labour party into a vote that he knows in his heart is wrong. I ask him to change his mind.

11.12 pm

Mr. J. Enoch Powell (South Down): I intervene briefly only to underline one of the points in the Colville report that has already been mentioned. Lord Colville's fortunes have been mixed in the debate. It is remarkable what can happen to a former Under-Secretary of State in his years out of office. He made a fair observation towards the end of his report, which has already been quoted by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman) and which I should like to read again to the House. He stated:

> "It does appear strange that the main measure, which is designed to give powers against international terrorism should be . . . completely entangled with the Northern Irish problem, from which the legislation grew."

Consequently, he believed that Her Majesty's Government might like to start again.

Certain remarks that fell from the Home Secretary suggested that his mind, in looking forward to a possible enactment two years ahead, was malleable on that topic. It is because of the entanglement with the affairs of Northern Ireland and with the particular circumstances of 1974 that we have, in this Act, that most regrettable element described as "internal exile".

The provision for exclusion from Great Britain was always viewed askance by opinion in Northern Ireland, which regarded it as an affront that this artificial boundary should be drawn across the United Kingdom. That was only partially allayed by the introduction into the Act of a virtually meaningless reciprocity which prevented entry into Northern Ireland from Great Britain; but the offence remains.

The inherent objectionableness of a power to exclude from one part of the United Kingdom into another is undiminished, but the evidence for utility continues to diminish. I hope that we shall see the end of it, certainly no later than the new edition of this Act, and preferably when we come to consider renewal in a year's time. An indication of that indeed came from the Home Secretary. There is no reason why we should perpetuate this division of the United Kingdom into mutual exclusion zones. We probably should never have done this in 1974. It was probably based on misconception and the hysterical state of opinion that existed at the time. The power is no longer welcome, certainly not in Northern Ireland.

11.15 pm

Mr. Ivan Lawrence (Burton): I shall not follow the right hon. Member for South Down (Mr. Powell) along the line that he has pursued with conviction and persuasiveness on many occasions.

The disgust of anybody in the House or the country for anything that even smacks of arbitrariness does not need to be stated. It is obvious on first blush that the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1984 does so smack. But in an age where the horror of international terrorism is everywhere so rife and the rule of law in its pure form is not always adequate to protect citizens, it is ridiculous to suppose that no further steps should be taken, beyond the pure form of the rule of law, to provide a defence. Yet Opposition Members do so pretend.

Opposition Members are in danger of being exposed as caring more for the civil liberties of someone who is a known associate of terrorists and most likely to be a foreigner—[HON. MEMBERS: "Disgraceful."]—than for the safety of British people. They are not only soft about terrorism but uncaring about terrorism. That is the impression that Opposition Members make and since that will do the Conservative party no harm at the hustings I do not share the request of my hon. Friend the Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Sir E. Griffiths) that Oppostion Members should change their tack.

It beggars belief that grown hon. Ladies and Gentlemen should come to the House and say, "If it becomes known after someone has gained entry to this country that he is a terrorist associate, if not a known terrorist, and there is some evidence, but not sufficient evidence to arraign him before a court of law, the police should have no power to detain or exclude him until and unless sufficient evidence becomes available." By the time the evidence becomes available it may well be too late.

Ms. Clare Short: That is not conducive to the public good. Has not the hon. and learned Gentleman heard about that?

Mr. Lawrence: The hon. Lady, who has not stopped talking from the start of the debate, would be one of the first to come to the House if ever there were a terrorist act in her city again, such as we experienced in the 1970s, whoever was responsible for it. Terrorists must be laughing their heads off.

The only reasonable objection one can have to the legislation is that it is not sufficiently restrictive. It should apply to anyone who boasts an affiliation with a known terrorist organisation, whether or not they have hitherto been convicted and whether or not there is any evidence against them. It should apply to stop PLO representatives staying in Britain and establishing their offices in Kensington. [HON. MEMBERS: "Ah."] But I suppose we would upset the United Nations if we took such a sensible step.

Mr. Jeremy Corbyn (Islington, North): Will the hon. and learned Gentleman give way?

Mr. Kevin McNamara (Kingston upon Hull, North): Will the hon. and learned Gentleman give way?

Mr. Lawrence: I shall be brief and Opposition Members have asked for an opportunity to speak, so I hope that the hon. Gentlemen will forgive me if I continue.

The right hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman) said, "Every hon. Member loathes terrorism." Yes, of course we do. However, it is easy just to mouth such a phrase. In this case, action is far more convincing than mere weasel words. The right hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton said in a sneering manner that only 5 per cent. of those who have been detained and excluded have been followed up with prosecutions or convictions elsewhere. Would even that 5 per cent. have been caught

if t[illegible]had not first been detained and excluded here and then arrested when they arrived back in Northern Ireland or wherever?

Not only are the Opposition not to be trusted with the nation's defences, not only can they not be trusted with the nation's secrets, but they are not to be trusted to protect this nation against terrorism. Their words are disgraceful.

11.20 pm

Mr. Alex Carlile (Montgomery): On page 36 of his report, Viscount Colville comments that the provision with which we are concerned tonight

"creates martyrs and tends to cause misplaced sympathy for people who on any rational view have committed terrible crimes."

Right though that comment is, I wish that I could regard the issues that we are discusing tonight in terms as black and white and clear as Labour Members purport to see them.

We have a terribly difficult balance to draw here between the civil liberties of people in this country—civil liberties that I noticed practically every Labour Member refused to support last Friday afternoon when we had a vote on whether the European convention on human rights should be incorporated into our domestic law—and, on the other hand, the very important consideration of the protection of the public.

Of course we are all revolted by terrorism and the fact that terrorists still abound. Most of us, at least, abhor too any intrusion on civil liberties which extends as deep as is summarised by Viscount Colville in the small section of his report from which I quoted a few moments ago.

On balance I am persuaded tonight to advise my hon. Friends to support the Government on this occassion. I am persuaded partly by the fact that Viscount Colville's very objective report appears to be based on the most extensive consultations yet in comparison with the other reports which have been considered by the House on this difficult subject. Although in the end this is not a matter for me, but for the Government, I want to dwell a moment on a comment made by the Opposition. They say that Viscount Colville's consultations were inadequate. In response to that, page 2 of the report shows that even though Viscount Colville may not have gone directly to certain interested people, they were given every opportunity through advertisements and other appeals to go to him.

I want to consider three substantive points very briefly. First, I want to look at the detention powers. We must be realistic and share with Viscount Colville the view that it is extremely difficult for the police to provide sustained evidence of conspiracy or attempt. Therefore, at present, the case against the detention powers has not been made.

Secondly, I turn to exclusion orders. We must recall the strong words of Sir Cyril Philips last year against the continuation of exclusion orders. This year Viscount Colville said in relation to the removal of exclusion orders:

"positive steps could perhaps be taken to prepare for this in 1988."

Lord Colville recognised that the tide of protest now outweighs the usefulness of the exclusion orders.

I too hope that by next year or, at the very latest, by 1988, the Home Secretary of the day will come to the House and show that the Government regard the continuation of the exclusion orders as unnecessary.

At the end of his report, Viscount Colville dealt with what he called the broader considerations. Every year, as we approach and then hear this debate, we see that legislation is divisive philosophically, between the Irish and between the Northern Irish and the rest of the British community, creates martyrs, and unnecessarily alienates people. It is not helpful that we have to deal with the Northern Ireland situation and the international terrorist situation as though they were all one, both in quality and quantity. I urge the Home Secretary to take the point urged by Viscount Colville, and start again, soon.

11.25 pm

Mr. Seamus Mallon (Newry and Armagh): Two years ago my party leader, my hon. Friend the Member for Foyle (Mr. Hume), said:

"The man who conducted the review did not consult, nor did he invite consultation, with the responsible organisations which represent the Irish community and which are at the receiving end of this legislation." — [*Official Report*, 21 February 1985; Vol. 73, c. 1316.]

My hon. Friend was referring to Sir Cyril Philips. The same could be said of Viscount Colville this year, and references to consultation should be taken with a pinch of salt.

I am glad that this debate is taking place. One of my quarrels with the order is that it substitutes one year for the six months' debate. If here is a room with an odour, and there is concern about that odour, the proper thing to do is open the window as often as possible; to open it to scrutiny, examination and to whatever fresh thinking can come in.

The previous debates have had one repetitious factor, but that is essential when we are dealing with legislation that derogates so much from high standards of legal practice. The key point is that, somewhere along the line, somebody has to break the vicious circle between terrorism and repressive legislation. Who will break it? We can be sure that, in Irish terms, it will not be the Provisional IRA, the IRA, the UDA or the UDF. The onus rests on the House to ensure that the highest standards are adhered to and the derogations, whatever they be — I accept that they must happen in certain circumstances—are of the very slightest. The onus rests on the House and the Government to make an act of faith by at least trying to temper the provisions of the Act, especially those concerning exclusion orders. I am disappointed that there has been no such attempt.

At the moment there is a small effort — it is not enough, but at least it is a start — to deal with the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act with public order, with the police complaints procedure and with the use of the supergrass system, so why not the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act? I would have thought that if there had been movement on the exclusion orders, on the basis of the suggestion made by Sir Cyril Philips, there would be hope that there was a hint of a rethink and the beginning of an attempt to break out of this vicious circle. Unless that circle is broken by the Government and the House, it will not be broken by those involved in terrorism.

There are those who poured scorn on the view that the aim of the terrorist is not to create repressive legislation, but that is their aim, because that creates the climate which they can recruit people and get active and covert support, and also resentment and alienation, which allows them to continue in their evil ways. I refer especially to the words of Mr. Daniel Morrison, of the Provisional Sinn Fein,

[Mr. Seamus Mallon]

after the atrocious attack in Brighton, when he said that it was the aim of the IRA to create repression. We remember the lengths to which they went after that atrocity to try to ensure that internment was reintroduced, because that is their most potent weapon. We play into the hands of the terrorists, be they of Northern Ireland or international, when we provide them with a means of creating a reaction towards law and the process of justice and towards those who are charged with enforcing the law.

Finally, I refer to exclusion orders and detention. The Secretary of State said that nine people had been excluded during the past year. How many of those nine people were questioned by the police in Northern Ireland before they came to England, Scotland or Wales? That question is crucial. Subsequently, after their exclusion, how many of them were questioned and charged? The Secretary of State said specifically that they were excluded because of their involvement in terrorism in relation to Northern Ireland. If there was sufficient proof of their involvement before they came here and after they were returned to Northern Ireland, surely there must be some record of charges having been brought.

I regard certain sections of the Act as an anachronism that is adding to the problems that have been created in the wake of terrorism. It could well follow the example shown with, and be a very small step in relation to, the Emergency Provisions Act and the other factors in relation to Northern Ireland. It would at least be a signpost of hope. Unfortunately, we have received a very defensive reply from the Government. We have to live with this for another year, during which we may be sure that the people who wish to promote terrorism and violence will use that defensiveness for their own purposes.

11.33 pm

Mr. Martin Flannery (Sheffield, Hillsborough): I was alarmed by one sentence that the Home Secretary used, among many, in which he implied that the situation was of such a nature that the Act was possibly with us for ever more. I think that is what he said really. It is often said by those who defend the Prevention of Terrorism Act—and I am one of those who have been against it from its inception—that those who oppose the Act are giving support to the terrorists. I was sad to hear the implication in the speech of the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Sir E. Griffiths), which was delivered in rather more immoderate language than he normally uses. Usually people who use such language are typical of those who prevented the operation of democracy in Ireland for hundreds of years, and especially during the last 50 years in Northern Ireland. Many of them wish to return to the old Stormont. They are acting as though nothing has changed, but things have changed and we can never go back.

Opposition to the emergency legislation is now massive and is growing. No matter what happens on the Conservative Benches, that is the reality. The British people are wishing more and more, and in bigger numbers, to be rid of the whole mess of Northern Ireland. —[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] The *Daily Express* poll underlined that, because 61 per cent. were for immediate withdrawal. Many of us would never agree with that, but it is a guide and a backcloth to what is happening.

Some of us have opposed this legislation from the beginning because it was born of a desperation—which is alway a bad adviser—which swept the country after the Birmingham pub bombings. The last word has not been said about those bombings and who did them. The legislation demanded victims and the nearest were seized. It has corrupted our justice and our courts. It has curtailed civil liberties throughout the country and continues to do so. It has solved nothing. It has widened and deepened the problem. We should not once again be renewing this emergency legislation; we should be getting rid of it for good. It is not the right legislation to deal with the problems with which it fails to grapple, no matter what the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds, who speaks for the police, constantly says.

Experience over the last decade has shown that the Prevention of Terrorism Act is not a necessary and acceptable response to political violence, but one of the chief causes of continued violence. Denial of civil liberties and rights and the implementation of emergency powers feed the conflict from which the terrorism emerges. The Acts of 1974 and 1976 brought to Great Britain the emergency legislation under which Northern Ireland has had to be governed for the last 50 years, when the real answer is democracy in Northern Ireland, which the Conservative party was never willing to give. That spawned the terrorism, and while Northern Ireland is in the grip of those people, terrorism will continue. The border has to go and the people of Ireland have to be united. As long as the border is there, so long will the struggle go on.

11.36 pm

Mr. Clive Soley (Hammersmith): The opening speech of my right hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman) should have convinced the Government that they should think again about this legislation. Even if they do not, I hope that the Home Secretary will note that, after I have been saying for some years that exclusion orders were a form of internal exile, Viscount Colville has confirmed that view. To some extent, the Home Secretary was right; the argument is beginning to shift. But where he is wrong is that it is shifting in our direction.

Lord Colville makes the other important point that there is a need to start again. We need to understand the force of that argument. In paragraph 2.25 on page 6 he says that

"only about 3 per cent. detained are subsequently charged".

The argument is then used to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the legislation. I have not argued that the Act is ineffective in that respect. What I have argued is the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Ladywood (Ms. Short), that it is counter-productive.

One of the things that makes the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Sir E. Griffiths) so obnoxious in his interventions is that at best one can say that he does not understand the argument or, if he does understand it he is trying to take unto himself the ability to represent the brave people who stand out against terror. It is not like that. The argument is clearly whether the Act is not just offensive to civil liberties—nearly everybody agrees with that, although one or two Government Back Benchers were heckling on that a few moments ago, so perhaps they do not—but also counter-productive.

Hurd: It saves lives.

Mr. Soley: The Home Secretary keeps saying that it saves lives, but let me put this back to him. I accept that one cannot prove such a negative, but I ask him to accept the other side of the argument, that if many people related to and friends of the 95 per cent. who are wrongly detained feel so alienated from the system that they no longer co-operate by giving evidence to the security forces, we are undermining the work of the security forces. If a small percentage of them are even more alienated to the point that they give support to the paramilitary organisations, we are responsible for helping the recruitment of those organisations. That applies as much to the Unionists as to the Republicans, although the Prevention of Terrorism Act affects Republicans more.

What Conservative Members have to understand is that increasingly and for many years the recruitment ability of the paramilitaries in Northern Ireland has been very high. Things like the Prevention of Terrorism Act are part of the propaganda that is used in recruitment. I ask them at least to understand that argument even if they do not agree with it. Lord Colville does not address that part of the argument.

The other difficult part of the argument is that the Government and Lord Colville concede that this is not properly called a Prevention of Terrorism Act. It should be called a Collection of Information Act, because that is what it is. Indeed Lord Colville says in paragraph 7.3:

"There is no denying that a police officer who stops someone for examination has often little but instinct to prompt him. One senior officer told me that his force stops people to see if they are terrorists; if this is not clear and there is no direct evidence, they are content to collect information. To detain a person under section 12 merely in order to collect information would clearly be an abuse of the section, which requires reasonable grounds for suspicion of terrorist involvement."

He concludes that paragraph by saying:

"Parliament may well wish to consider that line"—

the line between collecting intelligence and identifying terrorism—

"and ensure that powers are carefully phrased."

If we are to have a measure of this nature, let us be clear about it and call it a Collection of Information Act. Let us be clear about the use of that power because at least we shall then recognise, as Lord Colville has recognised, that the other part of the Act is a form of internal exile. Then we can debate the facts and not the fantasies.

11.42 pm

The Minister of State, Home Office (Mr. David Waddington): It is a great pity that Labour Members intend to vote against the order. We should all be standing together against the threat of terrorism, and I begin my remarks by reminding the House that it was only in 1983 that Labour Members for the first time voted against the prevention of terrorism legislation. There was no sense at that time in their change of front, because the terrorist threat had in no way abated. Nothing had changed at that time except the Labour party. It was one of the first retreats by Labour Members into irresponsibility, the beginning of a decline that has taken them to one-sided disarmament and a completely frivolous approach to national security.

I shall deal first with the question of detention. Opposition Members usually argue that the detention powers are unnecessary because the vast majority of detainees are not charged with any offence, and the right hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman) was up to that tonight. Last year he said—and he said much the same tonight — that 95 per cent. of those detained under this legislation had been completely innocent of anything. My noble Friend Lord Colville was over-generous when he described that as a simplistic approach. I would describe it as sheer and utter nonsense.

The purpose of the powers is to prevent the commission of offences and to deprive people of the chance of letting off bombs. Information is sometimes obtained showing the commission of offences and in quite a high proportion of cases charges follow. But in other cases the information obtained may be too sensitive to be revealed in court or no evidence is obtained which would be admissible in court, but there is clear information to the effect that the person is bent on terrorist activities.

My right hon. Friend said he had taken careful note of Lord Colville's argument that it would be better to have more vigorous scrutiny at the ports than retain the power to exclude. But is vigorous scrutiny at the ports a substitute? It is a question not just of identifying known terrorists but of what to do with a known terrorist when he has been identified. Exclusion, again, is a preventive measure. It is a power used with great discretion, but it has still been found necessary to use it on seven occasions in 1985 and on nine occasions in 1986, and my right hon. Friend is not as yet convinced that it is a power which can be abandoned without subjecting the public to increased risk.

When dealing with the issue of international terrorists the right hon. Member for Gorton was completely up the pole, not for the first time, especially when dealing with the question of the Abu Nidal group. He did not seem to grasp the fact that they were admitted and information was then received which led to their detention. They could certainly not have been detained under Immigration Act powers except for the purpose of removing them from the country. They could not have been detained under Immigration Act powers in order to be questioned about the possibility of the commission of criminal offences.

Regarding the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Sir E. Griffiths), there is an overlap between Immigration Act powers to designate ports and the powers under this Act, and we are not sure that there is an operational need for——

It being one and a half hours after the commencement of proceedings on the motion, MR. DEPUTY SPEAKER *put the Question, pursuant to Standing Order No. 14 (Exempted business).*

The House divided: Ayes 184, Noes 91.

Division No. 88] **[11.45 pm**

AYES

Aitken, Jonathan
Alexander, Richard
Alison, Rt Hon Michael
Ancram, Michael
Atkins, Robert *(South Ribble)*
Baldry, Tony
Batiste, Spencer
Beith, A. J.
Benyon, William
Bruce, Malcolm
Budgen, Nick
Burt, Alistair
Butcher, John
Carlile, Alexander *(Montg'y)*
Carlisle, Kenneth *(Lincoln)*
Cartwright, John
Colvin, Michael
Cope, John
Corrie, John
Couchman, James
Currie, Mrs Edwina
Douglas-Hamilton, Lord J.
Dover, Den
Durant, Tony
Fenner, Dame Peggy
Forsyth, Michael *(Stirling)*
Forth, Eric
Fowler, Rt Hon Norman

New Zealand High Commission

New Zealand House
Haymarket
London SW1Y 4TQ
Telephone: 01-930 8422 Ext:
Telex 24368

"YELLOW"

Reference B66/5/1A

16 March 1987

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA DLO)

c.c. PMD
NZSIS (TIC)
Police (PTIU)
Defence (DDOP)

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Date	Nature of Material	Remarks
	Terrorism	
	press reporting	
15 March 1987	Sunday Times report of operation of Abu Nidhal Group	

S.W. Prior
for High Commissioner

THE SUNDAY TIMES 15 MARCH 1987

Killer tells how Abu Nidal plotted massacres

Rome hitman gives secrets of terror network run from Syria

by Tana de Zulueta
Rome

ITALIAN investigators have pieced together the mysterious workings of the international terrorist organisation headed by Abu Nidal, thanks to the confessions of one of its members.

A magistrate ruled in Rome last week that Abu Nidal, whose real name is Sabri Al Banna, must stand trial this year charged with ordering the attack on Rome's Fiumicino airport in which 16 people died in December 1985.

Abu Nidal, who has his headquarters in Syria, will be tried in his absence – assuming he is not arrested before the trial begins – with one of his lieutenants, Rashid al Hamieda.

Abu Nidal has been identified as the mastermind who ordered the Rome attack and a simultaneous outrage at Vienna airport, and Hamieda has been named as the man who organised both operations.

The only man in the dock will be 20-year-old Ibrahim Khaled, the one terrorist of the four involved who survived the Fiumicino airport battle. His survival has proved a bonus for Western intelligence and his confessions have already made him a target for the ruthless gunmen of his own terror network.

Until Khaled began to talk, so little was known about Abu Nidal that some Western terrorism experts thought he was dead. Khaled set them right. "If you want to talk to Abu Nidal," he said, "call Damascus 774236." (When The Sunday Times rang the number an international operator said it appeared to have been disconnected.)

Italian police have checked Khaled's statements where possible, and they say that his revelations have invariably proved correct.

Though very young, Khaled was a senior member of his organisation. It was he who led the killer squad into action in Rome. It was not his first international mission. In December 1984, he was sent to Cyprus to assassinate the British ambassador there. The mission was called off at the last moment, said Khaled, for "technical motives".

In July 1985 Khaled spent 20 days in Paris preparing the ground for bomb attacks against the American, British, and Israeli embassies. The attacks were called off after French police intercepted two terrorists.


Abu Nidal's organisation maintains secret arms depots around the world. In August 1985, Khaled spent several days checking buried arms caches in four cities in Pakistan.

In Rome, Khaled led investigators unerringly to a hollow tree in a public park which still contained the oiled wrappers in which four Russian-made Kalashnikov machine guns used at Fiumicino had been stored.

The location of arms caches, Khaled explained, is known only to senior members of the Abu Nidal organisation, who trace them with the help of special maps. The caches are not known to local agents.

Abu Nidal is said to have one agent, known as a "resident" in each European country. These "residents" do not meet commando members. It is this strictly compartmentalised structure which has enabled Abu Nidal's organisation to survive the arrests of several of its members.

On Khaled's Rome mission he and three other terrorists were to attack the El-Al and TWA check-in counters at Fiumicino airport. None of the commando members expected to come out of the attack alive. Their aim was to storm aboard an



Face of terror: said to be Nidal

El-Al plane then blow it up over Tel Aviv.

Abu Nidal has made a policy of recruiting young and desperate survivors from the battered Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Chatilla, in Lebanon. Khaled fled from Chatilla to Syria after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. His childhood companion, Hassan Itaab, another Chatila survivor, was 17 when he threw a bomb into the British Airways office in Rome in September 1985, killing a woman and wounding several passers-by.

Abu Nidal's hitmen are trained assassins, practised at planting bombs or shooting a victim in a moving car. "I am a soldier, I execute orders," answered Khaled, when asked why he had fired at a crowd of innocent bystanders at the Fiumicino refreshments counter. But Khaled had believed that he was fighting Israel, and when it was pointed out to him that his victims had been mainly Greeks and Italians, he broke down.

With Khaled's help, Italian investigators have attributed six terrorist attacks in Italy to the Abu Nidal organisation. They have also identified 12 members of the network, some of them currently detained in Italy, Greece, West Germany and Austria. The group uses a variety of names, including Black September and Arab Revolutionary Brigades, to claim responsibility for attacks.

The aim of the names, says Khaled, is to confuse. Recently Abu Nidal has borrowed the names of Lebanese extremist groups such as the Hezbollah or Islamic Jihad. He has also promised to give these groups help and support in their activities in Europe. It is the prospect of collaboration between old and new groups which most alarms anti-terrorism officers.

In January this year a student travelling to Italy from Lebanon was arrested at Milan airport with several kilos of explosives and a list of potential targets, including Jewish schools in Rome.

Because Abu Nidal's network of agents and his daunting arsenal are still intact, according to Rome's anti-terrorism officers, it could be activated again at any time for terrorist attacks against civilian targets anywhere in Europe.

(1) MF Good to see — as discussed 19/3 SRC

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(2) B66/5/1/A

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clips

PP WELLINGTON -TT- BHH

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CONFIDENTIAL

CLAS: CONFIDENTIAL 18 MAR 87
FROM: LONDON
TO : WELLINGTON 2609 PRIORITY
LD : PMD (HENSLEY)
: SFA (NORRISH)
: DEFENCE (SEC DEF CDS)
: SIS (DIRECTOR)
: POLICE (COMMISSIONER)
SUBJ: ANTI-TERRORISM

YOUR 857.

2. WE HAVE TALKED TO HOME OFFICE OFFICIALS IN VARIOUS DEPARTMENTS INVOLVED IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF ANTI-TERRORIST POLICY. WE HAVE ALSO PASSED ACROSS A COPY OF THE DRAFT BILL TO THE (POLICE LIAISON) SECTION WITH OVERSIGHT FOR THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM ACT (PTA) FOR STUDY AND COMMENT.

3. WE ARE ADVISED THAT THERE ARE TWO RELEVANT ACTS OF PARLIAMENT THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM ACT (1984) AND THE INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS ACT (1985). LEGAL DIVISION SHOULD HOLD COPIES OF THESE, BUT, IF NOT, WE CAN OBTAIN THEM FOR YOU.

4. THE PTA GREW OUT OF LEGISLATION TO DEAL WITH INTERNAL TERRORISM IN NORTHERN IRELAND. PASSED IN 1984 IT HAS A FIVE-YEAR LIFE, AND HAS TO BE RENEWED ANNUALLY BY PARLIAMENTARY CONSENT UNTIL 1989 WHEN IT EXPIRES. ITS MEASURES ARE DESIGNED TO COPE WITH BOTH THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL TERRORIST THREATS.

5. THE EXTENSION OF THE PTA FOR A FURTHER YEAR WAS AGREED BY PARLIAMENT ON 10 FEBRUARY. WE ARE FAXING SEPARATELY THE HANSARD RECORD OF THE MOTION FOR ITS RENEWAL PUT FORWARD BY THE HOME SECRETARY, DOUGLAS HURD, AND OF THE SUBSEQUENT DEBATE. THIS, OUR CONTACTS TOLD US, IS INSTRUCTIVE AS TO THE WAY IN WHICH THE PTA OPERATES IN PRACTICE.

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CONFIDENTIAL

6. IT WAS STRESSED TO US BY THE HOME OFFICE (MRS CLARKSON, PRINCIPAL, F4 DIVISION (POLICE), RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PTA), THAT THE KEY ELEMENT OF THE PTA FROM THEIR POINT OF VIEW WAS THE POWER IT GAVE THE POLICE TO DETAIN PEOPLE FOR QUESTIONING ON SUSPICION OF TERRORISM WITHOUT REQUIRING THE STANDARD OF PROOF REQUIRED UNDER GENERAL ARREST POWERS. IN OTHER WORDS, REASON TO SUSPECT SOMEBODY OF COMPLICITY IN OR ASSOCIATION WITH TERRORISM IS SUFFICIENT UNDER THE PTA FOR A DETENTION. HOW THESE DETENTION POWERS ARE USED IN PRACTICE IS REVIEWED IN THE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE REFERRED TO ABOVE.

7. AS FAR AS THE CENSORSHIP OF THE MEDIA WAS CONCERNED, CLARKSON NOTED THAT THE HOME OFFICE DOES NOT HAVE ANY CENSORSHIP POWERS. THESE, SHE EXPLAINED, ARE RESERVED FOR TIME OF WAR.

8. FOLLOWING THIS ASPECT UP WITH THE HOME OFFICE'S BROADCASTING SECTION (SANDERSON, PRINCIPAL), WE WERE TOLD THAT THERE EXIST ''INFORMAL AND VOLUNTARY LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS'' BETWEEN THE POLICE AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MEDIA - PUBLISHING AND BROADCASTING. UNDER THESE ARRANGEMENTS THE MEDIA CAN BE PREVAILED UPON TO HOLD BACK ON PUBLISHING/BROADCASTING INFORMATION ABOUT TERRORIST INCIDENTS OR OTHER EVENTS, SUCH AS DOMESTIC KIDNAPPINGS, WHERE THE POLICE JUDGE THAT SILENCE WOULD BE NECESSARY.

9. THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF SUCH OCCASIONS, SANDERSON EXPLAINED, OF SELF-IMPOSED MEDIA RESTRAINT IN RECENT YEARS. BUT, HE WENT ON, THIS RESTRAINT HAS BEEN MATCHED BY A QUID PRO QUO - USUALLY IN THE FORM OF DAILY CONFIDENTIAL BRIEFINGS OF THE MEDIA ON THE INCIDENT IN QUESTION BY THE POLICE WHO HAVE PROVIDED THEM WITH INSIDE INFORMATION IN RETURN FOR PUBLISHING RESTRAINT WHILE THE EMERGENCY HAS LASTED.

10. SANDERSON WENT ON TO ADD THAT THIS INFORMAL SYSTEM HAD PROVED A ''SENSIBLE WAY TO OPERATE'' THUS FAR, AND THEY HAD NO THOUGHTS OF CHANGING IT UNTIL AND UNLESS IT WAS PROVED OTHERWISE.

11. IN OTHER WORDS, THERE IS NO LEGISLATIVE PROVISION HERE FOR THE PEACETIME CENSORSHIP AND CONTROL OF THE FLOW OF NEWS AND PICT-

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

URES IN TERRORIST EMERGENCIES. THE SYSTEM AS IT OPERATES IS AN INFORMAL ONE, MANAGED BY THE POLICE, ON THEIR JUDGEMENT, AND THROUGH THEIR MEDIA CONTACTS.

12. SIMILARLY, THE HOME OFFICE HAS NO LEGISLATIVE BACKING FOR CONTROL OF TELEPHONE OR OTHER COMMUNICATIONS RELATING TO AN EMERGENCY. INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS WILL BE THE DOMAIN OF THE SECURITY SERVICES, GCHQ AND THE POLICE WITHIN THE GUIDELINES OF THE INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATION ACT. WE HAVE NOT PURSUED THIS LINE OF ENQUIRY FURTHER, BUT COULD DISCUSS WITH SCOTLAND YARD'S SPECIAL BRANCH THEIR OPERATIONAL PRACTICE IN THIS RESPECT IF YOU FELT IT NECESSARY.

=

CONFIDENTIAL

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B66/5/1A

17 March 1987

by hand
18/3/87

Mrs Clarkson
Principal, F4 Division
Home Office
50 Queen Anne's Gate
LONDON

Dear Mrs Clarkson

... Further to our telephone conversation this afternoon, I have pleasure in enclosing a copy of the draft of New Zealand's "International Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Bill" to which I referred.

Any comments that you, Mr Chisholm, or indeed any other of your colleagues, might wish to make on the Bill would, I am sure, be appreciated by Wellington.

My contact number at the High Commission is extension 335.

Thank you for your assistance.

Yours sincerely

(Stuart Prior)
First Secretary

Enc

B66/5/1A

SWP

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PP LONDON
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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL 13 MARCH 86
FROM WELLINGTON
TO LONDON 857 PRIORITY

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FAP
C

PMD (HENSLEY)
SFA (NORRISH)
DEFENCE (SEC DEF CDS)
SIS (DIRECTOR)
POLICE (COMMISSIONER)

FROM HENSLEY
ANTI-TERRORISM
1. THE INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM (EMERGENCY POWERS) BILL WILL IN A WEEK OR TWO BE THE SUBJECT OF PUBLIC HEARINGS BY THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE AND LAW REFORM. PUBLIC COMMENT AND SUBMISSIONS FROM THE MEDIA AND THE CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION HAVE FOCUSSED PARTICULARLY ON THE BILL'S POWERS
- TO CENSOR AND CONTROL THE FLOW OF NEWS AND PICTURES
- TO INTERCEPT AND CONTROL TELEPHONE AND OTHER COMMUNICATIONS RELATING TO THE EMERGENCY.
2. IT HAS BEEN ASSERTED THAT THESE POWERS ARE MUCH GREATER THAN THOSE IN ANY COMPARABLE WESTMINSTER SYSTEM AND MORE EXTENSIVE THAN EVEN BRITAIN FINDS NECESSARY.
3. THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF AND I PLAN TO APPEAR BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE TO ANSWER QUESTIONS AND SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT ON QUESTIONS OF FACT. I WOULD THEREFORE BE GRATEFUL TO HAVE BY THE END OF NEXT WEEK A CABLED RUN-DOWN ON BRITISH POWERS AND PRACTICE IN THESE AREAS TOGETHER WITH SOME ACTUAL EXAMPLES WHERE THEY HAVE OR SHOULD HAVE BEEN USED.
=

Q
13/0115Z WLN JS
COL CKD
++

CONFIDENTIAL

John Ashton.
270-0316

Mrs Goode
213-4346

Home Office
Jeff Dilling
213-4249.
not back until 19/3

C.C 86615/11A

WLN824
OTT 4Q
WSH 6Q6
RR OTTAWA
RR WELLINGTON -T- CANBERRA LONDON ROME
ZCZC
WSH 6Q6
UUU

6565

FAP

CLAS: UNCLASS 12 MAR 87
FROM: WASHINGTON
TO : WELLINGTON 1QQ7 - ROUTINE
RPTD: CANBERRA 62 - ROUTINE : LONDON 4Q - ROUTINE
    : OTTAWA 26 - ROUTINE : ROME 8 - ROUTINE

LD : SFA (SEC, ADM, LGL, CCO, CON, EUR, AMER)
SUBJ: ITALY, NEW DIPLOMATIC BAG AND BAGGAGE PROCEDURES

YOUR 353.
THE LATEST ADVISE FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT IS THAT THEY HAVE STILL NOT DECIDED WHETHER TO TAKE ANY ACTION IN RESPONSE TO THE NEW PROCEDURES BEING IMPLEMENTED BY THE ITALIANS.
2. STATE HAVE GIVEN SOME CONSIDERATION TO THE POSITION THAT THEY SHOULD TAKE AND WILL ADVISE US WHEN A DECISION IS REACHED.
3. WE WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED OF ANY DEVELOPMENTS.

TOD 12/144QZ WSH
WSH 6Q6
NNNN

O

New Zealand High Commission

New Zealand House
Haymarket
London SW1Y 4TQ
Telephone: 01-930 8422 Ext:
Telex 24368

"YELLOW"

Reference B66/5/1A

12 March 1987

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA DLO)

c.c. PMD
NZSIS (TIC)
Police (PTIU)
Defence (DDOP)

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Date	Nature of Material	Remarks
	Terrorism/Drugs	
	press reporting	
12 March 1987	Mafia drugs case - press	reporting of findings of trial

"S.W. Prior"
for High Commissioner

THE INDEPENDENT Thursday 12 March 1987

Mafia drug smuggling case

British connection that beat a worldwide racket

Reports by Heather Mills
Courts Correspondent

WHEN a consignment of cannabis was discovered in a routine search of containers in Felixstowe, Customs and Excise officers had no idea it was the start of the biggest drugs operation yet seen in Britain.

In its size, its multi-million pound turnover and the importance of who was behind the trafficking, it was the most successful drugs bust in Customs history.

It involved working with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and with the law enforcement agencies in Italy, Sicily, India, Thailand, Kenya, and Belgium.

It led to Dr Giovanni Falcone, the most protected policeman in the world because of his investigation into the Mafia, and Signor Da Pizza, the Director of Public Prosecutions in Sicily, coming to Britain.

Three Sicilians arrested and brought to trial in Canada as part of the British "Operation Devotion" are already serving 20-year sentences.


But Customs officers from the drugs investigation branch have no illusions that the smashing of this operation, with the arrest of Di Carlo, the British Mafia boss, will have put paid to Mafia activities in Britain.

"Without doubt, someone has already taken Di Carlo's place in the British network," one said. "The Mafia have some two-thirds of the world drugs black market. They aren't likely to leave a gap for some other racketeer to fill".

The Customs story begins at Felixstowe container port, when officers found cannabis with a street value of £750,000 in a consignment of desks from Kashmir in northern India.

Officers replaced the drug with a substitute, re-packed the crates and followed them to a firm called Elongate Ltd., in Mitcham, Surrey.

Two men who took delivery were later seen painting out the Indian markings and re-marking the crates for Montreal.



When they left the warehouse they were both arrested. They were Francesco Siracusa and an employee, Alberto Gualtieri. Gualtieri has already been sentenced to two-and-a-half years for importing cannabis.

It was when officers contacted the Canadians telling them that the furniture had been destined for Montreal that they first learnt there may be a Mafia connection. The receiving company Santa Rita was believed to be run by people with Mafia associations.

Further checks in Britain disclosed that the company in Kashmir responsible for shipping the furniture to Elongate had also supplied another British-based company, Ital Provisions Ltd, based in Ellerslie Square, Clapham. All ports and airports were alerted to watch for imports to this company.

The consignment came in May 1985. Furniture made in Chiang Mai in Thailand was to arrive from Bangkok.

When the cargo arrived in Britain — again en route to Canada — it was examined by Customs officers in Southampton. Sixty kilograms of 95 per cent pure heroin were cleverly concealed, built into the furniture. In England its street value would have been £15m. In the Canadian and American black market, it was worth five times that.

Part of the consignment was re-packed and sent on to Canada where police were watching and waiting. They arrested the three Sicilians who took delivery of the drugs in Montreal.

In Britain the two directors of Ital Provisions, Fillipo Monteleone and Antonio Luciani, were arrested. Documents found in the Ital storeroom led investigators to Di Carlo.

Meanwhile, the investigation took Customs investigators to India, where the man responsible for exporting the cannabis was traced. He was Idris Gami, who has not been brought to trial.

The men behind the Thailand end of the operation have been arrested.

THE INDEPENDENT Thursday 12 March 1987

Mafia gang is jailed for £75m heroin smuggling

By Heather Mills
Courts Correspondent

THE SICILIAN head of the Mafia's operations in London was jailed for a total of 25 years at the Old Bailey yesterday for masterminding the biggest heroin smuggling operation in British history. The 60 kilograms of high grade drug involved was worth £75m.

As he sentenced Francesco Di Carlo, 43, and three of his "wicked and evil" henchmen, the judge said the haul was enough to make 125 million "fixes". "Those who peddle death and degradation on this mammoth scale can expect no mercy from the courts," Judge John Hazan, QC, said. "It is not difficult to understand why in some parts of the world traffickers in heroin are sentenced to death and executed."

The heroin was discovered hidden in oriental tables shipped into Southampton from Thailand after a worldwide Customs and Excise operation codenamed "Devotion". It was destined for Montreal and the lucrative American market, using Britain only as a staging post.

Di Carlo, known in his native Sicily as "the Butcher of Altofonte", of Brackendene, Horsell Rise, Woking, Surrey, was also fined £250,000 and ordered to pay £50,000 towards the prosecution costs.

Francesco Siracusa, 33, of Westfield Road, Woking, and Filippo Monteleone, 41, of Thaxted Court, Abbeyfield Road, Rotherhithe, south London, were each jailed for a total of 25 years. Antonio Luciani, 40, of Lincoln Road, Enfield, north London, was given 22 years.

At the end of one of England's most expensive trials, estimated to have cost about £6m, all four were found guilty of conspiring to smuggle the heroin in 1985, and of plotting to bring in £750,000 of cannabis a year earlier.

The jury of eight men and four women, who all received round-the-clock police protection throughout the 83-day trial, returned their verdicts after 14 hours and 57 minutes of deliberation, broken by two nights at a secret London hotel.

Because of fears of a Mafia reprisal, Judge Hazan, too, has armed police bodyguards and is expected to receive protection for the forseeable future.


He told the gang he regretted he could not give life sentences because the new Drug Trafficking Offences Act, empowering him to do so, had not been passed when they were arrested. Instead, he was bound by a maximum of 14 years for heroin smuggling plus 11 for cannabis — a sentence he described as "wholly inadequate".

The customs said this case was its most important drug success yet, but it believes another Mafia boss is already in Britain running a continuing multi-million pound racket.

■ At Isleworth Crown Court, another gang of heroin smugglers, trapped by customs officers, were sentenced to terms ranging from 16 to five years. The nine Pakistani couriers brought the drug into Britain concealed in condoms which they swallowed. They took muscle relaxants to delay the effects of nature, the court heard. One courier swallowed 75 packages, dipped in honey.

Background reports, page 3

THE INDEPENDENT Thursday 12 March 1987



Jailed: (From left) Francesco Di Carlo, Fillipo Monteleone, Antonio Luciano and Francesco Siracusa, who were sentenced yesterday.

'Butcher's' rise through the ranks

IN HIS native Sicily, Francesco Di Carlo is known as "the butcher of Altofonte".

In the notorious cage trial in Palermo, he faces, in his absence, charges of conspiracy to murder. His alleged victims include a magistrate and a chief of police. He is wanted in Italy for murder and drug trafficking.

Sicilian police believe it was no coincidence that Dr Nini Cassara, head of the Palermo flying squad, was shot dead days after his failed attempt to talk to Di Carlo in London.

For Di Carlo, until he was jailed for 25 years at the Old Bailey yesterday, enjoyed a privileged position among one of the five main Sicilian Mafia families.

Italian police estimate that the Altofonte "mob" to which Di Carlo belongs and named after the suburb of Palermo from which they operate, has been responsible for 500 murders since 1980. Victims include policemen, judges, magistrates, and investigative journalists.

Di Carlo was not a hereditary family member. He made his way through the ranks, establishing a reputation as a trusted, if ruthless, member. So highly thought of was he among the higher echelons of the Sicilian Mafia that when lower ranking members put out a contract on his life — believing he had cheated them of their share of drugs profits — he escaped after unprecedented orders from the hierarchy.

They lifted the contract and in 1976 sent Di Carlo to England to head the British side of the Mafia international operation. He initially set himself up in London, buying legitimate businesses like the Hotel Parco, near King's Cross, a travel agents called Aviaggi Travel, near Victoria, and a bureau de change. He bought a wine bar and an antiques business. He paid cash for them all.

But for the companies through which he was to mastermind the multi-million pound drug smuggling rackets, he put up dispensable front men, like Siracusa, Monteleone and Luciani, all jailed yesterday.

Although he has lived in Britain for 11 years, he does not speak any English. In 1983, he bought his £200,000 house in Woking where he was surrounded with large blown-up photographs of himself, and which he occasionally shared with his wife and two children — his family live most of the time in Sicily.

While in Brixton jail on remand, Di Carlo is said to have enjoyed "prison baron" status among other inmates. In fact, so taken with the idea of being a baron was Di Carlo that he has arranged to buy a baronetcy in Valetta, Malta.

Lawyers' strike hits trial

THE TRIAL in Palermo, Sicily, of 400 alleged Mafiosa — including in his absence, Di Carlo — has been further delayed this week because dèfence lawyers are on strike in protest at the way the judge is conducting the case, Michael Sheridan writes.

The trial, which could last for years, is the biggest challenge to the Sicilian organised crime families mounted by the Italian state since the days of Mussolini. The alleged offences range from control of the multi-million pound heroin trade to protection, kidnappings and a list of murders.

The judge and jury have to weigh up unique testimony by the first major informers to emerge from the Mafia's ranks in a generation. Their evidence may prove to be the crux of the case.

"YELLOW"

New Zealand High Commission

New Zealand House
Haymarket
London SW1Y 4TQ
Telephone: 01-930 8422 Ext:
Telex 24368

Reference B66/5/1A

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

11 MAR 1987

c.c. PMD
NZSIS (TIC)
Police (PTIU)
Defence (DDOP)

(EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA DLO)

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Date	Nature of Material	Remarks
	<u>Terrorism</u> press reporting	

"S.W. Prior"
for High Commissioner

Italians accuse Abu Nidal of airport massacre

From Michael Sheridan
in Rome

THE SHADOWY Palestinian guerrilla leader Abu Nidal is to be tried in his absence by an Italian court for the massacre at Rome's Fiumicino airport in December, 1985.

He is charged with masterminding the attack. One of his lieutenants, who allegedly directed the actual assault, will also be tried in his absence. The group has made repeated violent threats against Italy in recent months.

Investigators have also been told by the sole gunman who survived the shootout that the Abu Nidal group intended to attack British Airways and other British targets in Italy.

Investigating magistrate Rosario Priore named Nidal on the indictment as the instigator of the 1985 bloodshed. Twenty people died in simultaneous assaults on the Rome and Vienna airports.

At Fiumicino, gunmen burst into the terminal and opened fire on passengers grouped around the El Al and TWA check-in counters. All but one of the attackers were shot dead by Italian and Israeli security guards.

Nonetheless, painstaking inquiries by Mr Priore and his colleague, Domenico Sica, have led to the indictment of three men. They are the surviving gunman, Ibrahim Khaled, a man named as Ali Hameida Rashid, who is supposed to have co-ordinated the airport attack but fled while it was in progress, and Abu Nidal himself.

Nidal, whose real name is Sabri al-Banna, has worked under the auspices of Syria and Iraq. He is under sentence of death from Yasser Arafat's PLO and favours guerrilla violence as the only method to liberate Palestine.

Khaled, the survivor, has reportedly told the magistrates that Britain was targeted by Abu Nidal because it bore historic responsibility for the loss of Palestine.

The British Airways office in Rome was bombed in 1985. A young Arab man was arrested for the crime. He is said to have trained at the same camp as Khaled in Lebanon.

Tour groups, American-owned restaurants and all Jewish institutions were also singled out for attention, Khaled reportedly said.

Khaled, who is still in his teens, is described by Mr Sica as "a principal figure in his group who has carried out missions in Cyprus, Yugoslavia and France and who has admitted being the head of the Fiumicino commando squad". Mr Sica does not believe Khaled repents of his actions although he has co-operated with the inquiry.

He has said that Abu Nidal, when it suits him, uses names such as Black September, The Organisation of Revolutionary and Socialist Muslims (which said it killed the British hostage in Lebanon Alec Collett), Arab Revolutionary Brigades, Arab Guerrilla Cells, Fatah — the Revolutionary Council, Black June, Islamic Jihad and Hizbollah.

Some of these are evidently flags of convenience for the group. Most of them have surfaced only in claims of attacks and kidnappings made to Beirut news organisations.

In another inquiry, magistrates in the port of Genoa have ordered that the cousin of Nezar Hindawi should be re-arrested and put back in jail.

Awni Hindawi, a student, travelled to Syria and Libya with his cousin in the months before Nezar attempted to blow up an El Al jumbo jet using his pregnant fiancée to smuggle a bomb on board.

A resident of Genoa since 1980, he was charged with belonging to an armed gang but released on31 January because there was no evidence to support the charge.

At the request of Genoese prosecutors, he has now been imprisoned once more on a fresh charge of political conspiracy.

Awni Hindawi admitted membership of the self-styled "Jordanian Revolutionary Movement" but insisted its aims were purely political and it was not involved in violence.

THE INDEPENDENT Wednesday 11 March 1987

The Evening Post Tuesday March 10 1987

SCOP
B66/15/1A

Editors opposed to Terrorism Bill

All branches of the news industry felt so strongly about the International Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Bill that they had taken the unprecedented step of uniting to oppose it, a leading press figure said yesterday.

Mr Peter Muller, chairman of the New Zealand section of the Commonwealth Press Union, addressing the 77th yearly meeting of the section at the Sheraton Hotel, Auckland, said the anti-terrorism legislation was "of major concern."

If enacted, it would give police — under political direction — power to impose total news blackouts during international terrorism emergencies.

They would even be empowered, "if I read the Bill right," to enter newspaper offices and close down presses.

All branches of the news media had taken the unprecedented step of filing a joint submission with the parliamentary justice and law reform committee, opposing the Bill.

That submission had been presented yesterday, although the Bill itself had been introduced fewer than five weeks ago, he said.

Parties which combined to support the submission were both television and radio branches of the Broadcasting Corporation; the Independent Broadcasters' Association, representing the private radio stations; and the CPU, on behalf of daily newspapers.

Mr Muller said: "While I am sure all members of the CPU would acknowledge the Government's right to take steps to protect the lives and property of New Zealanders in the event of an international terrorist emergency, I personally cannot understand why the Government feels it necessary to legislate for censorship of the media in these situations when other countries with much greater experience of terrorist action have not found it necessary to do so."

It was obvious from comments by the Prime Minister that he, at least, saw the proposed restrictions being extended to apply to, in his words, "serious public unrest and civil disorder beyond the capacity of the police to control."

That, said Mr Muller, represented shades of South Africa.

It was a very serious step to restrict, by legislation, the capacity of newspapers to keep the public informed of what was going on in their own communities. For this reason alone, it was felt that opposition to the Bill was justified.

"But in introducing the Bill, the Government appears to be unaware that there is already in existence a set of guidelines for handling terrorist situations, drawn up by the police in consultation with representatives of the print and electronic media."

While these could not be forced on newspapers, radio and television, such organisations had shown in the past their willingness to co-operate with the police in delaying the release of information if lives were in danger.

"It is my belief that voluntary co-operation is much to be preferred to legislative compulsion, with all that that implies," Mr Muller said.

"The legislative hammer is not justified in this country at this time. I hope we can convince the Government of that." — NZPA

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Telephone 01-930 8422
Telex 24368

"YELLOW"

Reference: B69/58
cc B66/5/1A 1A

2 March 1987

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.
(MEA DLO EUR)

c.c. E.I.B.
MOD (DDI)

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Date	Nature of Material
	Libya - Interview with Qadhafi
1 March 1987	Observer interview with Qadhafi - reference is made to Libyan support for Irish terrorism.

"
S.W. Prior
"
for High Commissioner

CONFIDENTIAL

B66/5/1A. NZ London DHC the terrier has stuck it behind too!

109/1/4 (W)

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

WELLINGTON

PR Prior - no harm in erring on the side of generosity

25 February 1987

Mr Stuart W Prior
First Secretary
New Zealand High Commission
LONDON

Dear Stuart

You will recall that on 14 October last year we sent you a telegram (our 1106M) entitled "European Anti-terrorism Measures" in which among other things we noted that as far as we could tell we had not had any reporting from you on matters mentioned in our telegram 734(M) of 18 July 1986. Your telegram 8649 of 15 October 1986 listed a number of memoranda sent from London which, it transpires, were variously and separately numbered here for about 9 separate files. (We are still trying to track down some of them.) We assume that many were not copied to other members of our counter-terrorism community ...? This concerns us for a variety of reasons. Some of these reasons are set out below.

2 You will recall that at various times over the past year we have drawn your attention to Administration Circular 1983/45 of 13 December 1983 entitled "Terrorism and Related Matters : Distribution of Memoranda and Telegrams" and Mr Norrish's All Posts telegram A154 of 21 December 1984 with the same title. You will also recall that that telegram makes the points that while some posts have faithfully complied with Administration Circular 1983/45 others have not; that this is of concern here since it means that messages that ought to get to particular sections of Foreign Affairs and to particular departments with responsibilities in the anti-terrorist field have not reached them or have been delayed in reaching them; and that in some circumstances this could have serious consequences. In this context we took note of the comments in paragraph 3

/of your

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of your memorandum B66/5/1A of 30 October 1986. In the light of the above however we are puzzled by the somewhat haphazard nature of the Wellington distribution given by you to some of your reporting on terrorist matters, e.g. your B69/89 and B66/5/1A of 26 November 1986 entitled "Terrorism : The Hindawi Case : Syrian Connections" omitted NZSIS (TIC) and Police (PTIU), your B66/5/1A of 19 January 1987 omitted the Police while your B66/5/1A of 27 January 1987 entitled "Terrorism : Dictionary of Terrorist Groups" omitted NZSIS (TIC) and Police (PTIU) thereby overlooking both bodies' obvious interest in such material.

3 With the benefit of hindsight we should perhaps have made the point earlier that each participating department or agency in our counter-terrorist community contributes something; that each also has primary carriage (or in some cases shared primary carriage) of certain aspects; and that on the information and intelligence fronts we are concerned to see that as much relevant information, general and specific, as possible reaches asap those bodies here which are primarily involved in the terrorist intelligence assessment business viz the Terrorist Intelligence Centre of the NZSIS and the Police Terrorist Intelligence Unit (PTIU). Those bodies are the best judges of what is useful to them so we encourage posts overseas, when reporting on terrorism, to err very much on the side of generosity in copying material and reports to other members of our counter-terrorism community.

4 I trust the above clarifies matters for you. If there are any points you would like us to pursue or consider please let me know.

Murray

(Murray Watkins)
for Secretary of Foreign Affairs

B66/5/1A

talked to Roy Milburn 19/2

210 6800

O advised him we're not in a position to do anything for a while yet

4288

7A - P

NO clips

: CONFIDENTIAL NZ EYES ONLY 19 FEB 87
FROM: WELLINGTON
TO : LONDON 549 ROUTINE
RPTD: CANBERRA 445 WASHINGTON 353 OTTAWA 134 ROME 113
LD : SFA (SEC ADM EUR LGL CCO CONS DLO)
SUBJ: ITALY : NEW DIPLOMATIC BAG AND BAGGAGE PROCEDURES

14/2

THE POINTS CONTAINED IN LONDON'S 1155 TO US HAVE BEEN NOTED.
2. FOR POSTS INFORMATION ONLY, WE INTEND TO RESERVE OUR POSITION AND NOT RPT NOT TAKE UP THE BRITISH SUGGESTION TO MAKE AN APPROACH TO THE ITALIANS. IN MAKING THIS DECISION WE HAVE BEEN MINDFUL OF THE NEED FIRST TO CONSIDER WHAT OUR OWN FUTURE POSITION WOULD BE, SHOULD CIRCUMSTANCES LEAD US TOWARDS WANTING TO XRAY INCOMING DIPLOMATIC BAGS. THE IDEA OF HAVING THE FLEXIBILITY TO CARRY OUT DISCRIMINATE XRAYING BASED ON STRONG SUSPICION IN THE COUNTER TERRORIST CONTEXT IS LIKELY TO HAVE SOME APPEAL TO COUNTER TERRORIST AUTHORITIES AND WE NEED FIRST TO SEEK THEIR VIEWS.
3. GRATEFUL IF POSTS CONTINUE TO KEEP US POSTED ON DEVELOPMENTS IN THEIR CAPITALS.
=
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WLN 19Q6QQZ DC
COL 549 445 353 134 113 1155

Hanoi - introducing system of automatic scanning to

ZCZC
WLN2Q9

New Zealand High Commission

New Zealand House
Haymarket
London SW1Y 4TQ
Telephone 01-930 8422
Telex 24368

"YELLOW"

Reference: B66/5/1A

17 February 1987

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(DLO EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA)

c.c. E.I.B.
Defence (DDOP)
NZSIS (TIC)

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Date	Nature of Material
	Terrorism
11 February 1987	Commons written answer concerning progress of arrangements for pooling of information about terrorism by European governments.

S.W. Prior
for High Commissioner

Commons

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS

Terrorism

Mr. Thurnham asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement on the latest progress on arrangements for the pooling of information about terrorism by European Governments.

Mr. Eggar: As I told my hon. Friend the Member for Leicester, East (Mr. Bruinvels) on 12 January, we gave high priority to measures to combat terrorism during the United Kingdom presidency. Ministers met in the TREVI group on 25 September 1986 and 9 December 1986 and there was an informal meeting of Interior and Justice Ministers on 20 October 1986. The subject was also discussed by Foreign Ministers meeting in political co-operation and by Heads of State/Government at the European Council on 5 to 6 December.

These meetings resulted in enhanced practical co-operation between member states on counter-terrorism measures, including the setting up of a secure communications link between police forces of the member states; intensification of liaison between counter-terrorism experts and mutual exchanges of information about people excluded from the territory of any one member state. We will continue to do everything possible to promote effective counter-terrorist co-operation among the Twelve.

B66/5/1A

SWP

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BRU 979
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CLAS: CONFIDENTIAL 11 FEBRUARY 1987
FROM: BRUSSELS
TO : WELLINGTON 182 - ROUTINE
RPTD: LONDON 69 : BONN 23 : HAGUE 23 : GENEVA 35 : PARIS 39 :
ROME 22 : VIENNA 991
SVGS: (VIA LON) ATHENS

- 3497

7A-P
cliffs

LD : SFA (DLO EUR LGL SEC)
PMD
NZSIS
POLICE (PTIU)
DEFENCE (DDOPS)

SUBJ: EUROPEAN ANTI-TERRORISM MEASURES : TREVI GROUP

THE HAGUE'S 1494 USEFULLY EMPHASISED THAT THE TREVI GROUP PREDATES EPC AND THOUGH RELATED TO IT THROUGH THE ESTABLISHMENT LAST YEAR OF THE SEPARATE WORKING GROUP ON EXTERNAL ASPECTS OF TERRORISM, IS NOT PART OF IT. ITS ROLE CONCERNS MORE BROADLY THE GROWING INTERNATIONALISATION OF CRIME, INCLUDING TERRORISM, AND ITS FUNCTIONS ARE PRINCIPALLY COORDINATION OF THE COUNTER-EFFORT THROUGH THE THREE, AND NOW ADDITIONAL ONE, WORKING GROUPS.
2. WHEN WE LAST SPOKE TO JENARD, DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION IN THE INSPECTORATE-GENERAL OF THE BELGIAN MFA, WE GAINED THE IMPRESSION THAT COORDINATION BETWEEN THE DOMESTIC MINISTERIES, AND BETWEEN TREVI AND THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE WAS PROVING MORE OF AN EFFORT THAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES POST THE PARIS BOMBINGS WOULD SEEM TO REQUIRE. AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, BELGIUM MINISTERS, AND GOL, THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE IN PARTICULAR WERE GROWING IMPATIENT FOR THIS REASON THAT BELGIUM APPEARS SET TO MAKE THE WORK OF THE TREVI GROUP ONE OF THE

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SUBSTANTIAL AREAS OF THE EC'S PROGRAMME DURING ITS TENURE OF THE PRESIDENCY. IN RECENT WEEKS, BOTH GOL AND THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TINDEMANS, HAVE MADE MAJOR STATEMENTS (COPIES BY BAG) ON BELGIAN PRIORITIES FOR THE GROUP WHICH COMMENCED ITS WORK FOR 1987 ON 22 JANUARY.

3. FOR A MORE CONCRETE BRIEFING ON THE GROUP'S WORK THAN JERARD HAS SO FAR BEEN ABLE TO PROVIDE. WE CALLED LAST WEEK ON SPREUTELS, DEPUTY CHEF IN GOL'S CABINET. SPREUTELS TOLD US THAT THE PROGRAMME ENUNCIATED BY BELGIAN MINISTERS ADHERED FULLY TO THE PRIORITIES ESTABLISHED UNDER THE BRITISH PRESIDENCY. WHAT IS INTERESTING, HOWEVER, IS THAT BELGIUM IS SEEKING TO ENCAPSULATE THE WORK OF THE GROUP IN THE CONCEPT OF A ''EUROPEAN JUDICIARY AREA'' WITHIN WHICH WOULD BE DEVELOPED THE PROCEDURES FOR AN INTEGRATED EUROPEAN (AT LEAST EC) APPROACH TO CROSS BORDER CRIME, INCLUDING TERRORISM.

4. ALL THIS SOUNDS RATHER GRANDIOSE. IN ITS PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION, THE EUROPEAN JUDICIARY AREA REALLY AMOUNTS TO AN ATTEMPT TO HARMONISE EUROPEAN PENAL LAW AND PROCEDURES ON MATTERS OF IMMEDIATE CONCERN SUCH AS TERRORISM AND DRUGS, AND IN THE LONGER TERM, IN SUCH MATTERS AS THE TRANSFER OF SENTENCED PRISONERS AND ON CHILD ABDUCTION AND CUSTODY.

5. ON TERRORISM AND WHAT ARE SEEN TO BE RELATED QUESTIONS (EXTRADITION, ASYLUM, IMMIGRATION CONTROL), THE TREVI GROUP IS CONTINUING ITS WORK ON THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PERMANENT EVALUATION SYSTEM. THIS MEANS THAT COORDINATION WOULD PROCEED AT TWO LEVELS., THE GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF POTENTIAL THREATS (ON WHICH BASIS, THE EXTERNAL GROUP WOULD RECOMMEND ACTION) AND THE EXCHANGE THROUGH THE DEVELOPING ENCRYPTED NETWORK OF SPECIFIC THREATS. THE LATTER, WHICH INCLUDES THE HARMONISATION OF POLICE TRAINING TECHNIQUES, WILL BE FURTHER DEVELOPED BY A MEETING (UNSCHEDULED AT THIS STAGE) OF HEADS OF SPECIAL INTERVENTION UNITS.

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6. LINKED TO THIS PROCESS ARE THE QUESTIONS OF VISAS AND REFUGEE STATUS. SPREUTELS TOLD US THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO DEVELOPMENT OF THE IDEA OF A COMMON EC VISA. ACCORDINGLY, IT IS LEFT TO MEMBER STATES TO TIGHTEN THEIR BORDER CONTROLS, INCLUDING IN RELATION TO REFUGEES, THOUGH IT IS HOPED THROUGH THE TREVI GROUP TO DEVELOP SOME COMMON STANDARDS. AS AN EXAMPLE, HOWEVER, OF NATIONAL MEASURES IN ADVANCE OF COMMON STANDARDS, BELGIUM IS IN THE PROCESS OF ENACTING LEGISLATION TO TIGHTEN THE DETERMINATION OF REFUGEE STATUS.

7. A FURTHER COMPLEXION ON THE WORK OF THE TERRORISM GROUP IS THE EUROPEAN EXTRADITION CONVENTION. AS YOU KNOW, EC TWELVE RATIFICATION OF THE CONVENTION IS NOT COMPLETE, AND IS COMPLICATED BY THE RESERVATIONS THAT EXIST. ACCORDING TO SPREUTELS, SUCH MEMBERSHIP OF THE CONVENTION AS DOES EXIST, AMOUNTS AS A RESULT OF THE RESERVATIONS TO NO MORE THAN A SERIES OF BILATERAL TREATIES. IT IS A PRIORITY OF THE BELGIAN PRESIDENCY, THEREFORE, TO HARMONISE THE EC TWELVE APPROACH TO THE CONVENTION.

8. AS A MEASURE OF THE DIFFICULTIES OF COORDINATION, ONE NEW MEASURE PROPOSED BY BELGIUM IS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A ''LIGHT ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE'' TO SERVE AS THE INSITITUTIONAL MEMORY OF THE TREVI GROUP GIVEN ITS EXTENSIVE RAMIFICATIONS. THE BELGIANS HAVE REFRAINED FROM CALLING THE STRUCTURE A SECRETARIAT. SPREUTELS TOLD US, HOWEVER, THAT IF ESTABLISHED, IT SHOULD NOT BE REGARDED BY THIRD COUNTRIES AS THE CONTACT POINT ON THE GROUP'S WORK. THE GROUP REMAINS, HE SAID, KEEN TO COOPERATE WITH NON-MEMBER STATES (THE UNITED STATES IN PARTICULAR) BUT THAT WOULD CONTINUE THROUGH THE PRESIDENCY ON THE SORT OF PERIODIC AND INFORMAL BASIS ON WHICH WE ARE PRESENTLY ENGAGED.

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COMMENT

9. IT SEEMS TO US THAT THE NATURE OF THE BEAST WHICH WE ARE OBSERVING, IS THE REFINEMENT IN THE SYSTEM OF COORDINATION AMONGST EC COUNTRIES IN CRIMINAL MATTERS WITH A CROSS BORDER IMPACT. TO THAT EXTENT THERE IS LITTLE OF SUBSTANCE TO REPORT BECAUSE MEASURES OFTEN RELATE TO THE METHOD OF CONTINUOUSLY UPDATING ASSESSMENTS, AND NOT TO THE SUBSTANCE ITSELF. THAT WILL DOUBTLESS BE OF SOME INTEREST TO YOU. BUT IT SEEMS TO US THAT THE SORT OF GUIDANCE PAPER YOU REFER TO IN YOUR 1507(M) WOULD BE USEFUL TO ENCOURAGING A FULLER APPRAISAL OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE GROUP'S WORK. ARE THERE ANY PARTICULAR AREAS, FOR EXAMPLE, YOU WOULD WISH US TO FOLLOW-UP.

COL 182
BRU 970
11/1605Z
NNNN

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B66/5/1A

B10/6/5
B66/5/1A
7A-P - MR MUNN

RR WELLINGTON, -TT- CANBERRA WASHINGTON OTTAWA

ZCZC
LON743
CCC

CONFIDENTIAL

CLAS: CONFIDENTIAL 1Q FEB 87
FROM: LONDON
TO : WELLINGTON 1155 ROUTINE
RPTD: CANBERRA 2Q : WASHINGTON 25 : OTTAWA 16 : ROME 15
LD : SFA (SEC ADM EUR LGL CCO CONS)
SUBJ: ITALY : NEW DIPLOMATIC BAG AND BAGGAGE PROCEDURES

ROME'S 15 (1QQ TO YOU).
2. WE TALKED YESTERDAY TO PROTOCOL DEPARTMENT (MILBURN, HEAD, INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS SECTION) ABOUT THE PROPOSED ITALIAN MEASURES.

3. MILBURN BEGAN BY SAYING THAT NOT ALL THE ITALIAN PROPOSALS CAUSED THEM CONCERN. THE LIMITATION OF POINTS OF ENTRY AND THE SUBMITTING BY A COURIER OF HIS PERSON AND PERSONAL LUGGAGE TO SEARCH DID NOT, FOR EXAMPLE, WORRY THEM, MILBURN SAID. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE RESTRICTION OF BAG SIZE DID SEEM TO THREATEN THE TRANSMISSION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND SECURITY EQUIPMENT THROUGH THE BAG SYSTEM. EQUALLY, THEY WERE AGAINST THE SCANNING OF DIPLOMATIC BAGS AS A GENERALLY-APPLIED POLICY.

4. WHAT MOST CONCERNED THE BRITISH ABOUT THE PROPOSED POLICY, HOWEVER, WAS THE PRECEDENT IT COULD PROVIDE, AND THE KNOCK-ON EFFECTS WHICH WOULD FOLLOW: NOT THE LEAST AS FAR AS THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WERE CONCERNED, MILBURN SAID.

5. MILBURN THEN WENT ON TO REHEARSE THE DISCUSSION OF THE MEASURES THAT HAD TAKEN PLACE DURING THE BRITISH PRESIDENCY, AT MEETINGS OF EC HEADS OF PROTOCOL (IN JULY, OCTOBER AND, FINALLY ON 15DECEMBER, 1986).

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6. BEFORE THE DECEMBER MEETING, MILBURN EXPLAINED, THE BRITISH HAD BEEN ENCOURAGING OTHER EC COUNTRIES TO DRAW THEIR CONCERNS ABOUT THE PROPOSED MEASURES DIRECTLY TO THE ITALIANS. THE REASON FOR THIS WAS THAT, HAVING ESTABLISHED THAT THEIR OWN CONCERNS WERE WIDELY SHARED AMONG THE TWELVE, THE BRITISH HAD BEEN SOMEWHAT SURPRISED TO BE TOLD BY THE ITALIANS 'AT A VERY SENIOR LEVEL' THAT ONLY BRITAIN HAD CONVEYED ANY SORT OF PROTEST TO THEM.

7. AT THAT DECEMBER MEETING, MILBURN SAID, HEADS OF PROTOCOL HAD EXAMINED A REPORT ON THE ITALIAN MEASURES AND HAD PROTESTED ABOUT THEM. IT HAD BECOME CLEAR IN THE ''HARD FOUGHT'' EXCHANGES THAT HAD OCCURRED THAT THE ITALIANS WERE OUTNUMBERED 11:1, BUT IT WAS ALSO CLEAR THAT THERE WAS NOT A COMMON EUROPEAN VIEW OF HOW DIPLOMATIC BAGS SHOULD BE HANDLED. (NOR, MILBURN ADDED AS AN ASIDE, WOULD THERE BE, IF ONLY BECAUSE OF THE UNIQUELY STRONG FRENCH INTERPRETATION OF THE VCDR WHICH HELD THAT TURNING BACK, QUESTIONING OF, OR SCANNING A BAG CONSTITUTED INTERFERENCE WITH ITS FREE PASSAGE).

8. SOME MEASURE OF AGREEMENT WAS REACHED : MOST MEMBERS FELT THAT WHILE UNABLE TO ACCEPT INDISCRIMINATE SCANNING OF BAGS (SUCH AS WAS CURRENTLY BEING IMPLEMENTED BY KUWAIT, APPARENTLY), THEY COULD ACCEPT THAT THERE MIGHT BE OCCASIONS ON WHICH THEIR DISCRIMINATE SCANNING WAS JUSTIFIED, BUT ONLY IF THERE WERE ''VERY SERIOUS GROUNDS FOR SUSPICION'' ABOUT THE CONTENTS OF A PARTICULAR BAG. BUT EQUALLY, OTHER CONCERNS REMAINED.

9. FOR THEIR PART THE ITALIANS HAD ACKNOWLEDGED THE CONCERNS RAISED. IT WAS CLEAR, HOWEVER, MILBURN COMMENTED, THAT THEY FOUND THEMSELVES IN SOMETHING OF A CLEFT STICK IN THAT THEIR POLITICIANS HAD COMMITTED THEMSELVES PUBLICLY TO TAKING MEASURES SO THAT THEY COULD BE SEEN TO BE DOING SOMETHING, BEFORE THEY HAD DISCUSSED THE PRACTICALITIES WITH THEIR FOREIGN MINISTRY.

10. THE ITALIANS HAD CONCEDED SOME POINTS, MILBURN CONTINUED. THEY HAD, FOR EXAMPLE, SAID THAT THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO LET LARGE DIP-

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LOMATIC CARGOES IN (WHILE THEY, IN COMMON WITH OTHERS, WOULD NOT ACCEPT THAT A TRUCK ITSELF WAS A 'BAG', THEY WOULD ACCEPT THAT A SEALED CONTAINER CARRIED ON A TRUCK WAS A 'BAG') WITHOUT QUESTIONS, AND ENQUIRE ABOUT IT ONLY AFTERWARDS OF THE MISSION IN ROME CONCERNED. MOREOVER, THEIR SCANNING EQUIPMENT WOULD ONLY BE OF THE X-RAY TYPE. THE ITALIANS HAD ALSO EXPLAINED THAT THE MEASURES WOULD BE ENFORCED ONLY AGAINST CERTAIN COUNTRIES. IT WAS NOT, THEY SAID, INTENDED THAT THEY SHOULD APPLY AGAINST THEIR WESTERN PARTNERS, ALTHOUGH, FOR OBVIOUS REASONS, THIS COULD NOT BE STATED PUBLICLY.

11. THE MEETING HAD ALSO SHOWN UP AREAS IN WHICH ALL THE TWELVE HAD FURTHER WORK TO DO. FOR EXAMPLE, MILBURN COMMENTED, THEY HAD FELT THAT THEIR OWN POSITION IN RESPECT OF SCANNING BAGS WAS RATHER HARD TO DEFEND (VIA: THE BRITISH HAVE PUBLICLY DECLARED THAT THEY RESERVE THE RIGHT TO SCAN INCOMING BAGS, IN THE PRESENCE OF A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SENDING COUNTRY, WHEREAS THEY WILL NOT PERMIT THEIR OWN BAGS TO BE SCANNED).

12. MOREOVER, AS THE DANES HAD POINTED OUT, THERE WAS OBVIOUSLY A DIFFERENCE IN TREATMENT OF 'DIPLOMATIC' AND 'CONSULAR' BAGS INTENDED AT THE TIME THE VIENNA CONVENTION WAS DRAWN UP - ONLY NOBODY WAS QUITE SURE WHAT IT WAS, OR WHY. THE BRITISH WOULD BE DOING SOME HISTORICAL RESEARCH IN AN EFFORT TO FIND OUT, IN CASE THE ANSWER HAD A BEARING ON THE PRESENT PROBLEMS.

13. SINCE THE DECEMBER MEETING, MILBURN SAID, THE BRITISH HAD BEEN CONTINUING AN INFORMAL DIALOGUE WITH THE ITALIANS AT HEAD OF PROTOCOL LEVEL. THEY HAD AS YET RECEIVED NO FORMAL RESPONSES FROM THE ITALIANS, BUT THERE HAD BEEN SOME STRAWS IN THE WIND. FOR EXAMPLE, THEY HAD LEARNT THAT PLANS TO TURN A CREW ROOM AT ROME AIRPORT INTO A FACILITY THROUGH WHICH ALL DIPLOMATIC BAGS WOULD PASS (ONLY SOME OF WHICH WOULD BE SUBJECTED TO SCANNING) HAD RECENTLY FALLEN THROUGH BECAUSE THE AIRPORT AUTHORITIES WOULD NOT COOPERATE. THERE HAD ALSO BEEN OTHER INDICATIONS THAT NO EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MEASURES WAS ENVISAGED.

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14. THE ITALIANS, MILBURN COMMENTED, HAD OVER THE PAST 4-5 MONTHS, MOVED THEIR POSITION CONSIDERABLY CLOSER TO THAT SET OUT IN THE 1985 U.K. WHITE PAPER. THE BRITISH FELT THAT THEY COULD BE PERSUADED TO MOVE EVEN CLOSER, ALTHOUGH THEY ACCEPTED THAT THEY ''WOULDN'T COME ALL THE WAY''. THE KEY, AS THE BRITISH SEE IT NOW, IS TO PERSUADE THE ITALIANS TO REPLACE THE NOTION OF INDISCRIMINATE SCANNING WITH THAT OF DISCRIMINATE SCANNING ''BASED ON STRONG SUSPICIONS WITHOUT DEFINING WHERE THESE SUSPICIONS ARISE''. THE BRITISH WILL CONTINUE TO REITERATE THE DANGERS THEY SEE OF A KNOCK-ON EFFECT WITH THIRD COUNTRIES - PARTICULARLY THE SOVIET UNION - IF THE PRESENT ITALIAN PROPOSALS ARE ACTUALLY IMPLEMENTED.

15. OVERALL, THEY ARE HOPING, MILBURN SAID, THAT BY THE TIME OF THE NEXT EC HEADS OF PROTOCOL MEETING IN MAY THE ITALIANS WILL HAVE MOVED CLOSER TO THE GENERAL (BUT NOT COMMON) POSITION OF ITS ELEVEN PARTNERS.

16. IN CONCLUSION, MILBURN TOLD US THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE CANADIANS, TO WHOM HE HAD TALKED RECENTLY, MIGHT WELL BE MAKING AN APPROACH TO THE ITALIANS ALONG THE LINES OF THE AUSTRALIAN ONE. HE ADDED THAT IF NEW ZEALAND FELT ABLE TO MAKE A REPRESENTATION TO THE ITALIANS IT WOULD BE VERY MUCH APPRECIATED. WE COMMENTED THAT YOU WOULD DOUBTLESS BE LOOKING VERY CAREFULLY AT THE ISSUES INVOLVED, AND UNDERTOOK TO LET HIM KNOW YOUR VIEWS.
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"YELLOW"

Reference: B66/5/1A

9 February 1987

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.
(DLO EUR SEC LGL AAD MEA SPA)

c.c. ~~EXXB~~. PMD
NZSIS (TIC)
Police (PTIU)
Defence (DDOP)

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Date	Nature of Material
	Terrorism
8 February 1987	Sunday Telegraph report of American reaction to cancellation of meeting on terrorism proposed within confines of G7 meeting.

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S.W. Prior
for High Commissioner

The Sunday Telegraph February 8 1987

US fury over blown chance

by **David Blundy** in Washington and **Norman Kirkham** in London

AMERICA castigated European Allies yesterday over their "faint hearted" refusal to hold a crisis conference of foreign ministers who would co-ordinate action against the terrorist kidnappers of Beirut.

The furious State Department said yesterday that the posturing Europeans had "blown" the chance for a joint strategy while the United States had deployed an aircraft carrier battle group in the Eastern Mediterranean.

America wanted Mr Shultz, Secretary of State, and the Foreign ministers of Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, Canada and Japan to meet for urgent talks in Rome this weekend.

But first France and then Britain and West Germany, opposed the proposal because it might push the trigger-happy Beirut terrorists into executing some of their captives. Mr Jacques Chirac, the French Prime Minister, declared that such talks would be more dangerous than useful.

The six believe contacts with countries like Syria, Iran and Lebanon would be much more preferable. The Bonn Government has sent a special envoy to the Middle East to try to negotiate freedom for two German hostages and made clear its disagreement with America's "heavy handed" approach.

Britain objected to the timing of talks, believing they might panic the kidnappers. There was the risk, too, that the conference could break down in disagreement and the European partners could not back America in the use of force.

Whitehall is to stand firm on Mrs Thatcher's policy that there must be no payment by either Britain or her partners to pay ransom for the hostages.

Sir Antony Acland, Ambassador to Washington, was sent to the State Department last week with a message of British concern at the build-up of American forces off Lebanon, urging President Reagan to help defuse the tension.

Following the protests from London and other European capitals, America reduced her armada of 35 warships off Lebanon to 15, including the carrier John F. Kennedy and a force of 1,900 marines.

America denied last week that a decision had been taken in Washington to carry out a military strike. Officials admitted, however, that contingency plans had been drawn up in case any American hostages were executed by their Shi'ite captors.

Options under consideration in Washington are thought to have included a possible air strike against strongholds of the Hezbollah extremists in the Bekaa Valley or sending a small commando force ashore on a raiding expedition.

A main obstacle is the difficulty in trying to pin down headquarters of the extremists. One official at the Foreign Office commented: "We just do not know where the Hezbollah bases are. These people are on the move constantly.

"The Americans could take a blanket whack at terrorists in the Lebanon, but we would have to consider at once the implications for the hostages and the effect on the whole region."

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"YELLOW"

Reference: B69/121
B66/5/1A

5 February 1987

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(MFA DLO)

c.c. E.I.B. (SPO)

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Date	Nature of Material
27 January 1987	PLO - London Office

Lords oral answer (Lady Young) about the move of the PLO London office to new quarters. The principal questioner Lord Chalfont, took issue with the presence of the office on the grounds that it might provide 'a catalyst for terrorist activity' in the middle of London. Lady Young denied the allegation.
Chalfont, it will be recalled, is a prime mover of the new Institute for the Study of Terrorism.

"

S.W. Prior
for High Commissioner

PLO: London Office

2.55 p.m.

Lord Chalfont: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question Standing in my name on the Order Paper.

The Question was as follows:

To ask Her Majesty's Government what policy they propose to adopt towards the proposal that the Palestine Liberation Organisation should open an independent office in London.

The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Baroness Young): My Lords, the PLO has been represented in London since 1971, until recently sharing an office with the Arab League. The move of the PLO office into its own premises did not require government permission. There is no question of the PLO enjoying any official status, privileges or immunities in this country.

Lord Chalfont: My Lords, I thank the Minister for her reply. I should like to ask whether she is aware that it leaves many very important questions unanswered? Is it not true that while the PLO was occupying premises under the umbrella of the Arab League it was an unlikely target for other factions of the Palestinian terrorist movement? Would she not agree that now it has a separate office with the umbrella of the Arab League removed and in another part of London, it is a much more attractive target for factions such as the Abu Nidal group which has been conducting murderous terrorist activities against the PLO over many years?

Does the Minister not agree that the setting up of this new independent office in a residential section of London lays us open once more to the possibility of turning quiet London streets into the battleground of Middle Eastern terrorists?

Baroness Young: My Lords, I appreciate the con[illegible]n which lies behind the supplementary question of the noble Lord. The truth of the matter is that no official permission is required to open an office or to move to new premises as it is not a diplomatic or an official mission. As I have indicated, it does not therefore enjoy any official status or immunities. Of course if the organisation breaks the law we will not hesitate to act if there is evidence of illegal activity.

Lord Wells-Pestell: My Lords, I should like to ask the Minister how the Government can allow a terrorist organisation to remain in this country.

Baroness Young: My Lords, as the Government have made clear on a number of occasions, the PLO as such is not a terrorist organisation, though several of its component organisations have a deplorable terrorist record. The PLO is an umbrella organisation expressing the aspiration of thousands of Palestinians to secure their legitimate rights.

Lord Orr-Ewing: My Lords, is my noble friend aware that the Abu Nidal group in recent years has murdered four PLO members? By setting up a separate headquarters are we not going to attract the attention of that Abu Nidal desperate group of terrorists? Are the police and the intelligence service able to cope with these extra risks?

Baroness Young: My Lords, I must make it plain that the Government have not been responsible in any way for establishing this independent office. This is a matter for the PLO, and although I take the point that the noble Lord made I think we have to face the fact that in a free and democratic society such as ours any organisation may maintain an office here so long as its activities remain within the law.

Lord Mayhew: My Lords, is it not a fact that it was precisely when the PLO shared the premises of the Arab League in London that its director Sahid Hamani was assassinated by the Abu Nidal group? Is it not also a fact that the reason for these assassinations is that the PLO representatives support the idea of a negotiated settlement in Palestine? Therefore, should we not do what we can to help these people in the courageous job that they are trying to do in order to achieve a negotiated settlement?

Baroness Young: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, made two points. The first point is a matter of fact. On the second point, he will be well aware of government policy. I should say to him that the terms of the Question are very tightly drawn about the office of the PLO. I think the noble Lord's second supplementary is wide of the Question.

Baroness Cox: My Lords, given the fact that, as the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, has said, this office is likely to be particularly vulnerable as a target of terrorist violence, would the noble Baroness not agree that the particular location is especially unsatisfactory? For example, the rear entrance of that office is only 30 feet from a large primary school and there is a petrol station only 30 feet from its front entrance. Is there any kind of assurance that the noble Baroness can give to the residents, who are justifiably deeply worried about this matter?

Baroness Young: My Lords, again I take the noble Baroness's point about all this, but I must make it plain to her that in the move of this office no official permission was required. As for the use of the particular house, the office must comply with the local borough's planning regulations. Any kind of irregular use which conflicts with them would be a matter for Kensington and Chelsea Borough Council.

Lord Paget of Northampton: My Lords surely it is a terrible state of affairs when we say that we have no control as to what terrorist organisation sets itself up in this country or where? Can Mafia families come here and have a private office where they are unmolested, and will our police be prepared to defend them in their private battles? That is what we are being asked to do. On question of whether or not the PLO is a terrorist organisation, it has declared itself to be such. It has never had any other business. It has been its job to be a terrorist organisation.

Baroness Young: My Lords, I think that the noble Lord, Lord Paget, should recognise that the PLO has had an office in London since 1971. I would not accept, if he comes to look at my answers in *Hansard* tomorrow, his definition of the PLO as a terrorist organisation. That is not the definition I have given in answer to a previous question.

Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos: My Lords, the noble Baroness has been careful to detatch her department from the setting up of this independent office. Would she not agree, however, that this is, for reasons which have been expressed on all sides of the House, a significant development? Is she saying to the House that her department was at no time consulted by the PLO on this matter? If the department was consulted, could she say who consulted the department and whether talks were held about this development?

Baroness Young: My Lords, the short answer to the noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn, is that my department was not consulted. There was no reason why it should be consulted. As I have explained, it is open to any organisation to establish an office in London, and if in the course of its activities it breaks the law then of course it will be prosecuted.

Lord Morris: My Lords, could my noble friend say whether the Palestine Liberation Organisation will contribute to the undoubted increase in the police presence that will be required if this office is established in London?

Baroness Young: My Lords, it is of course the duty of the police to maintain law and order. I have no doubt that my right honourable friend the Home Secretary will see that if an offence is committed there will be a prosecution. Of course there would be police protection were this to be asked for or were it to be necessary.

Lord Molloy: My Lords, would the noble Baroness agree that there are many organisations in London which represent people from foreign countries which have been overrun and occupied by other powers and have tyrannical leaders and tyrannical governments? Those who believe in democracy and freedom have established themselves in London as well as the PLO. Is it not a fact that even orthodox ambassadors have been the subject of appalling assassinations? In so far as the Government recognise the PLO as the voice of the Palestinian people, is it not only right and sensible that it should have some representation in this capital city?

Baroness Young: My Lords, I am not absolutely sure that I have the question that the noble Lord has asked, but in fact the PLO, has had an office in London since 1971. The reason behind this particular Question on the Order Paper is the fact that it has moved its office to another address.

Lord Chalfont My Lords, perhaps I may ask the Minister whether she is aware that the problem here is not whether the PLO, or that faction of it which occupies these new offices, will conduct itself in an improper manner. The question is whether its move does not provide in the middle of London a catalyst for terrorist activity. Is she aware that the offices, as we call them in this euphemistic way, which have now been set up in Kensington have been protected in such a way that they have locked-up windows, bullet-proof doors, a permanent daytime police guard, and floodlights at night? Is this not a fortress, and is it not an invitation to attack from—as the noble Lord, Lord Orr-Ewing, has said—the Abu Nidal group which has Yassir Arafat's PLO as its main target? If this is not a matter for the Government will she tell us why not?

Baroness Young: My Lords, I had hoped that in my answers to earlier questions I had made the position of the Government plain. I understand the concern that has been expressed and I have the point that the noble Lord raised in his first supplementary; but, as I have explained, this was not a move which required official permission. As for the allegation that the house has now become an armed fortress, this of course is a matter—the alteration to the structure of the house, or the lights, and all these other matters—for the local borough's planning regulations. It is for it to enforce those if it believes that these developments are contrary to the regulations which exist in that part of Kensington.

Lord Glenamara: My Lords, it is within the knowledge of all of us that the PLO is not the benign organisation the noble Baroness has described, or that the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, described. It is an organisation which is committed in terms to achieving its objective by violence, and its objective is the destruction of a state with whom we have friendly relations. Is it not quite wrong to allow that organisation, as such, to establish itself in London?

Baroness Young: My Lords, as I have said earlier, the PLO has had an office in London since 1971. The point of the Question is the move of the office. If the noble Lord looks carefully in *Hansard* at what I have said he will see that I have chosen my words carefully over the description of the PLO.

Viscount Buckmaster: My Lords, is the noble Baroness aware that the present representative of the PLO in London, Fuad Awaidha, belongs to the moderate mainstream element of the PLO, and that he has consistently shown a moderate attitude during the three and a half years he has been in charge of the office?

Baroness Young: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Viscount for that piece of information.

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"YELLOW"

Reference: B66/5/1A

5 February 1987

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.
(EUR SPA LGL)

c.c. ~~Ex~~ B. PARIS

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Date	Nature of Material
	Rainbow Warrior
5 February 1987	Article from The Independent on possibility of decoration of Rainbow Warrior bombers.

S.W. Prior
for High Commissioner

THE INDEPENDENT Thursday 5 February 1987

France may honour Greenpeace bombers

From Patrick Marnham
in Paris

THE FRENCH Minister of Defence, André Giraud, is considering the possibility of decorating the two secret service agents responsible for sinking the Greenpeace ship "Rainbow Warrior" with the Legion of Honour.

In reply to a written question in the Senate, Mr Giraud says: "The question of decorating these two officers will be very carefully examined, in the context of the rules governing the conduct expected of personnel on active service, as soon as possible."

The question was asked by Jean Francou, a Senator aligned with the centre-right UDF group, part of the government coalition. Mr Francou is an olive oil producer from Provence who holds the Croix de Guerre.

He has suggested that Commandant Alain Mafart and Capitaine Dominique Prieur, the two agents involved, should be decorated because, having carried out their orders and been punished for the decisions of their superiors, "they displayed a dignity, and a degree of discretion and patriotism, that deserves to be honoured."

Mr Francou asked his question last April, and it seems likely in view of the long delay in answering it, and the implication of a further delay, that the defence minister intends to decorate the secret agents once he considers that enough time has passed for the facts of the case to be forgotten.

The attack on the Rainbow Warrior took place in July 1985 when two mines which had been attached to the hull of the ship exploded while it was docked in Auckland Harbour. A Dutch photographer of Portugese origin, Fernando Pereira, was killed in the explosion.

Within two days the New Zealand police had arrested Mafart and Prieur, who were travellling on false Swiss passports issued to them by the DGSE (the French MI6), and posing as a married couple called "Turenge". They were charged with murder and arson.

Yesterday the political weekly, *Le Canard Enchaîné,* suggested that if the medals were awarded the appropriate citation would read: "For having taken part, at the cost of the life of one photographer, in the sabotaging of a pacifist ship while it was in the port of an ally."

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CLAS: CONFIDENTIAL 2 FEBRUARY 1987
FROM: ROME
TO : WELLINGTON 100 - ROUTINE
RPTD: CANBERRA 03 - ROUTINE : LONDON 15 - ROUTINE
WASHINGTON 03 - ROUTINE : OTTAWA 03 - ROUTINE
LD : SFA (SEC ADM EUR LGL CCO CONS)
SUBJ: ITALY : NEW DIPLOMATIC BAG AND BAGGAGE PROCEDURES

CANBERRA'S 4031 TO YOU. THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY TELL US THEY CALLED ON DARMIS, PROTOCOL OFFICE, ITALIAN MFA, ON 29 JANUARY AND PASSED ACROSS A NOTE PROTESTING THE ITALIAN ACTION. DARMIS UNDERTOOK TO PROVIDE A WRITTEN RESPONSE TO THE NOTE, BUT ASSERTED THAT THE DECISION TO X-RAY DIPLOMATIC BAGS WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE VIENNA CONVENTION. HE COMMENTED THAT THE CONVENTION HAD BEEN FORMULATED 25 YEARS AGO WHEN THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM HAD BEEN VASTLY DIFFERENT FROM THE PRESENT DAY, AND THAT WHILE ITALY FULLY RESPECTED THE CONVENTION IT ALSO HAD TO INTERPRET IT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPECIFIC SITUATIONS AND CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS. DARMIS ALSO NOTED THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE SITUATION IN WESTERN EUROPE, WHERE THERE WAS A VERY SERIOUS TERRORISM SITUATION REQUIRING VIGOROUS MEASURES, AND THE AUSTRALIAN SITUATION WHERE THIS KIND OF PROBLEM DID NOT EXIST. THE FACT THAT AUSTRALIA TOOK A FIRM POSITION ON SOME MATTERS RELATING TO DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES, HE SAID, ILLUSTRATED THE WAY IN WHICH EACH GOVERNMENT INTERPRETED THE CONVENTION ACCORDING TO SPECIFIC SITUATIONS.
2 DARMIS SAID THAT ACTUAL SCANNING OF DIPLOMATIC BAGS HAD NOT COMMENCED BUT HE EXPECTED IT WOULD BEGIN VERY SOON.
3 THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY HAS REPORTED THE FOREGOING TO CANBERRA.
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OK TTS IT TKS ALL OK?

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"YELLOW"

Reference: B66/5/1A
B69/56

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

2 February 1987

(DLO EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA SPA)

c.c. ~~E.I.B.~~ PMD
~~xxxxx~~ NZSIS (TIC)
Police (PTIU)
Defence (DDOP)

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Date	Nature of Material
	Terrorism - Lebanon
1 February 1987.	Press backgrounding of hostage situation in Lebanon.

"

S.W. Prior
for High Commissioner

"

'My job is full of adventures. I must do this.'

Missing in the jungle of urban warriors

JULIE FLINT in West Beirut and **COLIN SMITH** in East Beirut report on Terry Waite's ill-fated mission.

SHORTLY BEFORE he disappeared on the night of 20 January, 12 days ago, Terry Waite acquired a leather jacket and a pair of dark glasses. He was going, at the suggestion of kidnappers from the Islamic Jihad, to meet their last two American hostages — Terry Anderson, a journalist, and Tom Sutherland, a teacher. The two, he was told, were depressed and needed him.

The Druze Progressive Socialist Party, Waite's protector in West Beirut, was extremely concerned about letting the Archbishop of Canterbury's envoy venture into the unknown territory outside its influence. But Waite insisted: 'My job is full of adventures. I have to do this.'

Before going to his rendezvous with the Shia doctor who has been the middleman in all his dealings with the Islamic Jihad for several months now, Waite met the Druze militia leader who had organised all his displacements—the public ones with journalists dancing attendance and the private ones with decoys to lure them off—since he arrived in West Beirut on 12 January.

Again he insisted that he not be followed. 'My life depends on it.'

Then the Druze drove Waite to the private clinic of the doctor—Dr Adan Mroue, a gynaecologist at the American University of Beirut—and, in accordance with his demands, took its guard off him.

The Church's envoy has not been seen since. Neither the PSP nor Lambeth Palace has heard from him — although the Druze, who have been making the most vigorous efforts to trace him ever since he failed to return a week ago last Wednesday has.

He has not been declared hostage, but neither has he been permitted to show a single sign of life. He is, for the moment at least, detained.

Last Friday, Reuters quoted an unnamed militia leader in West Beirut as saying: 'My information is that he will not be returning, as he is kidnapped. He has been added to the list of hostages. He became one the day he left without his bodyguard.'

In East Beirut this was echoed by the Christian militia leader Dany Chamoun. 'Waite has probably been kidnapped now and a larger ransom will be paid for him than anybody.' However, John Gray, the British Ambassador who works surrounded by armed guards in his compound in the Christian east side, is still reluctant to concede that Waite is being held against his will.

Commenting on the latest statement from West Beirut, he said yesterday: 'A disturbing story for which we have no corroboration. But it's obviously worrying.'

Arms scandal

Waite's determination to return to Lebanon goes back to December when, feeling his credibility damaged by the Iranian arms scandal, he ignored official advice not to proceed. The warnings were given at a meeting at Lambeth Palace on 23 December between him and a senior British Middle East official. The official pointed out that the power of the mainstream Lebanese Shia militia Amal had been eroded by the pro-Iranian Hizbollah faction who were thought to be holding all 25 foreign hostages.

Waite was told that Amal, whose relatively moderate leader Nabih Berri negotiated the release of the American TWA hijack hostages, would no longer be able to protect him.

But the envoy chose to ignore this advice.

Waite's next move was to persuade the Druze leader Walid Jumblatt to arrange protection for him. The Druze, whose religion is a schism of Islam, are fiercely independent.

At the beginning of last month, Jumblatt, an hereditary Druze leader who also heads the almost entirely Druze Progressive Socialist Party, came to London from Washington where his five-year-old son Aslam is receiving medical treatment.

He is said to have been initially reluctant to protect the envoy, pointing out that no matter how many assurances they were given they could not guarantee Waite's safety when he was out of their sight.

Once in West Beirut the envoy's contacts with the gang who are thought to be holding Anderson and Sutherland were made through Dr Mroue.

On Monday 19 January, Waite declared that this round of his negotiations was finished and he would be returning to London.

But his Druze bodyguards were unable to escort him to Beirut international airport because they were having one of their periodic squabbles with the Shia and there was the matter of a truce to arrange.

It was while Mr Waite was waiting for his bodyguard to resolve the problem that he is said to have been contacted by the men holding Anderson and Sutherland.

Dr Mroue is reported to have introduced Waite to the intermediary from the kidnappers. According to an account circulating among Western diplomats and the Christian militia of East Beirut the envoy then asked the go-between if he could prove his credentials.

The man is said to have seized a magazine from a desk top and declared that he would be back with a Polaroid picture of one of the hostages holding it.

These reports have it that in no more than an hour the man was back with a photograph of Anderson, who has been a hostage for almost two years now, clutching the magazine to his chest.

Assuming that the man would have needed at least 10 minutes to arrange the photograph to be taken this would mean that the hostage must have been no more than 25 minutes drive away from Waite's hotel. This would almost certainly put him somewhere in the sprawl of apartment blocks and shanty towns of south-west Beirut, known to its mostly Shia Muslim inhabitants as Dahi.

Beneath this urban jungle is a labyrinth of cellars and secret passages and it is thought that the hostages may spend a lot of their time in the dungeons. (An Israeli woman agent swapped in Cyprus in 1980 spent 11 years in a similar Palestinian prison and two years in hospital recovering from her ordeal).

Before going missing, Waite told journalists that his relationship with Islamic Jihad was unaffected by all the talk of arms-for-hostages and reports that he had a place in these deals. He said the kidnappers were not totally



Terry Waite and Walid Jumblatt, the Druze leader, whose men were guarding the British envoy.

ruthless. They had hearts and knew what was in their own best interest.

Privately, however, Waite confided that a problem arose with Islamic Jihad after the release two months ago of David Jacobsen, then administrator of the American hospital. Part of the deal, according to well-informed sources, was that there would be movement on the 17 Shia fundamentalists jailed in Kuwait whose release has been Islamic Jihad's main demand from the very start.

Jacobsen was released, the 17 were not. The kidnappers, reportedly, felt betrayed.

When Waite returned to Lebanon this year, for the first time since the retrieval of Jacobsen, he told a Shia contact he had a 'messenger' in Kuwait seeking a deal on the 17. After Waite disappeared to meet the hostages, Kuwait repeated, for no apparent reason, that there would be no deal for the 17 'criminals and killers.'

Yesterday, a Lebanese magazine *Ash Shiraa*, said the British negotiator's problems arose from the fact that he returned to Lebanon 'with empty hands.'

The interest of Islamic Jihad centres on three Lebanese among the 17. Sources close to the Waite investigation here say these include a cousin of Imad Mugniyeh, the man believed to be holding Waite. Mugniyeh, a member of the Hizbollah and part of the Musawi clan of Baalbeck, has refused to discuss the disappearance of Waite — even with the 'spiritual leader of Hizbollah, Sheikh Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah.

His only comment has reportedly been: 'My cousin is still in Kuwait.'

Last week, security sources say, Mugniyeh left Beirut for four days. This was the period when reports from the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley said Waite was sighted moving around in a three-car convoy. These reports have not been confirmed. But those looking for Waite say they do not believe he is moving around anywhere in Lebanon.

The fact that he has not been declared a hostage may mean that there is a division among those holding him.

In the past, according to well-informed sources here, the release of American hostages has come about because of three factors — weapons, cash payments that on one occasion were reportedly in seven figures, in US dollars, and promises of advance on the question of the 17. It is this promise that, so far has not been made good.

The Druze are not a people to let their protegé be stolen from them without reacting. All the Shia leaders moving between Tehran and Damascus and Beirut pass through the Druze mountains. This is one obvious way of squeezing the kidnappers and their friends: others will no doubt be considered if Waite does not reappear.

THE OBSERVER, SUNDAY 1 FEBRUARY 1987

EUROPE FACES SPLIT ON

deals with terrorists

THE disappearance of Terry Waite and the surge of kidnappings in Beirut is stretching European solidarity over terrorism to breaking point.

Both France and West Germany are strongly tempted to do deals in an attempt to get their hostages out. Unless Waite appears safe and well within the next few days, Britain will come under intense pressure to negotiate for his freedom.

Yet less than two months ago the EEC agreed in London to make no concessions under duress to terrorists or their sponsors — an undertaking Britain last week drew to the attention of West Germany as it wrestled with the dilemma of what to do with two Arabs arrested in Germany.

It was these arrests, observers in Bonn believe, which led directly to the kidnapping of two Germans, Hoechst chemicals executive Rudolf Cordes, 53, and Siemens engineer Alfred Schmidt, 37, in West Beirut. They may also have been connected with the long disappearance of Waite, who arrived in Beirut the day before the first Arab, Mohammed Ali Hamadei, was arrested at Frankfurt airport.

He was carrying a forged Lebanese passport with a West German tourist visa and nine litres of the liquid explosive, methyl nitrate in his hand luggage. The United States has said it will seek his extradition on charges of involvement in the 1985 hijacking of a TWA airliner from Athens to Beirut in which a young American Marine was murdered.

Last week Ali Abbas Hamadei, Mohammed's elder brother and a naturalised German, was also arrested at Frankfurt airport as he flew in from Beirut via Geneva.

It is believed in Bonn that a third brother, Abdelhadi Hamadei, is behind the kidnapping of the two Germans. The German Government is said to have received photographs of the two, through a middleman in Beirut, proving they are alive. Abdelhadi Hamadei is the security chief of the militant Shia Muslim group, Hezbollah —the 'Party of God.'


West Germany has imposed a news blackout while it considers what to do. The Chief Federal Prosecutor's Office in Karlsruhe, which has taken charge of the case, even refuses to say under what charges the Hamadei brothers are being held. In Mohammed's case presumably it is illegal entry

NIGEL HAWKES and TONY CATTERALL report on the growing pressure to barter with kidnappers.

and possession of explosives, while Abbas is said to be held for 'placing the State under duress.'

If Germany does elect to negotiate, the much-tattered banner of European solidarity will have a few more rents. In a front-page commentary last Thursday, the newspaper *Die Zeit*, virtually advised the Government to do a deal. Must Germans die so that a Lebanese can be sentenced by an American court, it asked.

'The USA had discredited itself as a champion in the fight against international terrorism. It would have a difficult time taking offence if we gave



Mohammed Ali Hamadei: Arrested.

precedence to saving our countrymen at the cost of its judicial claim.'

France faces a similar dilemma over whether to give a presidential pardon to an Iranian imprisoned for leading an attempt on the life of Shapour Bakhtiar, the former Iranian Prime Minister, in July 1980. The attempt failed, but in a gun battle a policeman and a woman bystander were killed.

President Mitterrand has been under pressure from the Chirac Government to pardon the Iranian, Anis Nattache, in exchange for the release of all the French hostages held by pro-Iranian groups.

Nattache is ill, which would give at least an appearance of legality to such a pardon, though Mitterrand has made clear he would want a deal in writing before he would grant the pardon and could not extend the same clemency to the other three Iranians sentenced with Nattache.

But French hopes that such a deal would wipe the slate clean and put an end to hostage-taking have been shaken by two events last week.

First Abu Iyad, a senior figure in the Palestine Liberation Organisation, gave an interview to *Le Matin* in which he said that Nattache was acting directly for Iranian religious leader Ayatollah Khomeini when he tried to kill Bakhtiar. It was Khomeini's personal responsibility for this 'religious mission' which made the Iranians so keen to spring Nattache, Abu Iyad claimed.

He said the four major groups of Shias responsible for the Beirut kidnappings — Hizbollah, Islamic Jihad, the Organisation of Revolutionary Justice and the so-called Oppressed of the Earth—were all under the direct control of Tehran.

This claim appeared to gain credibility when the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, Hojatojislam Hashemi Rafsanjani, virtually gave his approval to hostage-taking during a press conference in Tehran. This, in effect, removed French hopes that Iran might be willing to impose the release of French hostages on its Shia supporters in Lebanon.

In London, wise heads at the Foreign Office have been shaken in despair at the view apparently held in Paris that the hostage-takers can be retired from their grisly trade by a single deal. 'They would simply come back for more,' said one official gloomily. The history of kidnapping in Lebanon certainly seems to bear witness to this view.

But the British Government may find it politically difficult to stick to this austere view if it turns out that Waite has fallen victim to the kidnappers.

The Foreign Office takes an equivocal view of his eforts, for understandable reasons. When he succeeds, it makes professional diplomats look a little inadequate. If he fails, and falls captive himself, it is the professional diplomats who will be called on to find him and get him out. If they fail, they will face public excoriation.

So although individual diplomats admire and respect Waite's abilities, they see his enterprises as risky. What they would like most would be for all 27 Britons still in West Beirut to leave. Then at least the pressure on them could not be increased by fresh hostage-taking.

Financial Times Saturday, January 31 1987

Oh what a slippery war

ONCE again this week, the governments of several western countries found themselves on the rack of the hostage dilemma. All are committed to a policy of "no concessions to" or "no bargaining with" terrorists or hostage-takers and there is no doubt that this commands public suport. But it is a principle much harder to practise than to proclaim and few governments are confident about that support continuing when the going gets rough.

Officials and advisers from 22 Western governments and international organisations gathered in Sussex this week for a Wilton Park conference on terrorism.

But even among this formidable group of experts, there was no consensus on what precisely terrorism is: a method rather than a philosophy certainly, and almost everyone felt it was unacceptable, no matter how laudable the objective (though a small minority argued it would be better to define it first without reference to prescriptive values, leaving open the possibility that, in certain circumstances, it might be morally justifiable).

While ultimate goals were considered irrelevant, the immediate aim of inspiring fear or terror is crucial, otherwise every murder or act of arson could be classified as terrorism.

In most people's view, ordinary kidnapping or extortion does not qualify as terrorism which is seen as terrorising the population at large, or at least some section within it. Some would add that terrorism must also have a political or social objective, not simply the personal enrichment of the perpetrators. But this is already more controversial: one could argue for a category of purely mercenary terrorist, exemplified by the man who poisoned Tylenol capsules to extort money from the manufacturers by panicking the public.

One school of thought insists that the definition must specify the use of "criminal acts . . . contrary to international law." At first sight, it seems tautological to seek to define an international crime by saying that it is a crime against international law.

But without this the definition would include acts of normal behaviour by states involved in war: the threat or use of violence to obtain political objectives — particularly by inspiring fear among the whole population—and the indiscriminate killing of civilians, who have little influence over governments.

A definition of terrorism which makes such things criminal will be of purely academic value, since it will not be acceptable to the world's most powerful states. Therefore, the definition has to group together certain acts already recognised as crimes, rather than making anything criminal which was not so before.

But this deprives the exercise of much of its moral value. Is it not imposing a double standard to say that "terrorism" is legitimate when practised by established states with the power to wage war, but illegitimate for groups of oppressed people?

One answer to this is that international law does recognise the right of peoples to resist oppression, and that *bona fide* acts of insurgency or guerrilla warfare are not criminal. Indeed, a great deal of energy and ingenuity was devoted, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, to adapting the Geneva Convention to cover these acts. But an air of unreality remains: to obtain protection under international law, insurgents have to operate in regular units with distinguishing insignia, etc.

This is understandable because few states would concede belligerent rights to resistance

Edward Mortimer discusses terrorism

forces operating in plain clothes and resorting to surprise attacks. Yet this is the kind of activity which virtually any resistance has to embark on when faced with a monopoly of conventional military force in the hands of the oppressive or occupying power.

Thus it proves difficult to divorce the definition of terrosim from value judgments about the political context. In a democracy, where non-violent means of opposition are available, most people would describe the assassination of political leaders, judges, policemen or members of the armed forces as terrorism. Under a repressive state or foreign military occupation they would be reluctant to do so, reserving the label "terrorist" for indiscriminate killing of civilians.

That suggests a broader definition of terrorism can be used by co-operating states that recognise each other as democratic, while a narrower one will have to do for those which have different systems.

However terrorism is defined, its effects are so far no worse, indeed quantitatively nothing like as bad, as those of weapons of mass destruction. Terrorism is a form of war waged by those without the means, and without the legal personality, required to wage war legally.

States have to defend themselves against terrorism, as they do against other forms of war. But so long as Western democracies do not feel able to deny themselves the use of weapons of mass destruction, they should not assume an automatic moral superiority over those who resort to terrorism. Western political aims may be more defensible than other ones, but the methods of waging war are not qualitatively different.


The states the West accuses of sponsoring terrorism have been quick to grasp this point, condemning at the UN what they call "state terrorism," by which they mean such actions as the American bombing of Tripoli.

It is also difficult to avoid some kind of dialogue with such states. A French participant in the conference was disarmingly frank about this: "We will not bargain with terrorists," he said, "but we will negotiate with states, even if they are sponsors." Perhaps this statement should be adopted retroactively by the Reagan Administration.

Accounts conflict over how the Reagan Administration got involved in its ill-fated bargain with Iran. It sounds as if US officials gave a higher priority than required by public opinion — let alone long-term public interest — to obtaining the release of American hostages in Lebanon.

Yet US policy objectives in relation to Iran are almost bound to include dissuading that country from sponsoring groups in Lebanon that take US citizens hostage. It is surely reasonable that, in any incipient dialogue with Iran, US representatives would insist that it use its influence to obtain the freedom of hostages as a minimum sign of good faith. Similarly, Iran would insist on an end to the embargo on arms deliveries.

If lines of sponsorship and control were absolute and clear, there would be little problem: either all hostages are released unconditionally or no dialogue is possible—indeed, other sanctions may be appropriate. The trouble is that sponsorship may be the work of only one political faction or intelligence agency rather than of a government or regime as such. Support given by the state to a terrorist group—for services rendered, out of sympathy for its political aims or as an insurance policy—will not necessarily



buy total leverage or power to veto, especially where there is another competing sponsor involved.

Abu Nidal, for instance, has played off Iraq against Syria, and probably now Syria against Libya, with great skill.

While in principle it would be preferable if these states abstained from such sponsorship, Western governments inevitably find themselves looking for "respectable" interlocutors capable of influencing terrorist groups. In practice, it is only through some kind of sponsorship that a degree of influence is obtained; and it is only by showing interest in the sponsor state's political agenda that persuasion is likely to succeed.

"No bargaining with terrorists or their sponsors" is a fine slogan. But in real life it is hard to know where the search for "good offices" ends and bargaining for hostages' lives begins.

B66151/1A

Anti-terrorist teams foil Libya-IRA jailbreak bid

by Chris Ryder and David Connett

BRITISH security forces have foiled a planned joint Libyan-IRA operation to free top-security terrorist prisoners from jail.

According to security sources, representatives from the Libyan People's Bureau in Rome met IRA men in Amsterdam and Paris last summer and autumn to discuss freeing a number of IRA and Libyan prisoners serving long sentences for serious offences committed in Britain.

The Libyans offered to finance the planned escapes if the IRA organised them. The IRA would be allowed to include a number of their own convicted members in the break-outs.

One Brighton bomber, Patrick McGee, and another terrorist, Dickie Glenholmes, are thought to have been among those who were to be sprung.

The Libyans' ability to operate independently in Britain has been severely curtailed since WPC Yvonne Fletcher was shot during the siege at the Libyan People's Bureau in London in 1984. It was followed by the expulsion of the Libyan diplomats and the introduction of strict visa requirements and security checks for Libyans.

The meetings between the IRA and the Libyans were detected and monitored by the security authorities in France and the Netherlands. They have stepped up their surveillance of Libyan and Irish nationals as part of the drive against international terrorism.

The contacts were reported under arrangements for intelligence swapping and investigated further by security forces in Britain and Ireland. The joint intelligence committee at the Cabinet Office reported the information to Scotland Yard, the prison authorities and the Home Office, where precautions were taken at each of the top-security prisons.

In Ireland, police on both sides of the border reported the IRA had studied escape plans at the Libyans' request. The IRA army council is believed to have nominated three prominent prisoners for escape attempts. These were Brian Keenan and Dickie Glenholmes, both former operations officers, and Patrick McGee, the Brighton Grand Hotel bomber, who was a crucial figure in IRA operations in Britain for more than 10 years. The other two, both hard-liners from Belfast, were responsible for the IRA's terrorist onslaught throughout most of the 1970s.

Close attention was paid to the prisoners the Libyans wanted to free. None has been named, but among those believed to have been on the list is Rasim Awad, jailed for 25 years at the Old Bailey last year after a jury heard how he planned grenade attacks on British targets.

There are at least eight other Libyans serving long sentences in British top-security prisons after being convicted of a variety of offences, including murder and conspiracy to cause explosions. Some were members of Col Gadaffi's hit squads sent to kill the Libyan leader's critics who were living in Britain.

As Category A prisoners, they are surrounded by tight security. The main top-security prisons in Britain are at Hull, Gartree in Leicestershire, Albany and Parkhurst on the Isle of Wight, Durham, Wakefield and Long Larton in Worcestershire.

A month ago the security forces decided that the IRA had abandoned the plans. They are confident that present security precautions deterred planners of the would-be escapes.

The Libyans, who repeatedly give the IRA public support, partly based on their hostility to Britain, have financed the IRA in the past, but cash support was thought to have dried up.

The most publicised case of Libyan support for the IRA occured in March 1973 when an Irish naval vessel intercepted a gun-running ship carrying five tons of weapons suplied by Libya, including a large number of anti-tank weapons. Joe Cahill, a leading figure in the IRA ruling council, was arrested on board.

Links between the two have been strained since May 1975 after the arrest and deportation of an IRA liaison officer in Libya.

THE SUNDAY TIMES 1 FEBRUARY 1987

CONFIDENTIAL

B66/5/1A.

NEW ZEALAND EMBASSY
TO THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA
P. O. BOX 94397, RIYADH 11693
TEL: 4766602, TLX. 205878 HUIA SJ

سفارة نيوزيلندا
بالمملكة العربية السعودية
ص.ب : ٩٤٣٩٧ ، الرياض ١١٦٩٣
تلفون : ٤٧٦٦٦٠٢ ، تلكس ٢٠٥٨٧٨ إس جيه

NEW ZEALAND
LONDON
- 4 FEB 1987
CENTRAL REGISTRY
HIGH COMMISSION

41/6/3 SWP

FEA.

Copied JIO.

31 January 1987

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs
WELLINGTON

Attention: MEA

cc: SFA (DLO SEC LGL)
PMD
NZSIS
Police (PTIU)
EIB
Defence (DDOps)
London
Bahrain
Baghdad
Tehran

TERRORISM : ANOTHER SAUDI VICTIM

Our 41/6/3 of 25 January reported the kidnap in Beirut of a Saudi official. A second kidnap, on 26 January ... (press report attached) prompted us to make further enquiries. We can now confirm that two hijackers of the Iraqi flight did survive. They were promptly handed over to Baghdad : some say the next day, others after an interval of several days and following a request to Kind Fahd from the Iraqi President during their meeting in Dammam.

2 According to the Saudi MFA last week, the kidnappers of Damanhouri had made no contact with Saudi Arabia, nor released any public demands. They are firmly of the view that the event is linked to the Iraqi hijack. As the Saudis no longer held the hijackers, the objective of the kidnappings must be either financial compensation or revenge. A third possibility, to have the Saudis respond differently on a future occasion, is discounted here.

Geoff Randal

(Geoff Randal)
for Chargè d'Affaires

Encl

CONFIDENTIAL

41|6|3

SAUDI GAZETTE - 28 JANUARY 1987

Saudi kidnapped in Beirut

Second abduction of Saudis in two weeks

BEIRUT, Tues. (Rtr.)

A SAUDI national was kidnapped by three unidentified gunmen in Beirut yesterday.

Amal sources said Khaled Deeb was dragged by the gunmen into a BMW car at about 2000 GMT on Monday near the Bourj Al-Barajneh Palestinian refugee camp.

The kidnapping occurred near the spot where another Saudi, Bakr Damanhouri, was seized on January 14 in the capital's southern districts.

Deeb's abduction brings to at least 29 the number of foreigners missing, believed held by militants, some of whom seek changes in the Mid-east's and Western states' policies.

The Beirut police said they had no clues about Deeb's kidnapping and so far no demands have been made by the abductors. Damanhouri was an employee of the Saudi cultural attache's office in West Beirut.

Damanhouri was earlier kidnapped from the lobby of his apartment building in the Al-Rousha quarter in the Lebanese capital shortly after his arrival in the country.

The *Gazette* had learned that Damanhouri was kidnapped one day after the abduction of his Filipino housemaid, indicating that his kidnappers were familiar with his travel plans.

Waite kidnapped?—See Page 3

Sources said Damanhouri's kidnappers were apparently waiting for him in the lobby and took him as he arrived from the airport. He did not resist. Damanhouri had looked after Saudi students' affairs in Beirut.

The Kingdom had earlier condemned in a statement, all forms and methods of terrorism.

B661/5/1A

UNCLASS-SECURE 27 JANUARY 1987
FROM WELLINGTON
TO SUVA APIA PORT MORESBY HONIARA 93(M) ROUTINE
RPTD NEW YORK (PR) CANBERRA ROUTINE
SVGS LONDON OTTAWA WASHINGTON GENEVA BONN (VIA WLN)


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FAP
CHPS

SFA (LGL UNC SPA)

TERRORISM : HOSTAGES CONVENTION

NEW YORK'S 3Q.
GRATEFUL IF POSTS WOULD MAKE A FURTHER LOW KEY APPROACH TO FIJI, PNG, SAMOA, SOLOMONS AND VANUATU GOVERNMENTS REGARDING RATIFICATION.
=

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WLN 27/1903LT NWG



COL 93(M) 3Q

FROM COMMUNIST POLICY & TACTICS 5/86.

B66/5/1A.

THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TO TERRORISM

1. The Soviet Union condemns terrorism in its public statements, and rejects the suggestion that its support for national liberation movements amounts to backing for terrorism. Under Soviet law, those accused of acts of terrorism against Soviet officials or representatives of a foreign state may receive the death penalty under certain circumstances. Moscow supported the UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions of December 1985 condemning hostage taking and terrorism. The Soviet Union is a signatory to International Conventions on hijacking.

2. Probably in response to charges of indirect support for terrorist groups, the Soviet line has become more circumspect in recent years. In the early 1970's, official spokesmen (including former Candidate Politburo member Ponomarev) were prepared to support certain radical left-wing groups (although not the most extreme groups). Recent commentators, however, have underlined Soviet disapproval of both right and left wing extremists groups which use methods of violence and terrorism. As part of his campaign to present the Soviet Union as moderate and constructive in its international behaviour, Gorbachev (in his report to the CPSU Congress last February) rejected terrorism in principle, and offered effective cooperation with other states in order to root it out. The Soviet media have retaliated sharply against Western charges of Soviet support for terrorism, with counter-accusations of Western (especially US) involvement in acts of violence and sabotage. The CIA, for example have been accused of being behind Sikh terrorism and even the assassination of Mrs Gandhi. A media campaign against alleged Western State Terrorism has also been launched following the US raids on Libya.

/3.

3. For all the fine words, Soviet relations with some national liberation movements and states which indulge in or back terrorism show that Moscow regards terrorism as a useful aid on occasion to the furthering of its foreign policy interests. Moscow continues to offer training, and financial and political support to movements who have been involved in terrorism - Palestinian groups and the African National Congress. In Central and South America, the Soviet Union has let Cuba and Nicaragua take the lead in providing material supplies and training. Recent finds of major arms caches in Chile, however, have raised the question of increased Soviet indirect promotion of guerrilla activities in Chile. The arms were probably destined for the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front, the armed wing of the Chilean Communist Party. The latter has close links with Moscow (its leader, Corvalan, lives in Moscow). The Soviet Union has close relations with Syria, which offers support to a number of international terrorist groups.

4. On the other hand, where terrorist acts conflict with Soviet policy aims, and prove embarrassing to the Russians, the Soviet Union can be expected to exert a restraining influence on the protagonists, in the wake of the US raids on Tripoli and Benghazi last April, and may have done so in the case of Libya. The Soviet Union claims there was no proof of Libyan involvement in the Berlin discotheque bombing. In a significant passage in the TASS report of a meeting between Gorbachev and the Libyan leader Jalloud last May, Gorbachev appeared to be warning Libya about offering further excuses, through acts of terrorism, for American retaliation. The Soviet Union has shown itself to be wary of involvement with extremist groups over which it cannot exert control either in the Middle East, Western Europe or Latin America, and there is little evidence linking the Soviet Union directly with acts of terrorism (other than the murder of President Amin in Afghanistan in 1979). Soviet

/Union

Union maintains a cautious public attitude to both wings of the IRA to avoid the charge that it is sympathetic towards terrorism or that it interferes in the internal affairs of Western countries. The Soviet Union will have been increasingly wary of such groups since it has been the victim of terrorist attacks itself in the Lebanon, and most recently in Peru, where Soviet fishermen were attacked and seriously injured by the extreme left-wing Sendero Luminoso, in protest against Soviet Government links with the Peruvian Government and Soviet exploitation of Peruvian fishing resources.

B66/5/1A

27 January 198]

copies also taken for NZSIS

The Acting Director
External Intelligence Bureau
WELLINGTON

c.c. SFA, WELLINGTON (DLO)

TERRORISM : DICTIONARY OF TERRORIST GROUPS

... Middle East Section of the Research Department, F.C.O., have passed to us the attached copy (EIB only) of a reference dictionary they have prepared listing known Middle Eastern terrorist groups.

2. The dictionary listings set out the history of each organisation, the nature of its activities, modus operandi, and make a brief assessment of the threat it poses to the United Kingdom.

S. W. PRIOR
S.W. Prior
for High Commissioner

Att.

CONFIDENTIAL

NEW ZEALAND EMBASSY
TO THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA
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B 66/5/1A

سفارة نيوزيلندا
بالمملكة العربية السعودية
ص.ب : ٩٤٣٩٧ ، الرياض ١١٦٩٣
تلفون : ٤٧٦٦٦٠٢ ، تلكس ٢٠٥٨٧٨ إس جيه

NEW ZEALAND HIGH COMMISSION
LONDON
29 JAN 1987
CENTRAL REGISTRY

41/6/3

copy on B69/5/2

25 January 1987

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs
WELLINGTON

Attention: MEA

cc: SFA (DLO SEC LGL)
PMD
NZSIS
Police (PTIU)
EIB
Defence (DDOps)
London
Bahrain
Baghdad
Tehran

TERRORISM : A SAUDI VICTIM

... The kidnapping of a Saudi official in Beirut on 12 January received belated coverage in the Saudi press (example attached). There has been no further mention of the case so far. We have no doubt that the Saudis will do what they can directly, through Syria or other parties beholden to them, to buy release.

2 We know of no particular reason why a Saudi should have been targetted at that particular time. The only angle which comes to mind is the speculation outside the Kingdom that the Saudis hold two surviving members of the group which hijacked an Iraqi airliner in December. Baghdad reported on that event in their telex 586 (not to London or Bahrain) of 28 December 1986.

Geoff Randal
(Geoff Randal)
for Ambassador

Encl

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SAUDI GAZETTE - 15 JANUARY 1987

Saudi kidnapped in Beirut; Kingdom slams terrorism

BEIRUT, Wed. (Agencies)

GUNMEN kidnapped, Bakr Al-Damanhouri, a Saudi employee of the Saudi Cultural Attache's office in West Beirut, on Monday.

Damanhouri, who looks after Saudi students' affairs in Lebanon, was kidnapped from the lobby of his apartment building in the Al-Rousha quarter in the Lebanese capital shortly after his arrival at Beirut International Airport.

The *Gazette* learned that Damanhouri was kidnapped one day after the abduction of his Filipino housemaid, indicating that his kidnappers were familiar with his travel plans.

Damanhouri had originally been scheduled to fly to Beirut last Thursday. However, a rocket attack that destroyed an MEA Boeing on the tarmac forced the airport to close, and his arrival was delayed to Saturday. Damanhouri then again delayed his flight until Monday.



Bakr Damanhouri

His kidnappers had apparently been waiting for him in the lobby and took him as he arrived from the airport. He did not resist.

The Kingdom, in a statement, condemned all forms and methods of terrorism and urged the Lebanese authorities to take immediate action to free kidnapped employee, an official source in Riyadh said.

CONFIDENTIAL

New Zealand High Commission

New Zealand House
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London SW1Y 4TQ
Telephone 01-930 8422
Telex 24368

"YELLOW"

Reference:
B69/56
B66/5/1A

22 January 1987

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(MEA AMER)

MOD (DDI)
c.c. E.I.B.
TEHRAN
WASHINGTON

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Date	Nature of Material

Lebanon - Hostages and "Irangate"

21/22 January 1987 Two-part Independent series by Michael Sheridan on Beirut hostages situation. According to the author it is based on 'interviews with diplomats, officials and relatives of hostages between October 1986 and January 1987 in Syria, Lebanon, Cyprus, Italy and the United States'.

"S.W. Prior"
for High Commissioner

BGG/5/1A

WLN31/431

CBA 241
RR WELLINGTON - RR OTTAWA NEW YORK PM MM LONDON WASHINGTON GENEVA
ZCZC
CCC
CLAS: UNCLAS SECURE 2Q JAN 87
FROM CANBERRA
TO WELLINGTON 167 - ROUTINE
RPTD NEW YORK PM 1Q : OTTAWA 11 - ROUTINE
SVGS (VIA LDC) LONDON WASHINGTON GENEVA
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UNCLASS SECURE

1160
FAL
CLIPS

LD : SFA (UNC LGL)

SUBJ: TERRORISM : HOSTAGES CONVENTION

NEW YORK PM'S 3Q. THE AUSTRALIAN POSITION ON RATIFICATION OF THIS CONVENTION IS SOMEWHAT COMPLICATED. DFA IS URGING THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S DEPT TO PREPARE THE NECESSARYLEGISLATION WITH THE AIM OF PUTTING IT THROUGH PARLIAMENT IN THE BUDGET SESSION LATER THIS YEAR (I.E. SOMETIME BETWEEN AUGUST AND DECEMBER). TO DATE THE CONVENTION HAS NOT BEEN A PRIORITY AREA FOR THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S DEPT BUT DFA (GOODRICK, MULTILATERAL LEGAL SECTION) NOTED THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF AUSTRALIAN RATIFICATION THERE WERE PROBLEMS IN THE EXTRADITION TREATIES WHICH AUSTRALIA IS PRESENTLY NEGOTIATING: OFFENCES AS DETERMINED BY THE CONVENTION WOULD NOT BE EXEMPT FROM EXTRADITION PROCEEDINGS IF AUSTRALIA WAS NOT A PARTY TO THE CONVENTION. FOR THIS REASON THERE SHOULD BE SOME PRESSURE TO GET THE LEGISLATION THROUGH AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. BUT THE OFFICIAL POSITION IS THAT THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF RATIFICATION BEFORE THE SECOND HALF OF 1987 AND NO CERTAINTY OF RATIFICATION THIS YEAR.
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UNCLASS SECURE

(1) Ms Kennard to see (2) 1866/5/1A ~~1866~~

NYP 139
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UNCLASS SECURE

CLAS : UNCLASSIFIED SECURE 16 JANUARY 1987
FROM : NEW YORK PM
TO : WELLINGTON 30 -ROUTINE
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CANBERRA 12 -ROUTINE
SAVINGS (VIA LDC) LONDON OTTAWA WASHINGTON
SAVINGS (VIA LONDON) GENEVA BONN

1071
FAP
CLIPS

LD : SFA (UNC/LGL)

SUBJ : TERRORISM : HOSTAGES CONVENTION

ACTION COPY

OUR 573 OF 13 JUNE 1986.
A FURTHER MEETING WAS CALLED BY FRG YESTERDAY TO REVIEW PROGRESS IN ATTRACTING MORE PARTIES TO HOSTAGES CONVENTION. THERE ARE FOUR NEW PARTIES SINCE THE LAST MEETING - AUSTRIA, ANTIGUE AND BARBUDA, DOMINICA AND TOGO - BRINGING THE TOTAL TO 39.
2 PARTICIPANTS REPORTED THAT A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES ARE ACTIVELY PROCEEDING TO RATIFICATION OR ACCESSION. OUR CANADIAN COLLEAGUE ADVISES THAT AUSTRALIA HOPES TO BE ABLE TO RATIFY LATER THIS YEAR. NEGATIVE RESPONSES HAVE BEEN GIVEN TO DEMARCHES ONLY BY SOME ARAB COUNTRIES (SYRIA, LEBANON), SOUTH AFRICA, AND THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, WHICH OBJECT TO ARTICLE IX (PROHIBITING THE EXTRADITION OF OFFENDERS IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES).

UNCLASS SECURE

UNCLASS SECURE

3 REACTIONS TO OUR DEMARCHES TO SOUTH PACIFIC STATES REST WITH YOUR 537 AND SUBSEQUENT MESSAGES FROM SUVA (69), PORT MORESBY (22) AND APIA (1156). WE APPRECIATE THAT THIS ISSUE CANNOT BE A MAJOR PRIORITY, EITHER FOR OUR SOUTH PACIFIC NEIGHBOURS OR FOR YOU. HOWEVER, YOU MAY WISH TO GIVE THOUGHT TO FURTHER APPROACHES IN THE REGION BEFORE THE NEXT MEETING OF THE PARTIES, TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED FOR 11 JUNE. WE DID UNDERTAKE TO SEEK A REPLY FROM SOLOMONS AND VANUATU, NEITHER OF WHICH HAS APPARENTLY RESPONDED TO OUR EARLIER APPROACH.

NYP 139
16/2100Z NYP
NNNN

UNCLASS SECURE

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Telex 24368

"YELLOW"

Reference: B66/12/2
B66/5/1A

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(EUR DLO)

c.c. E.I.B.

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Date	Nature of Material
	Council of Europe
20 January 1987	Independent article previewing meeting in London of 21 European Interior Ministers under auspices of Council of Europe to discuss common approach to problem of drug trafficking. Involvement of Council of Europe in drug trafficking and terrorism problems.

"S.W. Prior"
for High Commissioner

THE INDEPENDENT Tuesday 20 January 1987

A neglected European forum makes its mark

By John Lichfield
West Europe Editor

A MEETING of 21 European interior ministers in London today to discuss a common approach to the struggle against drug trafficking marks another step in the re-emergence of the Council of Europe as an active player in European politics.

The ministers will be preparing a joint European position for a projected UN conference on drugs. They are expected to endorse the British decision to confiscate the assets of drugs traffickers and to agree that it should be enforced Europe-wide and, ideally, worldwide.

The Strasbourg-based Council is often confused with the European Community, especially the European Parliament, which shares its buildings. It is in fact the oldest and geographically the largest pan-European organisation (founded in 1949, eight years before the EEC). But its activities in the fields of health, education and culture have been progressively overshadowed by the growth in size and influence of the Common Market.

The clear exception has been the work of the Council's best-known agencies, the Commission and Court of Human Rights. The Human Rights Commission will be in the news again today, when it decides whether to pursue a case brought against the government for banning trade union membership at the Cheltenham GCHQ intelligence unit.

But the Council of Europe has recently been attempting, with some success, to re-create a wider political role to complement the activities of the EEC. Much of its new-found energy dates from the appointment of a former Spanish foreign minister, Marcelino Oreja, as secretary-general in January 1985. In the past two years Mr Oreja has given a clearer shape to the Council's activities by making the Human Rights Convention its central covenant and pushing the idea of Strasbourg as the keeper of Europe's conscience.

"Common respect for and determination to enforce the human values of European civilisation were the reasons for the foundation of the Council of Europe from the ruins of the last war," Mr Oreja told *The Independent*. "They should now once again be its main focus."

Partly through Mr Oreja's prompting, the Council has based its new-found claim to relevance on two modern and essentially international threats to human values: drugs and terrorism. Since both know no borders, it makes sense to spread European co-operation beyond the Common Market to the non-EEC states in the Council of Europe: Austria, Cyprus, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Malta, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey.

At the same time, the non-EEC states of Western Europe, now in a minority for the first time, have become increasingly anxious to play a part in European co-operation, short of outright Community membership. There is also, conversely, a reluctance on the part of some EEC states to allow Brussels to extend its influence to new areas, including education, culture and the struggle against international crime.

The Council of Europe has none of the Community's supranational powers. It proceeds by informal co-operation and legal conventions — 127 to date — binding only on those members which choose to ratify them. This less centralised approach is preferred by the determined neutrals outside the EEC (Sweden, Switzerland) but, also, in some sensitive areas, by states within the Common Market (Denmark, Greece and occasionally Britain).

A motion before the House of Commons tonight suggests, for instance, that European broadcasting policy should be shaped by the Council of Europe, not the EEC. The motion's signatories include Mrs Thatcher.

The 12 EEC states have reached independent agreements to co-operate against terrorism and drugs in the past 12 months. But progress in the Council of Europe has at least kept pace and, in some respects, gone ahead of progress within the EEC. The 21 are said to be nearing agreement that a terrorist arrested after fleeing from one member state to another must either be extradited or tried locally. There is no such understanding, so far, at EEC level.

Mr Oreja believes that the Council (total cost £41m a year, equivalent to about one day's spending on the EEC farm policy) can make for itself a permanent role as the standard-bearer of European civilisation. While the European Community pursues political and economic integration for the states minded to follow that road, he believes the Council should be the forum for co-operation to protect values already shared in common.

"The Council must be a political framework for the defence of human rights and democratic and civilised values. This means extending the scope of the Convention on Human Rights, if possible, to new areas such as women's rights and workers' rights to information on their companies. But it also means acting together to defend Europe's values against challenges such as drugs abuse and terrorism."

■ BRUSSELS (AFP) — The European Economic Community announced yesterday that it was providing $650,000 in emergency aid to Nigeria to finance a vaccination programme against yellow fever. The World Health Organization said last month that about 500 people had died of yellow fever in the previous four weeks.

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"YELLOW"

Reference: B66/5/1A

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

19 January 1987

(DLO EUR AAD MEA)

c.c. ~~E x I x B x~~ PMD
NZSIS (TIC)
DEFENCE (DDOP)

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Date	Nature of Material
	Terrorism
8 January 1987	Listener article by Paul Wilkinson, Professor of International Relations (and expert on terrorism) Aberdeen University.

S.W. Prior
for High Commissioner

THE LISTENER

8 January 1987

Paul Wilkinson **Cover story**

'Democracy must not be held to ransom by terrorism'

'Crisis!' on BBC1 was a dramatised version of an imaginary hijack. Professor Paul Wilkinson chaired a crisis committee which discussed how to deal with the hypothetical problems. Here he discusses the dilemmas of governments facing similar, all too real, crises.

Should a democratic government be willing to enter into diplomatic negotiations for the release of hijack victims or hostages? If so, what can be safely conceded, and what must be non-negotiable? Should the government be prepared to release prisoners in order to secure the release of hostages? Should it pay ransom? Should commercial firms or families be allowed to pay ransom to save the life of a hostage? Under what circumstances, and with what degree of risk to life, is it justifiable to use military force to rescue hostages? Is it ever permissible to use force without the consent of the state where the hijack or hostage incident has occurred?

It is my profound belief that these fundamental policy issues can and must be properly debated by a democratic society. The evolution of anti-terrorist policy and measures should not be the monopoly of experts. In common with other major aspects of foreign and domestic policy, measures to deal with terrorism require maximum public understanding, consent and active co-operation. Indeed, in a democratic system no long-term policy will survive unless it is sustained by a high degree of popular support.

When policy on terrorism is left to a small, self-appointed élite, the danger is that you get incompetent and foolish men conducting bad policy, and that they get away with it because they have deliberately evaded public and legislative scrutiny and accountability. The 'Irangate' scandal, the Reagan administration's arms-for-hostages deal with Iran and the diversion of some of the profits to the Contras, provides a dreadful warning of the dangers and corrupting effects of abuse of secret power.

Of course, it is true that in debating policy on terrorism one must take particular care to prevent any information of potential value to an enemy from entering the public domain. But terrorism is by no means unique in this respect. Every aspect of defence policy has to be debated with similar constraints in mind. But is it seriously suggested that public discussion of defence issues should therefore be suppressed or evaded?


In making the *Crisis!* programme we tried to ensure that the discussions involving senior politicians and diplomatic, military and legal experts avoided giving away any classified information. This did not prove to be a real problem because the programme was designed to deal with fundamental policy issues and not with the details of past or current incidents, or sensitive operational matters. It was a major safeguard that the entire programme was filmed and edited well in advance of its showing. Those who contributed were given the opportunity to delete any comment or detail which they felt might be damaging, or which could be misunderstood.

The making of the programme posed enormous problems. Because it was impossible to foresee how the crisis committee would react to the various stages of the hijack, many different scenarios had to be allowed for in the filming and in Jeremy Paxman's interviews. It was not simply a matter of two or three possible outcomes; the whole sequence would need to be altered if, for example, the committee decided to try negotiating a deal with the hijackers, or if, having gone some way towards this, the whole thing had gone disastrously wrong. Another major complication was that policies and actions could not be attributed to foreign governments or individuals, in case this brought diplomatic protests or libel suits from the government concerned. This made it desirable to suggest that all the passengers of the hijacked plane were British.

Last but not least of the problems encountered was the decision by James Callaghan to withdraw from the role of chairman of the crisis committee two weeks before the programme was due to be recorded. His reasons were perfectly understandable: as a former Prime Minister he was worried in case he might let slip some key information concerning national security, or that his comments might be taken as revealing the actual policy of the British government in such situations. As it was, his colleagues were a model of caution and correctness on matters of national security. The programme did not give away any secrets.

Crisis! did, however, highlight some important geneal lessons about combating international terrorism which deserve the widest possible assimilation among democratic citizens and governments. The situation presented in the programme is the archetypal terrorist problem for Western governments. Hijacking and other forms of hostage-taking are tactics chosen by fanatical terrorist groups because they know that such actions strike at the Achilles' heel of Western democracy. Our societies immediately identify with the hostages and their families, especially when they are fellow-countrymen. (One of the less attractive aspects of this is the relative lack of media and public interest when the victims happen to be from a foreign state.) Terrorists choose Western hostages knowing that by so doing they will be able to exert maximum emotional blackmail on the target Western government to concede their demands. They know full well that the Western mass media, especially the powerful medium of TV, will fuel the pressure on the government to appease in order to save lives. Terrorists today have learned all the tricks of media exploitation and manipulation, for example holding rigged 'press conferences' with the hostages, and releasing painful videos of individual hostages appealing for help, tugging at the world's heartstrings. And let us bear in mind that this hostage weapon has, in terrorist eyes, paid enormous dividends in recent years. In 1985 the Shi'ite terrorists who hijacked a TWA plane to Beirut were able to use their hostages to force the release of more than 600 prisoners from jail in Israel. This was not only a huge victory in the eyes of those particular terrorists: it whetted the appetite of terrorist groups, and their state sponsors, elsewhere for similar triumphs.

It now transpires that the US government has been engaged in secret arms-for-hostages deals with the Iranian regime, a major state sponsor of terrorism, since 1985, and possibly even earlier, in a desperate effort to recover US hostages from pro-Iranian terrorist groups in Lebanon. When one recalls the scathing American criticisms of deals made by certain European governments with Middle Eastern terrorist groups in order to try to buy a quiet life, the 'Irangate' affair reveals an astonishing hypocrisy and inconsistency in the conduct of government in Washington. But it is important to recognise that the scandal reveals more than gross dereliction of duty by high-ranking members of the administration, who must share responsibility for what was done in the name of the government. It also reveals a thoroughly bad policy. The initial claim that the arms were



Moment of crisis: terrorists blow up a 707 at Dawson Field, Amman, in 1970

sent to Iran as a token of good faith and to help build good relations with the likely successors to the Ayatollah Khomeini is clearly absurd. You do not have to provide much-needed weapons to a dangerous regime simply in order to open a diplomatic dialogue with it. It is transparently obvious that for the Iranian revolutionary leaders and the various terrorist groups which identify with their Islamic jihad, the deliveries of American arms and spare parts are seen as clear evidence that seizing American hostages achieves results. The only hopeful development from this sorry episode is the overwhelming condemnation of the arms-for-hostages deals on the part of the American public. Congress and the media are undoubtedly determined to discover the full facts in the major investigations due to begin shortly. Meanwhile, American public opinion has served notice that it will not tolerate such abuse of secrecy and abject weakness and double-dealing in US policy.

In total contrast to the policy of concessions and secret deals is the resolute refusal to surrender in the face of terrorist blackmail, however hard the going gets. It is this policy which has been admirably exemplified by successive British governments, and it is particularly apt that the British *Crisis*! programme team, representing all the major parties, demonstrated resolute adherence to this principle in its handling of the hijack and hostage crisis. It is of tremendous importance to achieve support among all the major parties in a democracy for the policy of refusal to surrender to terrorism. If one major party deserts this position, the terrorists will try to exploit the split, and their commitment to terror will be enormously stimulated by the scent of a possible victory.

Other key lessons brought out vividly by the programme are the vital importance of high-quality intelligence and its proper utilisation by decision-makers in countering terrorism, and the indispensable role of expert military forces,



Tehran, August 1984: hijackers of a Boeing 737 state their demands to a negotiator

for example for hostage rescue, amphibious operations and logistic support. It also underlines the crucial contribution of expert advice to the crisis managers on political and diplomatic matters, the assessment of intelligence, judicial and law enforcement aspects, and, of course, the military options and operational planning.

Of course, a crisis game is different from the real thing, and, as explained earlier, the *Crisis*! team had some of the cards stacked in its favour. But I firmly believe that the programme will help the public to understand and wholeheartedly support the hard-line policy against international terrorism. It is by no means easy to follow. It is all too easy to criticise it for being harsh, even inhuman. But a responsible democratic government cannot, through appeasement, jeopardise the security of hundreds or thousands of its citizens now and in the future, even when the precious lives of those held hostage are at stake.

After many years of study and reflection of how democracies can deal with terrorism, I am convinced that we can ultimately triumph by a firm strategy of minimising terrorists' rewards and maximising their losses. But we will only do so if we have national policies and measures which translate this will to win into practice and which avoid the perils of over- and under-reaction and maintain the democratic process and the rule of law.

Modern terrorists are ruthless, cunning and determined. If we are to beat them, our democratic governments must not let themselves be held to ransom. What we need, in good measure, are those Bulldog qualities of resolute determination and unflinching courage.

Paul Wilkinson is Professor of International Relations at the University of Aberdeen and the author of a number of books on terrorism, including 'Terrorism and the Liberal State'.

SP/SM

15 January 1987

B66/5/1A

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs
WELLINGTON

ATTN: DLO, EUR, LGL, SEC, AAD,
MEA, SPA

c.c. PMD
NZSIS (TIC)
Police (PTIU)
Defence (DDOP)

TERRORISM : ABU NIDHAL GROUP

Attached for your information is a copy of an FCO Research Department Background Brief entitled, "Abu Nidhal Group and State Terrorism".

2. Dated December 1986, the paper examines the background of "Abu Nidhal" and his group and provides a chronology of incidents known, or thought to be, connected with him.

3. The Brief concludes that the Nidhal group had "shown skill in adapting to the changing policies of their financial backers" (viz. the Iraqis, Syrians and Libyans) "and their capability to operate away from their own base in the Near East should not be underestimated".

S W Prior
for High Commissioner

Background Brief

Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London

December 1986

ABU NIDHAL GROUP AND STATE TERRORISM

The Syrians have been consistent supporters of the terrorist organisation Fatah-The Revolutionary Council, the formal name of the Abu Nidhal group, since 1983, and there is also evidence that the Libyan regime has given it support since 1985. The Syrians' support is particularly interesting because the Abu Nidhal group's early activities in 1976, when it sometimes used the operational name Black June, were directed against Syrian targets.

Abu Nidhal is the pseudonym of Sabri al-Banna, who was born of prosperous parents in Jaffa, Palestine, in the late 1930s, and was originally trained as a teacher. In the early 1960s he was a founder with Yasser Arafat and others of al-Fatah which, since 1968, has been the dominant group in the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). By 1969 he was Fatah representative in Khartoum and, after 1970, the PLO representative in Baghdad. By 1973, however, after the Arab States had failed to defeat Israel militarily, Abu Nidhal became increasingly opposed to the ideological and political stance adopted by Arafat and his immediate supporters whom he considered too moderate. He declared that he was himself the true leader of the armed struggle against Israel.

With Iraqi support, at a time when Iraq was one of the leading States rejecting any agreement with Israel, he established in Baghdad a breakaway faction called Fatah-The Revolutionary Council (there is another Revolutionary Council which is part of al-Fatah, and other superficial similarities exist between the Abu Nidhal group and Yasser Arafat's mainstream). It prepared plans to assassinate Arafat and other Palestinian leaders. Subsequently, the PLO asserted that Abu Nidhal had misappropriated its funds in Iraq and, in 1974, he was convicted (in his absence) by a Fatah military court of embezzlement of PLO funds, sedition and murder, and condemned to death.

The Palestine National Council's resolutions, in 1974, subordinating armed struggle to political action and establishing the goal of a Palestinian "mini-State", marked a watershed in Palestinian politics. It precipitated a major split in PLO ranks and intensified Abu Nidhal's opposition to Arafat.

Abu Nidhal's group developed rapidly as an effective terrorist organisation, operating under a variety of names appropriate to specific targets. Under Iraqi influence during 1976-77, it concentrated on Syrian

This paper has been prepared for general briefing purposes. It is not and should not be construed or quoted as an expression of Government policy.

objectives, using the name Black June in protest against the involvement of Syrian troops in Lebanon in June 1976. During 1976-77 the group made a number of attacks on Syrian targets including two assassination attempts, in December 1976 and October 1977, against the Syrian Foreign Minister Abdel-Halim Khaddam. The second attempt, which took place during a visit to Abu Dhabi, resulted in the death of the Deputy Foreign Minister of the United Arab Emirates, Saif Bin-Ghabbash. By 1978, however, the group had widened its range of political victims to include Palestinians who were pursuing the PLO policy of talking to the non-Zionist Israeli peace lobby. Abu Nidhal said in 1977 that "All contact with the Jewish State will be punished with death".

Opposition to the PLO

In 1978 three PLO representatives were murdered: Said Hammami (London, January), Ali Yassin (Kuwait, June) and Izzed-Din al Qalaq (Paris, August). All had been involved in the search for a diplomatic solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. In June 1981, the PLO representative in Brussels, Ibrahim Naim Khader, was killed. And in April 1983, Issam Ali Sartawi, a heart surgeon who had been one of Arafat's advisers and had initiated important Palestinian contacts with moderate Israelis, was shot dead while attending a Socialist International congress in Portugal. Sartawi, who was keeping a dossier on the Abu Nidhal group, had criticised its terrorist activities and insisted that Abu Nidhal himself should be put on trial. The Abu Nidhal communique admitting responsibility for Sartawi's murder said: "It is our pleasure to communicate ... our success in implementing the death sentence towards a criminal and traitor. The bullets that killed Issam Ali Sartawi are the bullets of Palestine".

Relations with Iraq and Syria

While Iraq was moving closer between 1978 and 1980 to more moderate Arab States (initially to help maintain a common front in opposition to the Camp David agreements and later in reaction to Iranian policies), Syria remained hostile to the Arafat wing of the PLO. Abu Nidhal, despite the earlier attacks on Syrian targets, moved his organisation to Damascus, though his headquarters and training camps remained temporarily in Iraq. In November 1982, an Iraqi Press release in Washington quoted President Saddam Hussein as having stated two months earlier: "When our policy is to welcome any Arab, it is quite natural for Abu Nidhal and any Palestinian fighter to be received in Iraq; welcoming such a person in Iraq is something, and encouraging anyone committing terrorism as a course for his policies is something else ... Iraq does not encourage terrorism and is rather against terrorism".

Iraq's final break with Abu Nidhal came after the conviction in London, in March 1983, of three of his supporters on charges of attempting to murder Shlomo Argov, the Israeli Ambassador to Britain, in June 1982. The Iraqi Press Counsellor in London denied any official Iraqi involvement in the attempt, after British Press reports had suggested that Nawaf Rosan, the group's leader in London, was a member of Iraqi intelligence and that the Iraqi Embassy had helped the group. The Iraqis insisted that their Embassy had only carried out "normal diplomatic work" and had "never been involved at any time" in such activity. Subsequent Press reports indicated that Abu Nidhal had been placed under house arrest in Baghdad; eventually, in November 1983, the Iraqi authorities announced his formal expulsion to Syria.

Jordanian and British targets

The move to Syria was followed by a period of increased terrorist activity, including attacks on Jordan and Britain (using the name "Revolutionary Organisation of Socialist Muslims" in abortive attempts to force the release of the Abu Nidhal prisoners in Britain). In 1984, new Abu Nidhal statements threatening Jordan and her Arab allies were followed by a series of attacks against Jordanian diplomats, including an unsuccessful attempt to kill the Chargé d'Affaires in Athens in November 1984, the murder of the Counsellor in Bucharest in December 1984, a rocket attack on the Jordanian Embassy in Rome in April 1985, the murder of a First Secretary at the Embassy in Ankara in July 1985, and another abortive attempt to kill the Chargé d'Affaires in Athens in August 1985. The Revolutionary Organisation of Socialist Muslims claimed responsibility for the murders of the Cultural Attaché at the British Embassy in Athens, in March 1984, and of Britain's Deputy High Commissioner in Bombay, in November 1984, and for the kidnapping of the British journalist, Alec Collett, in Lebanon in March 1985. The group also claimed responsibility for the "execution" of the journalist in April 1986.

Neither of the murdered British diplomats were involved in Middle Eastern politics. The journalist, whom his captors alleged to be a British intelligence officer spying for the US and Israel, had worked for a United Nations agency concerned with Palestinian refugees.

Abu Nidhal's health

A lull in Abu Nidhal activities during 1984 gave rise to Press speculation about Abu Nidhal's health, and in November 1984 it was rumoured that he had died of a heart attack (he had previously been reported as suffering from heart problems and as having undergone medical treatment in Eastern Europe). After the reports of his death were denied by his family, someone purporting to be Abu Nidhal gave a series of interviews to foreign journalists stressing that his personal survival was not essential. As his organisation later proclaimed:

> "Abu Nidhal is not just a person but a symbol and a fighting organisation which will fight to the end against imperialism and Zionism."

Moves towards Libya

By mid-1985, Abu Nidhal, while retaining his strong Syrian connexions, seemed to be moving closer to the Qadhafi regime in Libya. Persistent reports that he had established offices in Tripoli were complemented by rumours that Qadhafi had provided several million pounds for the group's activities. In November 1985, after the hijacking of an Egyptair aircraft to Cyprus at a cost in lives of 59 passengers, the Egyptian authorities asserted that Libya had masterminded the incident, using terrorists associated with Abu Nidhal; among those claiming responsibility was the Arab Revolutionary Brigades in Beirut, using a name previously associated with the Abu Nidhal group in its attacks on Kuwaiti, UAE and Jordanian targets. Meanwhile, the group continues to use its offices in Damascus, which the Syrian authorities insist are concerned only with information matters. The group also maintains

its training facilities in the Beka'a Valley in Lebanon, an area where Syrian troops are deployed.

Most of Abu Nidhal's victims have been Arab, and he has many Arab critics. According to the newspaper Al Mujtama (Kuwait) on 8 July 1986:

> "If the Abu Nidhal group confined its operations to attacks on the Zionist enemy inside the occupied territories, it would enjoy the fullest support and respect of the masses. But all it is concerned with is killing people - innocent people ... it kills them for purposes which are far removed from the Palestinian cause and which may, indeed, be in conflict with it; and it does this under the protection of the intelligence services of the State in which it resides and perhaps of those of other States too. This is not 'revolutionary' violence; it is futile, unsavoury violence which must either be stopped or be directed against its proper target in the occupied land of Palestine. Those within whose doors Abu Nidhal has found protection and support must change their ideas and throw him out; if they do not, and he remains on their territory, then the world will be left in no doubt that this terrorist is working on their behalf."

The future

In 1986, the Abu Nidhal organisation was known to have been responsible for only a handful of terrorist attacks, including a hijack operation in Karachi and an attack on an Istanbul synagogue (both took place in September and resulted in indiscriminate civilian casualties). In the middle of the year there were again rumours about Abu Nidhal's deteriorating health and there may have been changes in the group's leadership. Nevertheless, the organisation continues to see itself as the sole standard-bearer of the Palestinian revolution. It still has the capability to act in support of any State pursuing "rejectionist" policies in the Middle East, to oppose any State advocating discussions with Israel and to pay special attention to all countries (such as Austria, Belgium, Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Kuwait, Greece, Portugal and Turkey) which have imprisoned Abu Nidhal terrorists.

The group receives financial aid from countries sympathising with its activities. There have also been persistent rumours that certain countries have paid the group "protection" money. Contributions by individuals are likely to be less important. There is therefore no doubt that Abu Nidhal has considerable resources and that they have been well managed. According to PLO estimates in 1983, the Iraqis had been providing the organisation with some $10 million annually, while Syria provided an additional $1 million. Latterly the Syrians and Libyans have been the main paymasters (it has been estimated that the Qadhafi regime alone probably provided the group with over $10 million for use in 1986). The terrorists have shown skill in adapting to the changing policies of their financial backers, and their capability to operate away from their own base in the Near East should not be underestimated.

CHRONOLOGY

The following incidents are believed to have some connexion with the Abu Nidhal group under one or other of its pseudonyms.

1976

September	Attack on the Semiramis Hotel, Damascus, demanding release of prisoners.
October	Attack on Syrian embassies in Rome and Islamabad.
November	Occupation of the Intercontinental Hotel, Amman, apparently with the intention of taking hostages. Three of the terrorists were killed and the fourth captured.
December	Attempted assassination of the Syrian Foreign Minister, Abdel-Halim Khaddam.

1977

October	Another attempt on Khaddam's life during a visit to Abu Dhabi resulted in the death instead of the UAE Deputy Foreign Minister, Saif Bin-Ghabbash.

1978

January	Murder of Said Hammami, PLO representative in London. Hammami, a moderate, was being used by Yassar Arafat to conduct negotiations with Israelis.
February	Two Palestinian gunmen murdered the head of the Egyptian Press Syndicate, Youssef Sibai, in Nicosia, and then hijacked a Cyprus Airways plane. The plane later returned to Nicosia where after an abortive Egyptian commando rescue mission, the two gunmen surrendered to the Cypriot authorities.
June	Murder in Kuwait of PLO representative, Ali Nasser Yassin.
August	Murder in Paris of PLO representative, Izzed-Din al Qalaq, and Wafa representative, Adnan Hamad, by two men who admitted membership of the Abu Nidhal group.
August	Three PLO men and a Pakistani police guard were killed when four gunmen attacked the PLO office in Islamabad. A call to a French news agency claimed the "Black June and September" group was responsible.

This paper has been prepared for general briefing purposes.

1980

March — Murder of Spanish lawyer Adolfo Cotello in Madrid in mistake for Jewish leader Max Mazin.

June — Murder of Israeli Commercial Counsellor, Youssef Halachi, in Brussels.

July — Attack on Jewish schoolchildren in Antwerp; one child killed, seven injured.

1981

May — Murder of the Chairman of the Austria-Israel Association, Heinz Nittel, in Vienna. (In June, soon after claiming responsibility for the murder of Nittel, the Abu Nidhal group threatened Chancellor Kreisky of Austria.)

June — Murder in Brussels of the PLO representative, Ibrahim Naim Khader, a moderate.

August — Abu Daud, who for some years had been close to Abu Nidhal but by 1981 appeared to be moving closer to Arafat again, was shot and seriously wounded in a Warsaw hotel.

August — Attack on a Vienna synagogue as worshippers were leaving a service. Two people killed and 20 injured. Two assailants arrested along with a third Arab believed to be involved. At least one of the attackers claimed to belong to the Abu Nidhal group.

September — Hand grenade attack on the offices of Shoham, an Israeli shipping firm in Limassol, Cyprus. Two Arabs were arrested.

1982

March — Murder in Madrid of Nabil Wadi Aranki of the Arab Popular Liberation Movement.

June — Attempted murder of the Israeli Ambassador in London, Shlomo Argov.

July — Deputy Director of the PLO in Paris, Fadel al-Dani, killed when three men bombed and shot at his car.

August — Terrorists threw a grenade into the Goldenberg restaurant in Paris, then opened fire with machine guns. Six people died, 22 were wounded. Press reports referred to similarities with the weapons used in the attacks on the Vienna synagogue (July 1980) and on the Israeli Ambassador in London (June 1982).

September — First Secretary of the Kuwait Embassy in Madrid, Najeet Sayed Hashem al-Refal, murdered by a gunman who identified himself as a member of the Abu Nidhal group. A few hours

earlier a gunman shot at but did not hit the Kuwaiti Acting Consul-General in Karachi. Both incidents appeared to be attempts to secure the release of gunmen who in August shot and wounded the UAE Chargé d'Affaires in Kuwait.

September — Gunmen opened fire on members of the congregation as they were leaving a Brussels synagogue.

September — A Palestinian arrested in Zurich with a large amount of explosives claimed that he was planning attacks against Jewish targets in Switzerland and was a member of the Abu Nidhal group.

October — Several men using a machine pistol and grenades attacked worshippers leaving a Rome synagogue. (In a telephone call to a London-based Arab newspaper, a man claimed responsibility on behalf of "Black Lebanon".)

1983

January — An unspecified operation in Jerusalem was claimed on behalf of al-Assifa-Fatah, the Revolutionary Council, in a telephone statement on 1 January to al-Arab, a London-based newspaper. It was said to be the start of a new policy.

January — Grenade attack against a bus in Tel Aviv on 8 January was claimed by al-Assifa in a telephone call to al-Arab. But the Syrian Arab News Agency, in Damascus, said it was also claimed by as-Saiqa. According to the Voice of Palestine, the official PLO radio station, it was claimed by the General Command of the Palestine Revolution.

January — An Associated Press despatch from Damascus, on 27 January, reported that Abdul Rahman Issa had been named as the group's spokesman. He explained: "We have decided to let the world hear our own voice rather than hear about us from others".

February — Fatah - the Revolutionary Council claimed in Budapest to have blown up a water tank in Kfai Saba.

April — Murder of Dr Issam Ali Sartawi, an adviser to Yasser Arafat, in Portugal where he was attending the Socialist International Congress.

August — Arrest by the Jordanian authorities of some 20-30 Abu Nidhal members, followed by threats of retaliation against Jordan.

1983

September — Explosion on board a Gulf Air jet which crashed near Abu Dhabi, killing all on board. Claimed by the Arab Revolutionary Brigades.

October — Jordanian Ambassador to India seriously injured in a shooting incident in New Delhi. Claimed by the Arab Revolutionary Brigades.

October — Jordanian Ambassador to Italy wounded in a gun attack near his Embassy in Rome; his driver was also injured. Claimed by the Arab Revolutionary Brigades.

October — Car containing 40lbs of explosives blew up in Zarqa, Jordan. Claimed by the Arab Revolutionary Brigades.

November — Jordanian official killed and another seriously wounded in a shooting incident in Athens.

November — Package containing explosives and a timer defused close to the Saudi Airlines office, Amman.

November — Explosive device defused outside home of US official in Amman.

November — Car bomb defused near US Embassy, Amman.

December — Car bomb defused near US Officer' Club and French cultural centre in Izmir, Turkey.

December — Jordanian consular official killed and another wounded in shooting attack in Madrid.

1984

January — Abu Nidhal member Mohammed Rashid tried in Portugal for the murder of PLO official Issam Sartawi in April 1983. After the trial had begun, the Abu Nidhal group threatened retaliatory action against Portuguese interests if Rashid was not released. He was eventually acquitted of murder but received a three-year prison sentence for possessing false documents. The threat was withdrawn.

February — UAE Ambassador to France shot and killed in Paris. Claimed by the Arab Revolutionary Brigades.

March — Booby trap grenade killed three people and wounded nine others in Ashdod, Israel.

March — Bomb exploded outside the Intercontinental Hotel, Amman; second device found nearby. Abu Nidhal group claimed responsibility.

March — Assistant head of the British Council in Athens shot dead; a Greek woman travelling in the same car died later. The murders were claimed by the Revolutionary Organisation of Socialist Muslims in a statement which referred to the continued detention of "Muslim fighters" in British jails.

October — Shooting of a UAE diplomat in Rome was claimed by the Arab Revolutionary Brigades.

November — Press reports that Sabri al-Banna (Abu Nidhal) had died were denied by an anonymous spokesman.

November — A leading Abu Nidhal member was arrested while apparently reconnoitring possible targets in Madrid.

November — British Deputy High Commissioner in Bombay shot dead. Revolutionary Organisation of Socialist Muslims claimed the murder was in retaliation for the "detention and torture of fighters" by the British authorities.

November — An attempt to shoot the Jordanian Chargé d'Affaires in Athens failed when the gun jammed. The attacker was arrested.

December — Jordanian Counsellor shot dead in Bucharest. The attacker was arrested.

1985

February — An Abu Nidhal publication printed unspecified threats against the UK, Austria and Portugal for their treatment of Abu Nidhal members in custody.

February — French journalist published an alleged interview with Sabri al-Banna (Abu Nidhal). Latter adopted a pro-Syrian hard-line rejectionist stand towards Israel and those more moderate - eg Jordan, PLO.

February — Abu Nidhal group and the Syrian-supported Abu Musa faction of Fatah announced the establishment of a joint command structure.

March — 12 members of the previously unknown Jordanian Popular Movement arrested in Jordan. They confessed to a number of bomb attacks between 1983-85, including some against American targets previously attributed to the Abu Nidhal group.

March — British journalist Alec Collett, working for a UN agency in Lebanon, kidnapped. The Revolutionary Organisation of Socialist Muslims claimed that he was a British intelligence officer working for the Americans and Israelis.

April — Attack on the Jordanian Embassy in Rome caused extensive damage but no casualties.

April — Attack on a Jordanian aircraft at Athens airport. Claimed by Black September.

July — Machine-gun attack on Alia (Jordanian Airline) office in Madrid shortly after a similar attack on British Airways office. The BA attack, in which one person was killed and 24 were injured, was initially claimed by the Shi'a

Organisation of the Oppressed and said to be aimed at the TWA office upstairs. But it was subsequently claimed by the Revolutionary Organisation of Socialist Muslims. The Alia attack was claimed by the Black September organisation.

July — First Secretary at the Jordanian Embassy shot dead in Ankara. Attack claimed at first by Islamic Jihad and later by Black September and Black June.

August — Attack on a tourist hotel in Glyfada, near Athens, injured 13 people including six Britons. The claim by the Revolutionary Organisation of Socialist Muslims referred to Britain's refusal to satisfy "our demands" and threatened further attacks.

August — A Palestinian arrested near the Jordanian Embassy in Athens, who first admitted and then denied membership of Black September, claimed that he intended to kill the Jordanian Chargé d'Affaires.

September — A hand-grenade thrown into a Rome café injured 40 people including four Britons. A Palestinian was arrested and charged. A communiqué from the Revolutionary Organisation of Socialist Muslims claimed that the café was "one of the joint dens of US and British intelligence" and warned tourists, especially Arabs, not to travel to Italy, Britain or Spain "because they will be subject to operations by our mujahideen".

September — Hand-grenade attack on a tourist hotel at Glyfada, near Athens, injured 19 British tourists. The first claim of responsibility, by Black September, threatened further attacks "if our comrade is not set free soon". The attack was also claimed by the Revolutionary Organisation of Socialist Muslims.

September — The Jordanian publisher of the Palestinian weekly Annashra, who had links with the PLO office in Tunis, shot dead in Athens. Claimed by the Black September organisation.

September — Two Palestinians arrested in London in possession of hand-grenades which had been brought to London by Libyan Arab Airlines crew.

September — A statement in the name of Fatah-Revolutionary Council threatened the lives of two PLO representatives invited to London by the British Prime Minister.

September — An explosive device thrown into the British Airways office in Rome caused serious damage; 12 people injured one of whom, an Italian, died later. Attack claimed by the Revolutionary Organisation of Socialist Muslims. A Palestinian arrested after the incident admitted membership of this group (sentenced to 14 years' imprisonment in June 1986).

September — Bomb attack on the El Al office, Amsterdam, caused slight damage and no casualties. Claimed in Damascus by Fatah-Revolutionary Council.

October — Interview purporting to be with Sabri al-Banna (Abu Nidhal) published in Der Spiegel (14 October). He claimed that his group harboured "great enmity towards the Thatcher government"; that the "British Secret Service" was cooperating with its Israeli counterparts and that consequently he was working with "all the forces directed against Thatcher, for example with the IRA".

November — Egyptair aircraft en route from Athens to Cairo hijacked to Malta where, with Maltese Government approval, it was stormed by Egyptian commandos on 24 November after five passengers had been shot (two died). One hijacker had previously been killed; two more hijackers and 58 of the passengers and crew died in the assault. The hijackers claimed to be members of the Egyptian Revolutionary Federation, but among claims in Beirut was one by the Arab Revolutionary Brigades, a name used by the Abu Nidhal group for attacks on Kuwaiti, Jordanian and UAE targets.

December — Almost simultaneous shooting and grenade attacks on El Al check-in desks at Rome and Vienna airports. In Rome, 17 people, including three tourists, were killed and there were 68 other casualties. In Vienna, three people, including one terrorist, were killed and 33 were injured. The Arab Guerrilla Cells issued statement in Beirut claiming responsibility.

1986

January — Abu Nidhal statement claimed that "a number" of its members had been "approved" as members of the group's Revolutionary Council, but named only one, Nawaf al-Rosan, imprisoned in Britain following the Argov shooting in 1982.

March — Abu Nidhal member sentenced to 10½ years' imprisonment in Athens for the attempted murder of a Jordanian diplomat in November 1984.

April — Revolutionary Organisation of Socialist Muslims announced that it had killed Alec Collett, the British journalist held hostage in Lebanon since March 1985. A video purporting to show his hanging body was sent to a Beirut newspaper. The organisation claimed that he had been executed "in retaliation for the barbaric joint American and British raid" [on Libya]. It urged other organisations holding British hostages to kill them.

September — Four Arab terrorists, three of whom claimed links with Fatah-Revolutionary Council, hijacked a Pan Am jet aircraft on the ground at Karachi airport with 358 passengers on board. American passenger killed shortly afterwards. The hijackers demanded to fly to Cyprus to free Arab prisoners

there. When they opened fire and threw grenades, 22 people were killed. The hijackers were arrested.

September — In a machine-gun attack on an Istanbul synagogue, 22 people were killed. The attack involved guns and grenades; two attackers killed in explosions. A number of claims included one from the Abu Nidhal group.

September — Abu Nidhal member sentenced in London to 25 years' imprisonment for his part in receiving grenades smuggled into Britain by Libyan Arab Airlines in September 1985.

September — Six Abu Nidhal supporters, one a Swedish citizen, arrested in London and deported.

B 66/5/1A

13 January 1987

Ms S.P. Moore
Managing Director
Offshore Conferences
& Exhibitions Ltd
55-59 Fife Road
Kingston-upon-Thames
SURREY KT1 1TA

Dear Ms Moore,

The High Commissioner has asked me to thank you for your invitation to the Terrorism Avoidance Conference to be held in Geneva from 11-12 February 1987. I regret that it will not be possible for the High Commission to be represented.

Yours sincerely,

S. W. PRIOR
S.W. Prior
First Secretary
for High Commissioner

B66/5/1A

TERRORISM AVOIDANCE CONFERENCE

11-12 FEBRUARY 1987
HOTEL INTERCONTINENTAL GENEVA
SWITZERLAND

TAC 87

Please reply to the organisers: Offshore Conferences & Exhibitions Ltd (part of the Spearhead Group of Companies)
55-59 Fife Road, Kingston upon Thames, Surrey KT1 1TA, United Kingdom. Tel: 01-549 5831 Telex: 928042 SPEARS G Fax: 01-541 5657

29th December 1986

Our Ref: SM/JT

(1) HC
(2) Mr Cooke
(3) Secy

H E Mr Bryce Harland
High Commissioner
New Zealand High Commission
New Zealand House
Haymarket
London
England
SW1Y 4TQ

Dear Sir,

Re: TAC 87 - Terrorism Avoidance Conference - February 11th/12th 1987
Hotel Intercontinental, Geneva, Switzerland.

I have pleasure in enclosing your personal invitation to attend TAC 87 Conference. Entrance to the conference is by invitation only and those invited include senior representatives (in many cases of international prominence) of industry, commerce, banking, insurance, transport and tourist industries and other specialist groups.

The experts assembled have had actual experience of dealing with international terrorism and their presentations will be realistic, without over-dramatising the problem. They will clarify the extent and true nature of the terrorist threat and outline cost-effective steps that can be taken to minimise both the risks and the possible consequences of such acts, with the least possible disruption to your normal life, and to the freedom of those for whom you are responsible.

We hope very much you will be able to attend TAC 87, and should you require any further information, please do not hesitate to contact us. Although we have addressed this to you personally, if you feel it more appropriate that another person should attend, either in addition or instead of yourself, please complete the booking form accordingly. We shall make every effort to enable you to gain the maximum benefit from your participation.

Yours sincerely,

Susan P. Moore

Susan Moore,
Managing Director.

Directors: D. C. C. Stott (Chairman), S. P. Moore (Managing), B. M. Weavers, C. P. L. Marke.
Company Registration No: 1560301

TAC 87 — Terrorism Avoidance Conference
11-12 February 1987
Hotel Intercontinental, Geneva, Switzerland

A presentation to international business on minimising the risks of terrorism, piracy, kidnapping and acts of war.

DAY ONE, Wednesday, February 11th
FOCUS ON PUBLIC EVENTS AND PLACES

Chairman: Miles Copeland, Founder member of the CIA and, more recently, an international security consultant and adviser to fourteen governments and the majority of major oil companies.

0830-0930 Registration

0930-0940 **Chairman's introduction:** Miles Copeland.

0940-1020 **The terrorist threat:** Professor Paul Wilkinson, Professor of International Relations, University of Aberdeen.
a) Motivation; b) Funding – the international connection; c) Target acquisition and selection; d) The specific threat; e) Modus operandi.

1020-1035 **The psychology of security:** Professor Paul Wilkinson.

1035-1050 Questions/discussion

1050-1110 Coffee/Tea

1110-1150 **The security and safety problems:** M L McCaul, CMG, Security Consultant, and Robin Hill, Terrorism Researcher, University of Aberdeen.
a) Hotels; b) Airport terminals/airline offices; c) Exhibition/conference centres; d) Sports centres/locations; e) Banking/financial centres; f) Office complexes; g) Onshore installations; h) Vessels.

1150-1200 Questions/discussion

1200-1215 **Emergency services – the response:** Speaker to be advised.

1215-1220 Questions

1220-1245 **Risk assessment/risk management:** Paul Stevenson, Kingsley John & Partners.
The security precautionary measures: – a) Equipment – selective zone security; b) Levels of physical security; c) Training.

1245-1300 Questions/discussion

1300-1415 Lunch

1415-1445 **Information – the key to security:** M L McCaul, CMG, and Chris Brogan, Security International Ltd.

1445-1455 Questions/discussion

1455-1525 **The security of the VIP and Business Executive:** Speaker to be advised.

1525-1535 Questions/discussion

1535-1555 Tea/Coffee

1555-1615 **Insurance:** Howard Thompson, Director, H M Thompson & Co Ltd.

1615-1620 Questions

1620-1650 **Current availability of support services:** Special Project Consultants (SPC) Ltd.
a) Security companies; b) Security equipment; c) Courses & seminars.

1650-1730 Questions followed by **open panel discussion** and Chairman's closing remarks.

1730-1830 **Cocktail reception** for speakers and delegates.

DAY TWO, Thursday, February 12th
FOCUS ON MARITIME SECURITY/WAR RISKS

Chairman: Stuart Syrad, OBE, MC, Maritime Security Consultant; Member of the Nautical Institute and Lecturer in Maritime Security.

0830-0930 Registration

0930-0940 **Chairman's introduction:** Stuart Syrad, OBE, MC

0940-1020 **Piracy/terrorism/war risks – general considerations:** Professor Paul Wilkinson, Professor of International Relations, and Tom Schiller, Terrorism Researcher, University of Aberdeen.
a) Motivation; b) Funding; c) Target acquisition and selection; d) Modus operandi.

1020-1035 **The psychology of security:** Professor Paul Wilkinson.

1035-1050 Questions/discussion

1050-1110 Coffee/Tea

1110-1140 **Maritime security and safety problems:** Captain J M B Harington, Harington & Associates, Marine Consultants.
a) Vessel; b) Rig; c) Port/marine.

1140-1150 Questions/discussion

1150-1240 **Maritime risk assessment/risk management:**
1. The specific threat: Douglas Brand, Maritime Security Consultant.
a) Destruction; b) Sabotage; c) Extortion; d) Piracy.
2. Threat detection, seduction and distraction: John C Wise, MBE, Senior Systems Engineer, Electronic Warfare Group, MEL.
a) Equipment; b) Levels of protection offered; c) Training.

1240-1250 Questions/discussion

1250-1400 Lunch

1400-1430 **Information – the key to maritime security:** M L McCaul, CMG, Security Consultant, and Chris Brogan, Security International Ltd.

1430-1440 Questions/discussion

1440-1520 **Maritime crisis management – the levels of response:**
1. Piracy/terrorism: M L McCaul, CMG.
2. War risk: Stuart Syrad, OBE, MC. (Professor Paul Wilkinson in chair)

1520-1530 Questions/discussion

1530-1550 Tea/Coffee

1550-1610 **Asset recovery:** Speaker to be advised.

1610-1615 Questions

1615-1635 **War risk insurance:** Howard Thompson, Director, H M Thompson & Co Ltd.

1635-1640 Questions

1640-1700 **Current availability of maritime support services:** Stuart Syrad, OBE, MC.

1700-1730 Questions followed by **open panel discussion** and Chairman's closing remarks.

1730-1830 **Cocktail reception** for speakers and delegates.

CLOSE

Note: There may be additions and/or amendments to the programme.

TAC 87 — the objectives

The presentations and discussion at TAC 87 will look at the extent and nature of the current threat of terrorism, piracy and other forms of attack with particular reference to the various practical precautionary measures designed to guard against or mitigate the effect of such actions or the threat of these actions internationally.

"At TAC 87 there are assembled, perhaps for the first time, genuine experts who have had actual experience in dealing with international terrorism and its practical ramifications, as opposed to theoreticians. We believe that more realistic, down-to-earth perspectives are needed, so we can deal with the problem both ***effectively and economically, with the minimum of disruption to our normal lives****".*
– Miles Copeland (Chairman, TAC 87, Day One).

"At a time when the freedom of ships on the high seas in the Gulf War is seriously threatened, and in the wake of the Achille Lauro incident creating a latent maritime terrorist threat, this conference provides an opportunity to assess the risk and investigate countermeasures to safeguard our maritime assets".
– Stuart Syrad (Chairman, TAC 87, Day Two).

TAC 87 — who will attend

Delegates will attend by invitation only and will include senior representatives of industry, commerce, banking, insurance, transport and tourist industries and other specialist group representatives. Delegates may attend for either one or both days, noting the different emphasis of subject matter.

TAC 87 — the speakers

Presentations at the conference will be given by individuals who are acknowledged specialists in their particular subjects with first-hand practical experience of the problems. The information published about the chairmen and speakers is by necessity somewhat limited, but further information can be supplied by the organisers on a confidential basis.

TAC 87 — the organisers

TAC 87 is organised by Offshore Conferences & Exhibitions Ltd, established as one of the leaders in the field of specialised trade conferences and exhibitions. OCE is part of the Spearhead Group of companies, organisers of, among others, Offshore Europe (Europe's largest offshore exhibition), Oceanology International Exhibition, the Latin American Petroleum Show, and publishers of major trade directories.
As above, further information can be obtained by contacting the organisers.

TAC 87 Conference Booking Form

Name of delegate _____ Position (where relevant) _____

Fees £450 per person per day or £800 for both days

Day 1 _____ Day 2 (Please tick) _____

£ _____

£ _____

£ _____

TOTAL £ _____

☐ Cheque is enclosed payable to Offshore Conferences & Exhibitions Ltd

☐ The above sum will be credited by direct transfer to the account of Offshore Conferences & Exhibitions Ltd at Midland Bank plc, 1 Castle Street, Kingston upon Thames, Surrey KT1 1ST, UK. Account No. 61050419

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☐ Please debit my Access/Barclaycard/American Express with the sum of £_____ My credit card number is ☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐

Company (where relevant) _____

Address _____

Telephone number _____ Telex _____

Contact name and telephone number if not as above _____

Please indicate and specify any special requirements _____

Please gives name(s)/address(es)/contact phone number(s) of other member(s) of your party even if they are *not* attending the conference. (Please use separate sheet if necessary)

Number 09849

Booking Form — Hotel Intercontinental, Geneva

Price per room SFR 160 single/SFR 200 twin (inc tax & service).

Accommodation required

	Single	Twin (Please tick)	Nights Feb
NAME			
NAME			
NAME			
NAME			

Company (where relevant)

Address

Telephone No. Telex

Please indicate and specify any special requirements.

T A C 8 7

TAC 87 — Location and Hotel arrangements

All precautions are being taken to ensure the security and confidentiality of the conference and its participants. If you wish further details, or have any particular requirements, we will be glad to discuss them.

TAC delegates are offered preferential room rates at the Hotel Intercontinental, Geneva — SFR 160 single, SFR 200 twin room (inc. tax & service). We will pass on the booking to the hotel, but delegates are responsible for paying their own hotel bills direct to the hotel in the usual way on departure. **Please do not send cheques for hotel accommodation to the conference organisers.**

The hotel's full address is: Hotel Intercontinental Geneva, 1211 Geneva 19, Switzerland. Telephone (22) 34 60 91 Telex: 23130

Delegates' Fees

The fee for attendance is £450 per person per day or £800 for both days and includes morning coffee and afternoon tea, 3-course lunch with wine and an evening cocktail reception, for each day attended.
Please note: For security reasons each delegate will be supplied with an identity badge and upon confirmation of booking the organisers will request 2 passport-sized photographs.

Conference bookings

To book your conference place(s) and your hotel accommodation if required, please complete the form (both sides) and return it to:

Offshore Conferences & Exhibitions Ltd,
Rowe House, 55/59 Fife Road,
Kingston upon Thames Surrey, KT1 1TA, UK.
Tel: 01-549 5831. Telex: 928042. Spears G.
Fax: 01-541 5657.

T A C 8 7

TERRORISM AVOIDANCE CONFERENCE

11-12 FEBRUARY 1987
HOTEL INTERCONTINENTAL, GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

A presentation to international business on minimising the risks of terrorism, piracy, kidnapping and acts of war.

Organised by: Offshore Conferences & Exhibitions Ltd
(part of the Spearhead Group of Companies)
Rowe House, 55-59 Fife Road, Kingston upon Thames, Surrey KT1 1TA
Tel: 01-549 5831 Telex: 928042 Spears G. Fax: 01-541 5657

New Zealand High Commission

New Zealand House
Haymarket
London SW1Y 4TQ
Telephone 01-930 8422
Telex 24368

"YELLOW"

Reference: B66/5/1A

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

12 January 1987

(DLO EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA)

c.c. E.I.B.
PMD
NZSIS (TIC)
DEFENCE (DDOP)

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Date	Nature of Material
	Terrorism - anti-airline
10 January 1987	Independent report of publication "The Terrorist Threat to Aviation" published by Control Risks Ltd.

"S.W. Prior"
for High Commissioner

Airlines remain prime target for terrorists

THE INDEPENDENT Saturday 10 January 1987

By Nicholas Schoon

DESPITE enhanced security, airports and airliners remain a prime target for terrorists and insurgents, a security company is warning executives.

Control Risks, a London-based firm which specialises in protecting and warning executives of multi-national companies, summarises the threat to passengers by saying: "Aviation will remain an attractive target for terrorists — for governments, hijackers and passengers the stakes and the risks are now higher than ever."

Its report, costing £300 a copy, says that although the number of hijackings has gradually declined they are becoming more violent and the hijackers more suicidal.

"Casualties have risen sharply as hijackers have demonstrated greater ruthlessness in killing passengers and as governments have shown a greater readiness to order commandos to storm hijacked aircraft."

Security around airport perimeters and parked aircraft remains dangerously lax at many airports, the report says. This renders the screening of passengers and baggage inside terminals "virtually useless".

Bad "airside" security was a factor in the 1985 hijacking of an Egyptair jet departing from Athens. Fifty-five passengers and three hijackers were killed in Malta after a shootout with Egyptian commandos. Poor security was also responsible for the hijacking of a Pan-Am Boeing 747 at Karachi Airport in September, when four Arab terrorists killed 20 passengers before Pakistani commandos arrived.

Despite an enormous increase in screening over the past 18 months, the inspection of baggage is still inadequate. The main problem here is that staff may not be fully trained to identify explosives or parts of bombs.

The report pinpoints crew baggage as a special danger. It is often left lined up, identifiable and unattended in hotel lobbies for hours on end.

It says the system of examining baggage on its way to the aircraft hold is generally "a shambles". Usually it is wrapped in security tape after it is examined by X-rays, so that tampering with it before loading will be detected.

But at one major European airport which has been the scene of recent terrorist attacks, Control Risks found the tape being put on before the baggage was inspected.

Control Risks declines to name the airport, but it is understood to be Rome's Leonardo da Vinci, which has just gone on red alert after threats from an obscure Lebanese Muslim group, the Loyalists of God.

The report mentions few airports or airlines by name. The company says security cannot be guaranteed because no airport is impregnable and standards of vigilance can fall.

However, it does advise executives to avoid stop-overs in high-risk areas such as the Middle East and to use airlines with a record of few hijacks, such as British Airways, SAS and KLM.

It also suggests executives should dress casually and abandon the "ostentatious use of the prestige paraphernalia of international business". Instead they should appear to be "an inconsequential, nondescript tourist".

Control Risks says the greatest risk is from Palestinian factions, particularly the Abu Nidal group, followed by pro-Iranian Shia Muslim groups.

The company has chronicled all incidents which threatened air travellers over the past three years, including bombings, the shooting down of civil aircraft by rebel groups, and failed and successful hijacks.

There were about 200 such incidents, and nearly 700 civilians were killed. The worst incident was the Air India Boeing 747 crash off Ireland in 1985, in which all 329 on board were killed. Sikh extremists in Canada are believed to have planted a bomb on board the aircraft.

But terrorist outrages kill fewer people than aircraft accidents. The report says that although the risk remains and shows no signs of decreasing "it does not justify mass cancellations".

The Terrorist Threat to Aviation is available from Control Risks Ltd, 83 Victoria St, London SW1H.

B66/5/1 1A

THE IRISH TIMES, Monday, January 12, 1987

Animal rights group steps up violence

SEAN MacCONNELL traces the increasingly violent history of the Animal Liberation Front, responsible for last Saturday's incendiary attack on Switzer's store in Dublin.

THE planting of an incendiary device in Switzer's store in Grafton Street, Dublin, on Saturday last, causing massive disruption to the store's trade and the possibility of injury and even death, was a logical step on the increasingly violent road being travelled by the Animal Liberation Front.

This secret organisation — thought by Garda sources to number less than 20 activists — has an impressive list of headline-catching incidents notched up here in recent years, during which time none of its members has ever been caught or prosecuted.

It was in October 1984 that the organisation, which first surfaced in Britain, first spilled human blood in its "defence" of animals.

A group of five masked men armed with cudgels attacked two men guarding 80 hares at Mallow coursing grounds and beat them up before releasing the animals through a hole they cut in the wire. Some of the hares perished under the wheels of the Mallow town traffic.

In the past six year, there have been many such commando-style attacks on coursing clubs to free hares or scatter pepper, glass or tacks on the grounds where meetings are held. Sometimes the organisation does not use the Animal Liberation Front tag. Following the attack on lands owned by the Knight of Glin in October last when tacks and glass were scattered, the incident was claimed by the so-called Limerick Animal Liberation Front. In all, there are over 40 such incidents logged at National Coursing Club headquarters.

One of the biggest publicity coups pulled off by this group here was in December 1984 when it forced the temporary withdrawal of a brand of shampoo from supermarkets following a claim by it that it had placed bleach in the product, alleging animal oil had been used in the shampoo's production.

Over the years it has been responsible for attacks on butchers shops in Dublin and a break-in at a Dublin University laboratory. Coursing clubs have been the main target of the organisation up to recently, but now it has turned its attention to other sporting bodies like gun and fishing clubs.

Leading members of the National Association of Regional Game Councils, which organised the gun clubs, have frequently got death threats by letter or phone from the group and earlier this year the Minister for Agriculture, Mr Deasy, was sent a death threat letter in the name of the group.

This sparked off instant Special Branch action and a number of people were picked up and questioned under Section 30 of the Offences Against the State Act, including one leading member of the Irish Council Against Blood Sports.

Garda intelligence sources indicate that the group has about 20 members, most of them with continental or urban British backgrounds.

In Britain the organisation has claimed responsibility for bomb attacks on the cars of four scientists this time last year using the *nom de guerre* "Animal Rights Militia" and the petrol-bombing of nine homes in Kent in January 1985.

In Britain police have established links between the front and at least one Scottish-based protection group which began organising in this country about eight years ago. The police also believe the organisation have links with the National Front.

Since the Animal Liberation Front began operating here, it has attempted to infiltrate the established legitimate animal and environmental protection organisations like the Irish Council Against Blood Sport. It is believed that agents of the organisation engineered violent clashes between coursing fans and anti-bloodsport picketers in October 1985 in Cashel at a coursing match.

Their weekend action is bound to have seriously embarrassed all the respectable groupings involved in animal protection.

Army sources said this weekend the device used in Switzers on Saturday was "quite sophisticated" and was capable of causing a serious fire. The device is currently being examined by garda forensic experts.

The gardai used to treat the Animal Liberation Front as a nuisance group but with its weekend action it has been up-graded to terrorist status.

The business of terrorism

Paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland use fraud, extortion, and protection rackets to help cover their costs and are increasingly channelling money through apparently legitimate businesses. DAVID McKITTRICK examines the methods that finance terror and the measures being taken to staunch the flow of funds to "loyalist" and republican groups.

DESPITE OFFICIAL attempts at a clampdown, paramilitary organisations in Northern Ireland — both republican and "loyalist" — continue to net very large amounts of money through racketeering.

The Government is in the process of introducing laws to curb paramilitary finances. But terrorist organisations, in particular the IRA, have countered by switching resources into legitimate or apparently legitimate businesses.

The authorities believe — and paramilitary sources confirm — that both sides extract thousands of pounds each week from the construction industry alone. In addition, the organisations run drinking clubs and collect money from taxi operators, among other activities.

The Government is planning tighter controls on public money and new laws to impose stricter regulations on clubs and to limit the number of gaming machines they have.

A further measure is aimed at outlawing bogus security firms which give cover for paramilitary extortion. An amendment to anti-terrorist legislation will ban all security firms not certified by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

In another development, the Northern Ireland Office has in the past year withdrawn funding from a number of community organisations suspected of having paramilitary links.

The IRA's main sources of income are the building trade and the major drinking clubs it controls, especially in Belfast.

On the loyalist side, paramilitary groups make money from the building industry, from taxis and from crude but effective protection rackets. The loyalist protection business, which dates from the early Seventies, grew with the major Belfast slum clearance programmes of the past five years. Firms which refused to pay tended to be heavily hit by vandalism, theft and malicious damage. Before long, paying protection became the norm on building sites in loyalist areas.

Sometimes firms hand over several thousand pounds as one-off settlements. In other cases amounts ranging from £100 to £500 are paid weekly. Businesses are also asked for occasional "bonus payments" for the families of imprisoned group members.

One businessman, who would not be named, said: "Two of these men came into my office and explained, very civilly, that I needed protection for my business. When I said I didn't want any, they replied that accidents could happen, that fires could start.

"I went to the police and told them about the threats. They showed me mugshots and I picked out the two men immediately. They asked me if I would give evidence in court but they made it very clear they couldn't protect me or my family if I did. Some firms hold out against them, but people are frightened for their families' sakes. One friend of mine received in the post a photograph of himself, his wife and children leaving church. Another had a phone call to his home saying 'Your son looked well getting out of school today'."

That sort of thinly-veiled threat is typical, according to a security source who said: "They call at a site, or at a man's home and talk to his wife. The most effective thing they do is to mention his family; very often that's enough. They don't need guns or hoods."

In some cases firms are given receipts from the bogus security firms. These are registered companies making tax returns, but little attempt is made to conceal their purpose. One such firm, listed in the Yellow Pages, has the same address and phone number as the Belfast office of a loyalist paramilitary group.

Another source of steady income for one loyalist group, the Ulster Volunteer Force, is collections from taxis operating in loyalist areas. In west Belfast, according to authoritative sources, 70 taxi drivers each pay £29.20 a week, netting the organisation more than £100,000 annually.

Such groups also control social clubs which provide revenue but are neither as well run nor as profitable as those controlled by the IRA.

There is no doubt that loyalist and republican groups handle millions of pounds each year; yet there are signs that the profit is lower than might be expected. One large and constant drain on their resources is prison welfare payments. The major organisations make weekly contributions — typically £5 to £10 — to the families of their imprisoned members.

Northern Ireland's jails hold approximately 1,300 prisoners on terrorist-related offences, and the families of most receive welfare payments which mount up to an annual expenditure for the organisations which is almost certainly in excess of £500,000.

Another drain is that referred to by one paramilitary leader as "internal theft". When organisations keep false accounts — or no accounts at all — money easily goes into private pockets.

The key problem for the Royal Ulster Constabulary is producing evidence which will be acceptable in court. The RUC has a special rackets squad, designated C13. The unit receives many complaints, but those who are intimidated will not testify. Two years ago three Ulster Defence Association members appeared in court on 33 charges relating to protection rackets.

Several businessmen were prepared to give evidence on condition that their identities were hidden, and that they appeared in court wearing anoraks, hoods, balaclava helmets and gloves. The case collapsed.

Privately, the authorities say businessmen who will not give evidence must bear a measure of blame for their own problems. The businessmen reply that it is the authorities' function to protect them, and they are not doing so. While such arguments continue, so does the racketeering.

8661/5/11A

THE INDEPENDENT Tuesday 30 December 1986

drawn funding [illegible]

'Acceptable' face of IRA rackets

THE Provisional IRA's well-developed fundraising structure is based on a carefully worked-out philosophy. Its guiding principle is that it should be broadly acceptable in those Catholic working-class areas from which it draws support. Its methods illustrate how the search for votes for its political wing, Sinn Fein, has changed the IRA and led to the streamlining and refinement of its illegal activities.

The IRA's methods are, in general terms, no great secret to most people in the republican ghettoes; the emphasis is on ensuring that the techniques of raising money do not alienate actual or potential supporters. Thus the general public is largely untroubled by demands for money; strong-arm tactics are rare; and in some cases the IRA actually provides a service as it raises its funds.

The most obvious example of this can be seen in the IRA's social clubs, particularly in Belfast. Clubs controlled by paramilitary groups have been in existence for almost two decades. At first most of these were crude, unlicensed shebeens, but over the years a number have developed into fully licensed premises. Several dozen of Northern Ireland's 600 social clubs, including some of the largest, are under paramilitary control. A great deal of money is spent in these establishments: according to government statistics, members spent £34m on alcohol last year.

The IRA controls several very large clubs in Belfast, as well as many smaller establishments. According to official figures, the larger IRA clubs had a combined annual turnover of more than £1m each year. A number of the clubs are among the largest and best-appointed in the city. They often feature cabaret by very well-known artists.

One of those who inspects the clubs said: "They provide luxurious surroundings, first-class entertainment and cheap drink. "They are, on the face of it, completely legitimate. The police go in by appointment to check the books — and the books are always in order. The police are courteously received, often offered a drink. These people employ accountants, solicitors and professional stewards and managers."

Last month the authorities announced new measures designed to tighten up clubs legislation. The new laws will make life difficult for some smaller clubs, but no one believes they have any hope of putting the larger paramilitary establishments out of business. The authorities are concerned that profits from the clubs will shortly be used to buy, through front men, respectable bars outside the ghettoes of Belfast in trouble-free areas of County Down.

Furthermore, the Royal Ulster Constabulary's Special Branch is investigating a report that IRA funds are being channelled to one of Northern Ireland's largest pub-owning partnerships.

An incidental but surprisingly substantial source of income lies in the gaming machines installed in many clubs. Although the machines take only 10p and 50p coins, they are often in heavy use and in some clubs can net several thousand pounds in a week. The IRA appears to supply and service these machines in its own clubs. In other cases, it may put its machines in non-IRA establishments. New regulations aimed at cutting down paramilitary finances will limit the number of machines to two per club.

At the beginning of the Eighties the IRA hit a real jackpot, in the building trade.

Groups such as the IRA had been making money from housing work for years; 10 years ago a confidential police report concluded that terrorist organisations had probably skimmed off around £1m from building contracts in 1974 and 1975. New controls were introduced but the problem was never entirely eradicated. The large-scale slum clearance effort of the Eighties meant a great increase in demolition, new building and rehabilitation work, much of it in those working-class areas where groups such as the IRA are strongest.

The most profitable area was the use of tax exemption certificates. Large building firms pay sub-contractors holding such certificates a lump sum for carrying out agreed work. The sub-contractors take over all tax liability.

The IRA and other groups moved in and intimidated legitimate certificate-holders. Under the deals they dictated, the organisations kept a share, commonly 15 per cent, of the lump sum. The site workers handed over some of their wages to the IRA — usually 25 per cent — but many recouped the money through illegally-claimed unemployment benefit.

When the tax became due many of the certificate-holders simply declared themselves bankrupt. In other cases the certificates turned out to be forged.

The heyday of this particular racket has now passed, but even the authorities can only guess at the total sums involved. In the past few years the RUC has charged 180 people in this field, mainly in connection with the misuse of tax exemption certificates. Around 60 have been dealt with in the courts and the rest are still being processed.

The amount of money involved comes to just under £55m. About one-third of this is owed in tax.

A great deal of such missing money is simply pocketed by various criminal elements unconnected with paramilitary outfits; some is taken by other groups.

The Provisional IRA has, in fact, a major though hardly ever publicised rival for funds. This is the "Official IRA", a group which broke with the Provisionals in 1969-70. The Officials, as they are known, declared a ceasefire in



Foundations of wealth: Building projects like this one in Belfast have proved to be a jackpot for the paramilitary groups, which hold regular meetings to decide who will provide which services.

1972 and have since then only rarely indulged in overt violence.

For years the organisation has issued no public statements; in fact, it no longer acknowledges its own existence. Yet members and former members have been deeply involved in racketeering.

The Provisionals dislike the Official IRA but treat them with wary respect. They — and the authorities — have good reason to believe that the Officials maintain a highly sophisticated up-to-date armoury, largely as insurance against attack from the Provisionals. A security source said: "In fact, if there was ever a power struggle between the groups, we think they are strong enough to put the Provos out of business." As far as fund-raising is concerned, the two groups (together with a third, the much smaller and more fragmented Irish National Liberation Army) uneasily co-exist, often sharing the same territory. The tax exemption fiddle, though it still goes on, has been reduced in scale and profitability; but these organisations have other sources of power and profit, especially in the building trade. The rehousing programme, which at its height ran at 7,000 new homes a year, has been cut back. But the paramilitary groups now have an interest in city-centre commercial developments and in road-building.

On one site the Provisionals might provide, say, the bricklayers and the Officials the plasterers. The organisations hold regular meetings to carve up new projects.

The actual workers involved are not necessarily members of paramilitary groups. "You don't have to become a member," a building worker said. "You do your work, you don't ask questions, you accept the going rate."

The organisation, of course, takes a cut of the worker's wages as the price for providing him with the job.

For the major contractors, arrangements with paramilitary groups have their advantages. The Officials in particular are known to provide superior quality work. The jobs are usually completed on time, there are few if any incidents on site, and pilfering and vandalism is low.

The large firms who go along with such arrangements are the despair of the security authorities. "They are sheep, weak and ineffective," one source said. "They'll complain to us, but none of them will give evidence against these people."

Although the Officials are involved in protection rackets, the Provisionals have in recent years tended to keep clear of such activity. "They're anxious to gain acceptability," a security source noted. "If they desperately need a lot of money they will go to big businesses in republican areas, but they try to avoid that where possible."

As for money from Irish-Americans, it is regarded as a useful (and morale-raising) bonus rather than a lifeline. Last year Noraid, the New York-based fundraising organisation, sent around $150,000 (just over £100,000) across the Atlantic, according to US Justice Department records.

But for all the large sums of money involved, the IRA is not rich. It needs a great deal of money to keep going: arms are expensive, prison welfare costs are high and the political activities of Sinn Fein are costly. Within the IRA there has recently been a revival of the periodic friction over how much money should go on votes, and how much on weapons.

The RUC suffers from the classic police dilemma of having sound intelligence but little evidence which will stand up in court. A solution is instead sought through new legislation.

Such laws take time to formulate and to pass through the parliamentary process. Because their thrust is visible in advance of their enactment, the organisations have time to find loopholds and change tactics. This helps explain why some people in security and in politics doubt that the rackets can be eradicated.

THE INDEPENDENT Tuesday 30 December 1986

Violence increases in year of angry loyalist reaction

VIOLENCE in Northern Ireland — with the significant exception of violent deaths — increased sharply in 1986, according to figures compiled by the Royal Ulster Constabulary.

In a year marked by angry "loyalist" reaction to the Anglo-Irish agreement, the number of injuries rose from 900 in 1985 to more than 1,400 this year.

Deaths increased only slightly, from 54 last year to 61. Of these, 24 were members of the security forces. As usual, the majority of murders were the work of the IRA, though the year saw the re-emergence of loyalist groups. These accounted for more than a dozen killings.

In general terms the IRA's killing rate was unchanged; the increase in deaths was due to loyalist activity directed mainly against Catholic civilians.

The year's deaths brought the total number of politically-connected killings since 1969 to more than 2,500. Of these 1,700 have been civilians and the rest members of the security forces.

This year shooting incidents rose, in the first 11 months, to 350 from the 1985 total of 240, and armed robberies went up from 540 to 720. The number of people charged with terrorist offences rose from 522 to 630.

But there was no significant increase in the number of explosions, about 150, weapons recovered, or bomb scares.

Next year promises to be similar. The IRA has reverted to the tactic of attacking hotels and pubs and the RUC has warned the public to expect a new year bombing campaign.

The new "Republican Sinn Fein" which this year broke away from Sinn Fein, is developing a military wing.

Meanwhile, the Irish National Liberation Army staged a minor revival during the year. In the past week a number of important figures in the organisation were released from custody and increased violence may result.

■ A Grenadier Guardsman who died after being found with a gunshot wound to his head at an Ulster Defence Regiment base near Castlederg, Co Tyrone, was named yesterday. L/Cpl Gary Kiteley, 21, who lived near Banbury, Oxfordshire, died in the intensive care unit at Tyrone County Hospital, Omagh, on Sunday. Police said crime was not suspected.

B66/5/1A
B86/1/2A

12 December 1986

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs
WELLINGTON

(Att : DLO EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA)

c.c. PMD, WELLINGTON
NZSIS (TIC), WELLINGTON
POLICE (PTIU)
DEFENCE (DDOP)

TERRORISM : TREVI GROUP MEETING

The "Trevi Group" of EC Interior Ministers met in London on 9 December 1986. Only Greece was not represented at Ministerial level.

2. The principal achievement of the meeting was the adoption - by all participants except Greece - of a British analysis of the terrorist threat to Europe. This analysis, it is reported, lists countries and organisations known to have been involved in terrorist activity in Europe and the main terrorists and networks currently operating there. Its contents have not, for security reasons, been made public.

3. Ministers discussed progress on setting up secure telecommunications links between the police/counter-terrorist services of EC member countries. Half the EC states are to have a 'hotline' system installed by January 1987.

4. Ministers also reviewed the possibilities of establishing a common visa system for Europe, and the effectiveness of drug liaison officers working in drug-producing states such as India, Pakistan and Central America.

5. Following the meeting, officials have been instructed to continue work in three particular areas:

/P2

- harmonising frontier controls (which would include stricter passport checks);
- ensuring greater coordination between drug liaison officers; and
- the further assessment of the terrorist threat.

6. We hope to report further on the meeting when we have been able to discuss it with the Home Office.

S. W. PRIOR
S.W. Prior
for High Commissioner

B66/5/1A

THE GUARDIAN Wednesday December 10 1986

Europe's 'breakthrough' in fight against terror

By Malcolm Dean

European interior ministers have reached agreement on the individuals, organisations and states which pose the main threat of terrorism to Europe.

Mr Douglas Hurd, the Home Secretary, described the meeting in London yesterday as a breakthrough. "We have moved from an exchange of raw intelligence material to an agreed analysis, which will provide a tool not just for the police and security agencies, but also the European foreign ministers who have to consider their political reaction", he said.

He would not identify the main terrorist threats for security reasons. Of the 12 member states represented at the meeting, only Greece refused to adopt the analysis, because it did not want individual states named in the secret report.

Asked whether Greece could become a back door through which terrorists could gain access to Europe, Mr Hurd said the Greeks accepted the threat posed by terrorists but had reservations about the actual analysis in the report.

Thatcher attacks critics, page 6

He said officials would continue to work together on three separate fronts; harmonising frontier controls, including stricter passport checks; more co-ordination between drug liaison offiers; and a continued assessment of the terrorist threat.

Officials will discuss the latest report with US intelligence agencies, but Mr Hurd would not be drawn by American reporters yesterday on whether the supply of US arms to Iran had improved security.

The ministers also endorsed a proposal to improve co-operation at international football matches. Each state will nominate a permanent correspondent to serve as a contact for the police forces of other member states to help in drawing up the policing plans for football matches.

Financial Times Wednesday December 10 1986

UK analysis of terrorist threat wins broad support

BY STEPHANIE GRAY

EUROPEAN interior ministers, with the exception of the Greek minister, yesterday adopted an analysis of the terrorist threat to Europe based on a "specific and detailed" secret document provided by Britain. The UK holds the presidency of the EEC Council of Ministers until the end of the year.

The Greek delegation to the third meeting of the so-called Trevi Group, chaired by Mr Douglas Hurd, the British Home Secretary, would make no comment on why it had rejected the document.

The group, set up in September in response to terrorist incidents in Paris, agreed that the secret analysis would be brought to the attention of EEC foreign ministers in order that a "more informed, effective and concerted reaction at political level" could be made to terrorist ativities.

Mr Hurd would not be drawn on whether terrorists states had been discussed at the meeting. He denied that there had been any discussion with Mr Edwin Meese, the US Attorney General, in a briefing session on Monday about US arms sales to Iran.

He said the ministers were satisfied that US intelligence agencies would not be dealing with "back" channels and there had been no doubt about Washington's commitment to combat terrorism.

The ministers discussed the establishment of a possible common European visa system and a secure telecommunications link between member countries. Mr Hurd said half the EEC states would have installed a "hotline" system by the end of next month.

European police chiefs have started compiling a wanted list of terrorists and factions within the Community.

The Trevi Group is also charged with measures to combat drug trafficking and football hooliganism.

THE TIMES WEDNESDAY DECEMBER 10 1986

EEC security

Greeks cool on terror threat

By Michael Evans, Whitehall Correspondent

A secret EEC document outlining the first comprehensive analysis of terrorist organizations and operations in Europe, was drawn up and agreed by Interior Ministers of the Trevi Group on terrorism yesterday.

Only one country, Greece, refused to put its signature to the document, underlining fears that Athens could remain the weak link in Europe's drive to combat the terrorist threat on a co-ordinated basis.

But Mr Douglas Hurd, Home Secretary, who chaired the Trevi Group meeting in London, said that this did not mean that Greece would become the back door route for terrorists planning to mount attacks against European targets. He admitted, though, that it was "sad" that Greece could not agree to sign the document.

The Greek government did not even send a minister to the meeting. It was represented by a civil servant who apparently did not have the authority to sign anything.

The meeting yesterday was the final session on terrorism by the Trevi Group under the chairmanship of Mr Hurd. With Britain ending its six months in the presidency of the European Council of Ministers on December 31, the chairmanship will be handed over to the Belgians.

Mr Hurd, who has made great play of the fact that he wanted a strong British initiative on terrorism during the six months,' appeared to be pleased with the achievements in spite of Greece's refusal to join in.

He said that the secret document contained an analysis of the terrorist threat which would help all EEC anti-terrorist agencies. The document will now be shown to EEC foreign ministers to help form a concerted political strategy against terrorist activities.

Although he would not give details of what the document contains, he indicated that it listed the main terrorist organizations and networks and would have to be continually updated.

● Yesterday's meeting also considered football hooliganism and the effectiveness of drug liaison officers who have been sent from EEC countries to drug-producing states such as India, Pakistan and Central America.

B66/5/1A

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F.A.

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
WELLINGTON

8 December 1986

The High Commissioner
New Zealand High Commission
LONDON

NEW ZEALAND HIGH COMMISSION LONDON
22 DEC 1986
CENTRAL REGISTRY

cc: PMD
NZSIS(TIC)
Police(PTIU)
Defence(DDOP)
SFA(EUR,LGL,SEC,AAD,MEA,SPA)

WILTON PARK CONFERENCE ON NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
26-30 January 1987

Thank you for your memorandum B66/5/1A of 21 November 1986 on this matter. It does not appear likely at this stage that there will be anyone passing through London at the time of the above conference who would be in a position to attend. We would like to take up your offer however to obtain on our behalf copies of materials published as a result of the conference. We would also appreciate your endeavouring to obtain on our behalf copies of papers presented at the conference though not subsequently published.

(M F Watkins)
for Secretary of Foreign Affairs

B66/5/1A

THE SCOTSMAN Saturday, December 6, 1986

Menu brightens dull summit

By FRED BRIDGLAND

HEADS of government of the 12 EEC member states yesterday began in London their dullest and most controversy-free summit in many years.

And in a supreme irony, the person in the presidential chair at Westminster's Queen Elizabeth conference centre was Mrs Margaret Thatcher, their longest-serving leader, who has won countless bouquets for setting the twice-yearly summits ablaze.

In a very real sense, the most exciting event of the day was the Queen's pre-summit lunch at Buckingham Palace, where the leaders ate breast of pheasant — shot on the monarch's Windsor estate — accompanied by mushroom sauce and croquette potatoes stuffed with spinach puree.

The main debates when business began were on employment in the European Community and on problems of terrorism and drugs. The ground covered had already been dealt with by specialist EEC Ministers in Brussels and Luxembourg.

The low-key discussion of issues which were not at crisis point and which did not require urgent resolution, marked a return to the original concept of EEC summits envisaged by the former French Prime Minister, M Valerie Giscard d'Estang — a relaxed and civilised debate of EEC and international issues, providing guidance for the solution of complex problems but not actually dealing with nuts and bolts.

"This really is a summit where no one wants any real controversy," said a British diplomat. "Nearly everyone wants a few propoganda points they can take home to their electorates. But no one wants a row."

This applies above all to Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who faces a General Election in West Germany in five weeks. His spokesmen yesterday were talking of the Chancellor's idea for giving generous EEC aid to small German farmers for surrendering milk production.

They were also talking of the need for other EEC countries to share the burden of the 80,000 Third World political refugees who are living in West Germany.

These proposals have no chance of being accepted at the summit, but the very act of tabling them will not harm the electoral prospects of the Chancellor's ruling Christian Democrats.

Neither will his impassioned intervention on the need for leaders to take environmental issues into more serious account at a time when the German people are deeply concerned about the disastrous pollution of the Rhine by Swiss chemical companies.

Continued on Page 4, Col 5
Editorial — Page 6

Call for unity on terrorism

Continued from Page 1

Opening the debate on unemployment, Mrs Thatcher stressed the need to remove red tape that discouraged the formation of small and medium businesses. She emphasised the need to contain inflation, while other leaders concentrated on the need for more investment in public works and research.

M Jacques Delors, president of the Community's executive European Commission, told the heads of Government: "The unemployment problem remains at the centre of the Community's pre-occupations." He urged conciliation between employers and trade unionists, something, which Mrs Thatcher has constantly tried to play down both in the domestic and European contexts.

Mrs Thatcher, M Delors and the Italian Prime Minister, Mr Bettino Craxi, gave warning of the threat to world trade — and therefore to the European economy — of protectionism in Japan.

Mrs Thatcher talked about Japan in the course of urging acceleration of the process of breaking down barriers to trade within the Community. The EEC's trade gap with Japan was continuing to grow and stood at $20 billion, 70 per cent up on a year ago.

Forty-five minutes was devoted to a debate on terrorism and drugs. Mrs Thatcher said nearly every Community country had had some terrorist acts in the last year. She emphasised the need for the EEC's resources to be unified "to meet the threats to our peoples and societies."

The EEC nations had to make clear their determination to resist blackmail. What was acceptable as freedom fighting on their own territories was not acceptable as freedom fighting when extended to European soil.

She said that a threat against one EEC state had to be regarded as a threat against all EEC states. There must be no concessions under duress to terrorists. Control of the Community's external borders had to be tightened while permitting ever-freer movement within them.

There was no debate on the problems now afflicting the European Community: record food surpluses which are mounting faster than every before, and an imminent cash shortfall for agreed Community projects of at least £3 billion. The debates, and wrangles on these issues are going to shake the Community throughout next year, and the leaders saw no prospect of making real progress on them during their six hours of formal debate in London.

When formal discussions resume today the main subjects will be a co-ordinated European fight against AIDS and cancer. The leaders will also consider the final council declaration which is being worked on overnight by officials.

B66/5/117

Financial Times Monday December 8 1986

Tough line sought against terror

BY QUENTIN PEEL

JOINT ACTION to fight terrorism, illegal immigration and drug trafficking, with tighter controls at external frontiers, is essential if the EEC is to achieve free movement within and between the 12 member states, the heads of government agreed.

They gave their blessing to consideration of both a common visa policy for the community and common criminal legislation for drug offences, as well as a single list of banned drugs for all member states.

The summit conclusions put the stress in countering both terrorism and drug trafficking firmly on the need for tighter controls and greater co-operation, due to be considered again tomorrow at a meeting in London of EEC interior ministers.

The EEC leaders also underlined the need for controls to prevent the abuse of the right of asylum—a major concern for West Germany facing a flood of such applications from travellers through East Berlin from countries such as Sri Lanka. They agreed "that asylum should not be granted for economic and financial reasons and that steps must be taken to counter abuse."

At the urging of Mrs Margaret Thatcher, the British Prime Minister, they agreed on three principles to "govern their common fight against terrorism."

- No concessions under duress to terrorists or their sponsors;
- Solidarity between the member states in their efforts to prevent terrorist crimes and bring the guilty to justice;
- Concerted action in response to terrorist attacks on the territory of a member state, and to evidence of external involvement in such attacks.

The third point refers clearly to Mrs Thatcher's disappointment with the slow community response to Britain's break in relations with Syria after the attempted bombing of an Israeli airliner at Heathrow.

The interior ministers, meeting under the chairmanship of Mr Douglas Hurd, the British Home Secretary, have been told to discuss and agree arrangements for extradition—with the UK promising to change its extradition laws to fall in line with the European Convention on extradition.

France, Greece and Ireland have also promised to ratify the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, bringing all the member states into line with both agreements.

On drugs, the EEC leaders endorsed the work of the interior ministers, and also called for co-ordinated legal action to seize the assets of a convicted drug peddlar in any community member state.

They will also ask EEC ambassadors based in drug producing countries to recommend ways in which the Community can help fight the trade.

Reports on harmonised drug legislation, and a list of banned drugs for the whole Community, will be submitted to the next summit.

On public health, they agreed to co-ordinate national campaigns to improve public awareness of the dangers of Aids, exchange information to prevent the spread of the disease, and co-operate on research into a cure.

They also agreed to launch a European Cancer Information Year in 1989 to develop "a sustained and concerted information campaign . . . on the prevention, early warning and treatment of cancer."

New Zealand High Commission

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"YELLOW"

Reference: B66/5/1A
B69/47

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.
(DLO EUR AAD MEA)

4 December 1986

c.c. E.I.B.
Defence (DDOP)
Tehran

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Date	Nature of Material
	Terrorism: Iran and Europe
28 November 1986	"New Statesman" article on Iranian terrorism and state-sponsored terrorism in general

S.W. Prior
for High Commissioner

TERRORISM

The fruits of terror



The sponsorship and perpetration of terrorist acts have one overriding virtue for their backers and authors — they work. In the report on Iran below, **AMIR TAHERI** *unravels the 'network of Holy Terror': while on p.8* **R. W. JOHNSON** *analyses a phenomenon which appears resistant to reform or retribution alike.*
Boxes by **PATRICK FORBES**

THE SUPPLY of arms to Iran, a state which President Reagan had dubbed 'outlaw' less than 18 months ago for its sponsorship of terrorism, has weakened the US presidency more than any other act. But the US was barely out of line with other western states. All of them have similarly fulminated against the sponsorship of terrorism — and yet, for the past two years at least, most have been courting the revolutionary mullahs of Tehran. In Britain's case, this has meant turning a blind eye to Tehran's use of London as a centre for arms procurement, for propaganda and for the sponsorship of terror.

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's Islamic government demonstrated its ability to inflict humiliation on the 'cross worshipping enemies of Islam' when he approved the seizure of the US embassy in Tehran in 1979. When Ronald Reagan succeeded Carter in 1981, the mullahs ordered a temporary halt to revolutionary action against 'the great Satan', as Khomeini calls the US. Reagan was seen as a tough leader who would not accept the kind of ignominy Carter had suffered to keep the hostages alive and eventually win their release.

It was not until late in 1982 that the mullahs decided to put Reagan's 'macho' image to the test by ordering a series of bomb attacks on American-owned buildings in Kuwait and the Emirate of Qatar. Reagan's reaction proved surprisingly mild, and the mullahs decided to go further. By the end of 1982 they had created a veritable network of 'Holy Terror' under the enigmatic Ayatollah Fazl-Allah Mahalati, whose official title is 'The Representative of the Imam in the Revolutionary Guard'. (The 'Imam' or 'The Supreme Guide' is the title Khomeini chose for himself in 1978 when he launched his revolutionary movement against the Shah.)

Reagan's strengthening of Washington's military presence in the Persian Gulf and the consequent threat to Iran's oil-exports, meant that the Ayatollah had to find another terrain on which to fight the 'great Satan'.

That terrain was found in war-torn Lebanon, where Mahalati, spending tens of millions of pounds, succeeded in creating the Hizb-Allah (the party of Allah) with the help of a group of militant shi'ite Muslims. By mid-1983 the Tehran-sponsored network of 'Holy Terror' was a force to reckon with in the Lebanon. It had at its disposal dozens of 'Enteharis' — those who are 'ready to die while killing the enemies of Allah'. An entire squadron consisted of young women, aged 16 to 20, who had been designated as 'Arous Addamm' or 'Brides of Blood'. They were trained in driving truckloads of dynamite into enemy positions, killing and dying in the process.

In November 1983 the soldiers of 'Holy Terror' struck in Lebanon, blowing up the dormitories of American marines and French paratroopers. The double suicide attack cost the lives of 241 American servicemen and 59 French soldiers. The explosion caused by the attackers at the American soldiers' dormitory has since been described by experts as 'the biggest non-nuclear explosion the world has known since World War II'.

Both Reagan and the French President Francois Mitterrand reacted by promising an exemplary punishment for the terrorists. But they did not go beyond a number of largely symbolic raids on villages inhabited by shi-ites in the Bekaa valley and both subsequently withdrew their forces from Lebanon. However, the humiliation inflicted on Reagan went largely unnoticed inside the United States.

Israel and the mullahs

There is strong evidence that, following the suicide attack, Israel played a key role in persuading the Reagan Administration to start a dialogue with the mullahs. The Israelis had wasted no time in understanding the advantages that the presence of the party of Allah in Lebanon could bring them. The shi'ites were sworn enemies of the Palestinians who are, in turn, considered by the

Israelis as the worst enemies of the Jewish State. At the same time, the party of Allah and its patron saints in Tehran seemed determined to prevent President Hafez al-Assad of Syria from achieving his dream of dominating Lebanon.

Two men ran the network of 'Holy Terror' in Lebanon on behalf of Khomeini. One was Ayatollah Ali-Akbar Mohatashami whose official title was 'Ambassador of the Islamic Republic to Damascus'; the other was Muhammad Nourani, a graduate of the University of San José in California who served as chargé d'affaires in Beirut. They recruited a number of Lebanese shi'ite militants on the spot, among them Hussein Moussawi. Moussawi, a former teacher of Chemistry at Baalbek College, was picked by Nourani as the leader of the Islamic Amal (Hope) organisation which served as the political arm of the 'Holy Terror'.

Since then the network of 'Holy Terror' has been responsible for more than 700 documented terrorist attacks. Most of these have been against Iraq, at war with Iran since 22 September 1980. But a number of western countries, notably the United States and France, have figured among prime targets. A total of 400 American and French citizens are estimated to have died in various operations conducted by the 'Holy Terror' during the past four years.

Scores of Americans and French people have been held as hostages by the partisans of Allah for varying lengths of time in the same period. At least one American hostage, William Buckley, and one French one, Michel Seurat, have almost certainly been murdered by the 'Holy Terror' while in captivity. The network of 'Holy Terror' also takes credit for the murder of some 20 of the CIA's highest-ranking agents in the Middle East during the 1983 suicide raid on the US embassy in Beirut.

In creating his network, Ayatollah Khomeini has made use of an ancient Islamic tradition whereby the 'Elimination of the enemies of the faith' is an individual task incumbent on every true believer. To 'enforce the good and prevent the evil' is a sacred duty for all Muslims: thus the use of violence in the performance of this duty has been long accepted. Three out of four immediate successors of the prophet Muhammad, who were known as 'The Well-guided Caliphs', were assassinated by fanatics who believed they had violated the rules of the Qur'an. During the Crusades, the sect created by Hassan Sabbah in the mountains of Rudbar, northwest of present-day Tehran, spread terror in the Christian as well as the Muslim camps. These 'Agents of Allah's Will', as they like to be called, came to be known as the 'Assassins' because they were accused of taking hashish.

The assassination of unloved rulers and the physical elimination of 'enemies of Islam' have never been challenged in principle, even by the most learned of Islamic theologians. The prophet himself is quoted as saying that the believers should 'kill the trouble-makers before they can make trouble'. Those whose removal is considered essential for the sake of preserving Islam or ensuring its further expansion are given the title of Mahdur Ad-Damm or 'Those Whose Blood Must Go To Waste'. To assassinate them is to carry out the will of Allah for which one is rewarded by gaining a secure place in paradise.

During the past four years the Islamic Republic has trained several thousand young men and women for participation in acts of terror, ranging from individual assassinations to the hijacking of civilian aircraft and the blowing up of installations belonging to 'enemies of Allah'. Inside Iran, at least 22 'training centres', including four for women, have been established. But the 'Holy Terror' network also maintains half a dozen such centres in Lebanon. Most recruits are young radicals from Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain, Kuwait and Morocco. There are also Pakistanis, Filipinos and Indian Muslims. Some members of the 'Holy Terror' network have been recruited from among Muslim students attending British and American universities.

The network is spending an average of £4m a year in Britain alone on propaganda and recruitment. The sum in question is channelled through an Iranian bank in the City and a British Bank in the Island of Jersey.

'Revolutionary Justice'

The network of 'Holy Terror' is organised in a variety of separate and semi-autonomous groups. Often they use the code name of 'Islamic Jihad', or Holy War, in order to sign their actions. Another favourite code-name is that of 'Revolutionary Justice Organisation'.

Each group may have a total membership of between 20 and 150. Liaison among the various groups is assured only through the Islamic Revolutionary Guards stationed in Lebanon since 1982.

THE FUTURE of the network of 'Holy Terror' has been one of the key issues in the power struggle that has been going on in Tehran for the past three years: the failing health of Ayatollah Khomeini, now 84, has intensified the struggle. Some mullahs want the activities of 'Holy Terror' curbed so that the Islamic Republic can normalise its relations with the West — a normalistion deemed vital in view of the fact that Iran's oil revenues have steadily fallen since 1984, while the ongoing war with Iraq means that the Islamic Republic must somehow procure the necessary arms. Another faction, however, insists that the West understands nothing but the language of terror, and that the western powers must be *blackmailed* into meeting Iran's needs for arms and spare parts.

The faction supporting 'normalisation' with the West is led by the speaker of the Islamic Majlis (Parliament), Hojat Al-Islam Ali-Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, who has been negotiating with the United States, as well as Britian and France, through a number of intermediaries — including some prominent international arms merchants. Israel has also given a helping hand: the Israelis are anxious to help Iran with the Gulf War and bring down the regime of the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, in the hope that the event would be sufficient to keep the Arabs divided and confused for long enough for Israel to bring them to the negotiating table, one by one.

Negotiations between the Reagan Administration and Rafsanjani's faction were initiated by David Kimche, the former director-general of the Israeli foreign ministry — culminating in Robert McFarlane's two trips to Tehran.

The fact that the United States was obliged to ignore the arms embargo it had imposed against Iran, however, is seen by the radical faction in Tehran as a sure sign that 'the great Satan' would only respond to violence and terror. The radicals, led by the prosecutor-general Hojat Al-Islam Muhammad Khoiniha, eventually leaked the news of the secret negotiations forcing both Tehran and Washington to announce a halt in their contacts. But there is every indication that a majority of the mullahs and their allies want the process of normalisation to continue.

It is now established that even the Islamic prime minister, Mir-Hossein Mussavi, has been involved in the secret talks with Washington. This is important, because it shows that the process initiated by Israel now enjoys much broader support in Tehran than it does in Washington.

Meanwhile, France continues its own 'normalisation' with Iran. It will return the $1bn loan it received from the Iranians while the Shah was still in power. As for Britain, Mrs Thatcher has secured the goodwill of the mullahs by allowing them to use London as the main centre for their arms procurement activities on the international scene. A new Islamic chargé d'affaires is due in London soon and Sir Geoffrey Howe, the Foreign Secretary, has already given the go-ahead for the reopening of the British Embassy in Tehran.

The western powers, including Israel, avoid in their discussions with the mullahs any mention of the future of the network of 'Holy Terror'. They hope that, once the Islamic Republic is brought back into the fold, it will fade away on its own. This — according to most experts in Iran's complicated politics — is a dangerous miscalculation. All the factions involved in the struggle for power in Tehran are determined to keep the network intact, although some may want to limit its use in time and space. The mullahs know that it was the threat of violence, and the fact that 'Holy Terror' is holding American and French citizens hostage in Lebanon, which persuaded Reagan and the French premier Jacques Chirac that the 'unthinkable' must be swallowed so that talks could be held with the Islamic Republic.

The network of 'Holy Terror', has, as a result, been greatly strengthened by the revelations of Reagan's secret attempts to win favour from the mullahs. The incentive for seizing more western hostages and launching more attacks on western interests in the Middle East is today at its highest for over five years. □

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Responses to terrorism

President Ronald Reagan speaking to the American Bar Association — 9 July 1985:
'So there we have it, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Cuba, Nicaragua — continents away, tens of thousands of miles apart — but the same goals and objectives. I submit to you that the growth in terrorism in recent years results from the increasing involvement of these states in terrorism in every region of the world . . . And we are especially not going to tolerate these attacks from outlaw states run by the strangest collection of misfits, looney tunes, and squalid criminals since the advent of the Third Reich.'

Secretary of State George Schultz speaking in Yugoslavia — 17 December 1985:
'In dealing with the problem, we need to create an atmosphere so terrorists have no place to hide and are brought to justice.'

President Ronald Reagan defending the arms deal with Iran — 20 November 1986:
'It was a high risk gamble . . . the circumstances were warranted, and I don't see that it has been a fiasco or a great failure of any kind.' ●

Who's afraid of the state?

'TERRORISM is an *ex post facto* definition' says Franco Ferracuti, perhaps the world's greatest authority on the subject. 'Half the members of the United Nations got there by using what others would have called terrorism. You're only a terrorist if you lose.' Terrorism is one of those subjects where the simple popular verities melt away under analysis. There is no real agreement even on definitions. Is a state which terrifies its citizens by the use of arbitrary detention and torture terrorist? Is massive 'counter-terrorist' retaliation against innocent civilians itself terrorist?

There is not even agreement on what constitutes a terrorist act. Thus between 1982 and 1984 there were 220 acts of violence against abortion and family planning clinics in the US (including arson, shooting, bombing, and hostage-taking), but the FBI, reflecting the strong anti-abortion prejudices of the Reagan Administration, refuses to term these acts 'terrorist' on the grounds that no organised group publicly claims responsibility for them. One can sometimes almost see the point of the terrorists (cited by Stephen Segaller in his *Invisible Armies*[1]) who argue that to proclaim non-violence is merely to accept the state monopoly on violence, and that this is the worst situation of all for the state has power and authority as well.

A clutch of recent books on terrorism reflect the view that it is a problem we will have to live with. Segaller is admirably blunt: 'The terrorist can strike at anyone, anywhere, at any time. Nothing will eliminate terrorism; defeating it is a pipedream'. (Segaller's is the best overall survey of the subject here — though marred by mis-spellings, eg. guerrilla consistently written as 'guerilla', Batista as 'Battista'. Embarrassingly, it even mis-spells words like embarrassing, and it wrongly describes *Le Matin* as a communist paper. Rosie's book[2] provides a wonderfully comprehensive listing of terrorist acts and actors but its dictionary form makes it a work of reference only. The Freedman collection[3] is sensible, thoughtful but rather slim.)

In some ways, the problem is wildly exaggerated. Fewer than 5,000 people have died in terrorist acts in the last 20 years (and, despite Reagan's rhetoric, less than 10 per cent of these were Americans) — a fraction of what we lose through road accidents or lung cancer in a single year. The repeated allegations that some countries (Reagan's list is Libya, Iran, North Korea, Cuba and Nicaragua) deliberately foment terrorism rests on very flimsy foundations. The Cuban and Nicaraguan examples are clearly the product of Reagan's topsy-turvy, almost Disney-like mind (indeed, the examples were given in the famous 'loony tunes' speech with quite self-conscious echoes of Disney): both states have far more clearly been the object of (US) state-sponsored terrorism than the initiators of it.



Greenpeace

State-sponsored terrorism *par excellence*; but where are the calls for sanctions against Paris?

A fortiori, the frequent claim that the Russians sponsor terrorism is not taken seriously by most authorities. (This claim was officially launched by Alexander Haig, but even George Shultz shows some embarrassment about it.) The Russians do support what they term national liberation movements — which is, with only minor changes in terminology, what the US says it is doing with the contras. But the Soviets condemn as terrorist those groups, like the Japanese Red Army or the German Red Brigade, to which they do not accord that label. The most clear-cut case of state-sponsored terrorism in recent time was that of France in the *Rainbow Warrior* affair — but neither Thatcher nor Reagan have talked about sanctions against Paris.

Finally, the record of all the major powers in regard to terrorism is hypocritical and inconsistent. In practice all of them do bargain and make deals with terrorists — these books burst with examples. The press is often quite wonderfully obtuse or blind about this. We only know about Reagan's arms-for-hostages trading with Iran because, for domestic factional reasons, a leading Iranian politician broadcast the deal: the press sat in its offices and got the story off its telex machines. Similarly, the press reports Terry Waite's exploits as the everyday story of divine Anglican miracle-worker folk. Has no-one thought of finding out whether he is anything more than a middleman, and, if so, what currency

The gentle terrorist

THE WAY to Dr Petros was barred. Between the good doctor and myself stood three Ethiopian expatriates and two pallid Britons, both in their 20s, both sporting CND badges. I had the wrong day, a regrettable mistake had been made.

Dr Petros, an Ethiopian, is a member of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) — the badge wearers, presumably, supporters. The EPLF are secessionists, engaged in a bloody 20-year-long war with the Ethiopian government (whatever its political hue) for control of Eritrea, an inhospitable triangle of land in the North of the country. Petros is in charge of the EPLF's field hospital at Orotta, a remarkable underground facility.

The Ethiopian government would waste no time in asserting the organisation's terrorist status — pointing to the occupation of a large chunk of Ethiopian territory without sanction from the State, reliance on classic guerrilla-style raids for the advancement of the Eritrean front line, and, specifically, EPLF disruption of Red Cross food convoys. But the rambling, at times convincing answers, Petros gave to my unremarkable questions when we finally met, and the presence of those CND members underline the cliché that in terrorism, there are no moral certainties.

What was the military strategy his organisation followed? 'It is a protracted struggle. The objective is not only national independence, but also social transformation.' (The EPLF are avowedly Marxist.)

How could he, a doctor, justify the use of violence in pursuit of those objectives? The familiar answer: 'Well if you look at the history of the struggle, initially the Eritreans tried peacefully to gain their independence going to the United Nations . . . But this didn't work . . . And in the early 1960s Haile Selassie annexed Eritrea, and from then on the war has escalated.' Superpower involvement (with the USA backing Haile Selassie, the USSR the current administration) left the UN closed to the EPLF. He argued they had no alternative but violence.

But what about attacking Red Cross convoys? No, no the EPLF had never done that . . . they never attacked lorries that were properly marked . . . And weren't the EPLF backed by the Saudis, superpower for superpower? Another unconvincing reply: no, they were entirely dependent on the materials they captured from the Ethiopians.

And wasn't the Eritrean cause doomed to failure — at best a war of attrition, at worst defeat, as the government's superior force ground down the EPLF? First the rhetoric: 'No, no we would never have come this far without the support of the people. And the support of the people will ensure that the struggle will never end.' In fact the people's support can be counted on less and less — food shortages and mounting casualties have begun to tell. And in the next breath Petros admitted that indeed the struggle was becoming more difficult, with the EPLF penned in behind the front line.

Yet despite the incoherence of all his answers, there is something compelling about a man who tells you that he joined an outlawed organisation, after he had been treating another child with a deep bullet wound. 'I thought that I could better use my scalpel on the side of my people — even if they did carry guns.' ●

he trades in? Arms, Landrovers, money — or really just prayers?

TYPICALLY, groups have recourse to terrorism when they have bitterly-felt grievances and face overwhelming military might which rules out conventional means of resistance. This was a quite ordinary feature of the colonial situation and there it is quite common to find examples of terrorist wars, successfully won. Ironically, perhaps, the Israel of Irgun and the Stern Gang is the prototype, but the dynamics of the 'armed struggle' in Algeria or Zimbabwe were much the same. Terrorism triumphs in such situations because it enjoys at least latent mass support and because the oppressor, once tired of it, has somewhere else to go.

These examples are undeniably potent in a world where three quarters of the population lives in poverty and faces a privileged one quarter who have both an inevitable neo-colonial hold over the poor and possess overwhelming military superiority. Yet the fact remains that the rich-poor division has never yet provided a satisfactory basis for terrorist struggle. Such struggles are always phrased in ethnic, religious or national terms. Only those basic forms of identification seem capable of sustaining the fanaticism necessary to prolonged terrorist struggle. As Segaller points out in a fascinating section on the internal psychology of terrorist groups, they are easy to join but impossible to leave except through death.

At the other end of the spectrum lies the utterly hopeless and counter-productive terrorism of ideological groups in developed countries — Baader-Meinhof, the Angry Brigade, the Red Brigades, Rote Fahne and so on. Such groups do, fatally, tend to see the struggle in class terms. They always lose: they lack any support and merely allow for the state to reinforce itself against dissidents in general. Such groups are an utterly pointless menace to everyone.

The really hard cases are the marginal ones, like the IRA, ETA, the Kurds or the plethora of Middle Eastern groups which enjoy only some of the conditions necessary to success: they have some support, but not enough — and the oppressor has nowhere else to go. The result is that there is no result and a ghastly war of attrition wends on forever.

It is easy, reading these books, for the subject to become *banalisé*. The ghost that loomed over it all for me was that of Leon Klinghoffer, the 69-year-old Jewish American shot dead in his wheel-chair on the *Achille Lauro*. His body, unceremoniously dumped overboard, washed up on the shores of Syria. It is difficult to imagine a more inexcusable crime. Reading these books one has to keep tight hold of the fact that crude retaliation never works, that simplistic formulae won't do — but an even tighter hold of a straightforward moral revulsion against such acts being considered the ordinary coinage of war by anyone, anywhere. The trouble is that, as these books show, even that revulsion is simplistic, even that won't suffice. □

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[1]S. Segaller, *Invisible Armies: Terrorism into the 1990s* (Michael Joseph), viii, 311p, £15.95;
[2]G. Rosie, *The Directory of International Terrorism* (Mainstream), 310p, £14.95;
[3]L. Freedman et al., *Terrorism and International Order* (RKP), 112p, £5.95.

A partial who's who

ACTION DIRECTE: A left-wing French group which first appeared in the late 1970s with a series of attacks in and around Paris, Toulouse and Marseilles. The AD are thought to have been built on two earlier organisations and led by Jean-Marc Rouillan and Nathalie Merugnon (both captured and later released by the French authorities). In January 1985 Action Direct announced the formation of a 'political military front' with West Germany's *Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF)* to attack US and NATO bases throughout Europe.

BRIGATE ROSSE: 'Red Brigades'. One of the largest of the European left-wing groups which grew out of the failure of the New Left in the late 1960s, the Brigate Rosse also had roots in the old-established Communist Party of Italy. They began their operations in 1974 under the intellectual leadership of Renato Curcio and his wife Margherita Cagol (killed in a shooting in 1975). Although deprived of Curcio's lead at an early stage (1976) and fiercely persecuted by the Italian police after the killing of Aldo Moro in 1978, the Red Brigades persisted in their campaign of assassination and bombing. By 1982, it was estimated that the Brigate Rosse had killed 50 people, kidnapped another 50, and cost the Italian state around $90 million of damage.

GREY WOLVES: Neo-fascist Turkish terrorist group active in Turkey and Western Europe in the 1970s, though some experts estimate the organisation still possesses 26,000 members in more than 80 branches, with organisations throughout Europe. Drawn from the youth wing of the fascist National Action Party, led by Colonel Alparsan Turkes, the Wolves were accused by the Turkish authorities of murdering 700 left-wingers between 1974 and 1981. Their most high profile assassin was Mehmet Ali Agca, who tried to kill Pope John Paul II in May 1981.

ISLAMIC JIHAD: (Islamic Holy War). Loosely organised, Islamic Jihad is believed to be a Shi'ite Muslim organisation which grew up in the Baalbek Valley in Lebanon in 1982-3. Although probably trained by Iranians in the Baalbak camps, the Jihad is not thought to take orders from Iran. The organisation was described by the Shi'ite religious leader Sheikh Mohammed Fadlallah as 'a cover not for one group, but different groups'. In addition to a campaign of bombings against Western interests in Lebanon, Islamic Jihad have been responsible for the assassination of the President of the American University in Beirut, and the kidnapping of a series of Western journalists, diplomats, and clergymen.

NIDAL, ABU (born 1935): real name Sabry Khalil Bana — his nom de guerre means 'Father of the Struggle'. Born into a prosperous middle-class family in Jaffa (then part of Palestine) Nidal's family fled in 1948 to Beirut, where it is believed Nidal was educated at the America University. After the 1967 'Six-Day War', Nidal joined the main PLO faction 'Fatah' and rose through the PLO hierarchy becoming the PLO's main representative in Iraq. By the early 1970s Nidal had come to believe that Arafat's policies were futile and harmful to the Palestinians.

In 1973 Nidal set up his own military organisation, the *Fatah Revolutionary Council (FRC)*, which tried to assassinate Arafat in 1974. The PLO's response was to condemn Nidal to death. Operating out of Baghdad and then Syria, Nidal's organisation has been responsible for the assassination of PLO representatives in London, Kuwait, Paris, and Portugal, and launched attacks on Egyptians, Jordanians, and European Jews in Vienna, Rome and Paris – most notably Shlomo Argov, the Israeli Ambassador to Britain in 1982.

ROTE ARMEE FRAKTION (RAF): 'Red Army Faction'. Also known as the Baader-Meinhof Gang, the RAF was founded in 1967 by Andreas Baader, Ulrike Meinhof and Gudrun Ensslin. They launched their campaign against Western capitalism in 1968 by planting incendiary bombs in a Frankfurt department store. After a period of study and training in Palestinian camps, the nucleus of the RAF returned to Europe and began bombing US military bases, police stations, and the offices of the right-wing Springer press. The government's response was to step up police efficiency, and in 1972 Baader, Meinhof and Ensslin and 18 RAF members were arrested and jailed.

Although deprived of its founder-members, the RAF probably reached a peak in 1977 when the organisation killed Attorney General Siegfried Buback (and his guards), Hans Martin Schleyer (and his guards), and mounted a rocket attack on the Federal Justice department offices.

ULSTER DEFENCE ASSOCIATION (UDA): Largest and most powerful of the many Loyalist paramilitary groups operating in Northern Ireland. Rooted firmly in the Protestant working class, the UDA probably reached a peak in 1972 when it had an estimated 40,000 members and could bring whole areas of Belfast to a halt. The UDA has always been able to attract gangsters more interested in the cash they can extract from the Protestant communities than in any political stance.

WORLD ANTI COMMUNIST LEAGUE (WACL): Right-wing organisation founded in Taiwan in 1967, and with close links to the Unification Church (Moonies). Based in the USA and run by retired US General John K. Singlaub, the League specialises in raising large sums of money for 'anti-Communist' groups operating around the world, mainly in Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia. Apart from the $20 million for the Contras laundered by the Reagan Administration through WACL, WACL support is also thought to have been given to the death squads which operated in Argentina, Uruguay, El Salvador, and Chile. ●

Source: The Directory of International Terrorism *by George Rosie, pub. Mainstream Books.*

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CLAS: CONFIDENTIAL 5 DECEMBER 1986
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TO : WELLINGTON 1084 - ROUTINE
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OTTAWA 27 - ROUTINE : WASHINGTON 54 - ROUTINE
BRUSSELS 98 - ROUTINE : PARIS 147 - ROUTINE
LD : SFA (SEC ADM EUR LGL CCO CMS)
SUBJ: ITALY : NEW DIPLOMATIC BAG AND BAGGAGE PROCEDURES

YOUR 832.
2 WE WERE TODAY INFORMED BY THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY THAT THEY HAVE DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS TO PRESENT A FORMAL PROTEST NOTE TO THE ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY ON THE ITALIAN DECISION TO X-RAY DIPLOMATIC BAGS, AND THAT THIS WILL BE ACTIONED NEXT WEEK. THE TELEGRAM OF INSTRUCTION HAS BEEN REPEATED TO A NUMBER OF CAPITALS, INCLUDING LONDON AND WELLINGTON, WITH THE INDICATION THAT HOST GOVERNMENTS SHOULD BE INFORMED OF THIS DECISION AND OF THE POINTS TO BE MADE TO THE ITALIANS.
3 WE DO NOT KNOW THE CURRENT BRITISH POSITION, BUT PRESUMABLY THE FOREIGN OFFICE MAY HAVE SOME REACTION TO THE AUSTRALIAN DECISION.
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CLAS: CONFIDENTIAL 08 DECEMBER 1986
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RPTD: ROME 27 LONDON 334 WASHINGTON 484 OTTAWA 202
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SUBJ: ITALY : NEW DIPLOMATIC BAG AND BAGGAGE PROCEDURES

A COPY OF THE AUSTRALIAN TELEGRAM REFERRED TO IN ROME'S 1084 WILL BE IN OUR 9 DECEMBER BAG. AUSTRALIAN PROTEST IS BASED ON THE LEGAL POINTS MENTIONED IN OUR 3382 - THAT X-RAY SCANNING IS TANTAMOUNT TO OPENING THE BAG, THAT LIMITATION OF BAG SIZE IS AN UNACCEPTABLE RESTRICTION ON THE FREEDOM OF USE OF THE BAG (AND COULD POSE A PRACTICAL PROBLEM, PARTICULARLY WHEN COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT IS BEING CARRIED) WHILE RESTRICTIONS ON POINT OF ENTRY, WHILE OF LESS CONCERN, ALSO LIMIT THE FREEDOM OF THE BAG.

2. AUSTEMB ROME HAS BEEN ASKED TO LODGE A FORMAL PROTEST WITH THE ITALIAN MFA, LISTING THESE POINTS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF SHARED CONCERN ABOUT TERRORISM BUT POINTING OUT THAT UNILATERAL RESTRICTION OF RIGHTS UNDER THE VIENNA CONVENTION IS NOT THE MOST APPROPRIATE METHOD OF DEALING WITH THESE PROBLEMS.
3. DFA (MATHEWS, BILATERL DOMESTIC LEGAL SECTION) COMMENTED THAT IN THE COURSE OF DISCUSSIONS IN CANBERRA WITH THE ITALIANS ON OTHER MATTERS, THEY HAD BEEN TOLD THAT THE ACTIONBEING TAKEN WAS PRIMARILY FOR DOMESTIC PURPOSES, AND THAT NO X-RAYING OF BAGS WOULD TAKE PLACE UNLESS THE AUTHORITIES HAD VERY GOOD REASON INDEED TO SUSPECT THAT A BAG WAS BEING USED TO CARRY ARMS. THE AUSTRALIAN PROTEST WAS THEREFORE A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE AND RECORD AND THE AUSTRALIANS WOULD NOT EXPECT, IN PRACTICE, THERE TO BE ANY DIFFICULTY WITH THE CARRIAGE OF BAGS. BUT MATHERWS DID ADD THAT DFA WAS DELAYING THE DESPATCH OF A LARGE CONSIGNMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT TO ROME UNTIL AFTER THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT'S OBJECTIONS TO THE NEW REGULATIONS HAD BEEN OFFICIALLY REGISTERED.
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MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

WELLINGTON

4 December 1986

All Posts

cc: PMD
NZSIS(TIC)
Police(PTIU)
Defence(DDOPs)

COUNTER TERRORISM:: NEW ZEALAND POLICY AND PRACTICE

We attach for your information a copy of a recent telegram to The Hague (and repeated to several other posts) on the above.

(M F Watkins)
for Secretary of Foreign Affairs

Encl

NEW ZEALAND
LONDON
15 DEC 1986
CENTRAL REGISTRY
HIGH COMMISSION

COVERING
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL 28 NOVEMBER 1986
FROM WELLINGTON
TO THE HAGUE 15Q7(M) ROUTINE
RPTD LONDON ATHENS BONN BRUSSELS MOSCOW GENEVA PARIS ROME VIENNA
OTTAWA CANBERRA WASHINGTON 15Q7(M) ROUTINE

SFA (DLO EUR LGL SEC AMER AUS)
PMD
NZSIS
POLICE (PTIU)
DEFENCE (DDOPS)

EUROPEAN ANTI-TERRORISM MEASURES
THANKS YOUR USEFUL 14Q4.
AS PREVIOUSLY INDICATED IT IS VERY HELPFUL TO THE NZ COUNTER-TERRORISM COMMUNITY TO HAVE SUCH REPORTING ON ANTI-TERRORISM MEASURES OVERSEAS. (OUR 7Q3 REFERS).
2. FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS ON THE SUBJECT WE APPRECIATE THAT POSTS COULD USEFULLY HAVE MORE INFORMATION ON NZ POLICY AND PRACTICE. WE HOPE TO BE ABLE EARLY NEXT YEAR TO SEND OUT A GUIDANCE/BACKGROUND MESSAGE.
=

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RESENT 28Q445Z WLN EB

COL 15Q7(M) REST CKD

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RR THE HAGUE LONDON ATHENS BONN VIENNA BRUSSELS OTTWA
MOSCOW GENEVA PARIS ROME
RR OTTAWA WASHINGTON
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CONFIDENTIAL 28 NOVEMBER 1986
FROM WELLINGTON
TO THE HAGUE U /N ROUTINE
RPTD LONDON ATHENS BONN VIENNA BRUSSELS OTTAWA MOSCOW CANBERRA
GENEVA WASHINGTON PARIS ROME U/N ROUTINE

29771
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S E R VI C E

H/W AMENDED COPY OUR 1057M

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL 28 NOVEMBER 1986
FROM WELLINGTON
TO THE HAGUE 1507(M) ROUTINE
RPTD LONDON ATHENS BONN BRUSSELS MOSCOW GENEVA PARIS ROME VIENNA
OTTAWA CANBERRA WASHINGTON 1507(M) ROUTINE

SFA (DLO EUR LGL SEC AMER AUS)
PMD
NZSIS
POLICE (PTIU)
DEFENCE (DDOPS)

EUROPEAN ANTI-TERRORISM MEASURES
THANKS YOUR USEFUL 1404.
AS PREVIOUSLY INDICATED IT IS VERY HELPFUL TO THE NZ COUNTER-TERRORISM COMMUNITY TO HAVE SUCH REPORTING ON ANTI-TERRORISM MEASURES OVERSEAS. (OUR 703 REFERS).
2. FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS ON THE SUBJECT WE APPRECIATE THAT POSTS COULD USEFULLY HAVE MORE INFORMATION ON NZ POLICY AND PRACTICE. WE HOPE TO BE ABLE EARLY NEXT YEAR TO SEND OUT A GUIDANCE/BACKGROUND MESSAGE.
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ACTION COPY

CONFIDENTIAL 28 NOVEMBER 1986
FROM WELLINGTON
TO THE HAGUE
RPTD LONDON ATHENS BONN VIENNA BRUSSELS OTTAWA MOSCOW CANBERRA
GENEVA WASHINGTON PARIS ROME 1507(M) ROUTINE

CONFIDENTIAL

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FA(P)
CMPS

EUROPEAN ANTI-TERRORISM MEASURES

THANKS YOUR USEFUL 1404.
AS PREVIOUSLY INDICATED IT IS VERY HELPFUL TO THE NZ COUNTER-TERRORISM COMMUNITY TO HAVE SUCH REPORTING ON ANTI-TERRORISM MEASURES OVERSEAS. (OUR 703 REFERS).
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"Yellow"

B69/89
B66/5/1A

28 November 1986

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs
WELLINGTON

(Att : DLO EUR LGL SEC MEA)

c.c. PMD

NZSIS (TIC)

TERRORISM : HINDAWI CASE : SYRIAN DISINFORMATION

... Attached for your information is a further F.C.O. Briefing telegram on the Hindawi case countering what is considered to have been a Syrian disinformation campaign.

S. W. PRIOR
S.W. Prior
for High Commissioner

Att

CONFIDENTIAL

B66/5/1A

CCC
PMD

UNCLASSIFIED-SECURE

- 29698

CLAS: UNCLASSIFIED-SECURE 27 NOVEMBER 1986
FROM: BONN
TO : WELLINGTON 1483 - P R I O R I T Y
RPTD: LONDON 352 - ROUTINE
SVGS: (VIA LDC) BRUSSELS PARIS WASHINGTON
(VIA LONDON) THE HAGUE ROME
LD : SFA (DLO/EUR/LGL/SEC/AAD/MEA)
PMD
NZSIS (TIC)
POLICE (PTIU)
DEFENCE (DDOP)
EIB
SUBJ: TERRORISM : SYRIA.

FAPC

OUR 1410 (NOT TO ALL).

HINDAWI'S BROTHER HASI WAS SENTENCED YESTERDAY TO 14 YEARS AND ANOTHER JORDANIAN TO 13 YEARS FOR THEIR PART IN THE BOMBING OF THE GERMAN-ARAB SOCIETY BUILDING IN WEST BERLIN., IN DOING SO, THE COURT DECLARED THAT THERE WAS NO DOUBT ABOUT SYRIAN INVOLVEMENT.

2. IN A STATEMENT TODAY, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CONDEMNED THE INVOLVEMENT OF SYRIAN AGENTS IN AN ATTACK ON GERMAN TERRITORY AS A VIOLATION OF THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. THE FRG GOVERNMENT CALLED ON SYRIAN GOVERNMENT TO OFFER PROOF THAT IT WAS TAKING ACTION AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, STARTING WITH ITS OWN SECRET SERVICE.

3. THE FOLLOWING MEASURES WERE BEING TAKEN BY THE FRG IN RESPONSE:

A) THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR, WHO HAD LEFT SYRIA ON 16 NOVEMBER, WOULD NOT BE REPLACED FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD.

B) THREE NAMED MEMBERS OF THE SYRIAN EMBASSY IN BONN ARE BEING EXPELLED.

UNCLASS SECURE

C) THE MILITARY STAFF AT THE SYRIAN EMBASSY IS TO BE REDUCED FROM FOUR MEMBERS TO TWO (THE SAME NUMBER OF MILITARY PERSONNEL AT THE GERMAN EMBASSY IN DAMASCUS).

D) NO NEW DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE WILL BE APPROVED FOR SYRIA.

E) SYRIAN OFFICIAL PASSPORTS WILL NO LONGER BE RECOGNISED.

F) THE INVOLVEMENT OF SYRIAN AGENTS FROM EAST BERLIN WILL ALSO BE TAKEN UP WITH THE GDR, AND THE FRG WILL ALSO DISCUSS THE ISSUE WITH THE ALLIED POWERS IN WEST BERLIN.

4. COMMENT: THE FRG RESPONSE WAS WIDELY PREDICTED AND CONTAINS NO SURPRISES. CONSISTENT WITH ITS DECLARED POLICY OF MAINTAINING CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THE GOVERNMENT STOPPED SHORT OF BREAKING OFF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

COL: 1483 352 1410 14 1

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THE INDEPENDENT Thursday 27 November 1986

W Germany seeks Syrian spy colonel for murder

From Patricia Clough
in Bonn

THE WEST BERLIN public prosecutor's office announced yesterday it had issued an international arrest warrant for Colonel Haitham Saed, deputy chief of Syrian Air Force intelligence.

Col Saed has figured in court cases in London and West Berlin as the man behind the plots by Nezar Hindawi to blow up the El Al airliner and the German-Arab Society in West Berlin.

The announcement came as a West Berlin court sentenced Ahmed Hasi, a brother of Hindawi, and Farouk Salameh, to 14 and 13 years respectively in jail, for their part in the Berlin bomb attack, when nine people were injured.

Col Saed is wanted on the same charges that Hasi and Salameh were jailed for: attempted murder and causing an explosion. Giving the verdict, the president of the court, Hans-Joachim Heinze, said he and the four other judges found the official Syrian connection with the bomb attack proven.

The court was told how Hindawi and Salameh travelled to Damascus in January, were met at the airport by Col Saed and had a talk with him in a guarded official villa. During the talk, Col Saed, frequently referred to by his pseudonym, Abu Ahmed, showed Salameh the bomb to be used in the attack and asked him to take it to Germany. When he refused he was told it would be sent by diplomatic channels.

Hasi told the court how he was summoned to the Syrian embassy in East Berlin and was given the suitcase bomb by Col Saed. When it twice failed to go off, a Syrian was sent over from East Berlin to put it right.

Judge Heinze said Hasi and Salameh had committed one of the "most atrocious and detestable crimes" and would have been given life sentences if they had not confessed. The pair heard the sentence without any visible reaction.

Bonn has said a decision on the replacement of its ambassador in Syria, who has returned after ending his tour of duty, would depend on the outcome of the trial. But the Government spokesman, Friedhelm Ost, said yesterday the written verdict would be carefully studied before a decision was made on what consequences should follow.

A spokesman for the three Western allied powers in West Berlin said they would be meeting later in the day to discuss what action to take. He would not disclose details but it was understood that one likely move is to ban Syrian diplomats from the city.

The Syrian ambassador in East Berlin, Faysal Sammak, whose embassy appeared to have been used as a base for the attack, has denied any Syrian involvement in the bombing. He claims it was the work of the Israeli secret service, Mossad.

[Continuation from column 366]

Terrorism

10.25 pm

The Minister of State, Home Office (Mr. David Mellor): I beg to move,

That the draft Suppression of Terrorism 1978 (Application of Provisions) (United States of America) Order 1986, which was laid before this House on 20th November, be approved.

As the House will be aware, the purpose of the order is to enable the United Kingdom to ratify the supplementary extradition treaty with the United States. The text of the supplementary treaty, as amended, is set out in schedule 1 to the draft order. Its principal effect will be to prevent those accused or convicted of certain serious crimes of violence avoiding extradition by claiming that their offences are political. The background to the supplementary treaty is, of course, events in Northern Ireland, and the fact that people accused of serious crime associated with the situation there have fled to the United States to seek haven and have been able to avoid extradition.

The present extradition treaty with the United States will remain in effect in conjunction with the supplementary treaty. The treaty sets out in the normal way a list of crimes for which extradition may take place. This is a requirement of our Extradition Act 1870. The treaty incorporates a further requirement of that Act, which is the political offence exception. This requirement is a standard feature of extradition treaties. Thus, the United States treaty prevents extradition

"if the offence for which extradition is requested is regarded by the requested party as one of a political character."

This concept is not defined in either the 1870 Act or in the treaty. In the United States a body of case law has arisen concerning the interpretation of this exception. The effect of this has been that the United Kingdom has failed to extradite people accused or even convicted of serious offences on the ground that the United States court had to accept that their political motives prevented extradition.

I believe that all civilised people regard this situation as intolerable. It is deeply offensive to any law-abiding person to see people accused of vicious offences find haven in another country, especially one with which we have such close and friendly relations. It was clear both to the United States Administration and to the United Kingdom that what we had seen was not a proper use of the political offence exception.

The proper purpose of this safeguard must surely relate to asylum. It is to cover the situation in which the requesting state is after the fugitive for reasons other than the enforcement of the ordinary criminal law. This position does not and cannot arise between two liberal democracies, such as the United States and the United Kingdom. In our two countries a person may be sought only in relation to criminal conduct. The courts and the prosecution authorities do not act on the whim of Government, and the Government stand apart from the case. In our country the fugitive, when returned, is tried in the ordinary way according to rigorous standards of justice.

Both Governments considered that it was invidious for terrorist fugitives to escape jurisdiction and to have their conduct dignified by the word "political". In a democracy, the gun and the bomb are the tools of the crook, the thug and the enemy of law-abiding society. They cannot in any circumstances be regarded as the tools of political activity. Neither is it legitimate to draw a distinction between what goes on in Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom. The assertions by lobbyists in the United States about standards of justice and democracy in Northern Ireland have little or no relationship to reality, and no one knows that better than my hon. Friend the Minister of State, Northern Ireland Office, who I am glad to see in his place this evening. The truth is that the character and courage shown by the people of Northern Ireland has meant that democracy and justice have survived the onslaught of terrorist horror, and will continue to do so.

The draft order before the House is intended to deliver our side of the bargain. The supplementary treaty, like any extradition arrangement, is reciprocal. The draft order, therefore, applies to extradition requests made by the United States to the United Kingdom. As I have indicated, the draft order delivers, in effect, the United Kingdom's side of the treaty. Before ratification can take place, it is necessary for our statutory provisions to be applied in respect of the supplementary treaty. The House is asked, therefore, to approve the draft order, the effect of which will be to apply to the United States certain provisions of the Suppression of Terrorism Act 1978. That Act was the means by which the United Kingdom ratified the European convention on the supression of terrorism. The Act is applied by order to other states which have ratified that convention. It has been applied over the years to all the European countries which have ratified the convention.

The United States is the first country outside the Council of Europe to be designated. The draft order, in schedule 2 identifies the various provisions in the 1978 Act which give effect to the provisions of the supplementary treaty which is before us. In particular, paragraph 5 of schedule 2 sets out the list of offences which are not to be regarded as offences of a political character in relation to a request for the extradition of a person to the United States. This is not the only order which must be made before the supplementary treaty may be ratified. An Order in Council has been made which applies the Extradition Act 1870. A further negative resolution order under the Suppression of Terrorism Act will be laid, the efect of which will be to apply these arrangements to the dependencies.

I hope that the House will agree that the supplementary treaty is a most welcome development. It will send a clear message to terrorists: that neither the United Kingdom nor the United States will provide a haven for those who use violence to further their political ambitions. On that basis, I commend this draft order to the House.

10.31 pm

Mr. Clive Soley (Hammersmith): It is right that the House should respond to the threat of terrorism that has grown in the last couple of decades, particularly in view of the easier transport around the world, which enables terrorist activity to be carried out at short notice and in different parts of the globe. It is also important that we recognise that there is an underlying cause to terrorism, whether it is in the middle east or Northern Ireland. We have to face those political problems and sooner or later, we have to resolve them. We must recognise and have a

B69/89
B66/5/1A

26 November 1986

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs
WELLINGTON

(Att : MEA EUR DLO)

c.c. EIB, WELLINGTON

DEFENCE (DDOP)

TERRORISM : THE HINDAWI CASE : SYRIAN CONNECTIONS

... Attached for your information is an FCO Research Department Background Brief, "The Hindawi Case : Syrian Connections".

2. The Brief sets out the evidence linking Nezar Hindawi with the Syrians.

S. W. PRIOR

S.W. Prior
for High Commissioner

Att.

New Zealand High Commission

New Zealand House
Haymarket
London SW1Y 4TQ
Telephone 01-930 8422
Telex 24368

"YELLOW"

(1) DHC O/R

Reference: (2) B66/5/1A

cc B 42/120

21 November 1986

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(DLO EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA)

c.c. PMD
NZSIS (TIC)
POLICE (PTIU)
DEFENCE (DDOP)

National and International Terrorism:
Wilton Park Conference

... We draw to your attention the attached Preview of the 301st Wilton Park Conference which will be held from Monday 26 - Friday 30 January 1987. It will be addressed to the theme 'National and International Terrorism: Causes of Political Violence and Responses of Democratic Societies'.

2. For reasons of finance and staff resources we think it unlikely that we would be able to attend this conference although we would, of course, seek to obtain copies of materials published as a result of it. We draw it to your attention in case you might be having someone passing through London at the time who might wish to attend.

" S.W. Prior "
for High Commissioner

PREVIEW

HC
DHC d/R
D PK

SWP - could you pse bring this to d/fns attention - in case they have someone in the area at the time - costs about £300

30lst CONFERENCE

MONDAY 26 - FRIDAY 30 JANUARY 1987

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: CAUSES OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND RESPONSES OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES

Terrorism is a universal scourge, arousing intense debate about its causes, and about methods to prevent or respond to it nationally and internationally. In examining the causes the conference will discuss: the antecedents of late twentieth century terrorism; the difference between 'freedom fighters' and terrorists; the significance of the media for terrorism; international links among terrorist organisations; and the involvement of states, whether sponsoring terrorism abroad or using terror for internal repression. In discussing the responses the conference will debate: whether political violence can be eliminated without impairment of liberal democracy; to what extent it can be exorcised by political means; and the prospects for international co-ordination of counter-measures. Case studies will examine the origin and nature of political violence in particular areas such as Northern Ireland, as well as assessing the legitimacy and efficacy of the use of military force in the territory of states harbouring terrorists or promoting terrorism.

Invitations Extended and Themes Proposed

OPENING SESSION

Paul JOHNSON
Author; sometime Editor, New Statesman

NATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM: CAN IT BE COUNTERED WITHOUT DANGER TO DEMOCRACY?

Paul WILKINSON
Professor of International Relations, University of Aberdeen

A EUROPEAN NEXUS OF TERRORIST COLLABORATION?

Speaker to be announced

POLITICAL VIOLENCE: THE SIGNFICANCE OF THE MEDIA

Alan PROTHEROE MBE TD
Assistant Director General, British Broadcasting Corporation

DEFENCE AGAINST TERRORISM ON THE GROUND

Major-General Richard CLUTTERBUCK CB OBE
Writer and broadcaster specialising in political violence

STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM: A SUBSTITUTE FOR WAR?
Brian CROZIER
Writer and Consultant on International Affairs; Co-founder, Institute for the Study of Conflict

INTERNAL STATE TERRORISM: THE ULTIMATE WEAPON OF TYRANNY
Cosmas DESMOND
Author; sometime Director, British Section, Amnesty International

NORTHERN IRELAND: A TERRITORIAL CASE STUDY
Paul BEW
Lecturer in Political Science, Queen's University of Belfast

POLITICAL MEANS OF DEFUSING TERRORISM: THE FRENCH EXPERIENCE
Pierre LELLOUCHE
Associate Director, Institut Français des Relations Internationales

INTERNATIONAL ANTI-TERRORIST ACTION: A POLITICAL PROBLEM
Donald ANDERSON MP
Labour Member of Parliament for Swansea East

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM - RESPONSE AND REPRISAL: A U.S. VIEW
Yonah ALEXANDER
Professor of Political Science and Director, Institute for the Study of Terrorism, State University of New York

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GROUP DISCUSSIONS
Plenary work will be complemented by discussion in smaller groups.

LANGUAGES
The plenary sessions will be conducted in English, and a good understanding of English is necessary. Participants will, however, also be able to make their contributions in French or German, since simultaneous interpretation will be available from French or German into English.

Enquiries about participation should be addressed to:
DIRECTOR (PARTICIPATION), Wilton Park, Wiston House, STEYNING, West Sussex BN4 3DZ

Telephone: Steyning (0903) 815020 Telex: 877242 CONFST G

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- what injured film?

ACTION COPY

CLAS: CONFIDENTIAL 21 NOVEMBER 1986
FROM: THE HAGUE
TO : WELLINGTON 1404 -ROUTINE
SVGS: (VIA LONDON PSE) LONDON ATHENS BONN BRUSSELS MOSCOW
GENEVA PARIS ROME VIENNA

LD : SFA (DLO EUR LGL SEC)
PMD
NZSIS
POLICE (PTIU)
DEF (DDOPS)

29192

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SUBJ: EUROPEAN ANTI-TERRORISM MEASURES: NETHERLANDS YR 703.

WE SET OUT BELOW SOME INFORMATION PROVIDED BY SONDAAL OF MFA. FIRST HOWEVER WE NOTE THAT YOU HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO PROVIDE THE INPUT OR BACKGROUND WE HAVE BEEN REQUESTING. MUCH EMPHASIS HAS BEEN PLACED RECENTLY ON DEFINING GOALS/OBJECTIVES. WE THINK THAT EXACTLY THIS IS REQUIRED HERE AND SUGGEST A POLICY GUIDANCE PAPER BE PREPARED ON THE SUBJECT (GOING BEYOND WHAT IS CONTAINED IN YOUR 734M).

2. SONDAAL, CHIEF OF THE GENERAL AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE, BEGAN BY DESCRIBING THE MEASURES THE TWELVE HAVE TAKEN IN COMBATTING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. (DOMESTIC TERRORISM LIES OUTSIDE HIS RESPONSIBILITY). THE TREVI GROUP MADE UP OF MINISTERS OF JUSTICE OR THE INTERIOR HAS BEEN IN EXISTENCE FOR SOME TEN YEARS AND IS STRUCTURED LIKE THE EPC BUT IS NOT PART OF IT. THERE ARE THREE WORKING GROUPS AT DIRECTOR LEVEL. THEY REPORT VIA DIRECTORS-GENERAL TO MINISTERS. THE THREE GROUPS DEAL WITH INTERNATIONAL TERORISM, INTERNATIONAL CRIME, AND COMMUNICATIONS. SONDAAL COMMENTED THAT IT HAD BECOME RATHER BUREAUCRATIC IN ITS WAYS.

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3. AFTER THE ATTACKS ON THE AIRPORTS IN VIENNA AND ROME A NEW POLITICAL DIMENSION HAD BEEN GIVEN TO THE WORK OF THE TWELVE WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT THIS YEAR OF A WORKING GROUP UNDER EPC AUSPICES MADE UP OF REPRESENTATIVES AT DIRECTOR LEVEL OF MINISTRIES OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. SONDAAL IS THE DUTCH REPRESENTATIVE. ITS TASKS ARE TO PREPARE REACTIONS OF THE TWELVE TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ACTS (FOR THE MOST PART THIS EXCLUDES ACTIONS OF THE RAF, ACTION DIRECTE ETC), ANALYSE THE CAUSES OF THESE ACTIONS AND RECOMMEND PREVENTIVE MEASURES IN THE POLITICAL FIELD. SONDAAL WAS QUICK TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT WHAT THIS MEANT IN PRACTICE WAS NOT YET CLEAR. ONE POINT THAT HAD EMERGED EARLY WAS THAT THE WORKING GROUP NEEDED OPERATIONAL INFORMATION ON TERRORIST THREATS AND ACCORDINGLY HAD TO ESTABLISH WORKING RELATIONS WITH THE TREVI GROUP. THIS HAS HAD THE SIDE EFFECT OF STIMULATING THE TREVI GROUP TO REORGANISE ITSELF.

4. AS FOR THE RESULTS OF THESE EFFORTS BY THE TWELVE SONDAAL NOTED THAT WHEREAS NATIONAL POLICE FORCES HAD HAD TO USE THE INTELLIGENCE NETWORK THEY NOW HAD THEIR OWN SECURE COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK. THREAT ANALYSES WERE NOW BEING CONTINUALLY REASSESSED AND CIRCULATED. THE SYSTEM WAS WORKING BUT PEOPLE DID NOT TALK ABOUT IT. SONDAAL GAVE AS AN EXAMPLE THE RECENT INTERCEPTION AT SCHIPHOL OF A JAPANESE CARRYING EXPLOSIVES. HE LATER NOTED THAT COOORDINATED MEASURES TAKEN BY THE POLITICAL WORKING GROUPS TO TIGHTEN CONTROL OVER THE PEOPLES BUREAUX HAD FORCED THE LIBYANS TO SEEK OTHER COVER FOR THEIR AGENTS WITHIN LIBYAN AIRLINE OFFICES AND STUDENT BODIES IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES. (IN ANSWER TO OUR QUESTION SONDAAL SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THIS KIND OF INTELLIGENCE WAS PASSED ON TO OTHER COUNTRIES LIKE NZ OUTSIDE THE TWELVE.

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5. MINISTRIES OF JUSTICE AND THE INTERIOR HAD RECENTLY SET UP A SEPARATE AD HOC WORKING GROUP TO HARMONISE VISA PROCEDURES AND THE LIKE. THIS WAS BEING DONE AS PART OF THE EFFORT TO COMPLETE THE INTERNAL COMMON MARKET BY 1992, BUT IT HAD AN ANTI-TERRORISM DIMENSION. A PARTICULARLY PERTINENT QUESTION CONCERNED THE INTRODUCTION OF TRANSIT VISAS AT LEAST FOR CERTAIN NATIONALS. TRANSIT PROCEDURES AT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORTS PROVIDED A WIDE LOOPHOLE FOR TERORISTS. WORK WAS ALSO TO BE DONE ON THE FRAUDULENT USE OF PASSPORTS AN ISSUE OF PARTICULAR CONCERN TO THE NETHERLANDS SINCE SO MANY OF ITS CITIZENS WERE OF NON-EUROPEAN ORIGIN AND THEREFORE DID NOT LOOK ''DUTCH''.

6. ON THE WORK OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE SONDAAL SAID THAT IT HAD LIMITED ITSELF TO LEGAL ISSUES SUCH AS EXTRADITION. AT THE MEETING THIS MONTH IN STRASBOURG SOME OF THE NON EC MEMBERS HAD TRIED TO HAVE ITS WORK EXTENDED INTO THE OPERATIONAL FIELD BUT THE TWELVE HAD STRONGLY RESISTED. EVEN WITHIN THE TWELVE SAID SONDAAL IT WAS DIFFICULT ENOUGH TO PROTECT SENSITIVE INFORMATION. WORKING WITH COUNTRIES LIKE MALTA WOULD MAKE THE TASK EVEN MORE DIFFICULT. IN THE EVENT THE LEGAL NATURE OF THE COUNCIL'S WORK HAD BEEN CONFIRMED. FRANCE, IRELAND AND MALTA HAD AGREED TO ACCEDE TO THE CONVENTION ON TERRORISM. THIS WOULD HELP THE PROCESS OF ''PROSECUTE OR EXTRADITE''.

7. SONDAAL TOUCHED BRIEFLY ON THE WORK OF ICAO, UN AND IMO WITH WHICH YOU ARE FAMILIAR. HE EMPHASISED THAT THE ISSUE OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM HAD YET TO BE ADDRESSED. IT MIGHT BE TAKEN UP AT THE CSCE MEETING IN VIENNA. FOR THE DUTCH THE CSCE WAS NOT CONSIDERED A SERIOUS FORUM FOR THE DISCUSSION OF ANTI-TERRORIST MEASURES.

8. WHATEVER THE VARIOUS PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON TERRORISM MIGHT BE WORTH, SONDAAL THOUGHT THAT RECENT EVENTS HAD IN FACT INDUCED BETTER COOPERATION ESPECIALLY IN LINKING THE OPERATIONAL AND POLITICAL SIDES OF THE WORK. HOWEVER, THERE WERE ENORMOUS PROBLEMS

IN RECONCILING OPERATIONAL THREATS AND POLITICAL INTERESTS, ESPECIALLY BILATERAL. AT ONE OF THE WORKING GROUPS MEETINGS AN ATTEMPT HAD BEEN MADE (BY GREECE?) TO CIRCUMVENT THIS PROBLEM BY NOT HAVING COUNTRIES NAMED IN OPERATIONAL REPORTS SUBMITTED TO THE GROUP. THIS IDEA HAD BEEN PROMPTLY QUASHED. THE ARGUMENT THAT ''PROOF'' SHOULD BE PROVIDED OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT'S INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORIST ACTIVITY WAS UNACCEPTABLE IN THE CASE OF PREVENTIVE MEASURES SAID SONDAAL.

9. AS FOR COOPERATION OF OTHER COUNTRIES WITH THE TREVI GROUP, SONDAAL SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD SIMPLY PARTICIPATED WITHOUT INVITATION. NORWAY AND AUSTRIA HAD APPLIED AND THE BRITISH WOULD BE TALKING TO THEM. DURING THEIR PRESIDENCY THE DUTCH HAD BEEN APPROACHED BY THE CANADIANS AND AUSTRALIANS (SEE OUR 538 OF 2 MAY). THE LATTER HAD BEEN TOLD THEY SHOULD COME UP WITH SPECIFIC QUESTIONS - GENERAL DISCUSSION WAS NOT CONSIDERED FRUITFUL. LATER SONDAAL SAID THAT HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO HELP ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS NZ HAD. HE ALSO NOTED IN THIS CONNECTION THAT THE RESPONSIBLE MAN IN THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE WAS J H GROSHEIDE, DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR POLICE AND ALIEN AFFAIRS . WE WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO APPROACH HIM BEFORE WE HAVE CLEARER POLICY GUIDANCE FROM YOU.

10. IN ANSWER TO OUR QUESTION SONDAAL SAID HE DID NOT KNOW MUCH ABOUT WHAT THE G7 WAS UP TO IN COMBATTING TERRORISM. (THE DUTCH HAD BEEN AT THE LAST SUMMIT ONLY BECAUSE THEY HELD THE EC PRESIDENCY). HE DID UNDERSTAND HOWEVER THAT THE JAPANESE HAD REJECTED COOPERATION WITH THE TWELVE BECAUSE GREECE MADE THE SYSTEM TOO LEAKY.

11. HE ADDED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS SEEKING COOPERATION WITH MEMBERS OF THE TWELVE. THEIR GREAT FEAR WAS NUCLEAR TERRORISM (SONDAAL SAID HE SHARED IT). THEY CONSULTED THE FRENCH EVERY TWO YEARS, THE SOVIET SIDE BEING REPRESENTED BY RYBAKOV, LEGAL ADVISER OF THE FORIEGN MINISTRY (OUR ANTARCTIC CONTACT). THEY HAD ALSO APPROACHED THE BRITISH AND ITALIANS . A

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A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE LOCAL EMBASSY WAS TO VISIT SONDAAL THAT AFTERNOON TO DISCUSS TERRORISM.

12. SONDAAL CONCLUDED BY EMPHASISING THE DIFFICULTY OF POLITICAL ACTION AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. THE QUESTION WAS WHAT COULD ONE DO WITH THE FOREIGN POLITICAL TOOLS AVAILABLE. FOR HIS PART SONDAAL WAS STILL TRYING TO DEFINE HIS OWN JOB. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN HIGH FLOWN PRINCIPLES AS ENUNCIATED FOR EXAMPLE BY THE FRENCH AND THE AMERICANS AND POLITICAL EXPEDIENCE WAS LIKELY TO PERSIST UNTIL EVEN WORSE TERRORIST INCIDENTS HAD TAKEN PLACE.

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THE INDEPENDENT Monday 24 November 1986

Britain in White House terror talks

From Alexander Chancellor in Washington

THE FOREIGN Office's top civil servant discussed anti-terrorism policies in the White House on the very day that the former national security adviser to the President, Mr Robert McFarlane, flew into Tehran in a plane loaded with American weapons, informed sources said yesterday.

The sources were commenting on a report in the *Washington Post* of a meeting on 28 May between Sir Antony Acland, now British Ambassador in Washington but then Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, and Admiral John Poindexter, the successor to Mr McFarlane. According to this report, the British Government was worried about possible American backsliding in its policy of no deals with terrorists.

The newspaper said British suspicions could have been aroused by an approach made to the British businessman, Mr Roland (Tiny) Rowland, suggesting he should participate in a White House-supported secret operation to supply weapons to Iran.

It said Mr Rowland had discussed this project with two Israeli officials and with the Saudi Arabian tycoon Mr Adnan Khashoggi, but had decided not to be involved.

While confirming that Sir Antony did indeed meet Admiral Poindexter on the date given in the *Washington Post,* the sources gave little credence to the rest of the report.

They denied that Britain had reason to be suspicious of American intentions, as Whitehall officials, in common with practically everybody else, were completely in the dark about Mr Reagan's clandestine overtures and arms shipments to Iran.

The discussion, they said, did cover terrorism but principally in the context of Libya.

The sources could neither confirm or deny Mr Rowland's reported dealings with the Israelis and Mr Kashoggi.

The Israelis with whom Mr Rowland was reported to have had contacts were Mr David Kimche, the Director General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, and Mr Amiram Nir, a counter terrorism expert, both said to have been closely involved in the White House arms delivery scheme.

In another report, the *Post* said that, despite all the furore over his policies on Iran, President Reagan had not terminated his secret intelligence activities there.

While he has promised to authorise no more arms deliveries, the President has continued to entrust responsibilities for these contacts to the CIA and his White House staff.

THE OBSERVER, SUNDAY 23 NOVEMBER 1986

Far-from-gentle touch of

ROBIN SMYTH reports from Paris on the hunt for glamorous—and ruthless—killers.



Nathalie Ménigon: Delicate looks, slight limp.

IF she has orange-flecked green eyes, speaks French without an accent, is in her late twenties, around 5 ft 6 in tall with chestnut hair—or chestnut roots at least—some alert French citizen may think it just worthwhile ringing the police.

For she could be Joelle Aubron, whose face is now posted up throughout France following last Monday night's assassination of Renault manager Georges Beese by two armed women outside his front door.

Aubron's is not the only face on the 'wanted' notice however. She shares it with 29-year-old Nathalie Ménigon: brown eyes, extremely thin with delicate, rather thoughtful features and a slight limp—the result of a car accident four years ago. Both women are leading members of Action Directe, which has claimed responsibility for the Besse murder.

There is only slight evidence connecting them to the killing — but the terrorist hunters consider Aubron and Ménigon extremely dangerous. The reward for turning them in is one million francs (£100,000).

On that Monday night, the two or four young women on the pavement outside Besse's Montparnasse home watched his chauffeur drop him off a few yards down the street. They fired at him three times — once in the eye as he lay on the ground. The one who fired the coup de grâce asked: 'Is that it?'

'Yes—certain,' the other replied.

One snarled, 'Get lost' to a middle-aged blonde woman who had been drawn to the scene by the noise of the shots; then they both started to run.

Only next day were the Action Directe leaflets found scattered on the steps of a nearby Metro station.

A witness is reported to have tentatively identified Ménigon as one of the killers, though there is some doubt if she could have run as fast with her injured leg.

Whether the police are searching for two female assassins, France is now clearly in the mainstream of international terrorism where women play an increasingly important role. Half West Germany's current 'most wanted' terrorists are women. On many occasions they have proved even more ruthless than the men.


Police investigating the murder of Georges Besse fear further attacks of the same kind in coming weeks. The French Government, after gaining at least a temporary truce from Arab terrorism after negotiations in the Middle East, now faces a threat to the lives of its leading citizens from home-grown Baader-Meinhof-style groups.

There are just too many targets for a bodyguard shield to be practical.


The most dangerous period begins on 3 December when three imprisoned Action Directe members face trial in Paris for shooting two policemen in a street gun battle in 1983. The defendants' leader Régis Schleicher is the husband of Joelle Aubron. He is the third in command and intellectual of AD. She comes from a comfortable middle-class home.

Aubron's other wanted half, Nathalie Menigon, founded AD in 1979 together with her lover Jean-Marc Rouillan. They were arrested, but she won a medical release and he was freed by President Mitterand's amnesty when he came to power in 1981.

Now the two are on the run, leading the hard-core international branch of the movement which in January last year formally signed an alliance with the



Murdered: Besse.



Wanted: Rouillan.

R66 1514

terror women

German Baader-Meinhof defendants in the RAF (the Red Army Faction). The couple's fingerprints and those of Aubron were found last year along with an arms cache in a Brussels flat.

Ménigon and Rouillan are matched in Germany by the seductive-looking Barbara Meyer and her husband Horst. They went underground in 1984 when the RAF seemed to have been stunned into immobility by the capture of its leaders Christian Klar and Brigitte Mohnhaupt in November 1982.

Both the French and German organisations drew up hit-lists of leading figures in politics, industry and the armed forces.

Within a few weeks of the 'marriage,' the two organisations felt safe enough to embark on an 'alphabetical' murder programme. This, at least on the French side, could have concentrated protective measures — had the police not, apparently, found it too frivolous to be believed.

Action Directe started its A-Z by shooting General René Audran, director of the international affairs department of the Defence Ministry. The Germans, meanwhile, began at the bottom with industrialist Ernst Zimmermann.

Next, the French terrorists went on through the 'B's, narrowly failing to kill Henri Blandin, controller general of the armed forces, and Guy Brama, vice president of the employers' association. Georges Besse knew that he was on the death list but he refused to have bodyguards.

The German killers may have decided that the alphabetical game was an unnecessary risk. They flipped to 'B,' killing Karl-Heinz Beckurts, manager of Siemens, with a remote controlled bomb, and Gerold von Braunmùl, a permanent under-secretary at the German Foreign Ministry.



Joelle Aubron: Green eyes, chestnut hair.

866/5/1A

Financial Times Friday November 21 1986

FDP doubts may hold up W German anti-terror law

BY PETER BRUCE IN BONN

AN EFFORT by the West German Government to rush through a package of new laws to fight terrorism before Christmas is rapidly coming apart, and has set off serious political infighting among the parties in Chancellor Helmut Kohl's coalition.

The row is likely to reach a peak today in Mainz where the liberal Free Democrats (FDP), junior partners in the coalition, seem poised to renege on their earlier support of a bill which would offer terrorists their freedom if they give evidence against their accomplices.

Mr Franz Josef Strauss, the leader of the Christian Social Union (CSU), the Bavarian sister party to Mr Kohl's Christian Democrats, has warned that any watering down of the measure would mean abandoning the entire six point package and he claims this is Mr Kohl's view as well. He attacked the FDP for "constantly introducing unrest and insecurity into the coalition."

The Cabinet agreed on the measures at the end of last month after terrorists had gunned down a senior Foreign Ministry official near his home in Bonn. But the prospect of murderers being left unpunished has since then generated a revolt in the FDP parliamentary party and in the regions and has forced the



Bangemann: grim prospects

party leader, Mr Martin Bangemann, the Economics Minister, to look for a compromise.

He was strengthened somewhat by the overwhelming hostility to the measure by experts called to appraise it before a parliamentary committee last Friday, but the CDU and CSU have set their minds on the law, and have refused to be turned from it.

The FDP executive plans, nevertheless, to put proposals today to the party — at its last conference before the general election on January 25 — which would involve offering terrorists wanting to give themselves up and testify lighter punishments. But with both Mr Strauss and leading CDU officials insisting that anything less than a promise of total freedom is useless, the legislation would seem to have little chance of surviving.

Mr Bangemann will be fortunate, in fact, if the conference does not find his compromise too soft. Whatever the case, he faces— very close to an election—the grim prospect of coming under attack from the leadership of the bigger parties he is in coalition with. Mr Strauss never passes an opportunity anyway to rubbish the FDP, which teeters constantly very close to the 5 per cent vote share needed to get into the Bundestag.

It was because of its poor showing in the Bavarian state election in mid-October, in fact, that the FDP leadership agreed to support the anti-terror package in the first place. The belief then was that blocking anti-terror laws was not a vote winner and this same vision will be on the FDP leadership's collective mind as it is forced by the party to continue doing so.

This is quite clearly part of Mr Strauss's thinking when he says the FDP compromise would wreck the entire package.

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"YELLOW"

Reference: B66/5/1A
B69/34

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

20 November 1986

(DLO EUR LGL SEC)

c.c. E.I.B.
PARIS
NZSIS (TIC)

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Date	Nature of Material
	France - Urban Terrorism
19 November 1986	Press backgrounding of and commentary on murder of Renault head by Action Directe.
..	

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S.W. Prior
for High Commissioner

Campbell Page analyses Action Directe and Paul Webster,

The hard cell of revolution

A FEW months ago a member of the intelligence services described France's surviving terrorists in Action Directe as a ramshackle army of disillusioned left-wingers which was difficult to infiltrate because it was so marginal.

If it turns out that Action Directe killed the chairman of Renault in Paris on Monday, then the group's reputation as an alternately shadowy and menacing organisation will be confirmed.

Action Directe is small with an estimated 200 adherents. Its loose organisation embracing various forms of militancy reduces its efficiency in the field but also hampers the police who cannot discern a clear structure to be dismantled.

When Action Directe was formed in 1979 it inherited various malcontents from the resounding May events of 1968. Some had drifted away from Gauche Proletarienne when it excluded any form of violence. Some came from autonomous groups, some had developed their libertarian ideas in squats and communes, and some had graduated from distinct provincial movements such as the Groupe d'Action Revolutionnaire Internationaliste in Toulouse.

It is difficult to identify any social background shared by members of Action Directe. They are not uniformly the pampered children of the bourgeoisie flirting with revolutionary violence. What they have in common are those elements of experience and personality which have kept them outside the peaceful consensus.

One of the senior figures in Action Directe is Jean-Marc Rouillan, son of a French inspector of physical education and a Catalan mother. In 1968 at the age of 16 he became friendly with Salvador Puig-Antich whose parents were both Spanish immigrants. Six years later Puig-Antich was sentenced to death by the Spanish authorities and garotted.

Rouillan had accompanied Puig-Antich on a number of terrorist operations in Spain against the Franco regime. After his friend's death he helped to launch the Groupe d'Action Revolutionnaire Internationaliste which chose targets in France with some Spanish significance.

Nathalie Menigon, who became Rouillan's companion, was born into a working-class family and was employed in a bank until she left to join the revolutionary struggle. A second woman, Joelle Aubron, came from a comfortable middle-class background and her parents lived in a fashionable area of Paris and owned a house in the country.

The fingerprints of Rouillan, Menigon and Aubron were all found late last year by Belgian police in premises used by the Belgian terrorist, Pierre Carette.

In fact 1985 marked an important development in the history of Action Directe as it became a part of Euro-terrorism. After the assassination of General Rene Audran, head of arms sales at the French Ministry of Defence in January 1985, Action Directe and the West German Red Army faction signed a joint communiqué and confirmed the existence of a coordinated campaign against Nato and the Paris-Bonn axis.

In France the distinction is made between the international wing of Action Directe with its taste for assassinations and the national wing, which attacks buildings rather than people.

The distinction may be blurred at times but Action Directe has claimed responsibility for operations in France which match the organisational ability and ruthlessness of its West German counterpart. Perhaps foreign terrorists have participated in or taken over some terrorist operations in France.

General Audran was gunned down on the outskirts of Paris as he left his car to open the door of his garage. The terrorists struck at a vulnerable moment just as they apparently targeted the chairman of Renault, Mr Georges Besse, on Monday as he walked from his chauffeur-driven car towards the entrance to his flat in Montparnasse.

In June 1985 terrorists fired two bullets at another senior defence official, General Henri Blandin, but missed their target. Action Directe claimed responsibility and denounced the General as the right hand of the defence minister in implementing Nato projects.

Mr Guy Brana, Vice-president of the national employers' organisation CPNF, came under attack in April this year outside his house in the outskirts of Paris. His driver was wounded but Mr Brana escaped unhurt.

A few months later in July Action Directe claimed responsibility for an explosion in the offices of the serious crime squad in central Paris when a chief inspector was killed and two other policemen were seriously injured. Action Directe said the operation had been carried out in the name of an unarmed man shot dead by a police-



Victim: George Besse

man on a Paris street.

The apparent choice of the chairman of Renault on Monday has provided Action Directe with its best-known victim and produced the most extensive reaction as politicians, trade unionists and industrialists rushed forward to express their indignation. Mr Besse embodied Renault which in turn embodied state capitalism and what Action Directe would see as the company's indifference to the real interests of the workers.

The national wing of Action Directe has kept busy in organising its attacks on offices and buildings of symbolic importance. On November 11, as President Botha of South Africa prepared to inaugaurate a memorial to South African troops on the Somme, the offices of three firms came under attack in protest against French links with South Africa. President Botha came to France against the wishes of the French Government

Other incidents this year include attacks on an immigration office and the headquarters of OECD and Interpol. The Right-wing government, anxious " to terrorise the terrorists ," would like to assert its talent for law and order and achieve a striking success against Action Directe.

below, on the impact of Monday's assassination

The shots that signal a crisis for Chirac

THE murder of the Renault chairman, Mr Georges Besse, is a bodyblow not only to the crippled State-run car firm but to the whole economic strategy of the Chirac government.

Renault is in the middle of a massive internal overhaul after accumulating debts of more than £6 billion, notably in two disastrous years, 1984 and 1985, when it lost more than £2.5 billion as well as its position as Europe's biggest car builder.

As France's most important industrial company and exporter, Renault's recovery is crucial to salvaging a government economic programme plagued with balance of payment problems that threaten the Franc with a new devaluation in early Spring.

Even so, there are mixed feelings inside the government over the recovery put together by Mr Besse since his appointment by the Socialists nearly two years ago. The failure of Renault during five years of socialism contrasted with the success of its private rival, Peugeot-Citroen, providing a ready-made argument in support of government privatisation plans in which 65 industries and banks are being sold.

Renault had to be excluded because it was technically bankrupt but it is again the French market leader. However, Mr Besse's promise that Renault would be profitable by the end of 1987 even angered some ministers who felt he was sabotaging plans to put Renault into private hands by 1995 by showing that state-management could be profitable.

The argument underlined Renault's traditional political role. The terrorists who killed Mr Besse were fully aware of both Renault's economic and national symbolism although Mr Besse was hardly a typical enemy of the people. The son of a postal worker, he had always served nationalised industry, notably nuclear power and chemicals, and was the living proof that good management and state control were not incompatible.

The Socialist former prime minister, Mr Laurent Fabius, who was cool to state ownership, appointed Mr Besse to Renault after he saved the crippled chemical giant, Pechiney, following nationalisation in 1982. But Pechiney was just another industry whereas Renault was a series of images that make up the history of post-war France.

De Gaulle,' who called the firm " my daughter," nationalised it in 1945 as a punishment for collaboration and decided that it should be a model for national recovery and a new relationship between workers and management. For the first 10 years it was more a battleground for Communist unions but out of that conflict arose a privileged situation in which Renault workers retired earlier and were paid an average 17 per cent more than workers in private car firms. Agreement at Renault were intended to set guidelines for all industry.

Even pre-war, since the days when Louis Renault's prototypes set world speed records, the company provided national symbols such as the taxis of the Marne that saved the French army in 1914. In the last war it was a resistance stronghold and from the great strikes of 1947 onwards Renault created as much passion for its management role as for its cars. During the best years between 1955 and 1975 the company was not only the motor of the second French industrial revolution but was also the world's most lavish commissioner of new works of art. Five years later, without even drawing on government help, it was unchallenged as Europe's biggest car producer and then suddenly undermined by the flashy over-confidence that marked the last part of President Giscard's term in office.

Management mistakes during that period when reckless expansion in America was given priority over internal modernisation, worsened under socialism when saving jobs became more important than making money. Each of the five Renault chairmen since the war have been obliged to reflect the national mood of the moment and Mr Besse was faced with the same problem, solving it by making Renault a model of thriftiness,

Even though Mr Besse intended to reduce the workforce by 21,000 from 196,000, the trade unions were reassured because he cut away wasteful prestige products, such as Formula One racing and the Tour de France bicycle race. Traditional patriotic consumer confidence was restored and Renault now has 31 per cent of the market

But Mr Besse never had time to produce a long-term plan, a job his successor will be asked to do. More than that, the next chairman who will be chosen by the cabinet next Wednesday, is also likely to be asked to inspire a new national mood of ideological change. Government priority is still to sell-off its star industry which means that the next Renault boss will have to be dedicated to the type of private capitalism European terrorists hate.

Savagery of the enemy within


By Jonathan Fenby

AFTER a summer marked by Middle Eastern bomb attacks, France has been tragically reminded of the dimensions of its home-grown terrorist problem by the murder on Monday night of Georges Besse, the chairman of Renault, a killing claimed yesterday by the extremist group, Action Directe.

In many ways, domestic terrorism presents both the French and German governments with a greater challenge than violence imported from the Middle East. Interior ministers from the two countries agreed on Monday to set up liason teams to co-ordinate their fight against violent extremism.

"At least with state-sponsored terrorism, you can try to negotiate with a foreign government, or its secret services," a French official reflected. "Even with extremist groups based abroad, you can try to open up channels of communication. But with our own terrorists, there is nothing you can do except to try to stop them and catch them."

The problem for the French and West Germans is that, despite all the means at their disposal, their police forces have not done a very good job at either checking or catching members of Action Directe or the German Red Army Faction (RAF). Official buildings in West German, from post offices to ministries, carry posters showing the usually sullen faces of leading figures in the RAF. A reward of DM50,000 (£18,000) is on offer for each of the 18 RAF suspects. But still leaders of the RAF remain at large, among them Barbara and Horst-Ludwig Meyer, suspected of killing the head of an arms firm in 1985, and two women suspected of having played leading roles in killing a prominent banker, Jürgen Ponto, in the terrorist heyday of the 1970s.



Action Directe's Jean-Marc Rouillan...



...and Nathalie Menigon



From Middle Eastern bomb attacks like this in September to home grown terror

In France, the Mitterrand administration released several Action Directe members or sympathisers in its first flush of liberalism after winning power in 1981. The releases came back to haunt Mr Mitterrand and his ministers as Action Directe went on the attack. The right-wing parties made much of the Socialists' supposed "laxism" towards extremists in the run-up to this year's general election. Among the most virulent critics of the Socialists was the Gaullist leader in the Senate, Charles Pasqua. Now, Mr Pasqua is France's Interior Minister. In the killing of Mr Besse, Mr Pasqua and Prime Minister Jacques Chirac have to deal with one of the most striking incidents of terrorism against an individual since the Baader-Meinhoff gang kidnapped and killed the West German employers' leader, Martin Schleyer, in 1977.

The terrorists, whether West German or French, would deny that their victims were killed as individuals. The ideology of Action Directe and the RAF sees such men as representatives of a system. One underlying theme of European extremist groups is that, by provoking the police and their political masters into repression, terrorism will turn the supposedly downtrodden proletariat to revolt. There has been little sign of anything like that happening.

Recently, the French and West German groups have joined in a self-proclaimed alliance against Nato imperialism, linking themselves with a similarly-minded Belgian groups. They have attacked targets ranging from power pylons to computer companies. Civil servants, military personnel and top managers of companies deemed to be supporting US-led imperialism in Europe have been among those murdered.

Apart from the human cost, and occasionally costly destruction from bombs, the effect of the campaign has been minimal. Neither Action Directe nor the Red Army Faction are reckoned to count more than 20 active members. But they still keep going. How?

"Because they trust nobody, live a life of their own and take just as long as it needs to plan their attacks," a French police source said yesterday. Their isolation makes the use of informers difficult. Their planning enables them to strike with deadly speed, as in the shooting of Mr Besse by two people driving past his home on a motorcycle. They appear to be well supplied with arms and explosives, and to be frugal in their approach to weapons.

On top of all that, there is the ideological factor. Given their nature, it is impossible to know how the minds of the French and German terrorists work. But police who have tracked them for years believe that they still base themselves on an idological foundation, a belief that they are playing a necessary historical role in destroying the capitalist state. However wrong they are, nothing is likely to shake either Action Directe or the RAF from such convictions. Indeed, the more isolated they are, the more destructive they may be. The Franco-German liason teams have a hard road ahead of them.

Additional reporting: Sheila Jones in Bonn.

THE TIMES WEDNESDAY NOVEMBER 19 1986

Stephen Segaller explores the background of France's hard-left killers

Action Directe, ideologues of violence

One of the most disturbing developments during the 1980s has been the emergence of an alliance between previously separate terrorist organizations throughout western Europe. This alliance, involving French, German and Belgian groups, with sporadic parallel action from Portuguese, Spanish, Italian and Dutch organizations, is pledged to attack government, quasi-government, international agencies and business targets.

The terrorists' targets are decided by their anti-American, anti-business, anti-military, anti-nuclear, anti-Nato politics. The prime mover of this alliance appears to be the French revolutionary group Action Directe, which yesterday claimed responsibility for the brutal killing of the managing director of Renault, Georges Besse.

Action Directe is a second-generation European terrorist group. Its roots do not lie in the revolutionary fervour that accompanied the May 1968 upheavals, but it nonetheless shares the same violent political traditon.

Since it was first heard of in 1979, it has had only one leader, Jean-Marc Rouillan, who has shown an opportunistic willingness to espouse political causes or marginalized minorities, primarily to keep the group alive. Since 1984, however, its ideology has crystallized into a jargon-ridden Marxist-Leninism.

Despite Rouillan's orchestration of a series of brutal assaults on military, commercial and political targets, the French capacity for romanticizing the most dangerous and daring of criminals has created about him the myth of an intelligent, cultivated art-lover, half paranoid and half megalomaniac, who never takes off his bulletproof vest.

The reality is far more sober. Born in 1953 in Auch in south-west France, Rouillan was a student at Toulouse, where he became involved in anti-Franco protest groups in the early 1970s. He allegedly took part in cross-border "missions" to strike at Spanish targets, and was involved in some assaults on Spanish interests in France.

He was arrested in 1974 and imprisoned for three years; re-arrested in 1979 and imprisoned for another six months; and shortly thereafter founded Action Directe.

According to one of Rouillan's former associates, the establishment of Action Directe cannot be understood outside the wider political context of the radical left in France. Rouillan's associate maintains that the radical left had always worked on the assumption that the Socialists would never gain power by election.

And the hard left always believed that even if the Socialists did come to power, as François Mitterrand did in 1981, they would fail to carry out a radical programme. It was this doubt that pushed the hard-core radicals towards military force and clandestine activity. The founders of Action Directe believed that those radicals who stuck to the middle ground of legality were condemned to impotence, while the "real" activists would be left to fight the "real" battles.

But the founders of the movement confronted a major problem. If a Socialist government were to monopolize and legitimize all the major issues of the day, what was left for the hard-core radical?

Action Directe developed from an absence of debate on the issues where they chose their targets, Nato installations, international monetary systems, symbols of American capitalism and prominent international corporate leaders. Rouillan scorned the normal channels of public debate and criticism, and maintained that the only genuine course of action open for a revolutionary was literally *direct action.*

The theory was at once crude and effective. In essence it runs as follows. First you act, then you consider was it well or badly done? How was the action received by the people?

An analogy is then drawn between terrorism and the media. The Action Directe activist believes that terrorism represents the same approach to political problems – arbitrary, dramatic and sensational – that the media adopt in relation to "facts". The real power is thought to lie not with the participants in a given event, but with the editor who has the power to emphasize coverage, write headlines and change meanings.

For ideologues of the extreme left such as Rouillan, violence in itself is not an issue: the world is full of it, they say. The only interesting question, they believe, is what effect it has. According to their extremist logic, an act of violence committed by a member of Action Directe is utterly insignificant alongside the violence inherent in war, state terror, hunger, drought and disease; industry and commerce.

Action Directe became operationally viable as a clandestine organization following a robbery in the northern French town of Condé-sur-l'Escaut in 1979, when they stole about 16 million francs at gunpoint. At the time there was considerable evidence that this act of "proletarian expropriation" conducted on behalf of the "whole revolutionary movement" had been carried out with international assistance from Spanish and Italian terrorist groups.

International collaboration of this kind is not monolithic. Rather, it is essentially ad hoc, designed to offer mutual assistance in obtaining and distributing stolen arms, providing passports, identity papers, escape routes and places of safe hiding. It also lends a thin plausiblity to the movement's pretensions of proletarian internationalism.

The "proletarian expropriation" of 16 million francs enabled Action Directe to obtain weapons that were used in 20 or more attacks on French government and business targets during the following year. As a result of an extensive police investigation Rouillan was eventually captured in September 1980, and most of the organization's principal leadership had been rounded up by the end of the year.

But in May the following year, after the traditional but controversial practice of incoming presidents, Mitterrand declared an amnesty for several thousand prisoners whose crimes supposedly had a political element. To the amazement of the French public, Rouillan and other leading members of Action Directe were freed.

In March 1982 Action Directe published its political manifesto, *Pour un Projet communiste.* As a literary work it has no merit, consisting of indigestible Marxist-Leninist jargon. But its critique of world capitalism, and the particular examples singled out for vitriolic abuse, suggested who their new targets were likely to be.

The wave of terrorism that followed was too much, even for Mitterrand, whose amnesty was seen by many as at least partly responsible for the bloodshed. He went on national television to announce the setting up of anti-terrorist forces, the appointment of a Minister for Public Security and the proscription of Action Directe.

Action Directe nevertheless continued to expand its base of activists, domestically and internationally, and embarked on a new round of robberies and murders. By 1984 the various component parts of the European terrorist alliance had began to wage an all-out campaign of violence against the military-industrial targets identified in their published political tracts.

The death of Georges Besse thus follows in a long line of assassinations and acts of violence against those targets which the terrorists see as the oppressors of the proletariat and the upholders of the corrupt and exploitative capitalist state.

Extracted from Invisible Armies: Terrorism into the 1990s *(Michael Joseph, £15.95).*

(1) HC
(2) Ms Nelligan
(3) File → B66/5/1A
B69/96

20 November 1986

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs
WELLINGTON

(DLO EUR MEA LGL)

cc EIB
NZSIS (TIC)
Police (PTIU)

TERRORISM: INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM
SOUTH AFRICA/ANC-COMMUNIST LINKS

Please refer to our memorandum B66/5/1A of 20 November 1986.

2 We have received a further publication from the Institute, entitled "ANC - A Soviet Task Force?", together with some promotional literature. (A copy of the booklet is attached for SFA only.)

... 3 The booklet is written by one Keith Campbell, a former tutor in International Relations at the University of Witwatersrand, South Africa. Its ostensible aim is to provide objective material to enable readers to judge whether the ANC is closely linked to, and possibly controlled by, Moscow.

4 The "objectivity" of the booklet is coloured from the outset, however, This is indicated by Lord Chalfont who, in his Foreword writes:

"One of the myths carefully fostered by organs of progressive opinion in this country is that the African National Congress is a straightforward nationalist movement, dedicated to the peaceful establishment of majority rule in South Africa. Nothing, in fact, could be further from the truth ...

"The question of whether it is also inseparably bound to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, is of the greatest strategic importance to the Western alliance. In my view the information

presented in this publication suggests that the links with the CPSU are close and strong ...

"This book indicates, if the ANC has its way (South Africa) will be a one-party Communist-dominated state; and like most regimes which gain power by terror it is likely to perpetuate itself by the same means..."

5. The author himself is in no doubt either that behind the ANC lies the hand of Moscow. As he concludes his study:

> "The story of the ANC is a classic example of the Communist strategy of 'entryism': infiltrate a pre-existing organisation, take it over, and transform it from within. An internal revolutionary movement then serves the purposes of the 'peacefully co-existing' Soviet Union. Should the Soviet-aided ANC come to power in South Africa, it may be expected in the light of its present policies to take that mineral-rich and strategically important country into the Soviet sphere of influence and the anti-Western armed camp."

6. Further information about the Institute emerges in its most recent promotional literature. Lord Chalfont is acknowledged now as its Chairman, and its Director is Jillian Becker. Keith Campbell, the author of the above-mentioned booklet, is said to be employed as a 'researcher' for the Institute.

7. Indirect confirmation of our feeling that this Institute is emerging as an organisation with a pronounced right-wing bias is given by the close involvement of Lord Chalfont in the "Media Monitoring Unit", a new group which came into the public eye earlier this week with a report alleging "left wing bias" across all four television channels.

... 8. A report of 20 November from <u>The Guardian</u> (attached) indicates the part played by Lord Chalfont in this Unit, and refers also to his part in the "Coalition for Peace Through Security"

> "a right-wing pressure group founded in the early 1980s whose hallmark has been aggressive attacks on the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament" (<u>Guardian</u>).

S. W. PRIOR
(S W Prior)
for High Commissioner

Enc

Tory link with media monitors is revealed

By Andrew Rawnsley

The Media Monitoring Unit, whose report on alleged left-wing bias among broadcasters was given widespread publicity yesterday, has intimate links with the Conservative Party.

The unit was founded by a former Conservative parliamentary candidate who is closely associated with a Tory MP and with a political adviser to a Cabinet minister.

The report claimed to be an "objective assessment" which showed widespread leftwing bias across all four television channels. Lord Chalfont, who wrote a foreword to the report, was still maintaining yesterday that it had been compiled impartiality.

The report's author, Mr Simon Clark, is a former editor of Campus, a student magazine noted for ferocious attacks on students' unions. He now edits the house magazine of the high IQ Society, Mensa. Mr Clark, who is described as the unit's "Director" is its sole employee.

He was recruited to write the report by the Tory candidate for Swansea at the last election, Mr Julian Lewis, who is described in its literature as a "consultant" to the unit. Mr Lewis, along with Lord Chalfont, also organised financial support for the unit. Mr Clark's undisclosed salary and the printing of his 300-page dossier and PR expenses were met by a City businessman, Sir Peter Tennant, and business associates who share Conservative sympathies.

Mr Lewis is the director of a rightwing think tank, Policy Research Associates, one of several campaigns and groups which were fathered by the Coalition for Peace Through Security, a rightwing pressure group founded in the early 1980s, whose hallmark has been aggressive attacks on the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.

Lord Chalfont has been associated with the Coalition group since its inception. Mr Lewis's co-founders were Mr Edward Leigh, Conservative MP for Gainsborough since the 1983 election, and Mr Tony Kerpel, now the senior political adviser to the Education Secretary, Mr Kenneth Baker. Both men have retained links with its campaigns and those it fathered. Mr Leigh's name appears on the letter headings of the Coalition for Peace Through Security as its "Parliamentary Adviser."

During the recent BBC Nazi libel case, counsel told the High Court that Mr Lewis would be appearing to testify that it was he, and not Mr Neil Hamilton MP, who had goose-stepped in Berlin during a trip in 1983.

Mr Leigh and Mr Kerpel were also on the trip.

ANC
A SOVIET TASK FORCE?

NEW ZEALAND
LONDON
20 NOV 1986
CENTRAL REGISTRY
HIGH COMMISSION

ABOUT THIS PUBLICATION

Does the ANC have a close relationship with the Communist Party? Is it a terrorist organization? Opinions on these questions differ.

President Reagan, in his address on South Africa on 22nd July 1986 said that: "The Soviet-armed guerrillas of the African National Congress — operating both within South Africa and from some neighbouring countries — have embarked upon new acts of terrorism inside South Africa."

The Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group, however, believes that the extent of Communist influence in the ANC is very considerably exaggerated. They declared in their report in June 1986 that: ". . . the [South African] Government [has] insinuated that Nelson Mandela himself is a communist and that twenty-three out of thirty members of the ANC's National Executive are either members or active supporters of the South African Communist Party. More detached analysts dispute these figures . . . and question the picture that is frequently presented by Pretoria of the ANC as a component of international communism, dedicated to the pursuit of revolutionary power." (The Report of the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons, June 1986.)

And Mrs. Lynda Chalker, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs said in the House of Commons on 25th June 1986 after her meeting with Oliver Tambo, Acting President of the ANC: "We are in no way treating with terrorists".

Yet the official organ of the ANC, *Sechaba*, advocates the use of terror, as in this statement of November 1985: "A very important factor is the systematic assault on, and elimination of, policemen resident in the townships, stooges and informers . . . To sell out carries the immediate hazard of having one's flesh and bones reduced to unidentifiable ashes."

Moscow seems simultaneously to support both the mutually contradictory views that the ANC does and does not have links with the Communist Party. On 29th July 1986, Moscow radio's home service quoted the message of congratulations sent by the CPSU Central Committee to the South African Communist Party on the 65th anniversary of its founding: "Acting in combat alliance with the ANC, the SACP is making a worthy contribution to eliminating the disgraceful apartheid system."

Yet on 3 August 1986, a Moscow radio commentator dismissed a CIA report of links between the ANC and Communist organizations. He said that "the ruling circles in the USA attach the label of the Communist peril to any national liberation movement . . . Incidentally, the ANC of South Africa has categorically denied this latest CIA fabrication."

The ANC itself does not deny the connection. On its Radio Freedom, broadcasting from Ethiopia on 31 July in a programme marking the 65th anniversary of the South African Communist Party, "this strong alliance between the African National Congress and the

Communist Party" was praised, and the spokesman poured scorn on those politicians both within and outside South Africa who have "tried desperately hard and consistently to separate the two movements" and have "called on those they say are nationalists to break away from the Communists". However, the ANC denied "that the ANC is dominated by the [South African] Communist Party", or that "it [the SACP] in turn is a tool of Moscow".

Neither does the SACP deny the connection. But it too emphatically rejects the allegation that it dominates the ANC. In the Radio Freedom broadcast of 31 July, Joe Slovo, Secretary General of the SACP and Member of the National Executive of the ANC, came on the air and said: "We have to dismiss the distortion that the Communist Party plays some kind of dominant role in its relations with the ANC. Both these organizations have their own role to play, both organizations collaborate together."

It is necessary to establish the facts because a critical stage has been reached in the history of South Africa. If the ANC is a terrorist organization, the Western powers must not help to deliver the population of South Africa, Black and White, into its hands; for those who come to power by terror rule by terror. Most dangerously, if the ANC is a Communist organization, or its leadership inextricably committed to serving the interests of the Soviet Union, an ANC government would take South Africa into the Soviet camp, and the strategic consequences of that for the Western alliance could hardly be less than disastrous.

Should Western governments judge the ANC to be a Communist terrorist organization, they would be well advised to refuse to legitimize it by any form of recognition, and to make positive policy decisions to give moral and political backing to non-violent, Westward-looking Black organizations (of which there are a number with known membership in the millions), and encourage the legitimate Parties which promise reform and show serious intention of carrying it out, with a view to bringing about inter-racial negotiation for power-sharing.

This paper provides information by which the nature and intentions of the ANC may be judged. The author presents statements made by the ANC, the South African Communist Party, and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union side-by-side for comparison. He also examines the ANC's Freedom Charter to consider whether it may usefully serve Communist ends, and outlines the history of the ANC and its relationship with the Communist Party. Appendices provide a useful chronology and biographical notes on Nelson Mandela.

Jillian Becker
Director
Institute for the Study of Terrorism

INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM

Address for the receipt of mail only. • 65 Blandford Street, • London W1H 3AJ • Tel 01-487 4858

The Institute for The Study of Terrorism is a private research institute supported entirely by private donations and its own earnings. Its Chairman, Lord Chalfont, is a former Minister of State at the Foreign Office, and its Director, Jillian Becker, is a writer on the subject of Terrorism with an international reputation.

The activities of the Institute are:

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2. Supplying information and analysis on request.

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4. Publishing articles, papers, books.

5. Sponsoring public lectures, discussions and conferences.

6. Providing a centre for persons engaged in the study of terrorism, or in counter-terrorist activity, to contact or meet each other.

7. Building an archive for the Institute's own purposes, and as a facility for students, scholars and other researchers.

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B66/5/1A

30 October 1986

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs
WELLINGTON

(Attention : LGL, DLO)

c.c. NZSIS (TIC)
Police (PTIU)
EIB

TERRORISM : INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM

Your memorandum 109/1/4(W) of 13 October 1986 refers.

2. We have noted your interest in seeing further publications of the Institute.

3. On the question of the restricted distribution given to memorandum B66/5/1A of 15 September 1986, we confirm that we were aware of the full Wellington addressee list for terrorism matters. (The extra copies of the relevant Administration Circular you provided are accordingly returned herewith).

4. As a general proposition, we take the view that there must be discretion for a post such as London, which receives a large quantity of unsolicited material from various bodies, institutes, and pressure groups, to make an initial judgement as to the value of that material. We considered that your 351(M) of 17 April 1986 recognised that there should be just such a discretional element in posts' use of the terrorism addressee list.

5. In the case of this Institute, we restricted the distribution of our initial memorandum because we wanted to check out the bona fides of the new organisation. (We had in mind the recent well-publicised case of a new human rights group in London which attracted some well-known public figures to its sponsorship list and then proved to be an organisation promoted and funded by a well-known right wing American religious group). To distribute

information about the Institute to all addresses in Wellington before we had checked it out seemed to us to entail a risk of setting an official imprimatur on an organisation whose credentials might prove suspect. On the other hand, we wanted to flag its creation.

6. In the event, our further investigations have shown that the prime mover and Chairman of the proposed Institute is a former Foreign Secretary, Lord Chalfont. A copy of his c.v. is attached. The Institute will be managed by a Board of Governors, but until the formal announcement of its establishment is made (and because "these things all take time and we're in the process of applying for charitable status and still have many things to sort out yet") the membership of this Board will not be made public.

...

7. We shall report further when the public announcement of the new Institute's formation is made.

N. D. WALTER

High Commissioner

Att's

B69/47
B66/5/1A

18 November 1986

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs
WELLINGTON

(Att : MEA AMER EUR)

c.c. EIB, WELLINGTON (SPO)
TEHRAN
BAGHDAD
RIYADH
WASHINGTON

U.S./IRAN RELATIONS : ARMS SALES

Please refer to our memorandum B69/47 of 11 November 1986.

2. A great deal of attention has continued to be devoted by the press to unravelling the strands of American involvement in arms trading with Iran. President Reagan's television explanation of his Administration's actions is generally dismissed as incredible. The consensus is that the affair has made the Administration look "weak, wrong-headed and deceitful".

3. To judge by comments from our own F.C.O. contacts the reports by a number of newspapers that official reaction to the revelations had been "incredulous" are not far off the mark. There is a feeling of let-down that Britain's principled stand against terrorism has to some extent been undermined by American actions, and that the British-American relationship has been damaged by the failure of the Americans to tell their British counterparts what they were doing.

4. In the first full foreign affairs debate in the Commons in five months (in the resumed Queen's Speech debate) on 14 November, Sir Geoffrey Howe obliquely distanced his Government from the American approach. As he told MPs :

> "The Government are determined to deal decisively with states that sponsor terrorism. This does not preclude contacts with those who may be able to help secure the release of hostages. In our view concessions lead to more hostage taking, not less. This Government will not do deals with terrorists for the release of hostages. This is not an easy policy to follow - sometimes it is agonising - but it is right."

/P2

5. A representative selection of press reporting and commentary ... is attached for your information (not for Washington).

(U.K./Iran Arms Supply?)

6. Suggestions that Britain may have become involved in selling arms to Iran (referred to in our memorandum under reference) have crystallised into reports of negotiations by Land Rover to sell 3,000 four-wheel drive vehicles to Tehran, almost certainly for military use. These negotiations have reached the quotation stage. Both The Times and The Financial Times (17 November) carry reports ... (attached - not for Washington) that the Government is unlikely to act to bar "the sale should Land Rover win the contract." "Whitehall sources", The Times reports, consider that the landrover sale would not be in breach of existing British Government guidelines in respect of military sales to Iran and Iraq.

7. At the same time, Iranian dissident sources in London have made allegations that London is still being used as a centre for arms procurement deals (under cover of the National Iranian Oil Company's offices), and that a high-ranking Iranian military delegation visited Britain in September to try to buy radar equipment from Plessey.

8. There looks to be more mileage in the Iranian issue yet.

S. W. PRIOR

S.W. Prior
for High Commissioner

Atts

New Zealand High Commission

New Zealand House
Haymarket
London SW1Y 4TQ
Telephone 01-930 8422
Telex 24368

"YELLOW"

Reference: B66/5/1A
B69/89

18 November 1986

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
WELLINGTON

(ATT: DLO EUR LGL SEC MEA)

c.c. PMD

UK/Terrorism: Actions Against Syria

We attach for your information copies of two FCO Briefing telgrams of 24 October 1986 giving the background to the Hindawi case evidence against Syria and answering various questions of Syrian/UK relations and the British attitude to terrorism.

S.W. Prior
for High Commissioner

B66/5/1A.

THE OBSERVER, SUNDAY 16 NOVEMBER 1986

Animal Lib plans

EXCLUSIVE

by PAUL LASHMAR

ANIMAL rights activists are about to launch a pre-Christmas fire-bombing campaign against stores and companies which they believe are involved in cruelty to animals.

Detailed instructions for carrying out the campaign have recently been received by undercover activist 'cells' of the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) around the country, encouraging them to make and use fire-bombs.

'Coordinated actions using these devices are the type of action that constitute major successes,' say the instructions.

The Observer has obtained copies of the instructions which have been distributed to cells using secret 'dead letter drops' — a method normally favoured by spies. They show how to make two types of firebombs, both using simple timing devices.

The first is an incendiary device for setting off during the night the water sprinkler systems that departmental stores are required to have by law.

It is made by using everyday household materials including a watch, firelighters, nail varnish, a battery and a bulb. These and other components are put together and hidden in a cigarette packet, which is placed under an inflammable object on the store's top floor.

The sprinklers put the fire out and the water floods the store, causing extensive water damage.

The second firebomb is a small explosive device, made from a notoriously unstable mixture of a certain kind of weedkiller and sugar, which is attached to a container of petrol. This is then placed inside or underneath the target vehicle.


These devices are clearly aimed at damaging property, and not injuring or killing people. However, some animal rights campaigners we spoke to were clearly concerned at the risks.

One told us: 'This is going too far. There is too much danger that an innocent nightwatchman or cleaner could be killed.'

The ALF is divided into two distinct sections. There are over 2,000 'supporters' who operate openly and run the press office. Then there are the secret 'activist' cells who carry out attacks.

There are believed to be around 1,000 ALF activists in as many as 50

Christmas stores blitz


and the water [illegible] store and causes extensive water damage. Of course, we don't break into the store in the middle of the night to start a fire – we place an incendiary device in the store during shopping hours, under something inflammable. Usually a device is placed under an armchair or settee on the top floor, the result of which is that all the floors underneath are flooded. As some stores are now checking under their settees after closing we now place them out of sight under anything that is combustible and not always on the top floor. We do not place them in coat pockets or in a settee – [illegible] it may do at a

[illegible]attery snap.

Piece of light card cut to fit inside cig. box.

Fine wire and piece similar to snap wire.

Ordinary wind-up watch with glass removed.

Nail Varnish.

Tube of superglue.

Ordinary matches (not safety

Part of the guide on how to make fire-bombs.

autonomous cells around the country. Recruits are carefully screened and are picked on the personal recommendation of known activists.

A smaller and more radical group, the Animal Rights Militia, has actually used explosive devices to try to cause injury to individuals identified as involved with animal experiments.

However, although ALF cells have fire-bombed shops premises and vehicles before, this is the first time that they have appeared to be gearing up to a major campaign.

Earlier this year the ALF targeted the Allders department store in Croydon, Surrey, because of its fur department—which has since been closed.

First they left an incendiary device under a sofa which set off the water sprinklers during the night, causing considerable damage. Then, after signs of defiance from Allders, a number of the company's lorries were fire-bombed and destroyed.

Last month a Banbury company which supplies chicken feed to battery hen farms was targeted. Six of the company's lorries were set on fire, causing £100,000 worth of damage.

The bombmaking instructions have been taken from a 52-page booklet which has been recently published in secret.

The booklet, written from interviews with activists, is effectively an A-Z manual of animal rights activity, from supergluing the locks of butcher's shops and fire-bombing stores, to how to look after animals freed during raids on fur farms.

A Scotland Yard spokesman said that they were aware of the booklet. It is understood that a provincial force is conducting an inquiry into its publication.

ALF press officer Mr Chris Oakley said yesterday : ' The booklet is very interesting. It's quite a good guide. Some people would say it was irresponsible because if children got hold of it they could make bombs. But they could simply go into a newsagents and buy matches.'

Mr Oakley said he thought it be unlikely that anybody would be injured by the bombs. 'If they were, it would be a tragedy, a complete and utter tragedy. The ALF follows a policy of non-violence, but it comes down to the fact if there wasn't any animal abuse then there would be no ALF.'

B66/5/1A

THE TIMES SATURDAY NOVEMBER 15 1986

☆☆☆☆

Sri Lanka attacks Asia's failure to agree terror policy

From Michael Hamlyn, Bangalore

A stinging attack on the failure of the South Asian nations to agree on what constitutes terrorism, and an even more surprising assault on its comfortable procedural assumptions, have come from the Sri Lankan delegation at the seven-nation meeting of the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC).

The meeting, which will culminate in a summit gathering as heads of state and government arrive here today, has been shaken by Sri Lankan vehemence on terrorism. Mr W. T. Jayesinghe, the Foreign Secretary, told his colleagues that he felt bound to "stress our disappointment" at the work of an expert group on terrorism, set up at Sri Lanka's insistence at the first SAARC summit in Bangladesh a year ago.

"My delegation views with regret the lack of progress," he said, "on finalizing a list of offences which are to be regarded as terroristic, and which for the purposes of extradition are to be regarded as political."

Mr Jayesinghe added that a failure to agree on terrorism would be the first instance when the collective spirit of SAARC was tested and found wanting. "It will be a bad precedent and a blow, a grievous one at that, to SAARC'S prospects elsewhere," he said.

Mr Jayesinghe also complained about the plethora of grand-sounding declarations associated with SAARC. He insisted that to launch further into a restatement of the basic aims of the organization in another Bangalore Declaration will be "to devalue the currency of SAARC summitry", adding that historians "delving through the referential plethora" may be faced with the basic question: What was SAARC? "Repetition alone may lead them to the answer that it was nothing," he said.

The meeting in Bangalore, the garden city of India, is being held under the threat of a serious chill in relations between India and Pakistan, which has culminated in massive troop movements by India on the border.

Pakistan officials have said privately that a quarter of a million Indian troops are involved in exercises close to the international frontier, and Mr Abdus Sattar, the Pakistani Foreign Secretary, told a press conference yesterday: "When you hear the quantum of troops involved you will see that it cannot but generate a sense of unease."

Mr Sattar also indicated that India was in breach of an agreement to notify Pakistan of any major exercises, although he said he had been assured that India would fulfil the unwritten understanding to do so.

Mr Sattar insisted, however, that no shadow was being cast on the proceedings by Indo-Pakistan relations, and that there were good expectations from the brief talks that the two prime ministers, Mr Rajiv Gandhi and Mr M. K. Junejo, have over the weekend.

The SAARC conference is expected to end with the establishment of a permanent secretariat based in Nepal, and with a Bangladeshi Secretary-General, Mr Abul Ahsan, the present Ambassador to Pakistan. There will be three directors under him.

B66/5/11A

THE GUARDIAN Saturday November 15 1986

Warning by mystery Arab led to discovery of explosives

Israelis were tipped off about El Al bomb plot

By Ian Black,
Middle East Correspondent

Israeli intelligence received an advance general warning, from an Arab source, of a plot to blow up an Israeli civilian airliner earlier this year. It was this heightened state of alertness that led to the discovery of the bomb that Nezar Hindawi's girlfriend was carrying as she tried to board an El Al flight at Heathrow airport last April.

Hindawi, a Jordanian with a known history of involvement with terrorist organisations, was sentenced to 45 years' imprisonment at the Old Bailey last month after a trial in which there emerged apparently incontrovertible evidence of official Syrian involvement, although the Damascus regime vigorously denies this.

Immediately after the trial, Britain severed its diplomatic relations with Syria and persuaded other EEC countries to impose limited sanctions. The British move provided vindication for the long-standing Israeli position that states supporting terrorism must be punished and isolated internationally.

Inconsistencies and gaps in Hindawi's evidence, and the highly favourable results for Israel led many observers to argue that Israel's Mossad secret service was somehow involved in the affair. In the extreme version, the whole operation was somehow masterminded by Mossad. Another theory was that Israel had got wind of the plot and allowed it to run its course—almost until the end—in order to reap maximum political capital.

But new information from Jerusalam and Damascus this week suggests a far less conspiratorial—but no less intriguing—explanation for how the plot was foiled. Had the bomb gone off, and the Israeli plane, a jumbo jet with 375 people on board, crashed over Austria, it would almost certainly have led to a new Middle East war, initiated by Israel in revenge for Syrian involvement in the operation.

Intelligence sources now say that early this year Israel received a general warning, from an unspecified Arab source, of a plot to blow up an El Al plane. Special security arrangements were enforced and it was the heightened state of alertness that led an El Al security officer to look carefully at the bag that Hindawi's girlfriend, Miss Anne Marie Murphy, tried to take aboard the flight.

The sources refuse to say whether the information came from an officer in Syrian air force intelligence, Lieutenant-Colonel Mufid Akour, who is now reported to be in detention in Damascus on suspicion of being an Israeli spy.

Colonel Akour, who was mentioned by Hindawi as one of the officers involved in the mission, is thought to be a deputy to Lieutenant-Colonel Haitham Said, head of recruitment and foreign operations for air force intelligence in Damascus.

Western diplomats in the Syrian capital were told privately by government officials last month — shortly before the end of the Hindawi trial and Britain's dramatic decision to sever relations — that President Assad now knew who was responsible for the operation and would deal with him when the time was ripe.

Israeli intelligence is now convinced that Assad himself, who is renowned for his caution and circumspection in the face of a militarily superior enemy, did not know about the El Al operation and that it was the result of a power struggle between one or more of the half-dozen security and intelligence organisations operating in Syria.

It remains unclear, however, whether Colonel Akour is under suspicion as the man who initiated the London operation without clearance from above, or whether he warned the Israelis that they should be on their guard in general about a plot to plant a bomb on an El Al plane.

B665/1A

THE TIMES SATURDAY NOVEMBER 15 1986

Howe reaffirms policy of no deals with terror states

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The Government will do no deals with terrorists and is determined to deal decisively with states that sponsor terrorism, **Sir Geoffry Howe** told the Commons during the resumed debate on the Queen's Speech.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary stressed the importance of joint international action in the fight against terrorism. He said that the Government's determination to deal decisively with states that sponsored terrorism did not preclude contacts with those who might be able to help secure the release of hostages.

The Government remained deeply concerned about Mr Alec Collett and Mr John McCarthy, the two British hostages in Lebanon, and about Mr Brian Keenan, the dual Irish-British citizen. It was doing what it could to secure their freedom – if they were still alive – while maintaining the principle of no substantive concessions.

Britain's 'EEC partners had recently reaffirmed their determination not to make concessions to terrorists and that was a commitment to which the Government attached much importance.

"In our view concessions lead to more, not less, hostage taking. This Government will not do deals with terrorists for the release of hostages. This is not an easy policy to follow. Sometimes it is agonising. But it is right."

On disarmament, **Sir Geoffrey** said that the British people would not fall for the Labour Party's hollow and naive policy of renouncing our nuclear weapons for nothing in return.

That policy would smash the western alliance which had underpinned Britain's freedom for 40 years. It was difficult to believe that any major western party committed to peace and disarmament could choose this point in history to try to pull the rug out from under the Nato position.

At the very moment when years of patient diplomacy to bring the Russians to the negotiating table were starting to pay off, with substantial new agreements in sight in different areas, the Opposition proposed that we should throw away the cards that had brought us to that position.

For all the new thinking in Mr Gorbachov's Soviet Union, for all the skilful presentation and dramatic initiatives, the facts of the East-West division remained basically the same. The Soviet Union talked far more about peace and disarmament, but had in practice not stopped steadily building up its already massive forces.

Any party which refused to face up to that fact could not be trusted with the defence of the United Kingdom. One-sided disarmament had been repeatedly tried and had repeatedly failed. Unilateral gestures were likely to be destabilizing and damaging.

Nuclear weapons had prevented any war in Europe for the past 40 years. As successive governments had acknowledged, the UK's own nuclear capability had been essential both to give our country security and to deter nuclear blackmail.

While the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies retained a massive superiority in conventional forces and chemical weapons, we must keep our nuclear deterrent. It would be folly indeed to abandon nuclear weapons and so make Europe safe for conventional or chemical warfare.

The Government took a consistent and sensible approach to these questions. It insisted that Britain's defences should be maintained. But it was also ready for dialogue with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

It believed that such contacts allowed it to influence the Soviet leadership and, gradually, build up cooperation. The Soviet leadership acknowledged that the UK could make an important contribution to greater confidence between East and West and a more stable and secure world. That was why the Prime Minister would be visiting the Soviet Union on Mr Gorbachov's personal invitation in the first half of next year. Mr Gorbachov respected Mrs Thatcher precisely because she was not weak or ready to surrender Britain's interests but because she combined firmness in our national defence with patience and creativity in negotiation.

"We will not give away something for nothing and so put the UK's defence at risk. We shall continue to work for confidence between the Soviet Union and the UK. But we shall not take that confidence for granted.

"Leadership and consistency will remain the hallmarks of our policy. We will continue to promote Britain's interests, to do what is necessary and to do what is right."

Earlier, **Sir Geoffrey** had reviewed various aspects of foreign affairs in the five months since the House last debated the subject. These included measures to be taken against Syria in the wake of the Hindawi affair; the continuing search for peace talks in the Middle East; his mission to South Africa seeking an end to apartheid and heightened tensions in the region after President Machel's tragic death; and political cooperation within the EEC.

He said the Prime Minister was leaving today for important talks with President Reagan

~~B69/E~~
B66/5/1A

THE GUARDIAN Saturday November 15 1986

Howe snubs US deal with Iran

By Alan Travis

Sir Geoffrey Howe, distanced the Government yesterday from the United States decision to sell what President Reagan termed "small amounts of defensive weapons and military spare parts to Iran."

Underlining British refusal to negotiate with terrorists to secure the release of hostages, the Foreign Secretary told the Commons: "In our view concessions lead to more not less hostage taking. This government will not do deals with terrorists for the release of hostages.

"This is not an easy policy to follow. Sometimes it is agonising, but it is right."

Sir Geoffrey did not name Mr Reagan. Neither did his Minister of State, Mr Timothy Renton, who told MPs later in the continued debate on the Queen's Speech that it smacked of expediency to lead terrorists to believe they could swap hostages for arms — something that the President vehemently denied in his television speech on Thursday night.

Mr Renton went on to claim that Britain had lost "hundreds of millions of pounds of business" because it refused to grant export licences for the sale of defence equipment to either Iran or Iraq.

In his speech Sir Geoffrey qualified his refusal to treat with terrorists in one respect: that this policy did not preclude contacts with "those who may be able to help secure the release of hostages."

In contrast to the implicit ministerial criticisms of President Reagan, the shadow foreign secretary, Mr Denis Healey was at his most acerbic.

Sir Geoffrey, he said, had not the courage to name President Reagan, who had sent arms to a country which was a self-confessed sponsor of international terrorism and the main enemy of all Western interests in the Middle East.

Mr Healey said President Reagan's attempt to explain his behaviour was "stupifyingly incredible." The President had been bargaining with Iran at the very moment he was asking the Prime Minister to make British bases available for the bombing of Tripoli.

Dr David Owen, the Social Democratic leader, said Mrs Thatcher would be in no position to lecture President Reagan on the Iranian disclosures.

"Before we jump on our high horse and lecture them about doing this we ought to look in our own backyard." In the past Britain had faced criticism because it has used third parties to export military spare parts to Iran.

IN CONFIDENCE

B66/5/1A

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NEW ZEALAND EMBASSY
TOKYO

14 November 1986

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs
WELLINGTON

(DLO)
(AAD)
(LGL)
(SEC)
(MEA)



cc: PMD
EIB
Defence (DD)
NZSIS
Police (PTIU)
Secretary of Labour
Canberra
London
Washington
Brussels

BOMBING ATTEMPT ON LL AIRCRAFT : JAPANESE RESPONSE

... Attached is the statement issued by the Gaimusho on 11 November setting out their response to the recent attempted bombing of an LL aircraft.

2 Seo, Director-General of the Consular and Emigration Affairs Department, told us that the statement was issued following a request from the British Embassy that the Japanese Government should take some action against Syria. When Seo handed an advance copy of the statement to the British Embassy he was told that its contents would be appreciated in London. Seo said that they had received no other reaction from Governments.

for Ambassador

Encl

IN CONFIDENCE

F.P.C. Press Release No. 434
(F.P.C. Translation of
Foreign Ministry Release)

November 11, 1986
Foreign Press Center
Japan

Statement by the Director-General for Public Information and Cultural Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bombing Attempt against the El Al Jetliner

1. Japan is firmly opposed to acts of international terrorism, no matter what their reason or their form may be, and has taken serious interest in the trial in the British court on the attempted bombing of an El Al jetliner.

What has happened is quite deplorable, and Japan understands with sympathy the steps taken recently by the United Kingdom and by other EC nations.

2. Japan has joined in a number of statements on international terrorism and hereby reaffirms the position expressed in them, most recently in the statement at the Tokyo Summit in May this year. Japan intends to positively promote international cooperation, including the following measures, to curb international terrorism as a task for the whole international community.

(i) refusal to export arms;

(ii) strict limits on the size of the diplomatic and consular missions;

(iii) denial of entry to all persons, including diplomatic personnel, who have been expelled or excluded on suspicion of involvement in international terrorism;

(iv) stricter immigration and visa requirements and procedures.

(OVER)

3. Japan has been conducting constructive dialogues with Arab states, including Syria, on wide-ranging subjects among which is international terrorism. It intends to further promote these dialogues, and to urge Syria to translate its position against international terrorism into concrete actions.

The current status of relations between Japan and Syria is as follows. It is Japan's intention not to make any change in these relations at present.

(i) Syrian Airlines

There is no Syrian airline flight into Japan, nor is there any Syrian airline office in Japan.

(ii) Syrian Embassy

The size of the Syrian Embassy in Tokyo is maintained at a minimum level.

(iii) Exchange of high-level visits

There has been no such exchange since mid-1985; and there is no plan for such visits in the near future.

(END)

New Zealand High Commission

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Telephone 01-930 8422
Telex 24368

"YELLOW"

Reference:
B86/1/2A
B69/89
B69/96
B66/5/1A

14 November 1986

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(EUR, MEA DLO)

c.c. E.I.B.
TEHRAN

EPC : Foreign Ministers' Meeting

Please refer to our telegram 9497 (not to Tehran).

... 2. Attached for your information is the transcript of Sir Geoffrey Howe's press conference outlining the EPC dicussions and agreements at foreign ministers' London meeting on 10 November. After his statement the Chairman answered questions on Syria, the British position in respect of possible American arms sales to Tehran, and the Community position vis-a-vis coal imports from South Africa.

... 3. Attached also is the transcript of a second press conference given by Sir Geoffrey devoted to the question of Community action against Syria.

S.W. Prior
for High Commissioner

8 OVERS

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Syrian 'mole' upsets Turkey

THE GUARDIAN Friday November 14 1986

From David Bamford in Ankara

Turkey's relations with Syria are reported to be in disarray after publication of a confession by a Jordanian man arrested last month on terrorism charges. The man alleges that Syria was behind the killing of a Jordanian diplomat in Turkey last year.

Mr Adman Ameri, a former translator at the Jordanian embassy in Ankara, who claims to have been a Syrian "mole", has also alleged that through his Syrian connections he had foreknowledge of recent terrorist acts carried out in Turkey by the pro-Syrian Abu Nidal group.

Displomatic sources in Ankara say that Mr Ameri's confession, leaked to a number of Turkish newspapers, is being taken seriously. They say it is unlikely to have been invented by the Turkish authorities, who are embarrassed by the affair and who have been trying, despite the Hindawi affair in London, to improve relations with Damascus.

After the announcement of EEC measures against Syria, the Turkish Government cautiously reasserted its opposition to international terrorism while saying nothing about its Syrian relations.

Turkey's Prime Minister, Mr Turgut Ozal, meanwhile reaffirmed his support for Syria and on Wednesday warned about what he called "certain circles who wish to see Turkey and Syria in opposition to each other."

The Turkish authorities confirmed this week that Mr Ameri and an alleged Iranian accomplice, Mr Ali Kent, were in custody. The two are accused of complicity in the assassination in July Jast year of the Jordanian first secretary in Ankara, Mr Said al-Sati. Four Palestinian alleged to belong to the Abu Nidal group have also been charged with taking part in the murder.

Mr Ameri, in his confession, some of which was shown on Turkish television, claimed that he and the other accused had been ordered by the Syrian secret service, Al-Muhabarrat, to murder the Jordanian diplomat. He said that he had also been given full details of Abu Nidal activities in Turkey, including plots yet to be implemented.

They included car bombings and the blowing up of an arms dump near Ankara in August, in which seven people died.

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FROM WELLINGTON
TO THE HAGUE LONDON SVC

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DEFENCE (DDOPS)

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EUROPEAN ANTI-TERRORISM MEASURES
OUR 703 TO THE HAGUE AND 4591 TO LONDON
PLEASE CORRECT 3RD LINE PARA 3 TO READ ...
RELEVANT DIPLOMATIC AND HOST COUNTRY GOVERNMENT (INCLUDING POLICE/POLICE) ETC ...
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SECRET

SUBJ: TERRORISM : SYRIA.

OUR 1347.

WE ARE REPORTING BY MEMORANDUM ON OUR DISCUSSION WITH EINWAG (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTORATE, INTERIOR MINISTRY) ABOUT NEW FRG ANTI-TERRORIST MEASURES. DURING OUR MEETING WE GLEANED SOME COMMENTS ON SYRIAN INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORIST ACTIVITIES WHICH MAY ALSO BE OF INTEREST.

2. NOTING THAT CHANCELLOR KOHL HAD ALREADY CATEGORICALLY DENIED THE SUGGESTION MADE BY CHIRAC IN THE ''WASHINGTON TIMES'' INTERVIEW THAT THE GERMANS BELIEVED THAT THE ISRAELI SECRET SERVICE WAS BEHIND THE LONDON BOMB ATTEMPT, EINWAG CONFIRMED THAT THE FRG INDEED HAD NO INFORMATION TO SUGGEST THAT MOSSAD WAS INVOLVED. THE GERMANS NOW FACE THE FORTHCOMING TRIAL OF HINDAWI'S BROTHER FOR THE BOMB ATTACK AGAINST THE GERMAN-ARAB SOCIETY IN WEST BERLIN (PARA 7 OF OUR 45/11/6 OF 8 AUGUST)., EVIDENCE WILL PROBABLY EMERGE AT THE TRIAL LINKING THE SYRIAN SECRET SERVICE TO THE BOMBING. THE BROTHER HAS ALREADY PROVIDED DETAILED INFORMATION ABOUT HOW HE WAS SUPPLIED WITH THE EXPLOSIVES BY THE SYRIAN EMBASSY IN EAST BERLIN, AND WHILE NOT ALL OF THIS CAN BE CORROBORATED THE FRG SECURITY FORCES HAVE NO DOUBT ABOUT SYRIAN INVOLVEMENT, AND INDEED HAVE ALREADY AMASSED CONSIDERABLE DETAIL ON THIS. EINWAG'S COMMENTS SUGGESTED THAT MEMBERS OF THE SYRIAN AIR FORCE WERE INVOLVED, AND HE NOTED THAT SYRIAN ARAB AIRLINES (WHOSE PILOTS ARE MILITARY OFFICERS) WAS ALSO IMPLICATED IN TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.

SECRET

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"YELLOW"

Reference:
B69/34
B66/5/1A
B69/89

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(MEA EUR DLO)

c.c. E.I.B.
PARIS

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Date	Nature of Material
	French Hostages/Syria/Terrorism
12 November 1986	Press commentary on French Government involvement in release of hostages from the Lebanon.
	Financial Times reports

for S.W. Prior
for High Commissioner

The price of negotiation

DAVID JACOBSEN, Camille Sontag and Marcel Coudari are to be congratulated on their release from terrorist imprisonment in the Middle East. But we in the West must be aware that the procedures to which the French and US governments resorted for this laudable purpose have already cost us heavily on several fronts, and that the bargaining which secured the release of three hostages risks giving extra impetus to the cycle of terrorism, bomb-throwing and kidnapping.

The US Administration has long urged its western allies in the strongest terms to take a tough line over terrorism, and above all not to negotiate with terrorist groups. It now emerges not merely that part of the US Administration has for months been negotiating with Iran for the release of US citizens held hostage, but that the quid pro quo has been the supply of military equipment. Mr George Shultz, the US Secretary of State, continues to believe in the tough public policy, but the net effect of the revelations has been to undermine both his credibility and his authority.

Moreover, the supply of military equipment must help Iran in its war against Iraq. Even if it is not enough to tilt the balance decisively, it will alarm those moderate Arab states which fear above all else a military victory by a fundamentalist Iran.

Harsh contempt

In an interview printed in the Washington Times, Mr Jacques Chirac, the French Prime Minister, adopts a harshly contemptuous attitude towards what he sees as the noisy crudity of American policy towards the Middle East, particularly towards Middle Eastern terrorism. He may have a point, but it is disingenuous of him to pretend that a few bombs in the streets of Paris are small beer compared with the greater aims of resurrecting Lebanon, stemming the tide of Islamic fundamentalism, and restoring peace to the Middle East. In the first place, it is doubtful if France or any outside power can do much to achieve these great aims; in the second, the recent French tractations in Damascus were evidently not concerned with such grand strategy, but with the small beer of French hostages and bombs in Paris.

However great the other differences between Washington and Paris, on this issue they were both negotiating for the release of hostages. The quid pro quo in the case of the French hostages is so far unclear; perhaps it is the early release from prison in France of Georges Ibrahim Abdallah; but in any case, nobody will believe in a spontaneous act of generosity by a Middle East terrorist group.

Such negotiations always involve a short-term price, because that is what all negotiations involve; more seriously, the process sets a new precedent which legitimises the activities of the terrorists and gives them extra incentives to go on taking hostages. The Syrian Government is using its role in securing the release of the French hostages to vindicate its long-standing disclaimers where terrorism is concerned, and to offset against the evidence in the Hindawi case which pointed clearly to some Syrian involvement in the attempt to blow up an El Al airliner.

Intelligence exchange

The picture of other aspects of the fight against terrorism is less dismal. European governments are at last co-operating more intensively than they used to, and should be able to make the terrorists' activities more difficult through greater exchange of information and intelligence, through more effective screening and physical security checks. In addition, there is a strong case for targeting security checks more intensively against embassies, organisations and citizens of suspect countries, so as to hamper the import of guns and explosives.

But of all the terrorist threats, that posed by hostage taking is the most difficult for a democratic government to handle. Clearly, the principle of no negotiation, no surrender is logical; if terrorist groups knew it would be followed, they would be much less likely to take hostages. But it is a logic which subjects governments to domestic pressures they find hard to resist, because the hostage is an individual whose life is piteously under threat day after day. We welcome three returned prisoners; a cure which risks making the disease worse, and which exacerbates the divisions between western countries must be a cause of concern.

Financial Times Wednesday November 12 1986

THE LEBANON HOSTAGES

Chirac treads perilous path in Middle East

BY DAVID HOUSEGO IN PARIS

MR JACQUES CHIRAC, the French Prime Minister, had good reason yesterday to heave a sigh of relief that the freeing of the two French hostages came in time to deflect criticism from him over his interview with the Washington Times or over the French stance in the EEC negotiations on terrorism. But he cannot breath easily until the other five French hostages have been freed as well.

Radio Tehran yesterday praised him for the "intelligence" of French policy in the Middle East and for improving relations with Iran and Syria. But, indicating that thorns could still lie in his path, it said that France "had fulfilled several of the conditions" for normalising relations between the two countries and that negotiations would continue.

It must remain an open question what Iran will throw into the basket as its price for leaning on the Islamic extremists in the Lebanon to secure further releases

The freeing of Mr Camille Sontag and Mr Marcel Coudari appears to have been carried out under the orders of the Iranians, who in turn came under strong pressure from Syria. President Hafez Assad's regime was anxious for a gesture to be made to France for minimising EEC sanctions against Syria—but it could not act on its own.

For even though both the Revolutionary Justice Organisation (which released the hostages yesterday) and Islamic Jihad (which is believed to hold most of the rest) operate out of Syrian controlled areas in Lebanon, they appear to take orders only from Tehran. When Abdell Halim Khaddam, the Syrian Vice President, visited France in July, he promised Syria's best efforts to secure the release of the remaining hostages. But he was subsequently unable to deliver.

By contrast, one of the first assessments of Mr Chirac on coming to power in March was that the key to the hostages' release lay through Tehran. He thus initiated government-to-government talks with Iran in which Ayatollah Khomeini's regime posed three conditions for exerting its influence: a cut in France's massive support for Iraq; the expulsion of Iranian opposition leaders from France, and repayment of the $1bn loan made by Iran during the time of the Shah to the European enriched uranium consortium

It was shortly after the expulsion of the Mojahedin leader Massoud Rajavi and the opening of the negotiations on the financial dispute, that the first two French hostages

Coinciding with yesterday's release, Mr Jean-Bernard Raimond, the French Foreign Minister publicly confirmed that over the next few days he and Mr Ali Akhbar Velayati, his Iranian counterpart, would sign an agreement partially resolving the dispute. In practice, France has agreed to pay back FFr 330m (£50m) of the outstanding loan. The ministerial meeting in Geneva also constitutes for the Iranians an important step towards more official recognition.

These measures, coupled with Syrian pressure on Iran to reward France for its friendly stance in the EEC meeting on Monday paved the way for the two hostages to return to France. President Assad's regime would have looked foolish if it had had no compensation to offer the French Government for helping to offset the unfavourable publicity caused by the Hindawi affair.

Yesterday's release, none the less, leaves Mr Chirac's relations with both Syria and Iran in a complicated and fragile state. As against Syria's need for a French helping hand in Europe, Mr Chirac also needs Syrian support in preventing further terrorist attacks in France and in enabling French forces to remain in Lebanon.

As for Iran, on which he is dependent for the release of further hostages, Mr Chirac made clear in his off-the-record comments his immense distrust for the Khomeini regime. Speaking of the "extraordinary danger that stems from Iran," he said the first priority of policy "must be to prevent the Middle East being engulfed by religious fanaticism."

THE REAGAN Administration, thrown into disarray by revelations of its secret dealings with Iran, has begun a counter-offensive aimed at reassuring its allies and defusing reports of sharp splits among President Ronald Reagan's top advisers, writes Lionel Barber in Washington.

The White House, referring to reports that the US had shipped arms to Iran to gain the release of American hostages in Lebanon, said on Monday that "no US law has been or will be violated" and that US policy of not making concessions to terrorists remained intact.

In a related development, Mr George Shultz, US Secretary of State, said yesterday that he had sent Mr Reagan recommendations for action against Syria because of its alleged role in sponsoring terrorism.

Mr Shultz, widely believed to have protested against the secret dealings with Iran, did not disclose the recommendations. But the hint of further US action against Syria follows the withdrawal of the US ambassador in Damascus and a package of EEC measures against Damascus agreed in London this week.

Senior members of the Administration met on Monday to discuss how to defuse the row over the dealings with Iran which were conducted by a small group of White House staff working for the National Security Council.

Hostage release seen as a mark of Syrian gratitude to France

BY DAVID HOUSEGO IN PARIS AND ROGER MATTHEWS IN LONDON

TWO FRENCH hostages arrived back in Paris last night after being released in Damascus in what was widely seen as a gesture of thanks to France for helping to minimise EEC sanctions against Syria. Mr Jacques Chirac, the French Prime Minister, was at the airport to welcome them.

Mr Farouk al-Shara, Syria's Foreign Minister, pledged yesterday that his country would continue to do all it could to secure the release of hostages still held in Lebanon.

"The Syrian Government wants good relations with all countries. But those countries which show hostility to Syria should expect the same in return," he warned.

Mr Camille Sontag, 85, and Mr Marcel Coudari, 54, were handed to French officials at the Syrian Foreign Ministry yesterday morning after travelling overnight from Lebanon. They had been delivered into Syrian custody by the Iranian-backed Revolutionary Justice Organisation, an extremist Moslem faction.

The French Foreign Ministry thanked the Syrian authorities for their role. But it is believed the release would not have been possible without the assistance of Iran, which was willing to allow most of the credit to be claimed by Syria.

In an indication of the importance of Iran's role, Mr Jean-Bernard Raimond, the French Foreign Minister, announced yesterday that a partial agreement had been reached with Tehran over a financial dispute involving a $1bn (£695m) Iranian loan made while the Shah was in power to Eurodif, the European enriched uranium facility.

Mr Raimond is due shortly to meet Mr Ali Akhbar Velayati, the Iranian Foreign Minister, prior to a French repayment of $330m. Mr Velayati is a regular visitor to Damascus and he held talks with Syrian officials less than a fortnight ago.

However, Mr Raimond, speaking on French television, refused to make a direct link between the resolution of French differences with Iran and efforts to win the release of the remaining five French hostages in Lebanon.

He said he was convinced that Mr Velayati "was a man of his word who will help us." But Mr Raimond insisted there had not been bargaining over the release of the two hostages and claimed that French foreign policy had been conducted in complete dignity.

In a brief statement, President Francois Mitterrand told the hostages that he rejoiced in their release. The release may have helped to defuse the political row over the interview Mr Jacques Chirac, the French Prime Minister, gave to the Washington Times.

In the interview, Mr Chirac expressed doubts over Syrian responsibility for an attempt in London in April to place a bomb on an Israeli airliner. He sharply criticised Britain's decision to break diplomatic relations with Damascus.

Syria yesterday indicated some satisfaction at the outcome of Monday's meeting of EEC Foreign Ministers in London, during which 11 of the 12 members adopted limited measures against Damascus.

Mr al-Shara said that, after a careful reading of the EEC statement, "it is obvious that they are not all convinced that the British allegations are true. We believe that the statement was made under American pressure."

The Syrian Minister added that the European statement "shows a lack of genuine consensus. It gives flexibility to each country to make what contacts it considers to be appropriate."

Greece, the only EEC member not to sign the agreement, explained yesterday that it had not wished to condemn any country for terrorism. Mr Antonis Kourtis, the Government spokesman, said Greece respected the findings of a

Continued on Back Page

Chirac treads perilous path, Page 3; Editorial Comment, Page 24

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Thatcher/Reagan Meeting

Our 9397.

The following items report on the Prime Minister's determination to defend the independent British nuclear deterrent and push for a consistent anti-terrorist line during her meetings with President Reagan.

AUTHORISING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE:.....

NAME:.....S.W..Prior.....

2073
9547

THATCHER TO FIGHT ARMS DEAL

'Peace depends on nuclear weapons'

By George Jones, Political Correspondent

MRS THATCHER last night signalled her determination to retain Britain's independent nuclear deterrent despite the willingness of American defence experts to agree to a deal with the Soviet Union that would abolish all ballistic missiles.

She revealed publicly her worries that current disarmament negotiations between the superpowers could leave Europe vulnerable to overwhelming Soviet superiority in conventional, chemical and biological weapons.

In a speech at the Lord Mayor's banquet in London, traditionally used to set out the Government's foreign policy objectives, Mrs Thatcher concentrated on reaffirming her belief in the importance of nuclear weapons.

The Prime Minister, who flies to Washington on Saturday for talks on arms control with President Reagan, said:

"We can never forget that the frontier of freedom cuts right across our continent, and renders Westen Europe vulnerable to attack by conventional forces and chemical weapons in a way in which the United States is not.

"The fact is that nuclear weapons have prevented not only nuclear war but conventional war in Europe for 40 years. That is why we depend and will continue to depend on nuclear weapons for our defence.

Future of Trident in question

The Prime Minister's speech follows yesterday's exclusive report in The Daily Telegraph by John Keegan, Defence Correspondent, that senior defence officials in the Pentagon would be willing to agree to a disarmament deal with the Soviet Union that would get rid of all ballistic missiles, while permitting both sides to retain slower cruise missiles.

Such a deal would call into question the future of Britain's independent nuclear deterent, which is being updated with the Trident II missile manufactured by the Americans.

This is one of the weapons which would be dismantled in any superpower deal to get rid of ballistic missiles.

Mrs Thatcher, however, is planning to make clear to President Reagan on Saturday that disarmament negotiations with the Soviet Union must take account of the total military threat Russia poses to the West, particularly Europe.

Although the Prime Minister shares the desire for deep cuts in the nuclear arsenals held by both sides, she made clear last night she did not believe the time had come to get rid of the West's nuclear defences.

Her speech was seen as underlining her determination to retain Britain's nuclear deterrent until there is a radical reduction in the Soviet conventional arms capability.

Recalling Winston Churchill's last address to the United States Congress in which he warned America not to let go of the atomic weapon until it was sure other means of preserving peace were available, she added: "Other means are not yet at hand, and we should do well to heed his wisdom."

Mrs Thatcher said the recent Reykjavik meeting between President Reagan and Mr Gorbachev had brought a little closer the goal of a reduction in the number of nuclear weapons.

But she emphasised her strong support for the president's refusal to give in to Russian demands to limit research into the "Star Wars" defence system against nuclear missiles.

It was vital that the West should always be at the forefront of research into the latest technology, she said.

"Nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented. The knowledge of how to make them exists. And the risk will always be that someone will make them or conceal them".

Living with that risk would be a recipe for uncertainty and insecurity," said Mrs Thatcher.

U.S. support

Charles Laurence in Washington writes:Mrs Thatcher will find powerful support for questioning the new American attitude to the abolition of ballistic missiles when she visits President Reagan.

Senator Sam Nunn, chairman-elect of the Senate Armed Services Committee, which will be controlled by the Democrats after last week's elections yesterday described the proposal to scrap all ballistic missiles over the next 10 years as "ill-advised and dangerous."

Cruise key to safer deterrence— P18

3 of 3
9547

'No bargains' plea

Britain wants ban on terrorist deals


By Andrew McEwen, Diplomatic Correspondent

The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary are to step up the search for a pact between governments not to make deals with terrorist organizations.

After Monday's British-initiated decision by 11 EEC nations to penalize Syria for sponsoring the Hindawi bomb plot, Whitehall hopes to maintain anti-terrorist momentum.

Mrs Thatcher and Sir Geoffrey Howe are expected to urge the US and French governments not to waver from their stated "no bargains" policies.

Signs that both governments may have sought to buy off state-sponsored Middle East terrorists or hostage-takers have prompted concern that recent improvements in



Chirac: interview seen as "sand in the eyes"

inter-government co-operation could be compromised.

Whitehall sources said the Prime Minister will press her view, when she meets President Reagan at Camp David on Saturday, that such deals play into terrorist hands. Her summit with President Mitterrand of France on November 21, and a probable simultaneous meeting between Sir Geoffrey and his French counterpart, M Jean-Bernard Raimond, could be used to make the same point.

In the longer term, the Government also hopes for a similar understanding with Moscow. Although not realistic as a goal for the near future, preliminary soundings will be taken when British and Soviet terrorism experts meet for talks next month.

Moscow's uncompromising support for Syria, her top ally in the Middle East, is seen as a barrier to early co-operation. The Kremlin has consistently backed President Assad's denials of Syrian involvement in the Hindawi attempt to blow up an El Al airliner. Moscow has denounced Britain's decision to break relations with Damascus and the measures agreed on Monday by 11 of the 12 EEC nations.

Despite this, Whitehall sources believe it may eventually be possible to work with Moscow.

The British view is that governments should refuse to deal with terrorist groups and their government backers, even at the price of civilian casualties. The recent wave of bombings in Paris, apparently staged in a bid to negotiate the release from a French jail of Georges Ibrahim Abdallah, leader of the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Factions (FARL) is thought to have brought the French Government to the brink of compromise.

Threats from both Damascus and Tripoli that the measures by the 11 EEC nations would be met with reprisals are not dismissed lightly by Whitehall sources, but any suggestion of toning down the British line has been ruled out.

After a day's reflection on an interview given by M Jacques Chirac, the French Prime Minister, to an American newspaper, sources were moving towards a view that it was designed to confuse. At first reading, the remarks attributed by *The Washington Times* to M Chirac suggested duplicity by the French Government. On one hand, France was saying that it would back Britain on Syria and would never negotiate with terrorists; on the other M Chirac suggested that Israeli rather than Syrian agents could be behind the plot.

The sources did not discourage speculation that M Chirac's motive may have been no more than to gain a better press for Syria while efforts continued to secure the release of French hostages and to avoid a resurgence of the Paris bombings. "It looks like sand in the eyes," said one source.

THE TIMES WEDNESDAY NOVEMBER 12 1986

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EUROPEAN ANTI-TERRORISM MEASURES
OUR 662 AND YOUR 1242 AND 1149.
2. PARA 17 YOUR 1242: WE HAVE NO RPT NOT PARTICULAR POINTS FOR YOU TO RAISE WITH HELLNERS AT THIS TIME.
3. YOUR 1149 AND 1242. WE ARE INTERESTED IN FUTURE REPORTING FROM YOU ON THE ABOVE TOPIC - DRAWING AS APPROOPRIATE ON RELEVANT DIPLOMATIC AND HOST COUNTRY GOVERNMENT (INCLUDING POLICY) CONTACTS. HOWEVER TO AVOID MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND POSSIBLE DUPLICATION OF EFFORT WITH REGARD TO EXISTING ARRANGEMENTS WE DO NOT RPT NOT CONSIDER THAT YOU SHOULD INITIATE ANY ENQUIRIES WITH LOCAL SECURITY SERVICES IN COUNTRIES TO WHICH YOU ARE ACCREDITED. ANY FUTURE REQUIREMENT IN THIS REGARD WOULD BE THE SUBJECT OF SEPARATE AND SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS.
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CONFIDENTIAL

New Zealand High Commission

New Zealand House
Haymarket
London SW1Y 4TQ
Telephone 01-930 8422
Telex 24368

"YELLOW"

Reference:
B86/1/2A
→ B66/5/1A

12 November 1986

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
WELLINGTON

(att: DLO EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA)

c.c. PMD
NZSIS (TIC)
POLICE (PTIU)
DEFENCE (DDOP)

EUROPEAN ANTI-TERRORIST MEASURES

Please refer to our 9497 (not to all addressees) and FAX of 11 November 1986 concerning the results of the EC Foreign Ministers' London meeting on 10 November in respect of anti-terrorism measures.

2. Attached for your information is a Times report of this morning which considers the next steps to be taken by the British Government in its efforts to maintain the anti-terrorist momentum in Europe.

" S.W. Prior "
for High Commissioner

Att.

THE TIMES WEDNESDAY NOVEMBER 12 1986

'No bargains' plea

Britain wants ban on terrorist deals


By Andrew McEwen, Diplomatic Correspondent

The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary are to step up the search for a pact between governments not to make deals with terrorist organizations.

After Monday's British-initiated decision by 11 EEC nations to penalize Syria for sponsoring the Hindawi bomb plot, Whitehall hopes to maintain anti-terrorist momentum.

Mrs Thatcher and Sir Geoffrey Howe are expected to urge the US and French governments not to waver from their stated "no bargains" policies.

Signs that both governments may have sought to buy off state-sponsored Middle East terrorists or hostage-takers have prompted concern that recent improvements in



Chirac: interview seen as "sand in the eyes"

inter-government co-operation could be compromised.

Whitehall sources said the Prime Minister will press her view, when she meets President Reagan at Camp David on Saturday, that such deals play into terrorist hands. Her summit with President Mitterrand of France on November 21, and a probable simultaneous meeting between Sir Geoffrey and his French counterpart, M Jean-Bernard Raimond, could be used to make the same point.

In the longer term, the Government also hopes for a similar understanding with Moscow. Although not realistic as a goal for the near future, preliminary soundings will be taken when British and Soviet terrorism experts meet for talks next month.

Moscow's uncompromising support for Syria, her top ally in the Middle East, is seen as a barrier to early co-operation. The Kremlin has consistently backed President Assad's denials of Syrian involvement in the Hindawi attempt to blow up an El Al airliner. Moscow has denounced Britain's decision to break relations with Damascus and the measures agreed on Monday by 11 of the 12 EEC nations.

Despite this, Whitehall sources believe it may eventually be possible to work with Moscow.

The British view is that governments should refuse to deal with terrorist groups and their government backers, even at the price of civilian casualties. The recent wave of bombings in Paris, apparently staged in a bid to negotiate the release from a French jail of Georges Ibrahim Abdallah, leader of the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Factions (FARL) is thought to have brought the French Government to the brink of compromise.

Threats from both Damascus and Tripoli that the measures by the 11 EEC nations would be met with reprisals are not dismissed lightly by Whitehall sources, but any suggestion of toning down the British line has been ruled out.

After a day's reflection on an interview given by M Jacques Chirac, the French Prime Minister, to an American newspaper, sources were moving towards a view that it was designed to confuse. At first reading, the remarks attributed by *The Washington Times* to M Chirac suggested duplicity by the French Government. On one hand, France was saying that it would back Britain on Syria and would never negotiate with terrorists; on the other M Chirac suggested that Israeli rather than Syrian agents could be behind the plot.

The sources did not discourage speculation that M Chirac's motive may have been no more than to gain a better press for Syria while efforts continued to secure the release of French hostages and to avoid a resurgence of the Paris bombings. "It looks like sand in the eyes," said one source.

B6615/1A

Kinnock sets out way to fight terrorism

By Our Political Staff

A SIX-POINT plan for tackling international terrorism was outlined last night by Mr Kinnock who said that action had to be "more intensive, extensive, co-ordinated and effective" than hitherto.

The Labour leader acknowledged in a speech to the 80th anniversary dinner of Poale Zion, the Zionist group affiliated to the party, that the struggle against terrorism was bound to be "long, arduous and painstaking."

In the struggle "it is obvious that there will never be instant miracle victories," he said.

He said action by governments and international agencies should include:

■ Close co-operation at national level between civil and Service agencies concerned in the fight against terrorism.

Economic sanctions

■ Tighter agreements on terrorism to match the speed of present-day travel and communications and the diverse causes pursued by terrorists.

■ Better international co-operation between police and security organisations, with more efficient intelligence-gathering to forestall terrorist incidents.

■ Strong multilateral economic sanctions against countries which had "demonstrably" sought to sponsor terrorism, as Syria had in the Hindawi case.

■ An international convention to protect travellers by land, sea and air, requiring governments to take the "strongest possible action" against hijacking, hostage-taking and murder.

■ Action to make states sponsoring terrorism responsible for their actions, with an end to abuses of diplomatic privileges, if necessary through changing the treaties establishing them.

Telegraph 12/1/86

JKRR LONDON
TT PP WELLINGTON
TT RR OTTAWA

R6615/1A

ZCZC [redacted]
ROM93Q
CCC

CONFIDENTIAL

28164

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL 11 NOVEMBER 1986
FROM: ROME
TO: WELLINGTON 1Q94 - P R I O R I T Y
RPTD: LONDON 156 OTTAWA 25 - ROUTINE
LD: SFA (EUR, DLO, SEC, LGL)
PMD
NZSIS
POLICE (PTIU)
EIB
SUBJ: CHANCERY SECURITY

THE CANADIAN EMBASSY CONSULAR AND IMMIGRATION OFFICE WITH WHOM WE SHARE OUR CHANCERY OFFICE BUILDING HAVE ADVISED US THAT FOLLOWING THE SENTENCING OF THREEE ARMENIAN PRISONERS IN CANADA TO A LONG PERIOD OF IMPRISIONMENT WITHOUT PAROLE, THEIR EMBASSIES IN EUROPE HAVE BEEN PLACED ON SECURITY ALERT. THE CANADIAN EMBASSY IN PARIS HAS RECIEVED TWO BOMB THREATS AND FURTHER THREATS ARE EXPECTED. IN CONSEQUENCE OTTAWA HAS INSTRUCTED CANADIAN EMBASSIES TO TAKE CERTAIN SPECIFIED STEPS TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF THEIR PREMISES.
2: THE CANADIANS ARE INSTRUCTED TO MAKE A FORMAL REQUEST TO THE ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY TO ENFORCE THEIR DIPLOMATIC PARKING ZONE IN FRONT OF OUR BUILDING SO THAT THE AREA IMMEDIATELY IN FRONT OF IT REMAINS CLEAR OF CARS. IT IS CURRENTLY USED PRIMARILY BY OUR NEIGHBOURING TENANTS - A RENAULT CAR DEALER AND A PANELBEATING BUSINESS DUE TO LACK OF SPACE IN THE STREET. THE NZ EMBASSY HAS A CD PARKING ZONE ABOUT 25 METRES FURTHER DOWN THE STREET, BUT THIS IN PRSTICE IS ALSO USED BY NEIGHBOURING TENANTS.

AS A RESULT OUR OWN OFFICE CARS OFTEN DOUBLE PARK OUTSIDE THE BUILDING, TO AVOID USING THE GARAGE WHICH IS INCONVENIENT FOR SHORT TRIPS. WHILE THIS ENTIRELY CONFORMS WITH ROMAN TRADITION AND PRACTICE, IT MAY NO LONGER BE POSSIBLE ONCE THE CANADIAN CD ZONE IS CLEARED. (THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY CD ZONE - JUST AROUND THE CORNER BUT ON A WIDER STREET - BY CONTRAST IS RIGOROUSLY ENFORCED AND ALWAYS CLEAR, THOUGH AT THE COST OF OCCASSIONAL CALLS FOR THE TOWING AWAY OF NONDIPLOMATICE CARS.)
3: WE HAVE TOLD THE CANADIANS THAT, IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE AGREE THAT THEY SHOULD SEEK TO ENFORCE THE CD PARKING ZONE IN FRONT OF THE BUILDING ALTHOUGH THAT MAY INCUR SOME ANIMOSITY BY OUR NEIGHBOURS. CONSISTENTLY WITH THIS, WE ALSO PROPOSE APPROACHING THE FOREIGN MINISTRY ASKING THEM TO KEEP OUR OWN CD ZONE CLEAR AS WELL, SO THAT THIS IS AVAILABLE FOR OUR OFFICE CARS UNDER THE NEW STREET USE REGIME. GRATEFUL YOUR CONCURRENCE IN LATTER APPROACH.
=

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Facsimile (01) 839 4580

NUMBER OF PAGES IN TRANSMISSION (INCLUDING COVER SHEET)

PAGE 1 OF 3

28166

COVER SHEET FOR FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

B86/1/2A
B66/5/1A

UNCLASSIFIED

DATE: 11 November 1986

CLEARED
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

FROM: NEW ZEALAND HIGH COMMISSION, LONDON.

TO: Wellington
BLUSSELS 262

SERIAL NUMBER: 9496 (FAX)

PRECEDENCE: Routine

DISTRIBUTION: SFA (DLO EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA)
PMD
NZSIS (TIC)
POLICE (PTIU)
DEFENCE (DDOP)

European Measures Against Syria

The following is the text of the Presidency Press Statement on measures to be taken by the Community against Syria following the Foreign Ministers' meeting on 10 November. Further comments are provided in a following telegram (not to all addressees).

AUTHORISING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE: D W Leask

NAME: D.W. Leask

2/3
9+96

TERRORISM - PRESIDENCY PRESS STATEMENT

1. Following on from our discussion on 27 October of Syrian involvement in the Hindawi case, we have all agreed that further joint action is essential to protect our citizens from any possible repetition of such acts of terrorism.

2. No-one should be in any doubt about our unanimous condemnation of international terrorism and our resolve to curb terrorism in all its forms. We wish to send Syria the clearest possible message that what has happened is absolutely unacceptable.

3. We stand firmly by the commitments in previous statements and have therefore decided that the following additional action is required. In the present circumstances:

- we shall not authorise new arms sales to Syria;

- we shall suspend high-level visits to or from Syria;

- we shall each review the activities of Syrian Diplomatic and Consular missions accredited in our country and apply appropriate measures;

- we shall each review and tighten security precautions surrounding the operations of Syrianair.

4. Our Embassies in Damascus were instructed to make representations to the Syrian authorities. The Syrian government have delivered their reply. As far as the facts are concerned, this adds nothing to what was considered by the court which found Hindawi guilty, and to what the Embassies have presented to the Syrian authorities.

3/3
9496

5. We shall continue to employ all the political means available to us in order to persuade the Syrian authorities to translate into concrete action their stated condemnation of international terrorism. In particular, we call on them to end all forms of support for those groups which have been clearly involved in terrorist acts and to deny them all facilities.

6. Our actions have a specific purpose. We look to the Syrian authorities for a constructive response. We have close and important links with all the countries of the Middle East which we remain determined to develop and strengthen. In this respect, we recall the proposals the Twelve have made to give a new impetus to the Euro-Arab dialogue, and the importance attached to this in the recent communication dated 6 November from the Secretary-General of the Arab League. We strongly reaffirm our commitment to contribute in every way we can to the search for just and lasting solutions to the region's problems.

7. We shall follow developments closely and shall remain in regular contact on all these issues within the framework of European Political Cooperation.

LONDON 10 NOVEMBER 1986

B66/5/1A
B86/2/1A
B69/89

11 November 1986

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs
WELLINGTON

(Att : DLO, EUR, LGL, SEC,
AAD, MEA)

c.c. PMD
NZSIS (TIC)
POLICE (PTIU)
DEFENCE (DDOP)

EPC : SYRIA & TERRORISM

Please refer to our telegram of today's date reporting the F.C.O. briefing on the results of the EC Foreign Ministers' meeting here on 10 November.

... 2. Attached for your information is press backgrounding of and commentary on the decisions reached by the meeting in respect of measures to be taken against Syria for its involvement in the Hindawi bomb plot.

S. W. PRIOR
S.W. Prior
for High Commissioner

Att.

ROM 918
CCC

CONFIDENTIAL

~~B102/6/5~~
→ B66/5/1A

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL 7 NOVEMBER 1986
FROM: ROME
TO: WELLINGTON 995 - ROUTINE
RPTD: (VIA LONDON) OTTAWA 24 WASHINGTON 43 BRUSSELS 88 PARIS 134
(VIA WELLINGTON) CANBERRA 62 London 154
LD: SFA (SEC ADM EUR LGL CCO CMS)
SUBJ: ITALY: NEW DIPLOMATIC BAG AND BAGGAGE PROCEDURES

28005
Hal cuts

BY COINCIDENCE, ON ENQUIRING FROM THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR TODAY, WE GOT THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT OF WHERE THEY STAND IN RELATION TO THE ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY'S CIRCULAR NOTE OF 4 OCTOBER ON THE SCRUTINY OF DIPLOMATIC BAGS AND BAGAGE. IN TERMS, THIS IS A LITTLE MORE FREE-SWINGING THAN THE FCO REPORT IN LONDON'S INTERESTING 9144. THE CONCLUSION WE WOULD DRAW IS THAT THE BRITISH AND THE OTHER EC ARE LIKELY FOR SOME TIME TO REMAIN, PERFIDIOUSLY, RATHER INERT ON THIS SUBJECT, IN THE HOPE THAT PERHAPS ONE OF THEIR OLD COMMONWEALTH COLLEAGUES MAY MAKE THE RUNNING BY LODGING AT LEAST SOME TYPE OF FORMAL PROTEST NOTE WITH THE ITALIANS IN RELATION TO THE NEW PROCEDURES. WHETHER NEW ZEALAND SHOULD BE THE ONE TO GET ENTANGLED WITH THE ITALIAN TAR-BABY IN THAT CIRCUMSTANCE IS ANOTHER QUESTION, AS TO WHICH THE PRESENCE OF AUSTRALIAN AND CANADIAN COMPANY WOULD BE A CONSIDERATION.
2:: ACCORDING TO LORD BRIDGES, THE BRITISH NATIONAL POSITION IS THAT THEY ARE ''NOT VERY HAPPY ABOUT THE ITALIAN ACTION'' WHICH SEEMS TO THEM ''AT LEAST A GLOSS ON THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS,'' AND WHICH THEY BELIEVE BY EXAMPLE ELSEWHERE IN OTHER LESS SCRUPULOUS COUNTRIES COULD BE EXTREMELY EMBARARASSING, IF NOT WORSE.

BUT ALTHOUGH THE MATTER HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF SEVERAL ORAL APPROACHES BY THE BRITISH EMBASSY TO THE FARNESINA, THE ITALIANS KEEP REPLYING ''BUT OF COURSE THIS IS NOT AIMED AT YOU PEOPLE - WHAT ON EARTH ARE YOU WORRYING ABOUT?'' THE ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY HAS ALSO BROUGHT TO BEAR ON THE BRITISH THE FACT THAT THEY THEMSELVES ADOPTED A SIMILAR POLICY SOME WHILE AGO IN A WHITE PAPER WHICH SAID, APPARENTLY THAT IN THE EVENT THT THERE WERE REASON TO SUSPECT A DIPLOMATIC BAG OF BEING USED FOR HARMFUL PURPOSES, THEN IT COULD BE SUBJECTED TO SECURITY EXAMINATION. (THIS IS PRESUMABLY THE 1985 PAPER REFERRED TO IN LONDON'S MESSAGE). THE BRITISH ARE THEREFORE IN THE AWKWARD POSITION OF NOT BEING ABLE TO ASSERT A GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF INVIOLABILITY WHICH THEY THEMSELVES ARE ON RECORD AS BEING PREPARED TO BREACH.
3: BRIDGES SAID THAT THE MATTER HAS BEEN INCONCLUSIVELY REVOLVED IN A LONDON DISCUSSION OR ''CROSS-EXAMINATION'' BETWEEN THE ITALIAN CHIEF OF PROTOCOL AND THE CHIEFS OF PROTOCOL OF THE EC COUNTRIES, AND THAT IT IS NOW LEFT FOR FURTHER TALKS TO TAKE PLACE AT, HE THOGHT, THE EC POLITICAL DIRECTORS LEVEL. HE SEEMED TO IMPLY THEREFORE THAT THE EC COUNTRIES WILL GO ON INCONCLUSIVELY IN THIS FASHION WITH NO ONE ACTUALLY REJECTING THE ITALIAN NOTE BUT NO ONE, ON THE OTHER HAND, BEING VERY CONTENT ABOUT IT AT ALL: ''WE ARE, AS IT WERE, AT ACT ONE, SCENE TWO-AND-A-HALF''
4: BRIDGES REMARKED THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREOTTI HAD RAISED THE ISSUE IN ADVANCE WITH AT LEAST SOME OTHER EC MINISTERS AND RECIEVED NO ABSOLUTELY ADVERSE REACTION, AND THAT AS THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT DECISION IN FAVOUR OF THE LINE ADOPTED IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY'S CIRCULAR WAS THEN TAKEN AT THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS LEVEL, THE GOVERMENT WAS UNLIKEY TO ABANDON THE PROCEDURE. THE GILBERT AND SULLIVAN ANGLE TO THE WHOLE SITUATION, HOWEVER, IS THAT THE ITALIAN AUTHORITIES HAVE NOT YET PUT THEIR SYSTEM INTO PRACTICAL OPERATION BECAUSE SAID BRIDGES, ''THEY SIMPLY HAVE NOT GOT THE KIT'' I.E. THE APPROPRIATE X-RAY MACHINES ARE NOT THERE YET.

=

D/HC

Min(A)

Travel Section

FILE

B66/5/1A.

(copy taken 2. 14/11)

Heathrow

Heathrow Airport Limited,
D'Albiac House,
Heathrow Airport, Hounslow,
Middlesex TW6 1JH
Telephone: 01- 745 7653
Telex: 934892 BAA LHR
Fax: 01-745 4290

Ambassadors and High Commissioners
London Diplomatic Missions

11 November 1986

Dear Sir

In the present climate of increased worldwide terrorism there is an ever greater pressure on airports to improve their vigilance and control of persons and vehicles that need to have access to aircraft operational areas. In recognition of this it is necessary to review the Security Access Control measures related to the VIP operation at Heathrow Airport - London, Director's Notice 7/83 issued in August 1983 set out quite clearly the notification requirements placed on the Diplomatic Missions in respect of access to the VIP Suites at Heathrow Airport - London. These procedures have been re-clarified in GN 9/86 dated 27 October 1986, which has been circulated to all interested parties".

To avoid unnecessary embarrassment for intending passengers through the VIP Suites at Heathrow Airport - London it is requested that Diplomatic Missions draw the following conditions of entry to the attention of all visitors from their country who are entitled to the privileges of the VIP channels:-

1) The number of vehicles coming to any of the four VIP Suites MUST be reduced to only those that are strictly necessary for the transport of the VIP party and their baggage and for those people who MUST be present to meet or see-off the VIP group, and would normally be those vehicles which are identified by the HAL 'V' Apron Pass.

/2) .....

Registered in England 1991017
Registered office,
130 Wilton Road,
London SW1V 1LQ

2) The registration number, make and model, of each vehicle, the driver's name and full details of the party accompanying the principal must be notified not less than six hours in advance, to Heathrow Airport Ltd, Security Department on telephone number 01 745 7518 or 745 5178 during normal working hours and on 01 745 4112 at other times. Vehicles, drivers and members of the party not identified in this way will be refused access to the Suites. Only diplomats from London Missions who are in possession of airport 'D' passes together with the 'blue' F & CO identification and additionally protocol officers that have Heathrow Airport identification documents, will be permitted to proceed to the specific Suite that is booked in advance, for the national of their country.

Members of HM Government and Government officials who wish to attend the Suites either as travellers or on business will only be admitted on production of their VIP booking reference number and their departmental identification document.

The same vehicle details are required from HM Government Ministry's as that required from Diplomatic Missions, failure to supply this will result in refused access.

Yours faithfully

N E L SHANKS
Airport Security Manager

cc B66/5/1 IA

UNCLAS-SECURE 07 NOVEMBER 1986
FROM WELLINGTON
TO ALL POSTS A176 I M M E D I A T E

SFA(DLO MEA LGL SEC CON)
NZSIS
POLICE(PTIU)
PMD
SECLAB(CABANAGH)

UNCLASS SECURE

27783
FA(P)
CHPS

WATERJUG:ENTRY TO NZ

OUR A168 OF 24 OCTOBER 86 (AS AMENDED BY OUR A172 OF 30 OCTOBER)
REFER:
2. WE HAVE BEEN ASKED IF ALL RPT ALL TELEX RESPONSES FROM POSTS ON 'WATERJUG' MATTERS COULD BE GIVEN HENCEFORWARD A PRECEDENCE OF 'IMMEDIATE' RPT 'IMMEDIATE'.
3. GRATEFUL IF POSTS WOULD OBLIGE.
4. FOR CANBERRA: PLEASE RELAY AS 'UNCLASSIFIED' TO SYDNEY BRISBANE MELBOURNE PERTH ADELAIDE.

=

P123621
WLN070330Z MPC
COL A176

UNCLASS SECURE

B661511A

SWP

ACTION COPY

ROM 917
CCC

CLAS: CONFIDENTIAL 6 NOV 1986
FROM: ROME
TO : WELLINGTON 994 - ROUTINE
RPTD: LONDON 153
SVGS: BONN ATHENS THE HAGUE PARIS BRUSSELS
LD : SFA (EUR, MEA, DLO, SEC, LGL) EIB, PMD, NZSIS, POLICE (PTIU)
SUBJ: ITALY: MIDDLE EAST: TERRORISM

CONFIDENTIAL

27743

SUMMARY

OUR 95Q. THE UNTIMELY RELEASE LAST WEEK OF A JUDICIAL REPORT EXPLAINING EXACTLY WHY ABUL ABBAS HAD BEEN ALLOWED TO LEAVE ITALY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE ACHILLE LAURO AFFAIR, THE SO-CALLED ''PRISONER EXCHANGE'' WITH LIBYA THAT TOOK PLACE IN EARLY OCTOBER, CONTINUING (BUT UNFULFILLED) TERRORIST THREATS AGAINST ITALY FROM VARIOUS SOURCES, THE BRITISH-SUPPLIED EVIDENCE IMPLICATING SYRIA IN TERRORIST ACTIVITY, AND THE RECENT BOMB ATTACK AGAINST THE ITALIAN EMBASSY IN BEIRUT, HAVE AGAIN MADE THE ISSUE OF TERRORISM, AND RELATIONS WITH THE MIDDLE EAST, A TROUBLESOME ONE FOR THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT. WE SPOKE TO MFA (CHERUBINI, MIDDLE EAST DIVISION), ABOUT SUCH DEVELOPMENTS. OUR OVERALL IMPRESSION IS THAT ITALY, CONCERNED ABOUT ITS OWN VULNERABILITY TO TERRORISM, IS PROCEEDING VERY CAUTIOUSLY IN THE RUN UP TO THE 10 NOVEMBER MEETING IN LONDON, WHILE HOPING TO SEE CONCRETE MEASURES AGAINST TERRORISM EMERGE FROM THAT MEETING. MANY OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENTS SPECIFIC ACTIONS LISTED BELOW SEEM TO US DESIGNED TO HAVE A SEMI-PLACATORY OBJECTIVE VIS-A-VIS THE MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES OF TERRORISM., AND THE SITUATION CONTINUES TO BE CHARACTERISED BY AN ITALIAN PREFERENCE

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR PLURILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL MEASURES RATHER THAN FOR ANYTHING THAT MIGHT CALL THE FIRE DOWN ON ITALY AGAIN.

LIBYA

---

2. ALTHOUGH PUBLIC SIGNALS CONCERNING ITALIAN-LIBYAN RELATIONS HAVE BEEN AMBIGUOUS IN RECENT MONTHS, CHERUBINI CONSIDERED THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO MARKED CHANGE OF ATTITUDE ON ITALY'S PART. LIBYA HAILED BOTH THE PRISONER ''EXCHANGE'' (MFA WAS RELUCTANT TO USE THAT TERM, BUT IN REALITY IT IS HARD TO AVOID IT) THAT OCCURRED ON 7 OCTOBER, AND THE CONCLUDING OF A CULTURAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES A WEEK EARLIER, AS SIGNS OF IMPROVING RELATIONS FOLLOWING THE CRISIS WHICH DEVELOPED OVER THE ATTACK ON LAMPEDUSA. MFA HOWEVER SOUGHT TO DOWNPLAY THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE TWO EVENTS. THE CULTURAL AGREEMENT (WHICH IS ALONG SIMILAR LINES TO THE ONE WE HAVE WITH ITALY) HAS, FROM THE ITALIANS' POINT OF VIEW BEEN EFFECTIVE SINCE IT WAS SIGNED IN 1985. THE LIBYANS REQUESTED IN SEPTEMBER THAT RATIFICATIONS BE EXCHANGED SO THAT THEY COULD RECIPROCATE UNDER THEIR OWN LAW. CHERUBINI FELT THAT BECAUSE OF THE TIMING OF THE LIBYAN REQUEST, THE CONCLUSION OF THE AGREEMENT DREW MORE ATTENTION THAN WAS WARRANTED. HE STRESSED IT DID NOT INDICATE ANY INTENTION ON ITALY'S PART TO INTENSIFY THE CULTURAL RELATIONSHIP.

3. CHERUBINI WAS A LITTLE HARD PUSHED TO JUSTIFY THE RECENT APPARENT ''DEAL'' WITH LIBYA OVER THE RELEASE OF THREE LIBYANS IMPRISONED IN ITALIAN GAOLS FOR THE MURDER OF DISSIDENT LIBYANS IN RETURN FOR THE RELEASE OF FOUR ITALIANS GAOLED IN LIBYA ON TREASON CHARGES. HE SAID THAT, CONVINCED OF THE LATTERS INNOCENCE, THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT HAD MONTHS AGO REQUESTED THE RELEASE OF ITS CITIZENS, ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS. THE TIMING OF THE LIBYAN RESPONSE, WHICH INSISTED ON THE RELEASE OF ITS OWN CITIZENS AS A PRE-CONDITION, MADE THE ISSUE A DELICATE ONE. HE (RATHER UNCONVINCINGLY) STRESSED THAT THERE WAS A DIFFERENCE, THOUGH ADMITTING THIS DID NOT CONSTITUTE JUSTIFICATION, BETWEEN INDISCRIMINATE TERRORIST KILLINGS AND THE CALCULATED MURDER OF FELLOW

CONFIDENTIAL

COUNTRYMEN. ITALY HAS SUBSEQUENTLY DENIED RIGOROUSLY ANY COMPROMISE OF ITS ANTI-TERRORIST STANCE. AS EXPECTED THERE HAS BEEN CRITICISM FROM SOME OTHER COUNTRIES ABOUT THE EXCHANGE, THOUGH THE ISSUE SEEMS TO HAVE DIED DOWN QUICKLY.

4. CHERUBINI ALSO DOWNPLAYED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF GHEDAFFI'S ANTI-ITALIAN REMARKS ON 7 OCTOBER (MARKING THE 16TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE EXPULSION OF ITALIANS FROM LIBYA) WHICH WERE IN MARKED CONTRAST TO THE APPARENTLY IMPROVING CLIMATE OF RELATIONS. GHEDAFFI REFERRED TO ITALY AS ''PUBLIC ENEMY NUMBER ONE'' AND TO THE EXPLOITATION" OF ITALY BY AMERICA AND REPEATED THREATS MADE EARLIER THIS YEAR OF MILITARY ACTION AGAINST ITALY IF AMERICAN BASES HERE WERE USED TO LAUNCH ATTACKS AGAINST LIBYA. CHERUBINI SAID THAT IT WAS AT FIRST FELT THAT NO REPLY TO THIS RHETORIC WAS MERITED, BUT THAT THE CABINET SUBSEQUENTLY DECIDED TO (AND DID) SEND A STIFFLY WORDED FORMAL PROTEST. LIBYA'S RUDE RESPONSE TO THIS PROTEST WAS LEFT UNANSWERED.

SYRIA

5. ITALY, LIKE OTHER EC COUNTRIES, WAS SOMEWHAT CAUGHT BY SURPRISE BY THE SPEEDY BRITISH RETALIATION AGAINST SYRIA FOLLOWING THE HINDAWI TRIAL IN LONDON. CHERUBINI'S LINE WAS THAT THE IMMEDIACY OF THE BRITISH RESPONSE WAS ''COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE''. THE EC WAS ACCUSTOMED TO DOING THINGS MORE SLOWLY, AND NEEDED TIME TO WORK TOWARDS A CONSENSUS. HE ADMITTED (AS HAVE THE ITALIAN MEDIA GENERALLY) TO SOME SURPRISE THAT ANDREOTTI CHOSE NOT TO ATTEND THE LUXEMBOURG MEETING., BUT COMMENTED THAT AS ITALY'S FOREIGN MINISTER, HIS ATTENDANCE AT THE POPE'S ASSISI DAY OF PRAYER WAS IMPORTANT AND THAT AS A CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT HE FELT A STRONG PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO SUCH MEETINGS. (SOME OF THE PRESS HAVE AGREED, BY COMMENDING ANDREOTTI FOR GOING DIRECTLY TO THE LORD WHEN THINGS GET AWKWARD.) CHERUBINI THOUGHT IT PROBABLE, THOUGH NOT YET CERTAIN, THAT ANDREOTTI WOULD ATTEND THE LONDON MEETING ON 19 NOVEMBER.

CONFIDENTIAL

6. ITALY WAS REPRESENTED AT THE LUXEMBOURG MEETING BY FOREIGN AFFAIRS UNDER-SECRETARY CATTANEI. WHILE ITALY ITSELF FAVOURED ALL OF THE BRITISH PROPOSALS AT THAT MEETING, IT CONSIDERED THE ACHIEVEMENT OF CONSENSUS AMONG EC MEMBERS TO BE PARAMOUNT, AND THIS DID NOT EVENTUATE. HOWEVER, ITALY WITH SOME OTHER EC COUNTRIES (SUCH AS THE FRG AND FRANCE) WERE INDIVIDUALLY IMPLEMENTING SOME OF THE MEASURES PROPOSED BY BRITAIN: IN PARTICULAR THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR IN DAMASCUS WAS INSTRUCTED TO EXPRESS ITALY'S CONDEMNATION TO THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT, ON A BILATERAL AS WELL AS EC COUNTRY BASIS. ITALY ALSO AGREED THAT ALL HIGH LEVEL VISITS TO AND FROM SYRIA WOULD CEASE (ALTHOUGH AS NO SUCH VISITS ARE ENVISAGED FOR THE NEAR FUTURE, ANYWAY, THIS MEANS LITTLE FOR ITALY) AND AGREED IN PRINCIPLE THAT DIPLOMATS EXPELLED FROM OTHER COUNTRIES WOULD NOT BE ACCREDITED TO ITALY.

7. ALTHOUGH THE ITALIAN CABINET HAD ANNOUNCED THAT THE AMBASSADOR TO DAMASCUS WOULD LIKELY BE ''RECALLED FOR CONSULTATIONS'' CHERUBINI NOTED THAT IT WAS NOT CERTAIN THAT HIS RECALL WOULD BE FULLY IMPLEMENTED IN QUITE THAT SENSE. THE CABINET MEETING HAD BEEN AN INFORMAL ONE, FOR BRIEFING PURPOSES RATHER THAN DECISION TAKING. SINCE NOT ALL MINISTERS WERE PRESENT. THE ANNOUNCEMENT DID NOT REPRESENT A FINAL DECISION BUT RATHER A SHOW OF SUPPORT FOR BRITAIN. PRIME MINISTER CRAXI AND DEFENCE MINISTER SPADOLINI BOTH SUBSEQUENTLY MADE STATEMENTS EXPRESSING SOLIDARITY WITH BRITAIN. CHERUBINI THOUGHT IN SHORT THAT THE AMBASSADOR WOULD IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES PROBABLY RETURN TO ITALY FOR ''DEBRIEFING'' AFTER THE DEMARCHE TO THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT AND BEFORE THE 19 NOVEMBER MEETING OF EC FOREIGN MINISTERS.

8. ON THE PROSPECTS FOR THAT MEETING CHERUBINI COMMENTED THAT HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER A CONSENSUS ON FURTHER MEASURES TO BE TAKEN WOULD EVENTUATE, BUT THAT A MORE COMMON APPROACH WAS LIKELY SINCE EC MEMBERS WOULD HAVE HAD MORE TIME TO ASSESS THE SITUATION CAUTIOUSLY. ITALY WOULD NATURALLY BE PUSHING ACTIVELY TO SEE SUCH CENSENSUS ACHIEVED.

CONFIDENTIAL

ALGERIA

9. ON THE SAME GENERAL THEME OF MIDDLE EAST RELATIONS, CHERUBINI DESCRIBED CRAXI'S VISIT TO ALGERIA IN OCTOBER IN TERMS OF A ''FENCE-MENDING EXERCISE''. VISA RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED ON MOROCCO, TUNISIA AND ALGERIA BY ITALY FOLLOWING LAST DECEMBER'S ATTACK ON FIUMICINO AIRPORT HAD SERIOUSLY AFFECTED ALGERIA. (THE RESTRICTIONS WERE REMOVED IN AUGUST.) THIS VISIT SIGNALLED AN INTENTION TO STRENGTHEN THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. THE MAIN POLITICAL TOPICS DISCUSSED WERE MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY, LIBYA, TERRORISM, AND THE PLO. ALGERIA EXPRESSED CONDEMNATION OF TERRORISM BUT WITH A CAVEAT AS TO GENUINE ''FLIGHTS OF LIBERATION''. ALGERIA SAW ITSELF PLAYING A ''MEDIATOR'' ROLE REGARDING LIBYA, OR AT LEAST PREVENTING GHEDAFFI FROM RADICALISING HIS POSITION. IT WAS ALSO PLAYING A ROLE IN REUNIFYING THE PLO. CHERUBINI COMMENTED THAT THE ''REALISATION OF A POLITICAL ROLE FOR ALGERIA IN THE MEDITERRANEAN'' WAS SOMETHING OF A DISCOVERY FOR ITALY. CHARACTERISTICALLY, THE VISIT WAS ALSO INTENDED TO POLISH THE APPLE OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES: AN AGREEMENT FOR THE SUPPLY OF ALGERIAN NATURAL GAS TO ITALY WAS SIGNED, AND INCREASED MARKET OPPORTUNITIES WERE EXPLORED.

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1866151/1A

Chirac says heavy blow inflicted on terrorists

From Paul Ellman
in Madrid

The French Prime Minister, Mr Jacques Chirac, yesterday tore the wrappings off the present he will give today to his Spanish counterpart, Mr Felipe Gonzalez, by announcing this his police had inflicted a big blow on the Basque terrorist group ETA.

Mr Chirac is scheduled to spend seven hours in Madrid today on a visit expected to be marked by strong declarations of Franco-Spanish determination to crush ETA's campaign of violence.

French police yesterday raided a furniture making co-operative run by Spanish Basque refugees near Hendaye and announced that they had seized weapons, including two rocket launchers.

The raid appeared to have been designed to counter allegations that Mr Chirac's Government struck bargains with terrorists to end the recent wave of bomb attacks in Paris. It coincided with a ministerial meeting sponsored by the Council of Europe in Strasbourg on joint measures to counter terrorism.

Mr Robert Pandraud, the French Security Minister, said in Strasbourg that the raid was a "good example that we hope to prevent France from becoming a sanctuary for terrorists."

The Spanish Interior Ministry however, hinted at displeasure at French attempts to steal the thunder on measures against terrorism by pointing out that its security forces had informed their French colleagues two months ago of the use of the factory by ETA. The factory is on the French bank of a river that forms the border with Spain.

The central Government in Madrid is anxious to highlight the importance of its role in the fight against terrorism by ETA in the face of claims by the Basque regional government that its own police force would be more effective.

The French raid was the second blow to ETA this week. Last Sunday, two of its members were arrested when Basque police stormed a cave where they were holding a kidnapped businessman.

The French action, which resulted in 20 arrests, will guarantee Mr Chirac a good press when he arrives in Madrid today for a visit which will also include a meeting with King Juan Carlos.

B66/5/1A
B66/12/2

6 November 1986

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs
WELLINGTON

(Att : DLO EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA)

c.c. PMD
NZSIS (TIC)
POLICE (PTIU)
DEFENCE (DDOP)

COUNCIL OF EUROPE : EUROPEAN ANTI-TERRORIST INFORMATION NETWORK

.. Attached for your information are press reports of the results of the Council of Europe meeting in Strasbourg on 4 and 5 November which agreed that Council member countries should join the EC's Trevi network.

2. The British representative at the meeting, the Home Secretary Douglas Hurd, commented that the decision reflected the acceptance by European countries that joint steps to deal with international terrorism were needed.

S. W. PRIOR
S.W. Prior
for High Commissioner

Att.

B6615/1A

HOME NEWS

Most of free Europe to join intelligence-swapping system

Community's anti-terror network to be extended

Guardian 6/11/82

From Derek Brown in Strasbourg

The EEC's anti-terrorist information network is to be extended to include almost every country in free Europe.

The expansion will allow members of the 21-nation Council of Europe to plug into the intelligence-swapping system, known as the Trevi network, which was founded in Italy by the 12 members of the EC.

The new link was approved yesterday by interior and justice ministers of the Council of Europe, after two days of intensive talks here. The meeting produced a torrent of declarations and resolutions condemning terrorism and pledging cooperation. The Home Secretary, Mr Douglas Hurd, used the gathering to press his EEC colleagues to back British sanctions against Syria, in the wake of the Hindawi trial.

Community foreign ministers, who singularly failed to provide that backing in Luxembourg last week, meet again in London next Monday.

Mr Hurd said yesterday that details of Syria's involvement in the Hindawi plot to smuggle a bomb aboard an El Al jumbo jet in London, had been circulated to all 21 Council of Europe governments, from Iceland to Turkey.

"I think the penny is now dropping. Of course we all look after our national interests, and it takes time to achieve a common response. But we are still a bit slow in realising that we all have an overriding interest in defeating terrorism," he said.

Mr Hurd denied that the latest meeting had produced a lot of fine words, but little action. He welcomed the announcement in Strasbourg by the Paris Security Minister, Mr Robert Pandraud, that France was prepared to ratify the European convention on the suppression of terrorism. The nine-year-old convention is designed to ease the prosecution and extradition of terrorist suspects, by limiting their right to claim that their defences were political.

The only non-ratifying countries now are Ireland and Greece, though several others are reserving their right to grant political asylum in certain cases. Britain, having already ratified the convention, is moving to streamline national extradition laws, by removing the need to prove a *prime facie* case under UK law.

Mr Hurd insisted that the Trevi network should not be seen as an additional layer of European bureaucracy, but rather as an exercise in national cooperation. Not all non-EEC states are expected to join Trevi, which exists largely to ease bi-lateral contacts between national capitals, rather than a uniform flow of information to all.

The United States is always plugged into the exchange, and a new secure telecommunications link is being developed to link European capitals. Community officials admit that trust is the key element in the system, and some intelligence services are deeply reluctant to pass high-grade information to countries they suspect of having poor security.

Countries like Austria and Switzerland, however, which have been used as transit routes by terrorists and which have good national intelligence networks are held to be important potntial allies in the EEC campaign to build an effective machine.

THE SCOTSMAN Thursday, November 6, 1986

HOME NEWS

Hurd hails widening of anti-terror network

The Common Market's anti-terrorist intelligence network is to be extended to virtually every western democracy, it was agreed yesterday.

"I think the penny is dropping," declared Mr Douglas Hurd, Home Secretary, at the end of two days of talks in Strasbourg.

The outcome means that police and security co-operation measures, including the computerised sharing of information already agreed among the 12 EEC countries, will be made available to the other nine nations which complete the 21-government Council of Europe.

After Britain's failure to win practical EEC backing for its anti-terrorist moves against Syria, he commented: "It takes time for the penny to drop. But the penny is dropping and countries are realising that, overriding their national interests, there is the need to take joint steps to deal with terrorism."

Mr Hurd said the ability to plug in to the EEC anti-terrorist machinery was important, particularly as it would draw countries like Austria and Switzerland into the network.

"Inevitably, we all look for our own national interests in these matters and there is nothing wrong in that. But there is now the clear feeling that terrorism must be tackled."

The Council of Europe talks, the first of their kind, were attended by the justice and interior Ministers of all 21 member states.

The result is a series of agreed declarations condemning terrorism in all its forms, recommending closer co-operation between governments and specifically urging co-ordinated efforts to monitor diplomatic and consular representatives in missions considered as having terrorist connections.

Mr Hurd used the chance of talks to press for solidarity with Britain over Syria, though the issue will be taken up next week in London at EEC talks chaired by the Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe.

He also reminded his colleagues that the Government planned legislation in the next session of Parliament to streamline Britain's extradition rules, in line with the 1977 Council of Europe convention on the suppression of terrorism.

He welcomed the French announcement at the talks that Paris is now going to ratify the convention — leaving only Ireland and Greece still to join in.

The countries represented at yesterday's talks were: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, France, West Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

In a declaration after the talks, the 21 governments pledged themselves to "fight against terrorism in all its manifestations.

Financial Times Thursday November 6 1986

Other nations to join EEC anti-terrorism network

THE European Community's anti-terrorism intelligence network is to be extended to virtually every Western democracy, it was agreed yesterday, Agencies report from Strasbourg. "I think the penny is dropping," said Mr Douglas Hurd, Britain's Home Secretary, at the end of two days of talks.

The outcome means that police and security co-operation measures, including the computerised sharing of information already agreed among the 12 EEC countries, will be made available to the other nine nations which complete the 21-goveriment Council of Europe.

Mr Hurd conceded that national interests may prevent some countries from taking up the chance to link into the system. In the wake of Britain's failure to win practical EEC backing for its anti-terrorist moves against Syria, he commented: "It takes time for the penny to drop. But the penny is dropping and countries are realising that, overriding their national interests, there is the need to take joint steps to deal with terrorism."

The ability to "plug in" to the EEC co-operation arrangements was important, particularly as it would draw countries like Austria and Switzerland into the network.

The Council of Europe talks, the first of their kind, were attended by the justice and interior ministers of all 21 member states. The result is a series of agreed declarations condemning terrorism in all it forms, recommending closer co-operation between governments and specifically urging co-ordinated efforts to monitor diplomatic and consular representatives in missions considered as having terrorist connections.

"YELLOW"

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Reference B66/5/1A
B69/89

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(DLO MEA EUR SEC)

5 November 1986

c.c. E.I.B.
Defence (DDOP)

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Date	Nature of Material	Remarks
	press report	
	UK/Syria: Syrian Involvement in Terrorism	
1 November 1986	Guardian report of comments	by returning British Ambassador to Syria

"S.W. Prior"
for High Commissioner

Damascus 'maintains terrorist links'

By Michael Simmons
and agencies

Britain's ambassador to Syria, Mr Roger Tomkys, who returned to London yesterday, said he had "no doubt at all that many terrorist organisations have had facilities in Damascus in the past and that there are lots of connections between many terrorist organisations and the authorities in Damascus."

He said there had been a long-standing complaint from the British Government to the Syrians that although they opposed the sort of thing that the terrorist leader, Abu Nidal, was engaged in, they allowed him to maintain an office and an information section there.

The first group of British diplomats left Damascus on Thursday for Jordan, and Mr Tomkys and the rest of his team of 19 diplomats flew back to Britain yesterday.

Britain broke diplomatic ties with Syria last Friday after Syran diplomats were implicated in the attempt by the Jordanian, Nezar Hindawi, to blow up an Israeli airliner last April by giving his unsuspecting pregnant girlfriend a bomb concealed in a case.

Hindawi's trial was told that after El-Al security staff at Heathrow discovered the bomb, Hindawi had an urgent meeting with the Syrian Ambassador in Britain, Dr Loutof Haydar. The Syrians were also alleged to have supplied Hindawi with equipment.

Mr Tomkys said yesterday that he had assurances that British subjects remaining in Syria would be safe.

"As for resuming diplomatic relations with Syria, I think that is something that has to be looked to in the long term and not the short term. Long term is the right term and it will be a long time before I can see positive developments," he said.

The Syrian ambasador flew back to Damascus yesterday and accused the United States and Israel of planing a plot to stamp Syria with terrorism. Dr Haydar told reporters on his return: "I can assure you of two things, first that it (the attempt) had been a plot planned jointly by the American and Israeli intelligence agencies.

"All that Britain had to do is to dance to the news," he added.

Dr Haydar said before he left London that there was no truth in any of the allegations He said he had never been involved in any illegal activity

Three Syrlans are to remain at their former London embassy building which will now fly the Lebanese flag.

A Foreign Office spokesman said two Syrian diplomats and a supporting member of staff would be staying behind at the Belgrave Square building, which now becomes the Syrian interest section of the Lebanese embassy.

"YELLOW"

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Reference B66/5/1A
B69/97

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

5 November 1986

(EUR, LGL, SEC, DLO)

c.c. E.I.B.
Defence (DDOP)
Moscow

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Date	Nature of Material	Remarks
	press report	
	UK/USSR: Talks on Terrorism	
5 November 1986	Guardian report of agreement between London and Moscow to hold talks on terrorism	

"S.W. Prior"
for High Commissioner

B102/6/5

c.c. B66/5/1A

4 November 1986

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs
WELLINGTON

(Att : DLO EUR LGL SEC)

SCANNING OF DIPLOMATIC BAGS

Please refer to our telegram 9144 of 30 October 1986.

... 2. Attached for your information is a Commons written answer of 24 October 1986 concerning the British Government's practice in respect of scanning diplomatic bags.

S. W. PRIOR

S.W. Prior
for High Commissioner

Att.

Diplomatic Bags

Mr. Janner asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs on how many specific occasions he has ordered the scanning of diplomatic bags; on what dates such an order was given and such scanning carried out; and on the bags of which mission and with what results.

Mr. Eggar: It has been the practice of successive Governments not to comment on sensitive matters such as this which directly concern national security.

Mr. Janner asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether he will hold an inquiry into the effects of the Government's stated readiness to scan any diplomatic bag on a specific occasion where the grounds for suspicion are sufficiently strong and into whether the knowledge that he is prepared to do so has acted as a deterrrent to abuse; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Eggar: We keep application of the policy set out in the White Paper on Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges (Cmnd. 9497) under frequent review.

B66/5/1A

31 October 1986

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs
WELLINGTON

(Att : DLO EUR LGL SEC)

c.c. PMD
NZSIS (TIC)
POLICE (PTIU)
DEFENCE (DDOP)

TERRORISM IN EUROPE

... Attached for your information are excerpts from a book due for publication on 3 November entitled "Invisible Armies : Terrorism into the 1990s . The author, Stephen Segaller, as a Granada Television producer was responsible for a television documentary ("Terror") in 1985.

2. A Financial Times report of 30 October 1986 on anti-terrorist
... measures planned for West Germany is also attached.

S. W. PRIOR

S.W. Prior
for High Commissioner

Att's

Terror - the secret armies of Europe

"Everytime Thatcher or Reagan, and now Chirac, makes a statement about terrorism, the first thing they say is 'we're going to defeat the terrorists'," say Stephen Segaller. He argues that this is a defeatist sentiment; all that's wanted is for the terrorists not to use terror.

Segaller specialised in the Middle East as a producer on Granada Television's "World in Action," then produced a major TV documentary, "Terror," last year. In the first of two extracts from his new book on the subject, he describes the pan-European alliance that is emerging among terrorist groups.

ONE of the most disturbing developments in terrorism in the 1980s is the new European alliance, involving French, German and Belgian groups, with sporadic participation action from Portuguese, Spanish, Italian and Dutch comrades, apparently pledged to attack government, quasi-government, international agency, and business targets. The targets are united by the anti-American, anti-business, anti-military, anti-nuclear, anti-NATO themes of the terrorists' politics.

The prime mover of this alliance appears to be the French revolutionary group Action Directe.

Action Directe is a second-generation European terrorist group. Its roots do not lie directly in the student *evenements* and movements of May 1968, which to a large degree gave rise to both Italian and German terrorism: but its politics lie in the same tradition. Since the group was first heard of in 1979 it has had a single leader, but the political odyssey of Jean-Marc Rouillan shows an opportunistic willingness to espouse political causes or marginalised minorities, primarily to keep the group active. In this respect, Action Directe is unusual — no permanent, emphatic political objective has animated all its actions, though since 1984 its ideology has crystallised into a jargon-ridden Marxist - Leninism . . .

From the beginning of 1984, the various component parts of the European terrorist alliance began to turn their theories into actions, waging a really substantial campaign against the kind of targets identified in their political tracts. On 25th January 1984 a quantity of plastic explosives blew up at the Military Studies Bureau of the Aerospatiale Company at Chatillon; and on 29th January another bomb exploded at the Panhard-Levassor factory in Paris. Both attacks caused substantial damage.

Action Directe's new Belgian headquarters was almost certainly in Brussels. The Belgian police were getting more alert to the dangers of their presence with every bomb that exploded in the name of the anti-NATO, anti-military alliance.

Belgium now provided the CCC-AD-RAF (Belgian, French and Germans) terrorists with the wherewithal for almost as many attacks as they had the will and the numbers to stage. On the night of 2nd-3rd June, 1984, terrorists broke into the explosives store of a quarry at Ecaussines, 35 kilometres south of Brussels, and stole almost a ton of dynamite and plastic explosives.

If any confirmation was needed of the uses to which such a haul was to be put, it came with the first explosion — not in Belgium, but in France on 23rd August, 1984. About 23 kilos of the explosives blew up in a car parked outside the Paris headquarters of the Western European Union, at 83 Avenue du President Wilson. This attack, by Action Directe, was closely followed by another on NATO oil pipelines in Belgium, by CCC, and a third, on a military training school in Bavaria, West Germany, by the Red Army Faction. There followed a further eight attacks on industrial, military and political targets in Belgium between October and the end of the year.

Between January and June 1985 there was a lull in Belgium, a pause in activity, however, which coincided with an escalation of attacks on both West Germany and France. With the turn of the year, Action Directe devoted itself again to French political matters: that is, concentrating on the specifically French element of the familiar target areas — defence contractors, industrial multinationals and so on — and launching attacks relating to French domestic and foreign policy.

In West Germany, on 7th January, 1985, the Red Army Faction raided the explosives depot of a cement factory in Geisingen, Baden Wuerttemburg. It was not a great haul, but they got away with 35 rolls of fuse cord and 376 detonator caps. These materials were almost certainly used in the first of a concentrated series of attacks on American military targets in West Germany on 7th August, 1985, which was a model of terrorist tactics and rhetoric. A car bomb consisting of explosives and gas bottles killed two American citizens and injured more than twenty when it blew up at the United States Air Force's Rhein-Main base near Frankfurt. The attack was claimed jointly by the RAF and Action Directe: their communiqué claimed the attack was a blow struck against imperialism. "The USAF base is a centre for war against the Third World, used to transport American troops and military equipment for acts of intervention in the Middle East and Africa."

The groups later admitted to the murder of a US serviceman whose identity card had enabled them to get access to the base. The second-hand Volkswagen car which served to transport the bomb carried US military licence plates, and had been bought in Frankfurt 10 days earlier. West German police named the suspected purchaser of the car as Sigrid Sterneback, "a veteran RAF hardliner" who has been on the wanted list since 1977, with a price on her head of 50,000 Deutschmarks.

On 15th June, 1985, an apparently new terrorist group attacked the American Forces Network Pomcus depot, in Münchengladbach. The attack was claimed by the Fighting Unit for the Creation of an Anti-Imperialist Front in Western Europe — a title which neatly describes the collective aims of the AD-RAF-CCC alliance. Their letter demanded the "immediate release" of a jailed RAF terrorist, Guenter Sonnenberg, and the "bringing together of the prisoners of the Red Army Faction and the anti-imperialist resistance in groups capable of interaction."

Yet another new name emerged in late June. On Wednesday, 19th June, 1985, a parcel bomb exploded in a luggage locker at Frankfurt International Airport, killing three people. At first there was a mysterious silence — breaking the normal pattern of terrorism, where the prime rule is to make a public claim. But three days later a bomb exploded in a letter box of the Bayer Pharmaceuticals Company in the centre of Brussels. A few minutes afterwards, an anonymous caller to the police claimed responsibility for the bomb, saying it was a response to pollution of the North Sea by toxic waste, and the seizure by Spain of the "Sirius" — one of the campaign ships of the environmental pressure group Greenpeace, who promptly denied



Police remove a wounded terrorist following the attack on Rome Airport last December.

any connection with the terrorists.

Later the same day, staff at Agence France Presse in Paris found a letter written in English. It read: "Our brothers have just struck in Frankfurt Main. Congratulations." The letter was headed, in French and English, "The Peace Conquerors" — the same name given earlier the same day to Belgian police, and never heard elsewhere. Neither claim made mention of the other, but the letter opened by AFP in Paris went on to warn "Stop Nuisance / Stop Pollution / Stop Airport" (presumably the airport extension at Frankfurt). The letter added: "Before the end of the month we'll destroy a major Frankfurt Airport building, and a Jumbo Jet." This warning certainly evoked a frisson of shock, though little serious speculation of a link, when the next day, 23rd June, 1985, an Air India jet went to the bottom of the sea off Ireland.

Attacks continued in Belgium throughout 1985. No individual names had yet emerged in connection with the CCC. No details about the organisation had been discovered. There are many instances in the past of terrorist groups inventing new names to distract and confuse the security forces pursuing them. It was tempting to speculate that the Belgian comrades-in-arms were a fiction, a red herring to scatter attention away from Action Directe and the RAF. The European police forces were working on the assumption that the new terrorist alliance had four leaders: Jean-Marc Rouillan and his girlfriend, Nathalie Menigon, of Action Directe; Inge Viett, a longstanding comrade of the Baader-Meinhof and Red Army Faction ranks; and a Belgian anarchist (and former member of Action Directe itself), Pierre Carrette, aged 33, the son of a policeman and printer by trade, who had first come to the notice of police when he championed the cause of imprisoned terrorists in West Germany. (Late in 1985, however, the concrete reality of CCC's membership was confirmed with the arrest, after 14 months of police investigation, of Pierre Carrette and three associates: Bertrand Sasoye, Didier Chevolet and Pascal Vandegeerde. The trio had been under surveillance, and when they met Carrette at a hamburger bar opposite Namur station, police blocked all the exits and moved in. All four were armed, but they did not resist arrest: subsequent searches of safe houses revealed documents relating to the CCC's 27 bombing attacks, and police claimed they found Carrette's fingerprints on leaflets. All four had been filmed by police as they revisited the scenes of their attacks.)

By far the most dramatic escalation of terrorist attacks, however, came in France. In January 1985, the first communiqué signed jointly by Action Directe and the Red Army Faction was delivered to AFP in Paris. It discussed "the essential tasks facing communist guerrillas in Western Europe":

"We must construct a politico-military front in Western Europe, as the central project, in the present phase of imperialist strategy, is the attempt to unite European States into a homogeneous structure, into one hard bloc, which would be completely integrated in the noose of imperialist power NATO.

"The new policy of NATO puts particular emphasis on the placing of Euromissiles, the revitalisation of the Western European Union, the creation in France of the Rapid Deployment Force, cooperation in weapons areas by NATO members, discussion of German participation in the French strike force, and its integration into NATO."

This is an edited extract from "Invisible Armies: Terrorism into the 1990s" by Stephen Segaller, to be published next Monday by Michael Joseph at £14.95 in UK.

Repercussions of terror

AS A RULE, terrorism does not succeed in terrorising the chiefs of government who are protected, and perhaps sanguine or heroic about the risks they face. It does terrorise the general population, the very audience that the terrorists are attempting to win over. The reaction of most politicians and citizens to an act of terrorism is, first, shock; and second, anger and a sense of impotence. There are very few converts, and very many are simply revolted by the violence, uninterested in the issue and uncomprehending of the mentality of those who use such violence in the name of their cause or ideals. The phenomenon is far from new; Karl Marx — in whose name a terrible variety of bloody acts of violence or repression is committed in pursuit of "popular struggle" — observed the same immense gap between the dedication of the terrorists and the mingled shock and indifference of the people watching. As he wrote to his friend Freidrich Engels on 14th December, 1867, after the Fenians had bombed Clerkenwell Prison in London, killing a number of passing Londoners: "The last exploit of the Fenians in Clerkenwell was a very stupid thing. The London masses who have shown great sympathy for Ireland will be made wild by it and driven into the arms of the government party. One cannot expect the London proletarians to allow themselves to be blown up in honour of the Fenian emissaries."

The third repercussion of an act of terrorism is the confused clangour of stable doors being slammed, bolted, welded shut and bricked up. But terrorists are not so foolish as to strike twice in the same place. Like the moving finger, terrorism, having hit, moves on: leaving enraged states with the limited and dangerous options of vigilance, diplomacy and seeming impotence on the one hand; or blunderbuss retaliation and seeming barbarity on the other.

The sensation-value of terrorism, however, is distinctly out of proportion to the actual physical damage caused and the numbers killed, and above all out of proportion to the successes achieved by the terrorists. Terrorism since the 1960s has claimed relatively few victims in global terms. US State Department statistics in mid-1985 showed that from 1968 to 1984 inclusive, a total of 7,435 terrorist incidents worldwide had claimed a total of 4,796 lives (of whom 465 were Americans). In the same period, it might be reasonable to guess that 50 natural disasters have claimed as many lives each, if not more; without considering the infinitely greater suffering and death toll of famine and epidemics in sub-Saharan Africa.

THE IRISH TIMES, Wednesday, October 29, 1986

The power behind the terror

In the second edited extract from his book "Invisible Armies", STEPHEN SEGALLER looks at State terrorism and State-sponsored terrorism.

WHICH States sponsor terrorism? For many people in Washington, in government and near to it, it is axiomatic that international terrorism is more or less the product of a Soviet conspiracy. In the first days of the Reagan Administration in January, 1981, General Alexander Haig, the incoming Secretary of State, made the accusation: "Moscow continues to support terrorism and war by proxy with a conscious policy — programming if you will, which fosters support, and expands international terrorism . . . When you get to the bottom line, it is the Soviet Union that bears a major responsibility for the proliferation and haemorrhaging of international terrorism as we've come to know it."

The State Department quickly issued chapter and verse for the general accusation, citing "Financial support, training, and arms given to such groups as the PLO: surrogate use of Cubans and Libyans to assist terrorist organisations; Moscow's propaganda effort aimed at energising national liberation movements; propaganda supportive of the hostage-taking of Americans in Iran; and general Soviet advocacy of armed struggle as a solution to regional problems, such as in El Salvador and Namibia, promoting the use of terrorism and impeding the peaceful resoltuion of conflicts."

It does not require a very fierce sceptic to take the view that as a detailed accusation on *terrorism* — as opposed to generalised ideological conflict, the statement demonstrates an acute lack of specific evidence. Indeed, there is little. Hersay and extrapolation — as is the case with every general argument about terrorism — overshadowed the minimal amount of concrete detail which could be offered in court. But this is puzzling, because in the vast majority of cases where terrorists are arrested by police or security forces, they are shown to be remarkably careless about covering their tracks. They are repeatedly captured in physical possession of large sums of cash, maps with clearly-marked targets, manifestos and communiques claiming their attacks, weapons and ammunition. Yet only very rarely — and usually ambiguously — has any clue emerged to connect European terrorists, for example, to any Soviet or East European source.

Unsurprisingly, it is the view of the Nicaraguan Government that the FDN (Democratic Nicaraguan Forces, the largest grouping among the Contras) is a terrorist organisation, designed, built up, financed and directed by the CIA. On 19th July, 1985, President Daniel Ortega addressed a crowd of up to half a million people on the sixth anniversary of the Sandinista revolution. He claimed that since 1982 the number of killed, injured and kidnapped had reached 12,000; that Contras had murdered 199 children under the age of 12, injured 166, and kidnapped 303; that 7,582 children had been orphaned in the war; that 134 women had been killed; and that 321 schools had been destroyed.

The one major exception is weaponry. Many terrorists throughout the world are found in possession of the automatic-fire Kalashnikov rifle, made either in the Soviet Union or manufactured under licence in the Warsaw Pact countries. However, American weapons are almost certainly well represented in terrorist arsenals as Soviet weapons — for example in Northern Ireland, where confiscated weapons represent a comprehensive history of the American obsession for the right to carry arms — yet the suggestion is not made that the USA thus foments terrorism by making weapons available . . .

The US Government gets a great deal of propaganda mileage out of its attacks on State-sponsored terrorism, but its position is complicated by more than the political flexibility of its list of "terrorist states" and the lack of demonstrable proof for its assertions. In effect, the world's self-appointed moral policeman is an Aunt Sally living in a glass house. For all its innocent indignation on such matters, America is quite capable of behaving with the same disregard for its own stated standards of justice and democracy that it condemns in its enemies, and it is this contradiction that undermines both the credibility of the American stance and the integrity of its responses .

Actions that would elsewhere be condemned as terrorism permitted US Secretary of State, George Shultz to dismiss all idea that the US supported terrorism in the shape of the Contras, both by insisting that as freedom fighters they could not be terrorists, and that as they did not commit terrorist actions, they were not terrorists. "Once we understand terrorism's goals and methods, it is not too hard to tell, as we look around the world, who are the terrorists and who are the freedom fighters. The resistance fighters in Afghanistan do not destroy villages or kill the helpless. The Contras in Nicaragua do not blow up school buses or hold mass executions of civilians." If they did, one must suppose, Secretary Shultz would concede that they were terrorists, and argue for the withdrawal of US support. Unfortunately for Shultz, there is considerable evidence that they are.


In August 1985, in an embarrassing development for the Reagan administration, Edgar Chamorro, a spokesman and leader of the FDN, spoke out against the FDN and the CIA's control of the organisation in a detailed and well-documented article in the *New Republic* magazine. Chamorro's principal points were that "the CIA had brought the groups together with money and unequivocal promises of support"; that "the Americans liked to make all the crucial decisions"; and that "the CIA was talking with other anti-Sandinista groups in Miami and Central America but they . . . wanted to keep us apart . . . They were using us for their own purposes."

Chamorro also describes how he was woken one night at two a.m. and told to read a statement on the clandestine radio station "before the Sandinistas broke the news". The statement took credit for the Contras' mining of several Nicaraguan harbours; but as Chamorro points out: "Of course, we played no role in the mining of the harbours . . . The CIA (had) employed its team of 'Latino assets' to bomb the Sandinistas' petroleum tanks at Punto Corinto in October 1983. When I protested to 'Georgie', asking why the CIA didn't simply give us the money and let patriotic Nicaraguans do the job, he sighed, 'This is the way they want us to do it in Washington'."

What then, is State-sponsored terrorism? If the terrorism and the terrorists already exist, the identity of its new sponsor does not amount to a new problem; and if the terrorism is a mere extension of an already unacceptable domestic State terror, one is addressing an existing problem in a new but limited arena. In effect, real "State-sponsored terrorism" is perhaps a relatively limited problem, perhaps more deserving of attention for its corruption of the international *modus vivendi* than for the numerical incidence of its attacks. It is somewhat predictable, yet just as unacceptable as every other manifestation of terrorism; nevertheless, it still has the capacity to surprise. While Western opinion may not be altogether astonished when the repressive and erratic Libyan régime begins eliminating its opponents on the streets of Western Europe and the United States, it is undoubtedly bewildered when the democratic government of France — committed by its Constitution to guarantee freedom of political dissent — mines the flagship of a legal environmental pressure group in a foreign country, and in the process commits manslaughter upon one of its members.

The French Secret Service attack on Greenpeace's *Rainbow Warrior* is a reminder that even nations which count themselves civilised occupy a place in the political continuum of which terrorism is one extreme.

This is an edited extract from "Invisible Armies: Terrorism into the 1990s" by Stephen Segaller, to be published next Monday by Michael Joseph at £14.95 in UK.



Hooded SAS men at the Iranian Embassy siege in London.

EUROPEAN NEWS

Questions are being raised about West Germany's fight against revolutionary violence

Terror curbs prompt soul-searching in Bonn

BY DAVID MARSH IN BONN

THE WEST German Government's planned new measures to combat domestic terrorism are prompting considerable soul-searching in Bonn about whether the state is taking the right approach to curbing an apparently rising tide of politically motivated violence.

The measures, adopted yesterday by the Cabinet, centre on controversial legal changes to allow terrorists to escape punishment if they give evidence against their accomplices.

Additionally, the Government is seeking to widen the scope of terrorist offences to encompass sabotage of transport and energy installations, placing the West German state practically on a war footing in its fight against perpetrators of revolutionary violence.

Misgivings in Bonn over the new legislation, not only from the Opposition Social Democratic Party (SPD) but also from the junior partners in the centre-Right-coalition, the Free Democrats (FDP) come at a time when the Government is facing up to a spiral of guerrilla action.

But, more than any other Western nation, the country is caught in a dilemma over anti-terrorist steps between measures which do not go far enough to meet the menace and those which risk infringing carefully built up post-war judicial and democratic rights.

Just over a fortnight after the murder by terrorists in Bonn of the political director of the Foreign Ministry, Mr Gerold von Braunmuehl — the first political assassination in the capital since the Federal Republic was founded in 1949 —the country was rocked by a further two attacks on Tuesday.

Mr Harald Hollenberg, director of the West Berlin department for the registration of foreign nationals, was wounded in the legs in a shooting reminiscent of Northern Ireland guerrilla incidents.

Police were investigating possible links between the attack and a bomb blast on the same day at the Cologne headquarters of Lufthansa, the national airline.

Responsibility for the bomb attack, which caused DM 100,000 (£35,000) worth of damage was claimed by the "Revolutionary Cells" movement linked to the hardcore Red Army Faction responsible for the killing of Mr von Braunmuehl and other murders over the past 18 months.

Both Mr Hollenberg and Lufthansa had apparently been selected as targets to protest against policies towards asylum-seekers in West Germany.

A letter sent to news bureaux claiming responsibility for the explosion at Lufthansa alleged that the airline was being used to fly out of the Federal Republic refugees whose asylum applications had been turned down.



Count von Lambsdorff . . . against the new moves.

Fears and tensions in West Germany over terrorism were starkly underlined in Frankfurt on Monday and Tuesday during the two-day "cultural summit" between the French and West German governments.

A total of 2,000 police and security men were on hand to guard the two delegations, outnumbering the crowds of curious and sometimes irritated Frankfurt citizens lining up to watch the ceremonial parts of the proceedings.

As part of the huge security precautions, hundreds of manhole covers in the city were screwed or welded down by municipal workers to prevent any danger of bombs being hidden.

Yesterday's new measures passed by the cabinet are due to go before the Bundestag (federal parliament) in the next few days and enter into force before Christmas.

The measures coincided with a mass raid by 500 police and security officers on several houses in a street in Dusseldorf yesterday morning in a hunt for clues in relation to the murder of Mr von Braunmuehl.

The FDP, which has come under considerable pressure from the dominant conservative parties in the coalition, the Christian Democratic (CDU) and Christian Social (CSU) groupings, agreed last week to go along with new anti-terrorist laws in spite of strong misgivings within the party and among its parliamentary deputies.

Doubts particularly over the possibilities that terrorists, including murderers, could escape prosecution by giving "state's evidence" against their accomplices have, however, since come to the fore.

Count Otto Lambsdorff, the former FDP Economics Minister, and reckoned to be close to the CDU on many issues, stated baldly that he is against the new moves on the grounds that they radically change an important part of the country's legal system.

The SPD meanwhile has accused the Government of excessive haste in rushing through the anti-terrorist measures.

A meeting of Interior and Justice Ministers from SPD-ruled federal states (Laender) on Tuesday gave backing to efforts by the Government and the public prosecutor's office in Karlsruhe to step up exchanges of information with other countries over international terrorism.

But the SPD believes the "state's evidence" legislation will not only contradict the country's legal principles but also prove to be ineffective.

Additionally, the party is also unhappy about proposals to use more widely computer data banks — including the huge "memory" of the federal motor vehicle registration office —in the police hunt for terrorists.

c.c. B6615/1A

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RR WELLINGTON -TT- RR CANBERRA
RR OTTAWA

B102/6/5 B66/5/1A

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CCC

CONFIDENTIAL

27076
FX-P

CLAS: CONFIDENTIAL 3Q OCT 86
FROM: LONDON
TO : WELLINGTON 9144 ROUTINE
RPTD: CANBERRA 259 - OTTAWA 236 - ROME 1Q1 - ROUTINE
LD : SFA (SEC ADM EUR LGL CCO CMS)
SUBJ: ITALY : NEW DIPLOMATIC BAG AND BAGGAGE PROCEDURES

YOUR 4189.

2. WE HAVE AT LAST BEEN ABLE TO TALK TO THE FCO (MILBURN, HEAD INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS SECTION OF PROTOCOL DEPARTMENT) ABOUT THE BRITISH REACTION TO THE ITALIAN PROPOSALS. THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF THEIR VIEWS.

3. WHILE WELCOMING THE ACTIONS OF A EUROPEAN PARTNER IN ATTEMPTING TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT TERRORIST ABUSE OF DIPLOMATIC BAGGAGE PRIVILEGES, MILBURN SAID THAT THEY WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THE ''KNOCK-ON'' EFFECTS OF THE ITALIAN PROPOSALS. PERHAPS THEIR MAJOR DEFECT WAS THAT THEY DID NOT RECOGNISE THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A HOSTILE AND A FRIENDLY SENDING STATE.

4. THE ELEMENTS IN THE ITALIAN PROPOSALS WHICH CAUSED THEM THE GREATEST DIFFICULTY, MILBURN SAID, WERE THOSE INVOLVING SCANNING OF DIPLOMATIC BAGS, AND LIMITATIONS ON THEIR SIZE. RESTRICTING PORTS OF ENTRY WOULD CAUSE THE BRITISH NO DIFFICULTIES, NOR DID THEY HAVE PROBLEMS WITH THE IDEA OF SCANNING PERSONAL BAGGAGE OF DIPLOMATIC AGENTS.

5. THE BRITISH REMAINED OPPOSED TO THE IDEA OF 'INDISCRIMINATE' SCANNING OF DIPLOMATIC BAGS, MILBURN SAID, AND THEIR ATTITUDE WAS AS SET OUT IN THE 1985 WHITE PAPER ON THE ISSUE: THAT SCANNING SHOULD BE RESTRICTED TO SPECIFIC CASES IN WHICH THERE WAS STRONG SUSPICION OF ABUSE OF THE DIPLOMATIC BAG SYSTEM.

6. AS TO THE SIZE LIMITATION, MILBURN SAID THEY SAW THIS AS BEING DICTATED BY THE SIZE OF THE MACHINES THE ITALIANS HAD AVAILABLE FOR SCANNING. THEY FELT, HOWEVER, THAT THE PROPOSED RESTRICTIONS WERE

TANTAMOUNT TO A BREACH OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION'S PROVISION FOR ARTICLES FOR THE USE OF A MISSION TO BE ADMITTED. MILBURN ADDED THAT WHILE A TERRORIST COULD EASILY BREAK DOWN - SAY - A MACHINE GUN INTO A PACKAGE SIZE THAT WOULD PASS THE NEW REGULATION, A GENUINE MISSION MIGHT FIND IT IMPOSSIBLE TO GET AN ESSENTIAL PIECE OF CYPHER, COMMUNICATIONS OR SECURITY EQUIPMENT INTO A PACKAGE OF THE PRESCRIBED SIZE.

7. THERE WAS THE FURTHER POINT, MILBURN ADDED, THAT IF THE ITALIANS INTRODUCED THEIR PROPOSED MEASURES AND THEIR EUROPEAN PARTNERS FELL IN WITH THEM, THEN OTHER 'HOSTILE' COUNTRIES WOULD NATURALLY SEEK TO IMPOSE SIMILAR RESTRICTIONS WHICH WOULD BE TO THE WEST'S OVER-ALL DISADVANTAGE.

8. MILBURN ADDED THAT THEY HAVE RECENTLY DISCUSSED THE MATTER IN **TERSE TERMS WITH THE ITALIANS AT SENIOR OFFICIAL LEVEL.** THEY WERE SURPRISED TO BE TOLD BY THE ITALIANS, THAT THEY HAD THUS FAR BEEN THE ONLY ONES FORMALLY TO VOICE SUCH WORRIES. THEY FELT THEMSELVES SOMEWHAT OUT ON A LIMB AGAIN (AS, MILBURN COMMENTED, THEY FELT AT THE MOMENT ON THE SYRIAN ISSUE).

9. MILBURN SAID THAT THEY HOPED OTHERS WOULD MAKE THEIR CONCERNS FELT TO THE ITALIAN AUTHORITIES WHO, THEY BELIEVED, WERE STILL THINKING THROUGH THE PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF WHAT THEY HAD PROPOSED. HE SAID HE WOULD WELCOME ADVICE OF ANY REPRESENTATIONS THAT YOU HAD MADE OR WERE INTENDING TO MAKE TO THE ITALIANS.
=

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B66/5/1A

BONN 461
CCC
PMD

UNCLASS SECURE

27086

ACTION COPY

CLAS: UNCLASSIFIED-SECURE 30 OCTOBER 1986
FROM: BONN
TO : WELLINGTON 1347 - ROUTINE
RPTD: PARIS 148 - ROUTINE : BRUSSELS 198 - ROUTINE
LONDON 324 - ROUTINE
SVGS: ROME THE HAGUE WASHINGTON NEW YORK PR
LD : SFA (DLO/EUR/LGL/SEC/ADD)
PMD
NZSIS (TIC)
POLICE (PTIU)
DEFENCE (DDOP)
SUBJ: FRG : TERRORISM.

TWO FURTHER TERRORIST INCIDENTS HAVE OCCURRED IN RECENT DAYS IN GERMANY. ONE INVOLVED THE WOUNDING, NOT FATAL, OF THE HEAD OF THE ALIEN REGISTRATIONS OFFICE IN BERLIN, AND THE OTHER A BOMB ATTACK ON THE COLOGNE HEADQUARTERS OF LUFTHANSA. NO-ONE WAS KILLED. RESPONSIBILITY FOR BOTH INCIDENTS HAS BEEN CLAIMED BY THE ''REVOLUTIONARY CELLS'' MOVEMENT (RZ) WHICH HAS LINKS WITH THE RED ARMY FACTION. IN BOTH CASES THE RZ WAS APPARENTLY PROTESTING AGAINST FRG POLICIES ON ASYLUM SEEKERS.

2. THE COALITION PARTIES IN BONN HAVE MEANWHILE REACHED GENERAL AGREEMENT ON FURTHER ANTI-TERRORIST MEASURES, DRAWN UP IN RESPONSE TO THE VON BRAUNMUEHL MURDER OF TWO WEEKS AGO (OUR 1264), WHICH THEY HOPE TO HAVE ADOPTED SPEEDILY IN THE BUNDESTAG. A MAJOR CONTROVERSIAL FEATURE OF THIS LEGISLATION IS THE PROPOSED GRANTING OF ALMOST COMPLETE IMMUNITY TO GOVERNMENT INFORMISTS WHO THEMSELVES MAY HAVE TERRORIST RECORDS. THE GOVERNMENT IS ALSO SEEKING TO BROADEN THE DEFINITION OF TERRORIST OFFENCES TO INCLUDE SABOTAGE OF TRANSPORT AND ENERGY INSTALLATIONS. THE SPD HAS STRONG RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE LEGISLATION AND THE RAPIDITY WITH WHICH THE GOVERNMENT WISHES TO ADOPT IT AND SOME MEMBERS OF THE FDP COALITION PARTNER, TRADITIONALLY SENSITIVE ON ''LIBERAL'' SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ISSUES, HAVE ALSO MADE PUBLIC THEIR RESERVATIONS.

3. WE WILL REPORT FURTHER FOLLOWING DISCUSSIONS NEXT WEEK WITH OUR CONTACT IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS MINISTRY.

COL: 1347 148 198 324 RZ
BONN 461
30/1655 LT BONN
NNNNN

UNCLASS SECURE

B66/5/1A

30 October 1986

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs
WELLINGTON

(Attention : LGL, DLO)

c.c. NZSIS (TIC)
Police (PTIU)
EIB

TERRORISM : INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM

Your memorandum 109/1/4(W) of 13 October 1986 refers.

2. We have noted your interest in seeing further publications of the Institute.

3. On the question of the restricted distribution given to memorandum B66/5/1A of 15 September 1986, we confirm that we were aware of the full Wellington addressee list for terrorism matters. (The extra copies of the relevant Administration Circular you ... provided are accordingly returned herewith).

4. As a general proposition, we take the view that there must be discretion for a post such as London, which receives a large quantity of unsolicited material from various bodies, institutes, and pressure groups, to make an initial judgement as to the value of that material. We considered that your 351(M) of 17 April 1986 recognised that there should be just such a discretional element in posts' use of the terrorism addressee list.

5. In the case of this Institute, we restricted the distribution of our initial memorandum because we wanted to check out the bona fides of the new organisation. (We had in mind the recent well-publicised case of a new human rights group in London which attracted some well-known public figures to its sponsorship list and then proved to be an organisation promoted and funded by a well-known right wing American religious group). To distribute

/P2

information about the Institute to all addresses in Wellington before we had checked it out seemed to us to entail a risk of setting an official imprimatur on an organisation whose credentials might prove suspect. On the other hand, we wanted to flag its creation.

6. In the event, our further investigations have shown that the prime mover and Chairman of the proposed Institute is a former Foreign Secretary, Lord Chalfont. A copy of his c.v. ... is attached. The Institute will be managed by a Board of Governors, but until the formal announcement of its establishment is made (and because "these things all take time and we're in the process of applying for charitable status and still have many things to sort out yet") the membership of this Board will not be made public.

7. We shall report further when the public announcement of the new Institute's formation is made.

N. D. WALTER

High Commissioner

Att's

Who's Who 1986

Lord Chalfont

CHALFONT, Baron, *cr* 1964 (Life Peer); **(Alun) Arthur Gwynne Jones,** PC 1964; OBE 1961; MC 1957; Chairman, All Party Defence Group, House of Lords, since 1980; Director: IBM UK Ltd, since 1973 (Member, IBM Europe Advisory Council, since 1973); Lazard Bros & Co. Ltd, since 1983; President: Nottingham Building Society, since 1983; Abington Corporation (Consultants) Ltd, since 1981; *b* 5 Dec. 1919; *s* of Arthur Gwynne Jones and Eliza Alice Hardman; *m* 1948, Dr Mona Mitchell; one *c* decd. *Educ:* West Monmouth Sch. Commissioned into South Wales Borderers (24th Foot), 1940; served in: Burma 1941–44; Malayan campaign 1955–57; Cyprus campaign 1958–59; various staff and intelligence appointments; Staff Coll., Camberley, 1950; Jt Services Staff Coll., 1958; Russian interpreter, 1951; resigned commission, 1961, on appt as Defence Correspondent, The Times; frequent television and sound broadcasts and consultant on foreign affairs to BBC Television, 1961–64; Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1964–70; UK Permanent Rep. to WEU, 1969–70; Foreign Editor, New Statesman, 1970–71. Director: W. S. Atkins International, 1979–83; Shandwick Consultants, 1980–; Chairman: Industrial Cleaning Papers, 1979–; Peter Hamilton Security Consultants Ltd, 1984–. President: Hispanic and Luso Brazilian Council, 1975–80; RNID, 1980–; Llangollen Internat. Music Festival, 1979–; Freedom in Sport, 1982–; Chairman: UK Cttee for Free World, 1981–; Eur. Atlantic Gp, 1983–; Member: IISS; Bd of Governors, Sandle Manor Sch. FRSA. MInstD. Hon. Fellow UCW Aberystwyth, 1974. Liveryman, Worshipful Co. of Paviors. Freeman, City of London. *Publications:* The Sword and The Spirit, 1963; The Great Commanders, 1973; Montgomery of Alamein, 1976; (ed) Waterloo: battle of three armies, 1979; contribs to The Times, and other national and professional journals. *Recreations:* formerly Rugby football, cricket, lawn tennis; now music and theatre. *Address:* House of Lords, SW1A 0PW. *Clubs:* Garrick, MCC, Lord's Taverners, City Livery.

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

109/1/4(W)
115/23/6

B66/5/1A
B69/17.

F.A.

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

WELLINGTON

13 October 1986

DHQ to see!
→ SWP O/R
19 suggest a short memo. simply explaining why you did not put the full hit-list on the particulars memo. (ie. the para excised from answer-table)

The High Commissioner
New Zealand High Commission
LONDON

cc SFA (DLO)
SFA (Sec)
SFA (LGL)
NZSIS (TIC)
Police (PTIU)
EIB
(all without attachments)

20 OCT 1986
CENTRAL REGISTRY
HIGH COMMISSION

TERRORISM : PUBLICATIONS OF THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM

Thank you for your memorandum B66/5/1A and B69/17 of 15 September 1986 in which you informed us of the establishment of an "Institute for the Study of Terrorism" in London, by which you conveyed a copy of the Institute's booklet "Tamil Terrorism in Sri Lanka", and in which you asked whether we would be interested in seeing future Institute publications.

2 We have passed copies of the booklet mentioned above to relevant departments and agencies.

3 The answer to your question is 'yes' - we would be interested in seeing future publications of the "Institute for the Study of Terrorism".

... 4 We attach for your future reference a copy of Administration Circular 1983/45 dated 13 December 1983 entitled "Terrorism and Related Matters : Distribution of Memoranda and Telegrams" and a copy of All Posts telegram A-154 of 21 December 1984 entitled "Terrorism and Related Matters (including aircraft hijackings, Bomb Threats etc) : Distribution of Memoranda and Telegrams".

(M F Watkins)
for Secretary of Foreign Affairs

Encl

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

B66/5/1A

INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM

This Institute has not yet made formal announcement of its setting up - "these things all take time and we're in the process of applying for charitable status and still have many things to sort out yet."

Where will the premises be - at the mailing address as stated on top of pamphlet sent out.

Lord Chalfont is the Chairman but until they formally set up they can't go much further yet. Intend having a Board of Governors and this will include variety of people.

He asked who I was speaking on behalf of and I gave your name and position. He hopes you will order from their mailing list - many other Embassies and High Commissions have.

Cathy
29.10.86

New Zealand High Commission

New Zealand House
Haymarket
London SW1Y 4TQ
Telephone 01-930 8422
Telex 24368

"YELLOW"

Reference: B66/5/1A

29 October 1986

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(DLO, EUR, LGL, SEC, AAD)

c.c. PMD
NZSIS (TIC)
POLICE (PTIU)
DEFENCE (DDOP)
TEHRAN

Terrorism and International Order

The Royal Institute of International Affairs yesterday held a seminar to launch its publication "Terrorism and International Order". (A copy of this book is enclosed for SFA only).

2. The book contains a collection of essays addressed to problems of international terrorism:

- Terrorism and International Order
- The Middle East and Terrorism
- Trends in International Terrorism and the American Response
- Terrorism and Strategy
- The political dilemmas for Western governments

3. As the Chairman of the seminar explained, the collection of these essays was prompted by the American air raids on Libya of 15 April 1986 which forced people in the RIIA 'to think deeply about the issues of transnational terrorism and its impact on the international community'.

4. Three of the contributors to the book spoke in the course of the meeting. Copies of our Note for File recording the gist of their remarks on the scope for international action against terrorism, the Middle East context of international terrorism, and the problems facing European Governments in trying to deal with the terrorist problem, are attached for all addressees.

" "

S.W. Prior
for High Commissioner

Note for File B66/5/1A

'Terrorism and International Order'

Chatham House, Tuesday 28 October 1986

On the occasion of the launching of the RIIA publication of the same title (Routledge and Kegan Paul).

Panel: Dr Christopher Hill, Reader in International Relations, LSE
Philip Windsor, ditto
Professor Paul Wilkinson, Department of Politics, Aberdeen

Chairman: William Wallace RIIA

(The Scope for International Action Against Terrorism)

Wilkinson began the meeting by saying that it was now much more widely recognised that terrorism was not a minor law and order problem, that international terrorism was a potential threat to stability, and to regional peace, with the potential for escalating situations to the point of war. The 1970s had seen a gradual escalation of the use of terrorism as a weapon. They had seen the development of terrorism as a threat to national security affecting the policies and policy options of major powers. The Tehran hostages case, for example, had affected the policies of the United States, as had the fate of the American contingent to the Multinational Force in Beirut. Terrorism had the effect of reaching past Governments and political policymakers to the people at large. Its impact was out of proportion to the violence it inflicted - clearly it was not as lethal, in terms of lives lost, as an international war, or a civil war, though it could still influence regions and threaten the peace. The most dramatic example of this was the terrorism which took place in southern Lebanon prior to the Israeli invasion with the wider ramifications for the region as a whole that followed.

It was an illusion that showing weakness in dealing with terrorism would somehow help to buy peace - experience had demonstrated that such weakness actually invited more terrorism and made the violence worse. There was no simple solution to terrorism, whether political, military, or legal. Historical experience showed that the multiple approach was the only one with anypossibility of bringing a reduction in violence.

There had been improvements in national measures being taken against terrorism in recent years - in Britain, Italy, and West Germany, for example. These had had significant successes because of the political commitment of the governments concerned not to give in to terrorists. But international cooperation was still far from achieving similar successes - the recent meeting in Luxemburg of EC Foreign Ministers had demonstrated that. However, the disappointments of that particular meeting should not be allowed to overshadow the achievements of international cooperation. Firmness of approach at the national level might not at the moment be being translated into international action among the Europeans at the moment, but things could be improved. What were the policy goals that the Europeans should set themselves? There were, in his view, nine:

1. obviously their general policy should be aimed at reducing the rewards of terrorism and maximising its risks and costs
   - collectively nations should be able to bring some notion of deterrence to bear; at the same time they should, through diplomatic and practical measures help to alleviate the legitimate grievances

from which the terrorism had sprung; it should be noted that these measures should not be seen as a panacea, but as an element of a multiple strategy;

2. increased physical security;
3. better intelligence gathering and analysis and, above all, a sharing of that intelligence - currently this was proving very difficult even among countries of the Western Alliance;
4. strengthening international law to improve extradition policies which were currently extremely slow and often very ineffective - in such circumstances people were having to rely on the 'extradite or bring to trial' clauses in international agreements on terrorism;
5. looking for ways of international cooperation beyond extradition - perhaps looking to set up an international criminal code and court system to deal with terrorism but also other international crimes such as drug trafficking (the French had made such a proposal in the past);
7. improving military capabilities, particularly in regard to hostage rescue; looking for ways of bringing expertise to bear in hostage situations in countries inadequately equipped to deal with them - perhaps through an international agreement on assistance, on training and procedures for counter-terrorist military actions;
8. bringing pressure to bear on state sponsors of terrorism in order to punish and deter them - this was a very important part of eating away at the support for terrorism;
9. taking economic measures against countries involved in terrorism - again, this should not be seen as a panacea, but it did have an important role to play; - the withholding of aid, business contracts and so on could be useful, especially if used as part of a multiple approach.

(Middle East Context of Terrorism)

Windsor addressed the question of the Middle East context of modern international terrorism. It was possible to talk of such a specific context for a number of reasons:

- the long historical ancestry of terrorist activities;
- the degree of continuity largely focussed on Palestine; terrorism in the area had been there from the beginning of the modern period and had had throughout an international dimension, scope and objectives; as today, terrorist activities were directed specifically at the international audience;
- the struggles in the Middle East were still related to the question of Palestine, the dispersal of the Palestinians, the existence of the state of Israel - they were the legacy of the unresolved question of Palestine.

As a region the Middle East was extraordinarily vulnerable to terrorism. Terrorist exploits could in a single move destroy prospects for peace and stability. It was a region in which the cause of terrorism tended to flourish.

In speaking of terrorism in the Middle East it was difficult to specify exactly what was involved - it wasn't a question of what the PLO did or did not do - many of the major terrorist incidents of recent years had been the reflection of internecine warfare between PLO factions.

The PLO forms of terrorism were not the only forms in the Middle East by any means; there were other kinds which went again right back into history - for example in Lebanon itself. The key lay in the fact that in traditional societies which had had other methods of resolving internal political conflicts terrorism had come to be a <u>way</u> of political conduct.

Sheer resoluteness, for example in the for m of massive retaliation, was not necessarily the way of dealing with Middle Eastern terrorism. Indeed the more one attacked terrorist organisations the more they broke up into tiny disparate groups practising terrorism for terrorism's sake.

The great achievement of the Israelis in driving the Fatah leadership out of Beirut, for example, and dispersing it to 8 separate countries, was to make sure that their was nobody in control of PLO terrorism. Whereas with the united Fatah leadership there was at least a possibility of the PLO's being persuaded to talk to Israel, without such a leadership, there was no chance at all. In short, trying to cut off the head of the hydra simply led to the creature's sprouting more heads.

In his view there was only one way that offered at least some prospect of stamping out the common enemy, terrorism: that was some meeting of all the states involved in the Middle East, not excluding Syria or Israel, with such an agenda as to be attractive to the individual parties.

<u>(European Governments and Terrorism)</u>

<u>Hill</u> concluded the presentation by discussing the dilemma posed European governments by international terrorism. As a problem of international relations, he said, it had come to the fore soon after the 1967 Middle East war; now it had become a pressing problem of West/West relations.

But while terrorism was undoubtedly very important for international relations it should not be exaggerated as a problem on the international agenda. However, the converse was true: terrorism in existence did complicate relations between states because it was essentially a transnational process which caused problems for governments who were used to international diplomacy and dealing among themselves, not with extra-governmental groups and populations at large.

An example of the complications of public opinion was the fact that once US citizens became aroused on the question of terrorism other Western countries had to put that issue at the top of their agendas, even if they did not regard it as deserving such a position in their own order of priorities.

Terrorism posed two sorts of dilemmas: primary, and secondary.

Into the first category came the question of how to handle terrorism. Here there was an intrinsic problem of definition - after all, as it had been said, one man's freedom fighter was another man's terrorist. There had appeared here a basic division between European and American views: the Americans tended to see the terrorist as someone

who couldbe eliminated from the scene if only there were the political will to act on the part of governments. There was an element of doublethink in their attitudes however: the treated terrorists as if they were all madmen and psychotic, and yet tried to emphasise the need for concerted deterrent actions: but how could you deter - rationally - psychopaths, if that was what terrorists were? Equally, there was an element of doublethink in European views: European governments claimed that terrorism could be checked only if people tackled its root causes, but when it came to the crunch they proved often to be unwilling to act.

Secondly there was the problem of technical coordination among countries - this problem had been behind the setting up of the EPC's terrorism group earlier this year. Undoubtedly problems were caused by the fact that there were so many different international forums in which terrorism could be discussed and which could be used for coordinating international activity against it. And then there were other considerations - such as the fact that many countries did not see Interpol as the organisation best-placed to centralise action against terrorism because it was too big, too leaky, and too loose, and they had therefore concentrated their efforts in the Trevi Group.

As far as secondary dilemmas were concerned, Hill noted that the terrorist problem had raised and accentuated the problem of the use of force in international relations. Generally the European states were pacifically inclined - the French were the ones most prepared to use military force as part of their international diplomacy. At the same time the United States was moving into a period of greater confidence in its own use of force.

A second facet was that of the regional nature of terrorism. Terrorism was in fact a semi-autonomous issue in its own right, not connected at all solely with the Middle East, although terrorism did tend to feed back to that region which complicated the overall terrorist problem.

There was also the nature of domestic politics, and the competing pressures on the American Government and European Governments. In America the pressure was in favour of decisive action against terrorists. In Europe the pressures were the other way, and there was concern about the use of force. Not only were there different domestic needs to be taken into account in the USA and Europe, but there was also the confusion as to whether each side was acting out of foreign political considerations or because of domestic political needs.

As he saw it, the big problem facing the West was getting a consensus on anti-terrorist policies. This difficulty was not caused by a lack of political will, nor by domestic political pressures, but rather from the structural nature of terrorism. The principal need at the moment in his view was to try to lower the public profile of the terrorist - terrorism thrived on publicity and exposure in the media - and to try to return to the technical coordination and the quiet manner of progress which had marked the fight against terrorism in the 1970s.

++++++++++++++++++++

S.W. Prior,
28 October 1986

B66/5/1A

B86/4/2A · B66/5/1A

B 69/89

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FA - P
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CONFIDENTIAL

CLAS: CONFIDENTIAL 29 OCT 86
FROM: LONDON
TO : WELLINGTON 2297 - ROUTINE
RPTD: BRUSSELS 255
LD : SFA (EUR MEA DLO LGL SEC)
: EIB
: PMD
: NZSIS (TIC)
: POLICE (PTIU)
: DEFENCE (DDOP)
SUBJ: EPC/SYRIA

THE FCO (RAMSDEN, EUROPEAN CORRESPONDENT) BRIEFED NON-EC EUROPEANS AND OURSELVES ON THE LUXEMBOURG FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING ON 27 OCTOBER WHICH HAD ADDRESSED ITSELF ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY TO THE QUESTION OF SYRIAN LINKS WITH THE HINDAWI BOMB PLOT CASE.

2. RAMSDEN SAID THAT HE WANTED ''TO ADD A GLOSS'' TO PRESS REPORTS THAT BRITAIN HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTED ABOUT A FAILURE BY ITS EUROPEAN PARTNERS TO AGREE TO TAKE ACTIONS AGAINST SYRIA. WHILE IT WOULD HAVE LIKED THE MEETING TO COME OUT WITH SUCH MEASURES IT WAS SATISFIED WITH THE FACT THAT MEMBER STATES WERE ABLE TO AGREE TO A COLLECTIVE EXPRESSION OF OUTRAGE, AND TO STATING THEIR SUPPORT AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE UK. HE PASSED OVER THE TEXT OF SPEAKING NOTES AGREED BY THE MINISTERS FOR USE BY SIR GEOFFREY HOWE IN BRIEFING THE PRESS LATE ON 27 OCTOBER. (THIS, PLUS PRESS AND OTHER COMMENTARY IS BEING FAXED SEPARATELY.)

3. RAMSDEN COMMENTED THAT EC MINISTERS HAD BEEN 'DISTURBED AND IMPRESSED' BY THE DETAILED EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THEM BY SIR GEOFFREY OF SYRIAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE HINDAWI CASE, AND NOTED THAT IT WAS HIS FIRST OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF THE HINDAWI TRIAL ON 24 OCTOBER. THE BRITISH SIDE HAD PASSED ON THE TREVI NETWORK A VERY FULL ASSESSMENT OF THE EVIDENCE IT HAD, AND HOPED THAT THE POLICE AND SECURITY FORCES OF THE VARIOUS EUROPEAN AND OTHER COUNTRIES INVOLVED WOULD DRAW APPROPRIATE CONCLUSIONS.

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4. IN SPEAKING TO THE PRESS SIR GEOFFREY HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WAS TALKING ON BEHALF OF ELEVEN MEMBERS ONLY - GREECE HAVING DISSOCIATED ITSELF ON THE BASIS THAT IT WOULD NOT WISH TO BE IDENTIFIED WITH ANY STATEMET NAMING SYRIA OR AGREEING TO SPECIFIC ACTION AGAINST SYRIA.

5. WHAT WOULD THE FOLLOW-UP BE TO THE LUXEMBOURG MEETING? THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE WOULD BE CONSIDERING A RANGE OF MEASURES AGAINST SYRIA ON 6 NOVEMBER AND WOULD DULY REPORT TO MINISTERS IN TIME FOR THEIR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS ON 1Q NOVEMBER.

6. WHAT MEASURES WERE BEING CONSIDERED? THESE WERE INDICATED IN THE PRESS REMARKS MADE BY SIR GEOFFREY. FIRST, THERE WOULD BE THE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE TO THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT TO ENSURE THAT THE EC SENT A COLLECTIVE SIGNAL TO IT. IT WAS STILL TO BE DECIDED HOW, AND BY WHOM, THIS SHOULD BE DONE. THERE WOULD BE A REVIEW OF THE POTENTIALLY TROUBLE-MAKING ACTIVITIES OF SYRIAN EMBASSIES IN OTHER CAPITALS, AND OF THE OPERATIONS OF SYRIAN ARAB AIRLINES (AS THE RESULT OF THE VERY WORRYING EVIDENCE THAT HAD EMERGED DURING THE HINDAWI TRIAL OF INVOLVEMENT BY SAA AIRCREW IN SMUGGLING EXPLOSIVES AND PROVIDING COVER FOR HINDAWI A REVIEW WOULD BE NEEDED OF SAA AIRCREW SEARCHING PROCEDURES, FOR EXAMPLE.

7. ADDITIONALLY, THE QUESTION OF HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS WOULD NEED TO BE LOOKED AT (A PLANNED VISIT BY THE SYRIAN FOREIGN SECRETARY TO WEST GERMANY HAD BEEN CANCELLED) AS BRITAIN FELT THAT IT WOULD SEND MISTAKEN SIGNALS TO DAMASCUS 'AT THIS JUNCTURE' IF SUCH CONTACTS WERE TO TAKE PLACE. THERE WOULD ALSO NEED TO BE A REVIEW OF ARMS SALES. RAMSDEN COMMENTED THAT SIR GEOFFREY HAD RECALLED FOR MINISTERS THEIR JANUARY 1986 STATEMENT ABOUT ARMS SALES TO COUNTRIES CLEARLY IMPLICATED IN TERRORISM, AND ADDED THAT - CONTRARY TO NEWSPAPER REPORTS - THE FRENCH HAD DENIED STRONGLY THAT ANY FRENCH ARMS SALES TO SYRIA WERE IN PROSPECT.

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8. RAMSDEN CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT THE BRITISH WOULD BE PURSING THE QUESTION OF ACTION AGAINST SYRIA. HE NOTED THAT A MINISTERIAL MEETING IN STRASBOURG NEXT WEEK WITHIN THE COUNCIP OF EUROPE FRAMWORK WOULD BE DISCUSSING THE QUESTION OF THE FIGHT AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, AND THAT A SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL WOULD BE 'DOING THE ROUNDS' OF EUROPEAN CAPITALS THIS WEEK TO DISCUSS THE HINDAWI CASE.

9. FURTHER BACKGROUND AND COMMENTARY ON THE HINDAWI CASE IS CONTAINED IN OUR MEMORANDUM B66/5/1/A OF 28 OCTOBER 1986, NOT TO ALL.
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NUMBER OF PAGES IN TRANSMISSION (INCLUDING COVER SHEET)

PAGE 1 OF ..7.....

SWP 26953

COVER SHEET FOR FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

UNCLASSIFIED

DATE:..29 October 1986.....

B66/5/1A
B69/89

FROM: NEW ZEALAND HIGH COMMISSION, LONDON.

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EPC - Political Cooperation Meeting: Terrorism/Syria

Our telegram of today's date refers.

The following is the text of Sir Geoffrey Howe's speaking notes for the press following Monday's Luxembourg ministerial, together with press reporting and Parliamentary debate on the outcome of the meeting.

AUTHORISING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE:.....

NAME:.....S.W. Prior.....

2 of 7 LON 9101

27 October 1986

Elements for Presidency Press Statement on Hindawi Case

1. Reaffirm previous statements by the Twelve on international terrorism.

2. Share sense of outrage that the agencies of a State involved in such appalling incident. Full briefing given by UK.

3. Understanding and support for action UK taken and support for Community solidarity in such circumstances.

4. Agreement that those expelled from the UK in connection with Hindawi case will not be accepted as diplomats by any other partner.

5. Agreement to instruct Ambassadors to present to the Syrian Government the evidence of what had taken place and to report in time for a meeting of the Political Committee on 6 November in preparation for further discussion at Ministerial level on 10 November.

6. Points for further consideration then:

i. Arms sales.
ii. High-level visits.
iii. Activities of Embassies
iv. Security arrangements affecting SAA operations.

7. Affirmation of importance attached by all member states to maintenance of a constructive dialogue with the Arab world.

3 of 7 LON 9101

Europe refuses to back Howe on Syria

From Derek Brown in Luxembourg

Britain's attempts to persuade its EEC allies to join in a concerted programme of punitive economic and political measures against Syria following the Hindawi affair were on the point of failure last night.

Foreign ministers meeting in Luxembourg extended their discussions without any firm agreement in sight.

As a way out, the Netherlands proposed a last-minute compromise — a token, temporary withdrawal of EEC ambassadors to Damascus.

The Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, appealed in vain for his Community colleagues to adopt a nine-point package of measures against Syria. Few were prepared to go beyond a vaguely worded condemnation of terrorism.

There was widespread resentment among the other ministers that Sir Geoffrey was trying to stampede them into anti-Syrian action. Many felt such action to be premature and dangerous, designed to boost Mrs Thatcher's political popularity at home rather than as a genuine international contribution to defeating terrorism.

Suspicion and mystery in Hindawi's wake, page 23

THE GUARDIAN Tuesday October 28 1986

France and Germany both argued the case for maintaining diplomatic links with a key country in the Middle East. Greece, predictably, went further, refusing to accept that Syria was sponsoring terrorism or that the Damascus Government should be singled out in an EEC statement.

In Washington, the United States was prepared to take a series of diplomatic, political and economic steps to isolate Syria, but officials were notably cautious yesterday about assigning responsibility for the Hindawi affair out of fear for the lives of the six American hostages still being held by Islamic extremists in Lebanon.

The decision to recall the US ambassador to Damascus was an expression of our great displeasure," was as far as the State Department spokesman, Mr Charles Redman, was prepared to go last night.

The Americans have informed Britain, however, that they are ready to take a series of steps as soon as this week's round of consultations by US officials led by the State Department counter-terrorism chief, Mr Paul Bremer, is concluded.

Among the measures are

Turn to back page, col. 5

Europe refuses to back Howe on Syrian action

Continued from page one

travel restrictions to Syrian diplomats stationed in the US, a ban on flights by Syrian-Arab airlines to the United States, stepped up security arrangements at US airports, and putting some pressure on the Saudi Government to halt economic aid to Syria. The US would also issue a "travel advisory," warning Americans not to travel to the country.

There was little enthusaism in Luxembourg for the anti-Syrian measures suggested by Sir Geoffrey. They were: a tough statement condemning Syria; no more EEC aid; an arms embargo; no official visits; limits on the size of Syrian embassies; mutual non-acceptance of expelled Syrian diplomats; tighter visa controls; temporary recall of EEC ambassadors from Damascus; and, more security checks on Syrian airline flights.

Sir Geoffrey offered a detailed summary of the trial of Nezar Hindawi, gaoled for 45 years last week for trying to blow up an El Al jumbo jet. He contended that there was firm evidence of official Syrian involvement, and demanded that fellow EEC ministers come up with "a reaction which will be credible within the Community and in the wider world."

In a clear dig at France, he reminded ministers that the British EEC presidency had reacted quickly and decisively to the Paris Government's request for an emergency meeting of interior and justice ministers in the wake of last month's terror bombings.

Sir Geoffrey was battling against the mood of the meeting. He was one of only six full-fledged foreign ministers at the table. His French and German counterparts were in Frankfurt for a Kohl-Mitterrand summit meeting. Italy's Giulio Andreotti was in Assisi greeting the Pope. Spain, Portugal, and Ireland were all represented by junior ministers.

After an initial two-hour round, Sir Geoffrey testily suggested to his colleagues that they seek further instructions from their national capitals.

There was little sign as the talks resumed, however, that positions had shifted. The French and Germans both insisted that diplomatic links must be cultivated rather than cut—with Paris especially concerned about the effect of hasty action on the eight French hostages in Lebanon, not to speak of the 500 French Unifil troops there.

A French spokesman flatly denied that there was a lucrative arms deal in the offing with Syria.

4 of 7 LON 9101

THE INDEPENDENT Wednesday 29 October 1986

Greece's delicate courtship

From Kieran Cook
in Athens

GREECE'S refusal to go along with an EEC statement expressing "outrage" against Syria was entirely predictable.

The hard line pursued by Athens is said to reflect close ties with states in the eastern Mediterranean. But EEC officials said it also resulted from support given by Syria to the present Prime Minister, Andreas Papandreou, during his years of exile when the colonels ruled in Athens.

Mr Papandreou and President Hafez al-Assad are said to enjoy a close personal relationship. In May this year Mr Assad visited Greece, his first official trip to a Nato member country. Mr Papandreou's American-born wife, Margaret, visited Damascus recently to coordinate efforts with the Syrians for the release of Western hostages held in Beirut.

Greece has yet unrealised hopes for increasing trading links with Syria. The two countries are even co-operating on a tourism programme.

But the Greek stand at Luxembourg also highlights Mr Papandreou's reputation for being something of an international maverick. Earlier this year he refused to go along with EEC measures against Libya. He was also among the strongest critics of the US bombing raids on Libya and, as in the case now with Syria, cast serious doubts on evidence indicating Libyan links with terrorist attacks in Europe.

Mr Papandreou went on to tell the Greek parliament that violence carried out by groups engaged in a "national liberation struggle", such as the Palestinians, did not constitute terrorism. Washington called the remarks "baseless, unhelpful and indeed harmful to Western efforts to achieve an effective response to international terrorism."

One reason for Mr Papandreou's stand is that he does not want to antagonise any Arab nation into recognition of the separate state declared in Cyprus by Turkish Cypriots, so far only recognised by Turkey. But more importantly, Mr Papandreou does not want to be seen to fall too easily into line with other Western policies.

Recent local election results showed a considerable erosion of left-wing support for Mr Papendreou's Pan-Hellenic Socialist Party (Pasok). This was partly due to Mr Papendreou'sfailure to keep election promises to close down US bases on Greek soil and withdraw from Nato and the EEC.

But Mr Papandreou plays a clever game between what he says and what he actually does. In April, Greece refused to agree to Community measures reducing staff at Libyan missions in European capitals. Three months later the staff at the Libyan Peoples' Bureau in Athens was quietly cut by a third.

5 of 7 Lon 9101

THE INDEPENDENT Wednesday 29 October 1986

Howe keeps up pressure

BRITAIN is planning to twist a lot of arms over the next two weeks in an effort to persuade its European allies to change their minds and join in tough action against Syria, **John Bulloch** writes.

Diplomats said last night that they had no hope of persuading Greece to take action against Syria. It was understood that Greece was in a special category because of its position in the Eastern Mediterranean, and because of its Socialist government.

But Britain remained optimistic that other Community countries would fall into line. Much of the blame for what was admitted to be a "small disaster" at the weekend meeting was put on the fact that six foreign ministers found it impossible — or impolitic — to be there.

The French and German ministers, and their deputies, were at the opera, and Spain, Italy and Greece all sent juniors.

British officials that feel the full strength of the evidence of official Syrian involvement in the attempted bombing of the El Al plane had not been properly appreciated in European capitals. They pointed out that the United States and Canada decided to recall their ambassadors from Damascus after hearing the details which Britain had of Syrian complicity.

It was also quietly pointed out that the United States would have had its own direct knowledge through its extensive monitoring of communications, which it would have turned over to its North American partner.

Surprisingly, the officials said Britain had additional material it could produce, over and above what Sir Geoffrey Howe told the House of Commons yesterday was "conclusive evidence of official Syrian involvement". This is expected to be quietly passed on to certain European intelligence agencies by their British counterparts over the next few days.

Under the complicated rules which govern all actions by the Common Market, there has to be unanimity for any concerted EEC action against Syria. But Britain has found one way of making its feelings known.

A new package of European aid to Syria, which in the normal course of events would have been worth about £60m over the next five years, requires unanimous approval of all Community countries to be put into effect.

"There can be no question of the United Kingdom agreeing to further financial assistance for Syria in the present circumstances," Sir Geoffrey said.


The British ambassador to Damascus, Mr Roger Tomkys, is expected back in London with his staff at the end of this week. As both British Airways and Syrian Arab Airlines have halted flights between London and Damascus, the ambassador is expected to fly to a neighbouring country before taking a British plane. The Syrian ambassador will have to act in the same way when he leaves Britain.

The present intention is that Britain will not bother to have an "interests section" based in another country's embassy to look after the 250 or so British citizens in Syria. Australia is expected to act as "the protecting Power".

6 of 7 LON 9101

THE INDEPENDENT Wednesday 29 October 1986

British veto on EEC aid for Syria



Ivan Lawrence: Query over French arms sales to Syria.

BRITAIN is to veto any furthur EEC financial aid for Syria. The Damascus government stands to loose £100m over the next five years, but **Sir Geoffrey Howe** told the Commons the Syrians had to be sent a clear message that their behaviour over the Hindawi case has been intolerable.

Both the Foreign Secretary and **Margaret Thatcher** voiced disappointment at Monday's failure of European community members to agree a strong package of retaliatory action.

Denis Healey, Labour's chief foreign affairs spokesman, condemned the "pusillanimous behaviour" of some EEC states, while Tory backbenchers described the lack of French cooperation as "craven".

Syria is one of the non-EEC countries which receive aid under the community's Mediterranean financial protocols. But these expire next Saturday and renewal requires unanimity.

"There can be no question of the United Kingdom agreeing to further financial assistance for Syria in present circumstances," said Sir Geoffrey.

Syria received about £60m of aid under the expiring five-year agreement,

By Stephen Goodwin

but was expecting to benefit by over £100m from its successor.

The British government also intends to block the system of restitution payments under which the community subsidises EEC farm exports to Syria.

MPs were told of Government concern over the representation of British interests in Syria following the tit-for-tat closure of the UK embassy. Sir Geoffrey said there was no problem about getting another government to represent British interests. But so far the necessary consent from the Syrians to set up an interests section had not been forthcoming.

Sir Geoffrey told MPs he had presented his EEC colleagues with "conclusive evidence of Syrian involvement" in the plot to blow up at El Al aircraft leaving Heathrow. "They were both impressed and disturbed."

With the exception of the Greek representative all minister had expressed their collective sense of outrage that agencies of a state had been involved in such an incident.

They had expressed "full understanding and support" for Britain's action in breaking off diplomatic action with Damascus and undertook that no partner would accept as a diplomat any of the Syrians expelled from London.

"We have agreed to consider at the next ministerial meeting in London, on 10 November, the possibility of action in relation to arms sales to Syria, high level visits to and from Syria, the activities of of Syrian embassies in member states and security arrangements affecting the operations of Syrian Arab Airlines."

The Foreign Secretary acknowledged that the Luxembourg proceedings went "by no means as far" as MPs would have wished. But he said that with the exception of Greece all the foreign ministers were prepared to take further action. "We certainly do want to see a more effective set of decisions from the community at the next meeting," he told Mr Healey.

The Labour spokesman described the outcome of the Luxembourg meeting as "deplorable". But he said action against terrorism was indivisible. He urged Sir Geoffrey not to show the same "pusillanimity" as some ECC countries had over Syria, in taking action against state terrorism by South Africa.

The Foreign Secretary however rejected Mr Healey's suggestion that the community was imposing a whole range of commercial and economic sanctions against Syria. " What I announced was that we will not assent to the granting of further financial aid to Syria."

There was a rumble of approval from both sides of the House when **Nicholas Soames** (C, Crawley) charged Britain's "so-called partners" with behaving in a "tawdy, timid and above all a fatuous manner".

Ivan Lawrence (C, Burton) wanted to know if the French were still selling arms to Syria. "Is not the sickeningly inadequate response of our European allies not only a betrayal of of their commitment to fight terrorism but an incentive to further terrorism," he asked.

But Sir Geoffrey thought Mr Lawrence's choice of words "unhelpful", and he pointed out that the French representative had in fact been willing to endorse a ban on future arms sales to Syria.

He also looked forward to the fulfilment of a pledge by President Mitterrand on television yesterday that if terrorist activity was proved Europe's response should be "totally firm". The President had said there should be "no compromise with states involved in terrorism".

Earlier during question time, the Prime Minister told **David Sumberg** (C, Bury South) she shared his disappointment that the statement had not been stronger. "I hope they will consider the matter further, especially in view of the bold statements previously made."

The European Foreign Affairs Council had said in September that they were prepared to take common action against terrorism. "I hope that they will see that at the next meeting they put what they said into practice," said Mrs Thatcher.

Mr Sumberg has asked her: "Is it not ironic that when there were terorist bombings in Paris last month the French government looked to us for support.

"When will our European partners realise in relation to terrorism that we either stand together or hang together?"

7 of 7 Lon 9101

THE INDEPENDENT Wednesday 29 October 1986

Britain blamed for EEC row on Syria

ABRUPT changes in Britain's approach to the Syrian crisis contributed to the muddled outcome of Monday's meeting of EEC foreign ministers, according to senior Community officials.

Other EEC governments are convinced that the Prime Minister, Mrs Thatcher, intervened to harden the Foreign Office response to Syria's involvement in the Heathrow bomb plot on two occasions in recent days.

The first was the decision to breach diplomatic relations with Syria immediately after the bomb trial verdict. EEC governments had expected Britain to withdraw its ambassador and then consult them before taking further action.

Mrs Thatcher is also believed to have been responsible for the Government's decision to push for far-reaching EEC sanctions at Monday's meeting without warning. Community officials said yesterday there was some suspicion in EEC capitals that the unexpectedly tough line had been influenced by Washington.

"It certainly appears that the British attitude to international terrorism — that you respond with a short, sharp shock — is now much closer to that of the United States than that of its EEC partners," one official said.

The refusal to take strong action against Syria was only partly the result of unpreparedness. There is a widespread view — not just in Athens and Paris — that Syria must be treated more delicately than Libya.

"I would not be too optimistic that significant measures will be adopted against Damascus when the foreign ministers meet again next month," a West German official said yesterday.

From John Lichfield
in Brussels

British officials insisted they were confident that decisions would be taken in London on 10 November on four possible measures listed by foreign ministers on Monday: a ban on arms sales, an embargo on high-level visits to Syria, tighter security for Syrian Arab Airlines and restrictions on Syrian Embassy staff.

In reply to the criticism by other EEC countries on the unexpectedly hard line adopted by Sir Geoffrey in Luxembourg, British officials pointed out that all 12 EEC states agreed last week to adopt measures of this kind against any state found guilty of sponsoring terrorist acts.

British sources admit, however, that Downing Street was responsible for a radical change in the British approach.

Last Friday, at a meeting of senior political advisers from EEC capitals in London, discussion was confined to a statement condemning Syria and possible withdrawal of EEC ambassadors. It was understood that discussion of stronger measures would be postponed.

But on Monday in Luxembourg, the Foreign Secretary presented a list of at least eight specific demands for immediate action, including the four above and an embargo on aid.

"We simply were not ready to take a decision on such a long list of measures at short notice," one French official said yesterday. "London gave no warning that it intended to abandon discussion on the statement examined in London last Friday."

An official from another EEC country was present at the talks and said there was irritation at Sir Geoffrey's use of his position as EEC Council President to push Britain's case so forcefully. This was contrasted in some minds with his relative reluctance to push the case for stronger South African sanctions last month.

After more than four hours of negotiations, largely in restricted session with only ministers present, Sir Geoffrey settled for a condemnation by 11 of the 12 EEC countries of Syria's part in the attempt to smuggle a bomb aboard an Israeli jumbo jet at Heathrow in April.

Apart from the measures to be considered next month, the ministers agreed that member countries should refuse to admit Syrian diplomats expelled from Britain.

Greece refused to go along with the statement expressing "outrage" against Syria and "solidarity with Britain".

■ PARIS — A close aide to the Prime Minister, Jacques Chirac, yesterday defended France's rejection of sanctions against Syria, saying these would have amounted to "a policy of hara-kiri", **Reuter** writes.

Jacques Toubon, secretary-general of Mr Chirac's RPR party, indicated the government was concerned over the fate of seven French hostages held in Lebanon and the prospect of a new outbreak of bomb blasts in Paris.

He said France would not take decisions "and then, like Pontius Pilate, wash our hands of the consequences — on the hostages, on terrorist attacks, on our economic relations and our diplomatic position".

B66/5/1A

29 October 1986

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs
WELLINGTON

(Att : DLO, EUR, LGL, SEC, AAD)

c.c. PMD
NZSIS (TIC)
POLICE (PTIU)
DEFENCE (DDOP)

EUROPEAN MEASURES ON TERRORISM AND DRUGS

Please refer to our FAX 8864 of 21 October 1986.

... 2. Attached for your information are copies of the "Conclusions on Drugs" and "Conclusions on Immigration" reached by European Community Ministers at their London meeting on 20 October 1986, together with press reports of that meeting.

S. W. PRIOR

S.W. Prior
for High Commissioner

Att.

File B6615/1A

CONCLUSIONS ON DRUGS

1. Ministers recalled the grave concern expressed by the European Council in the Hague about the serious problem of drug misuse.

2. Recognising the importance of international co-operation in combating the drugs problem, they commended the efforts of those countries which have shown determination to stamp out production, trafficking in and demand for drugs and welcomed the forthcoming International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking.

3. They agreed that the Member States in connection with the Community had an important role to play in the international effort to combat drug production, trafficking and misuse. They commended both the work done in the Pompidou Group by Council of Europe Member States in the areas of supply and demand for drugs, and the high degree of co-operation in the law enforcement field. They asked Member States and the Commission to examine whether the Community and its Member States could assist the work of the Pompidou Group in the following areas, whilst seeking to avoid the duplication of work being done in other fora:

(a) Measures to reduce demand for drugs especially among young people;

(b) Measures to improve the treatment and rehabilitation services for addicts;

4. They asked the Community and its Member States to consider action to ensure that bilateral and Communty aid supports, as appropriate, a recipient country's efforts to combat drug abuse.

JACADH

5. They also asked the Member States, with the Community where appropriate, to consider action in the following areas:

(a) ensuring that legislation takes account of the need to maintain effective control over illicit drug trafficking, particularly at the Community's external frontiers;

(b) mutual enforcement of confiscation orders relating to drug traffickers' assets;

(c) building on the good co-operation which already exists between law enforcement agencies, by posting drugs liaison officers (DLOs) within the Member States, by Member States posting DLOs to other countries, and by supporting a world-wide directory of contacts for drugs related messages. To this end Ministers asked Trevi Working Group III to examine the scope for building on existing arrangements to create a coordinated network of drug liaison officers to monitor developments in producer countries.

6. Ministers noted that co-operation on drugs control had become an increasingly significant element on the international political agenda and welcomed the programme of work which had been initiated by the Member States of the Community meeting in Political Co-operation.

7. Recognising the significant contribution made by individual Member States to exisitng UN activities and international co-operation on drugs, Ministers considered that enhanced activity would help to develop a common approach by the Member States to drugs related assistance and activities in certain drug producing and transit countries.

8. Ministers urged that Ambassadors of the Twelve accredited to the major drug producing countries be asked to prepare joint assessments of the situation in those countries and recommendations for further action by the Twelve.

JACADH

CONCLUSIONS ON IMMIGRATION

Ministers with responsibilities for immigration, counter-terrorism and drugs and a Vice-President of the Commission meeting in London on 20 October have agreed that:

(a) It remains an agreed objective to provide for free movement in the EC within the terms of the Single European Act;

(b) Problems over terrorism, drug trafficking, other crime and illegal immigration must not be allowed to deflect the Community from this objective;

(c) At the same time, as the European Council meeting in Brussels in March 1985 recognised, the goal of abolishing frontier formalities must remain compatible with the need to combat terrorism and drug trafficking;

(d) It is therefore essential to work towards a system of easing and ultimately abolishing frontier formalties for Community citizens that is not open to abuse. This points to:

(i) strict controls at the Community's external frontiers;

(ii) consideration of co-ordination of visa policies;

(iii) improved exchange of information between the immigration services of member states;

(iv) sharing information on the steps already taken by member states to prevent passports being issued under false pretences or their abuse if stolen and consideration of improved co-operation in future;

(v) consideration of the problems which arise from those seeking asylum.

JACADG

(e) The above considerations have implications for frontier controls operated on the basis of spot checks. There is scope for keeping under close review the operation of such systems in the light of the criteria laid down by Heads of Government;

(f) To set up a high-level ad hoc working group of member states composed of the closest advisers of Ministers in the field of immigration policy and, in so far as there is Community competence, representatives of the Commission. The Council Secretariat will assure the secretariat of the group. The group was charged to consider urgently:

(i) improved checks at external Community frontiers

(ii) the contribution which internal checks can make;

(iii) the role of co-ordination and possible harmonisation of visa policies of member states in improving controls;

(iv) the role and effectiveness of frontier controls at internal frontiers in the fight against terrorism, drugs, crime and illegal immigration;

(v) exchange of information about the operation of spot check systems;

(vi) close co-operation to avoid the abuse of passports;

(vii) measures to achieve a common policy to eliminate the abuse of the right of asylum in consultation with both the Council of Europe and the UN High Commission for Refugees;

(viii) examination of ways in which the convenience of Community travellers can be improved without adding to the terrorist threat or the risks of illegal immigration, drug trafficking and other crime;

(g) The working group should produce urgently a programme of work with dates for completion;

(h) The work of the group should be co-ordinated with the work necessary to the realisation of the Internal Market.

THE GUARDIAN Tuesday October 21 1986

SWP

EEC ministers agree border controls plan

By Derek Brown

The 12 EEC governments have launched an ambitious border control programme to streamline safeguards against terrorists, drug traffickers and illegal immigrants.

The outline plan, adopted by EEC interior ministers in London yesterday, marked an important stage in the community's long struggle to break down the tangled web of national barriers to travel and trade.

With security a major current preoccupation, policymaking areas which have up to now been jealously guarded by national governments, are likely to be increasingly subject to EEC agreements.

They include immigration controls, issue of visas, and procedures for frontier checks.

Mr Douglas Hurd, the Home Secretary, who chaired yesterday's meeting, said that the ministers had moved into a new sphere of EEC policymaking.

"We all want the minimum of inconvenience to travellers within the Community. Convenient travel, reduced delays at frontiers, is good for people and for business. But we also have a duty to protect the citizens of the community," he said.

The final shape of EEC policy on immigration may take years to emerge. Mr Hurd announced "urgent" studies by officials of the main aims, which include strengthened controls at EEC external frontiers, coordination of national visa policies, and cooperation to avoid abuse of stolen passports.

Ministers discussed the idea of a common EEC visa for travellers from outside the community, but Mr Hurd stressed that such a scheme was long term.

There will also be a search for ways to combat the abuse of asylum rights — a matter of vital interest to West Germany, where liberal asylum laws have attracted close to 100,000 refugees this year alone.

Mr Hurd denied that freer movement within the EEC was incompatible with effective security. The easing of internal frontier checks — a key aim of the overall plan to create a genuine Common Market by 1992 — would be complemented by tougher controls on external boundaries and airports.

"It's not so much a contradiction as a balance which needs to be struck," said the Home Secretary.

Ministers also reviewed the impact of their anti-terrorist measures adopted last month in the wake of the Paris bomb blitz. Mr Hurd revealed that equipment for a new secure communications link between police forces was already in place in Britain, and was being installed elsewhere.

On measures to combat drug addiction and trafficking, the meeting adopted a seven-point plan unveiled earlier this month by the Home Office minister, Mr David Mellor.

This pledges governments to try to reduce drug abuse among young people, and to improve treatment and rehabilitation of addicts. It also aims to link EEC overseas aid to recipient countries' efforts to combat the drugs trade.

The drugs plan will involve for the first time the so-called Trevi Group, which primarily exists for EEC members to swap information on terrorism.



Douglas Hurd: 'Duty to protect citizens'

Financial Times Tuesday October 21 1986

**

EEC moves to combat terrorism and drugs

By Robert Mauthner

INTERIOR MINISTERS from the 12 European Community countries agreed yesterday on a series of joint steps to combat terrorism and illicit drug trafficking through immigration controls.

After a one-day meeting in London, Mr Douglas Hurd, the Home Secretary, said the immigration measures had been designed to protect the community at its external frontiers, while facilitating travel within the community by citizens of the members.

The ministers agreed to set up a high-level working group to study ways to strengthen checks at external community frontiers and the contribution that internal checks could make.

The group, which is expected to present its first progress report to ministers at their next meeting in London in December, will also consider stronger checks at external frontiers and, internally, the following:

- Co-ordination and possible harmonisation of visa policies.
- The role and effectiveness of frontier controls at internal community frontiers, in the fight against terrorism, drugs, crime and illegal immigration.
- Close co-operation among member states to avoid the abuse of passports.
- Measures to achieve a common policy to eliminate the abuse of the right to asylum.
- Examination of ways in which the convenience of community travellers can be improved, without adding to risks.

The ministers also adopted a plan against drug abuse through the following:

- Steps to reduce demand for drugs, especially among young people. Mr Hurd cited the British Government's advertising campaign.
- Measures to improve rehabilitation services and the treatment of addicts.
- Bilateral and community aid to help members combat drug abuse.
- Steps to ensure legislation takes account of the need to control illicit drug trafficking, particularly at the community's external frontiers.
- Mutual enforcement of orders to confiscate drug traffickers' assets.
- Enhanced co-operation by law enforcement agencies through an exchange of drugs liaison officers between countries. It is also intended to establish a global directory of those involved in fighting drug abuse, to create a network of drug liaison officers to monitor developments in drug-producing countries.
- Assessment by community ambassadors in drug-producing countries so interior ministers may receive recommendations for action.

SWP

– I have arranged to get the press statement from the Home Office press office (Mary Palau ph 213-4050)

– I also spoke to Geoff Dilling who deals with the terrorism aspects of all this ← I warned him that we might want to follow things through in which case you or I would get in touch with him.

His telephone no at the Home Office is 213-4249.

DWL.

21/10

PRESIDENCY STATEMENT BY THE HOME SECRETARY, THE Rt HON. DOUGLAS HURD CBE MP FOLLOWING THE MEETING OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY MINISTERS

(London, 20 October 1986)

Community Ministers responsible for immigration, counter-terrorism and drugs and a Vice-President of the Commission met today to study new measures designed to maintain and strengthen safeguards against terrorists, drug traffickers and others involved in serious crime and against illegal immigration, in the light of the progress being made towards freer movement within the Community.

IMMIGRATION

We all want the minimum of inconvenience to travellers within the Community. Convenient travel, reduced delays at frontiers, is good for people and for business. But we also have a duty to protect the citizens of the Community. So we have all agreed to work towards a system of easier frontier formalities for Community citizens that is not open to abuse. We set up a working group to consider urgently :

i) stronger checks at external Community frontiers ;

ii) the contribution which internal checks can make ;

./.

iii) the role of co-ordination of visa policies of member states in improving controls ;

iv) the role and effectiveness of frontier controls at internal frontiers in the fight against terrorism, drugs, crime and illegal immigration ;

v) exchange of information about the operation of spot check systems ;

vi) close co-operation to avoid the abuse of passports ;

vii) measures to achieve a common policy to eliminate the abuse of the right of asylum ;

viii) examination of ways in which the convenience of Community travellers can be improved without adding to the terrorist threat or the risks of illegal immigration, drug trafficking and other crime.

TERRORISM

The meeting noted the progress made on implementing the decisions taken on 25 September.

- Procurement of the equipment for the secure communications link between police forces is being urgently pursued.

- Work continues on intensifying liaison between counter terrorist experts.

- Arrangements have been set in place for the mutual exchange of information about people excluded from the territory of one member state so that others can have advance warning of possible risk.

DRUGS

We agreed that the Community and its member states have a major role to play in stepping up the fight against drug abuse. We have agreed a seven point plan to cover :

- measures to reduce demand for drugs especially among young people;

- measures to improve the treatment of addicts and rehabilitation services;

- ensuring that bilateral and Community aid supports as appropriate a recipient country's efforts to combat drug abuse;

- steps to ensure that legislation takes account of the need to maintain effective control over illicit drug trafficking, particularly at the Community's external frontiers;

- mutual enforcement of confiscation orders relating to drug traffickers' assets;

- enhanced co-operation between law enforcement agencies involving exchange of drug liaison officers between member states, the posting of drug liaison officers to other countries and the establishment of a world-wide directory of those involved in the fight against drug abuse: this would be achieved by inviting Trevi to examine the scope for creating a co-ordinated network of drug liaison officers to monitor developments in producer countries;

- preparation of joint assessment by Community Ambassadors in drug producing countries in order to ensure a steady flow of recommendations for action by The Twelve.

"YELLOW"

New Zealand High Commission

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Telephone: 01-930 8422 Ext:
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Reference B66/5/1A

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.

(DLO EUR LGL SEC AAD)

28 October 1986

c.c. PMD
NZSIS (TIC)
POLICE (PTIU)
DEFENCE (DDOP)

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Date	Nature of Material	Remarks
	newspaper reporting:	
	European Terrorism	
27 October 1986	Guardian report of statement by director of security firm Control Risks	
17/18 October 1986	Times two-part feature on terrorism in West Germany	

"S.W. Prior"
for High Commissioner

Terror threat to business in Europe 'rising'

FT 27/10/86

BY CHARLES BATCHELOR

THE TERRORIST threat to business in Europe, particularly to US-owned companies, is on the increase, according to a leading British expert.

The number of incidents, particularly bombings, is rising, according to Dr Peter Janke, director of research of Control Risks, a specialist security consultancy. Although many attacks had caused only slight damage, the bombers' increasing expertise and commitment indicated that greater damage would occur in future, he said.

Three factors have coincided to make Europe more dangerous, he told a seminar organised jointly with the American Chamber of Commerce in the UK.

They are: a resurgence of attacks on capitalism by Marxists; the spur given to environmentalist groups by the nuclear disaster at Chernobyl; and a response by radical Palestinian factions and supporters to the US air strike on Libya.

Any terrorist response from Syria or its supporters to the jailing on Friday of Nezar Hindawi for the attempted bombing of an El Al airliner and the closure of Syria's London embassy is likely to be directed primarily at British diplomatic or military targets overseas, Dr Janke said.

Business would come under threat only if the terrorists decided their first-line targets were too well protected

The countries most likely to be the scene of renewed terrorist action by Marxist groups are West Germany and France but Italy, Belgium, Portugal, Greece and Spain are also possible. Marxist groups are unlikely to affect business security in the UK, the Netherlands, Scandinavia or Switzerland, although the groups campaigning on nuclear power and in support of Libya may attempt action in those countries.

Dr Janke said there was no evidence that the Soviet Union funded terrorist groups in Western Europe. The risks such groups took in robbing banks and stealing weapons from military arsenals indicated that they must fall back on their own resources

To illustrate growing co-operation between terrorist groups in different European countries, Dr Janke indicated a joint statement in January 1985 by the German Red Army Faction (RAF) and the French Action Directe, announcing a united front to combat "Nato imperialism"; and a meeting in Frankfurt in February 1986 of 800 supporters of the RAF, Action Directe and the Belgian Fighting Communist Cells (CCC) "to form a common anti-imperialist front."

THE TIMES FRIDAY OCTOBER 17 1986

☆ ☆ ☆

New-breed urban guerrillas worry Bonn security forces

A week ago West German left-wing urban guerrillas struck for the first time in Bonn, the nation's capital. In the first of a two-part series, ***Philip Jacobson*** *reports on the "second generation" terrorists, successors to the Red Army Faction, as they prepare for a bloody offensive.*

There are no more than 30 of them, supported by perhaps another 50 active sympathizers. They have to finance operations with risky bank raids and steal their weapons from gun shops. They are not particularly well educated, nor, apparently, are they motivated by burning political ideology.

Yet one of Bonn's top security officials confesses that today's Red Army Faction scares him rigid. "These people are stronger than at any time in the past, and the new ones seem to be only interested in killing," says Herr Alexander Prechtel, of the Federal Prosecutor's office.

Take last week's murder of Herr Gerold von Braunmühl, a senior figure in the German Foreign Office. Immaculately planned, mercilessly executed, it was clearly intended to convey a deliberate challenge to the large and sophisticated security apparatus.

The murder weapon turned out to be the same Smith and Wesson .38 revolver used almost a decade earlier to kill Hans-Martin Schleyer, leader of the industrialists' organization. A six-page letter the hit team left nearby was written on the same typewriter that has been used to claim responsibility for two other killings early this year. The getaway car was dumped not far away with the dead man's briefcase — bullet-holed and smeared with blood — in full view on the back seat.

"They're taunting us, telling us we can't stop them," says Herr Prechtel.

It is barely two years since Bonn became aware of the emergence of a second generation faction. By the end of the 1982 virtually all the original hard core of the Baader-Meinhof Gang were dead or in jail. There was a widespread feeling that the crisis was over, the battle against internal terrorism won, although some experts warned that the relative calm merely indicated that a new network was being recruited.

The alarm bells started ringing in mid-1984, when 12 young Germans under occasional police surveillence suddenly dropped out of sight. "They just vanished, leaving everything behind, and we knew then that we were in for big trouble," Herr Prechtel recalls in the heavily-guarded Federal Prosecutor's head office at Karlsruhe.

Terror in Germany
Part 1

A spate of bombing attacks against targets broadly associated with Nato and the "military-industrial complex" was followed by the first faction assassinations for seven years, the victims selected for their association with "imperialistic" programmes such as Star Wars.

It was soon clear that the revived Red Army Faction is a much more formidable enemy than the often haphazard and disorganized Baader-Meinhof group. Its "underground" leaders have clearly learned invaluable lessons from the long public trials of their predecessors.



Herr von Braunmühl: mercilessly executed

The most graphic example of this concerns fingerprints, which have previously provided crucial evidence to convict faction terrorists.

To the dismay of the security authorities, the new wave of attacks has yielded just one set of prints, still unidentified. At a recent raid on a gun shop the terrorists laid ungloved hands all over a glass counter, but left no traces for the forensic technicians. "We believe they are coating their hands with something like the compound boxers use for sealing up cuts," says Herr Prechtel.

The same meticulous attention to detail is apparent in their explosives technology. One of their first bombs failed to go off because cold weather had drained a timing battery. The remote control device that blew up Karl Heinz Beckurts, research director of the Siemens Electronics group, and his driver last July contained an extra battery, just in case.

Most worrying of all for those hunting them, the new inner core of faction leaders is fanatically security conscious. "We haven't had a single good tip-off about them," laments one security source. "When we have pulled in suspects, all they do is threaten to kill us."

Although the terrorists have struck all over West Germany in the past 18 months, the murder of Herr Von Braunmühl was their first killing in the federal capital.

"We were braced for an operation in Bonn, but we couldn't prevent it," observes Herr Prechtel. "It's a city full of soft targets, and these new killers seem perfectly happy to go after secondary people if they can't get at the most important figures."

West Germany faces a general election in January. For the security authorities, this raises the prospect of trying to keep the faction's hit teams away from the country's most prominent politicians when the campaigning begins.

Tomorrow: Hi-tech fight against terror.

Low-key guerrillas pose a dilemma for high-tech Bonn

☆☆☆

In the second of two articles from Bonn, ***Philip Jacobson*** *examines the police use of high technology in reaction to the new generation of urban terrorists.*

It seemed at the time like a stunning breakthrough in West Germany's war against urban terrorism. In the late 1970s, a vast computer network at the Wiesbaden headquarters of the federal criminal police (BKA) was being programmed to maintain open files on each and every person suspected of having connections with the Red Army Faction.

Every scrap of information known about them would be fed into data banks for use by "target teams" assigned to hunt down one terrorist.

The touch of a key would summon up an astonishingly detailed profile; everything from childhood pictures and the names of friends at school and university to dental records, fingerprints, sometimes even "voice prints" taken from tapped telephone calls. Did the suspect always phone mother on her birthday, eat regularly in certain restaurants, prefer a revolver to an automatic pistol? The answers were all in the BKA computer, that went by the nickname "the Kommissar".

To this day, security specialists argue about the effectiveness of West Germany's high-tech approach to combating terrorism.

Supporters maintain that the Kommissar's 10 million pages of information were worth an untold number of police man-hours as the original Red Army Faction guerrillas were slowly but surely tracked down, often abroad, and taken.

Critics point out that all the computers in the world can never replace classic detective work – pavement pounding, patient observation, the professional "nose" – and note that carelessness, arrogance and sheer luck still accounted for the capture of the majority of wanted terrorists.

Faced now with the threat of the "second generation" of the Red Army Faction terrorists, West Germany's security authorities find themselves in something of a dilemma. These new terrorists, explains Herr Alexander Prechtel, of the federal prosecutor's office, are usually much harder to pin down than their high-profile predecessors.

"We keep stumbling across people who have never been under surveillance before, never appeared in any file," he said.

One such group was discovered recently with detailed plans of a key government ministry in Bonn. "Where they came from, who recruited and controlled them, remains a mystery," said Herr Prechtel.

It is no easier for the security authorites to keep tracks on the faction's essential back-up system – the 200 or so sympathizers who provide safe houses, rent or steal cars, and spy on potential victims.

He added: "We suspect such people have steady jobs and live quietly in anonymous blocks of flats in the big cities. They don't drive flashy cars or chuck their money around like some of the old guard. It's really only by chance that they get caught."

Terror in Germany
Part 2

Even so most experts in West Germany agree that computers have a vital role to play in counter-terrorist operations, especially at an international level.

It is almost 10 years since the Kommissar was put at the disposal of the Italian authorities hunting the Red Brigade's gang which kidnapped and executed Signor Aldo Moro, the former Prime Minister.

That turned out to be a notably fruitless exercise, but there is now a clear need for swift exchanges of the sort of data which can trap wanted terrorists – advance notice of movements, the numbers of phony passports or forged driving licences, recent changes in appearance.

A recent example of practical co-operation along such lines is the telex hotline linking key offices in Bonn and Paris, the result of a growing conviction in both countries that the faction is co-operating with the terrorists of France's Action Directe group.

There is, however, an important factor inhibiting the spread of computerized police work in West Germany. For obvious historical reasons, the courts, political parties and the civil liberties lobby are exceptionally alert to any extension of the state's already substantial involvement in ordinary citizens' everyday life.

Herr Prechtel acknowledges such concern, but warns that legal limitations already in force are affecting West Germany's ability to deal with the renewed faction threats.

He said: "The enemy is always one step ahead of us, always improving its capacity for terror. The state must try to keep up. Better a little loss of liberty now than a great deal in the future."

Concluded

Red Army Faction

First operation: 1971, killed three US soldiers in bomb attack on base.

Peak of terrorism: 1977, "year of the big hit", with murders of federal prosecutor and escort, prominent banker and an industrialist.

Revival of operations: 1985, and since then more than 50 bombing attacks have been carried out on public buildings, factories, power lines and the like. At least six assassinations have been claimed.

Estimated hard core membership: now 25 to 30, with 50 "active" supporters and approximately 200 other sympathizers.

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28 October 1986 FAX Page 1 of 1

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TO : WELLINGTON 3504 ROUTINE
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UK/SYRIA : AUSTRALIAN INVOLVEMENT

Our 5493

Following is article from The Canberra Times of 28 October reporting public comments by Mr Hayden and Mr Peacock on an Australian response to the UK/Syria dispute:

No Australian action yet to sever ties with Syria

CT 28/10

By ANNA GRUTZNER

The Government will not respond immediately to Britain's diplomatic action against Syria with any moves of its own, despite a call from the Opposition to withdraw the Australian Ambassador from Damascus.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Hayden, indicated yesterday it could be several weeks before Cabinet decided how it would deal with the incident.

Although he was not aware of any direct appeal from Britain, to the United States or Canada to join in imposing sanctions or diplomatic retaliation against Syria, for its terrorist activities, Australia would remain in close consultation with its allies.

However, the Opposition spokesman on Foreign Affairs, Mr Peacock, called for an urgent review of relations with Syria, including the withdrawal of the Australian Ambassador, Mr Burns.

"Those who sponsor international terrorism must realise that they will suffer diplomatic, economic and other costs," he said.

"Such passivity and disinclination to give effective cause to the western alliance leave one forever hostage to the forces of terrorism.

"The Government must now either withdraw our Ambassador in Damascus or indicate a preparedness to support the British in implementing a range of other measures, including the examination of economic sanctions."

Speaking in Sydney, Mr Hayden described the level of Australian trade with Syria as "practically negligible". Exports are confined to some cereal crops and mechanical parts, and while Qantas does not land in Damascus, it flies through Syrian air space on 28 flights to and from Europe each week.

The Australian Embassy in Damascus handles nearly 3,000 visa applications a year, mainly from Lebanese nationals.

Drafted by LMJ:MLS

Approved by .....

"YELLOW"

New Zealand High Commission

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Telephone: 01-930 8422 Ext:
Telex 24368

Reference B66/5/1A
B69/89

28 October 1986

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.
(DLO EUR LGL SEC AAD MEA)

c.c. PMD
NZSIS (TIC)
POLICE (PTIU)
DEFENCE (DDOP)

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Date	Nature of Material	Remarks
25/26 October 1986	press reporting, commentary and analysis Terrorism: Hindawi Case: Syrian Involvement in Middle East Terrorism	

for S.W. Prior
High Commissioner

Dte R6615/1A

New Zealand High Commission

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PAGE 1 OF 4.....

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EUROPEAN MEASURES ON TERRORISM AND DRUGS

Our 8649.

Community Ministers responsible for immigration, counter-terrorism and drugs met yesterday to discuss new measures designed to maintain and strengthen safeguards against terrorists and drug traffickers. The focus was on the need for improved immigration measures in the light of progress towards freer movement within the Community.

2. Attached is a statement made by the British Home Secretary following the meeting. It sets out the major decisions reached.

AUTHORISING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE: DWLeask

NAME: DEREK. LEASK

2/4

8864

PRESIDENCY STATEMENT BY THE HOME SECRETARY, THE Rt HON. DOUGLAS HURD CBE MP FOLLOWING THE MEETING OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY MINISTERS

(London, 20 October 1986)

Community Ministers responsible for immigration, counter-terrorism and drugs and a Vice-President of the Commission met today to study new measures designed to maintain and strengthen safeguards against terrorists, drug traffickers and others involved in serious crime and against illegal immigration, in the light of the progress being made towards freer movement within the Community.

IMMIGRATION

We all want the minimum of inconvenience to travellers within the Community. Convenient travel, reduced delays at frontiers, is good for people and for business. But we also have a duty to protect the citizens of the Community. So we have all agreed to work towards a system of easier frontier formalities for Community citizens that is not open to abuse. We set up a working group to consider urgently :

i) stronger checks at external Community frontiers ;

ii) the contribution which internal checks can make ;

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3/4
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iii) the role of co-ordination of visa policies of member states in improving controls ;

iv) the role and effectiveness of frontier controls at internal frontiers in the fight against terrorism, drugs, crime and illegal immigration ;

v) exchange of information about the operation of spot check systems ;

vi) close co-operation to avoid the abuse of passports ;

vii) measures to achieve a common policy to eliminate the abuse of the right of asylum ;

viii) examination of ways in which the convenience of Community travellers can be improved without adding to the terrorist threat or the risks of illegal immigration, drug trafficking and other crime.

TERRORISM

The meeting noted the progress made on implementing the decisions taken on 25 September.

- Procurement of the equipment for the secure communications link between police forces is being urgently pursued.

- Work continues on intensifying liaison between counter terrorist experts.

- Arrangements have been set in place for the mutual exchange of information about people excluded from the territory of one member state so that others can have advance warning of possible risk.

4/4
8864

DRUGS

We agreed that the Community and its member states have a major role to play in stepping up the fight against drug abuse. We have agreed a seven point plan to cover :

- measures to reduce demand for drugs especially among young people;

- measures to improve the treatment of addicts and rehabilitation services;

- ensuring that bilateral and Community aid supports as appropriate a recipient country's efforts to combat drug abuse;

- steps to ensure that legislation takes account of the need to maintain effective control over illicit drug trafficking, particularly at the Community's external frontiers;

- mutual enforcement of confiscation orders relating to drug traffickers' assets;

- enhanced co-operation between law enforcement agencies involving exchange of drug liaison officers between member states, the posting of drug liaison officers to other countries and the establishment of a world-wide directory of those involved in the fight against drug abuse: this would be achieved by inviting Trevi to examine the scope for creating a co-ordinated network of drug liaison officers to monitor developments in producer countries;

- preparation of joint assessment by Community Ambassadors in drug producing countries in order to ensure a steady flow of recommendations for action by The Twelve.

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EUROPEAN ANTI TERRORISM MEASURES
THANKS YOUR USEFUL 1242 AND 1149. WE AND OTHER DEPARTMENTS ARE A LITTLE PREOCCUPIED AT THE MOMENT. WE WILL RESPOND TO BOTH YOUR MESSAGES ASAP.
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YOUR 1106 (M).
2. FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF CABLES AND MEMORANDA SENT FROM LONDON ON VARIOUS ASPECTS OF TERRORISM SO FAR THIS YEAR.

DATE	FILE REF.	TITLE
27 JANUARY	B 66/5/1A	TERRORISM - LADY YOUNG'S STATEMENT TO LORDS
31 JANUARY	B 66/5/1A (FCO PAPER)	TERRORISM - INTERNATIONAL REACTION
25 APRIL	B 66/5/1A	FAX 3715
29 APRIL	B 69/58 (FCO PAPER)	QADHAFI AND IRISH TERRORISM
30 APRIL	B 66/5/1A	(NEWSPAPER COVERAGE)
9 MAY	B 69/58 (FCO PAPER)	LIBYA : STATE TERRORISM
19 MAY	B 66/5/1A	DEFINITION OF TERRORISM FAX 19/5/86
20 MAY	B 66/5/1A	DEFINITION OF TERRORISM CABLE 4461
29 MAY	B 66/5/1A	DEFINITION OF TERRORISM CABLE 4741
29 MAY	B 66/5/1A	DEFINITION OF TERRORISM FAX 4740

SAVINGS
THE HAGUE
BONN
PARIS
ROME
WASHINGTON
OTTAWA
NEW YORK PM
CANBERRA
VIENNA
ATHENS
MOSCOW
GENEVA.


CONFIDENTIAL

30 MAY	B 66/5/1A	DEFINITION OF TERRORISM
17 JULY	B 66/5/1A	TERRORISM (FCO PAPER)
15 SEPTEMBER	B 66/5/1A	''INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM'' (INCL. BOOKLET ''TAMIL TERRORISM IN SRI LANKA'')
22 SETPEMBER	B 66/5/1A	TERRORISM AND PARIS BOMBINGS - BACKGROUND
26 SEPTEMBER	B 86/1/2A	TREVI GROUP MEETING, LONDON

3. IN ADDITION WE HAVE SENT A REGULAR FLOW OF BACKGROUND NEWSPAPER COMMENTARY ON TERRORISM.
4. YOUR INTEREST IN KEEPING ABREAST OF EUROPEAN THINKING ON TERRORISM WAS REGISTERED WITH THE FCO EARLIER THIS YEAR. SINCE THEN WE HAVE KEPT IN TOUCH WITH THE EPC SECRETARIAT ON THE ISSUE OF TERRORISM, AS ON OTHER ISSUES. THE RESULTS OF THE TREVI GROUP'S MEETING LAST MONTH WERE SET OUT IN THE ATTACHEMENTS TO OUR B 86/1/2A OF 26 SEPTEMBER. WE PROPOSE TO REPORT ON THE DELIBERATIONS OF THE VARIOUS SUB-GROUPS SET UP BY MINISTERS NEARER THE TIME OF THE DECEMBER MINISTERIAL MEETING, WHEN KEY DECISIONS ARE TO BE TAKEN.

LON 748
151100Z
NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL



CCC

25 6 file B86/1/2A

FAP

B66/5/1A

CC; PS

CLAS: CONFIDENTIAL 15 OCTOBER 1986
FROM: LONDON
TO : WELLINGTON 8649 ROUTINE
LD : SFA (DLO EUR LGL SEC AAD)
: PMD
: NZSIS (TIC)
: POLICE (PTIU)
: DEFENCE (DDOP)
SUBJ: EUROPEAN ANTI-TERRORISM MEASURES

CONFIDENTIAL

YOUR 1106 (M).
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CONFIDENTIAL

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LON 748
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NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

B68/5/1A

THE GUARDIAN Wednesday October 15 1986

Passport 'revealed Hindawi's travels'

By Peter Murtagh

Nezar Hindawi, the Jordanian accused of trying to blow up an El-Al jumbo jet with 375 people on board, made numerous trips between the Middle East, western Europe and Eastern Bloc countries during 1984 and 1985, an Old Bailey jury was told yesterday.

A Jordanian passport seized at his brother's flat in West Berlin on the day Hindawi was arrested in London showed that Hindawi visited Poland, East and West Berlin, Syria, Britain, Italy, Romania and Bulgaria. In 1986, he used the same passport to visit Germany, Cairo, East Berlin, Syria, Britain and West Berlin, said the prosecution.

Hindawi was allegedly using a Syrian passport in the name of Issam Share when he was arrested in London. The passport was of a type normally issued to Syrians on government business.

During a visit to Britain earlier this year, Hindawi allegedly joined the Connoisseur Club in London and described himself as a Syrian diplomat.

The prosecution has alleged that Hindawi, who has pleaded not guilty, was working for Syrian military intelligence when he attempted to blow up the plane and that while trying to evade arrest, was helped find a safe house in West London by the Syrian ambassador, Dr Loutof Allah Haydar.

It is alleged that he was given a bag containing the bomb by a member of a Syrian Arab Airlines crew staying at the Royal Garden Hotel in London.

The jury heard yesterday that on April 5, someone called Z. Shourbaji, who was booked into the hotel as an SAA steward, telephoned Hindawi's father, Mr Nawid Mansour, at his home in Longbridge Road.

The prosecution concluded its case yesterday, and Mr Gilbert Gray, QC, will open the defence for Hindawi today.

LON 748
CCC

CLAS: CONFIDENTIAL 15 OCTOBER 1986
FROM: LONDON
TO : WELLINGTON 8649 ROUTINE
LD : SFA (DLO EUR LGL SEC AAD)
: PMD
: NZSIS (TIC)
: POLICE (PTIU)
: DEFENCE (DDOP)
SUBJ: EUROPEAN ANTI-TERRORISM MEASURES

CONFIDENTIAL

25 627 File B66/5/1A FAP CI PS

ACTION COPY

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LON 748
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NNNN

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(1) D [illegible]

(2) B6615/1A

ACTION COPY

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CONFIDENTIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L 14 OCTOBER 1986
FROM WELLINGTON
TO LONDON 1106(M) P R I O R I T Y
RPTD THE HAGUE BONN PARIS ROME WASHINGTON OTTAWA NEW YORK PM
CANBERRA VIENNA GENEVA ATHENS MOSCOW 1106(M) ROUTINE

25502
FAP
CLIPS

SFA (DLO EUR LGL SEC AAD)
PMD
NZSIS (TIC)
POLICE (PTIU)
DEFENCE (DDOP)

answered
15/10/86

EUROPEAN ANTI-TERRORISM MEASURES
OUR 734(M) TO YOU OF 18 JULY 1986 NOTED THAT WE AND OTHER DEPARTMENTS/AGENCIES HERE HAVE AN ONGOING INTEREST IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN ANTITERRORIST THINKING AND ANTITERRORIST MEASURES. WE WENT ON THAT BECAUSE WE WISHED TO REMAIN ACTIVELY IN TOUCH WITH THE EUROPEANS IN THE ANTITERRORISM FIELD WE SHOULD BE PLEASED IF YOU WOULD EXPRESS TO THE FCO AT THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL NZ'S KEEN INTEREST IN KEEPING ABREAST OF EUROPEAN THINKING ABOUT AND MEASURES IN COMBATTING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: AND THAT IN TALKING TO THE FCO YOU COULD SUGGEST THAT YOU WOULD WELCOME BEING REGULARLY BRIEFED IN FOREIGN MINISTERS' DECISIONS, ON DECISIONS OF THE TREVI GROUP (EC MINISTERS OF JUSTICE AND/OR INTERIOR/HOME AFFAIRS) AND ITS OFFSHOOTS AND ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EPC WORKING GROUP ON TERRORISM.

2. A NUMBER OF EUROPEAN POSTS HAVE REPORTED USEFULLY ON TERRORIST AND ANTITERRORIST DEVELOPMENTS THAT HAVE COME TO THEIR ATTENTION AND HAVE SOUGHT AND RECEIVED APPROPRIATE BRIEFINGS FROM THEIR HOST GOVERNMENTS. AS FAR AS WE CAN TELL HOWEVER WE HAVE HAD NOT/NOT REPORTING FROM YOU ON MATTERS MENTIONED IN OUR 734(M) OF 18 JULY 1986. ARE WE CORRECT? GRATEFUL YOUR EARLY COMMENTS.

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CONFIDENTIAL

P113279
140854Z WLN DR
COL: 1106(M)

B66/5/1A

Financial Times Tuesday October 14 1986

Assad denies jet bomb plot

SYRIA'S President Hafez al-Assad has denied that his government was involved in an attempt in London to place a bomb on an Israeli airliner, **Our Middle East Staff reports.**

In an interview with Time Magazine published today, President Assad asserted that "no terrorist acts were carried out from Syria, by Syrians or others." He claimed that Israeli intelligence had been behind the attempted attack on the airliner.

President Assad said that Israel had planned the operation to halt before the bomb was placed on board and then to use the matter politically. "Theoretically, they made up a plan to down the plane and created a scenario for executing the plan. But the scenario ends at the plane's doorstep when the woman carrying the briefcase hands it over to an Israeli security officer," said Mr Assad.

WLN 129/475
PP LONDON RR HAG BONN ROME GENEVA MOSCOW PARIS BRUSSELS
VIENNA ATHENS
RR OTTAWA WASHINGTON NEWYORKPM
=

C O N F I D E N T I A L 14 OCTOBER 1986
FROM WELLINGTON
TO LONDON 1106(M) P R I O R I T Y
RPTD THE HAGUE BONN PARIS ROME WASHINGTON OTTAWA NEW YORK PM
CANBERRA VIENNA GENEVA ATHENS MOSCOW 1106(M) ROUTINE

CONFIDENTIAL

25502
FAP
CLIPS

ACTION
COPY

SFA (DLO EUR LGL SEC AAD)
PMD
NZSIS (TIC)
POLICE (PTIU)
DEFENCE (DDOP)

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CONFIDENTIAL

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P113279
140854Z WLN DR
COL: 1106(M)

B6615/1A

25558

FA(P)

Clipper

ACTION COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

:)-': CONFIDENTIAL 14 OCTOBER 1986
FROM: THE HAGUE
TO : WELLINGTON 1242 - ROUTINE
RPTD: LONDON 279 - ROUTINE
LD : SFA (DLO EUR LGL SEC AAD)
       PMD
       NZSIS
       POLICE (PTIU)
       DEFENCE (DDOP)
SUBJ: EUROPEAN ANTI-TERRORISM MEASURES

YOUR 1106M.
WHEN IN OSLO AND STOCKHOLM LAST WEEK WE HAD SOME GENERAL TALKS ON TERRORISM, BUT WE ASSUME THAT IF YOU WANT MORE DETAIL WE SHALL HAVE TO OFFER SOME INPUT (OUR 1149 REFERS).
2 IN OSLO LEGAL ADVISER TRESSELT SAID TERRORISM HAD NOT BEEN A GREAT PROBLEM IN NORWAY. KURDISH REFUGEES FROM TURKEY HAD NOT BEEN INFILTRATED BY PKK AS IN SWEDEN. THERE WAS A QUESTION MARK OVER THE SIKHS. AT THE TIME OF INDIRA'S ASSASSINATION THE INDIAN CHARGE, A SIKH, HAD DEFECTED AND WAS GRANTED A RESIDENCE PERMIT. SINCE THEN HE HAD ENGAGED IN POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND HAD BEEN VISITING PAKISTAN.
2 TRESSELT SAID HE ''IMAGINED'' THERE WERE CONTACTS AMONGST NORWEGIAN POLICE/INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITIES AND THEIR FOREIGN COUNTERPARTS. FOR ITS PART MFA HAD ENCOURAGED CONTACTS AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION WITH TREVI GROUP AND OTHER COUNTRIES SUCH AS CANADA AND USA. FOLLOWING THE US AIR RAIDS ON LIBYA NORWAY SAW ADVANTAGE IN BRINGING THE US INTO A MULTILATERAL CONTEXT IN ORDER TO DISCOURAGE SUCH UNILATERAL ACTIONS. IT WAS A GENERAL AIM TO GET ALL WESTERN COUNTRIES TO WORK ALONG THE SAME LINES SINCE ACTING AGAINST TERRORISM ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS WAS ''AN UP-HILL STRUGGLE''. NORWAY WOULD BE ATTENDING A COUNCIL OF EUROPE MEETING ON TERRORISM IN STRASBURG NEXT MONTH. WHEN WE ASKED WHAT WOULD BE ACHIEVED TRESSELT ANSWERED THAT IT WAS A MATTER OF ''PEP-TALKS AND STOCK-TAKING, OF ENCOURAGING THE RIGHT PEOPLE TO GET TOGETHER''. HE DID NOT SEEM TO ENVISAGE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FORMAL STRUCTURES.

4 IN STOCKHOLM WE FOUND THAT MFA HAD EARLIER THIS YEAR DESIGNATED A SENIOR OFFICER VIDAR HELLNERS TO WORK FULL TIME ON TERRORISM. HE HAS DIRECT ACCESS TO THE MINISTER. IT IS PROBABLE THAT HIS SECTION WILL BE EXPANDED.
5 HELLNERS NOTED THAT HIS APPOINTMENT WAS U/L NOT U/L THE CONSEQUENCE OF PALME'S ASSASSINATION. THE TERRORISM PROBLEM HAD IN ANY CASE BEEN GROWING. MFA ASPECTS HAD BEEN DEALT WITH ON A GEOGRAPHIC BASIS AND THERE WAS A NEED FOR CO-ORDINATION, THE IDENTIFICATION OF TRENDS, ASSESSMENT OF HOW SWEDISH INTERESTS WERE AFFECTED, THE ORGANISATION OF INITIATIVES ETC. HELLNERS TRAVELLED A GREAT DEAL IN WESTERN COUNTRIES. IT WAS A MATTER OF BUILDING UP A NETWORK OF CONTACTS, OF KNOWING WHO COULD BE RELIED ON TO DO WHAT. OTHER WESTERN MFAS WERE ALSO APPOINTING SPECIALISTS.
6 AS FOR THE TERRORIST THREAT IN SWEDEN HELLNERS SAID THERE WAS STILL A GREAT QUESTION MARK OVER PALME'S ASSASSINATION, BUT APART FROM THAT THE MAIN TROUBLE STEMMED FROM THE M.E. SWEDEN HAD GOOD RELATIONS WITH ARAFAT AND MAINSTREAM PLO BUT MANY FACTIONS, SOME WHOLLY TERRORIST, HAD INFILTRATED REFUGEE GROUPS IN SWEDEN. THERE HAD BEEN NO ATTACKS AGAINST SWEDEN ITSELF BUT IT WAS PROBABLY BEING USED AS A BASE FOR OPERATIONS ELSEWHERE.
7 KURDS MOSTLY OF TURKISH SOME OF IRAQI ORIGIN WERE DIVIDED INTO MANY FACTIONS, THE MOST BLOODY BEING THE REVOLUTIONARY MARXIST PKK. THERE WERE MANY INTERNAL FEUDS AND KILLINGS.

SOME OFFENDERS HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED AND WERE SUBJECT TO POLICE SURVEILLANCE BUT SWEDEN WAS NOT PREPARED TO EXPEL THEM TO TURKEY. IT WAS A SECURITY DILEMMA. KURDS HAD BEEN MENTIONED IN CONNECTION WITH PALME'S ASSASSINATION BUT THERE WAS NO PROOF OF THEIR INVOLVEMENT.

8 THERE WERE A NUMBER OF SHINING PATH PERUVIANS IN SWEDEN AND THE PERUVIAN EMBASSY HAD WARNED OF THE DANGER OF TERRORIST ATTACKS. SO FAR THERE HAD BEEN NO INCIDENTS.

9 NO EVIDENCE YET OF IRA OR ACTION DIRECT.

10. THE BAADER MEINHOF GANG HAD BEEN ACTIVE IN THE 70'S (ATTACK ON GERMAN EMBASSY, ATTEMPT TO KIDNAP SWEDISH MINISTER) BUT WAS NOT NOW OPENLY ACTIVE. IT WAS SUSPECTED THAT MEMBERS ''SLEPT'' IN SWEDEN. THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEM IN EXPELLING THEM TO FRG IF IDENTIFIED.

11 THERE WERE 6-7000 SIKH'S IN SWEDEN WHO WERE A POTENTIAL SOURCE OF TROUBLE .

12 THERE HAD BEEN CASES OF CROAT TERRORISM IN THE 1970S. ONE OF MAIN OFFENDERS WAS TO BE RELEASED FROM PRISON IN 18 MONTHS. MORE RECENTLY TROUBLE WAS COMING FROM THE KOSOVOS. THERE WERE 6000 YUGOSLAV REFUGEES IN SWEDEN.

13 HELLNERS NOTED THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE STREAM OF REFUGEES INTO SWEDEN AND THE GROWTH OF THE TERRORIST THREAT (BUT SEE OUR MEMO ON REFUGEES.) IN HIS RECENT GOVT STATEMENT P M CARLSSON SAID ''EVERY EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO COMBAT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. THIS STRUGGLE MUST NOT, HOWEVER, BE ALLOWED TO UNDO THE WORK OF DECADES OF REMOVING OBSTACLES TO INTERNATIONAL CONTACTS.''

CONFIDENTIAL

14 HELLNERS SAID THAT TO COMBAT TERRORISM INTERNATIONAL POLICE COOPERATION HAD TO BE STRENGTHENED. SWEDEN HAD MANY BILATERAL CONTACTS IN WESTERN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA. IT WAS WORKING TOWARDS COOPERATION WITH THE TREVI GROUP AND WAS AN OBSERVER ON ONE OF ITS POLICE SUB-COMMITTEES. SWEDEN HAD A POLITICAL PROBLEM IN WORKING TOO CLOSELY WITH EC ORGANISATIONS BUT SINCE TERRORISM WAS NOT AN EAST-WEST PROBLEM SOME KIND OF SOLUTION MIGHT BE POSSIBLE. THE SWEDES WERE ''BROODING ON THIS''. THE BRITISH WERE URGING A SOLUTION.

15 PART OF THE WORK OF THE TREVI GROUP CONCERNED COMMON ACTION ON VISA POLICY AND EXPULSIONS. THE EUROPEAN NEUTRALS FEARED THIS MIGHT RESULT IN TERRORISTS BEING DUMPED INTO THEIR COUNTRIES.

16 SWEDEN WOULD BE ATTENDING THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE MEETING NEXT MONTH TO PARTICIPATE IN DRAFTING OF CONVENTIONS ON TERRORISM.

17 HELLNERS SAID HE WAS READY TO CALL ON US IN THE HAGUE IF WE HAD FURTHER QUESTIONS. DO YOU HAVE ANY POINTS FOR US TO RAISE WITH HIM?

HAG 933
14/1605 LT
NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

B66/5/1 1A

UNCLAS SECURE 14 OCTOBER 1986
FROM WELLINGTON
TO BONN 689 P R I O R I T Y
SAVINGS (VIA LONDON) OTHER EC POSTS

UNCLASS SECURE

25490
FAP
CLIPS

SFA (EUR LGL SEC DLO)
PMD
NZSIS
POLICE (PTU)
EIB
DEFENCE (DDOPS)

FRG : MURDER OF FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL
YOUR 1264. GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE
FROM MR NORRISH TO MEYER-LANDRUT-
BEGINS
I WAS SHOCKED TO HEAR REPORTS OF THE MURDER OF YOUR COLLEAGUE
VON BRAUNMUEHL LAST FRIDAY.
ALTHOUGH I DID NOT KNOW HIM PERSONALLY, I AM AWARE OF THE HIGH
RESPECT IN WHICH HE WAS HELD BOTH BY HIS COLLEAGUES, BY HIS MINISTER,
AND BY THOSE EMBASSIES, SUCH AS OUR OWN, WHICH WORKED IN COOPERATION
WITH HIM.
I SHOULD LIKE TO PASS ON THE SYMPATHEY OF MY MINISTRY TO YOUR AND
TO HIS FAMILY.
ENDS

=

UNCLASS SECURE

P113197
140623Z WLN DR
COL: 689

B102/6/5

ACTION COPY

[redacted]

PFGJW
[redacted]OR

13/10.

B 14/10 → C.C. B6615/1A

SA (C5) → FILE

(3) Below is the action required. Does Lt. Reynolds have the contact to make the enquiry. If not, we will need to discuss with Steward Prior. 13/10.

WLN12/393
RR LONDON ROME
RR OTTAWA
=

CONFIDENTIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L 13 OCTOBER 1986
FROM WELLINGTON
TO LONDON 4189 CANBERRA 3143 OTTAWA 1082 ROUTINE
RPTD ROME 751 ROUTINE

25382
Min Admin

SFA (SEC ADM EUR LGL CCO CMS)

ITALY : NEW DIPLOMATIC BAG AND BAGGAGE PROCEDURES
ROME'S 892, 893 AND 901 TO WELLINGTON REFER.
2. WE ARE CONSIDERING OUR RESPONSE TO THE NEW MEASURES ANNOUNCED BY THE ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY AND WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR EARLY ADVICE OF INTENDED RESPONSES BY YOUR VARIOUS CAPITALS.
3. IN MEANTIME WE HAVE SOUGHT ADVICE FROM NZSIS AND GCSB ON THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE ITALIAN PROCEDURES AND PENDING ADVICE TO THE CONTRARY INTEND NO CHANGE TO OUR PRESENT PROCEDURES FOR DESPATCH OF SAFEHAND AND AIRFREIGHT BAGS.

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P112594
130509Z WLN DR
COL: 4189 3143 1082 751

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Ray Milburn
210 6800

Re Joe Montague.

PKM

ACTION COPY

ZCZC
ROM 898
CCC

CONFIDENTIAL

25333

FAP
CWPS

CLAS: CONFIDENTIAL 19 OCT 1986
FROM: ROME
TO : WELLINGTON 991 - P R I O R I T Y
RPTD: LONDON 1499 PARIS 117 CANBERRA 54 OTTAWA 23 WASHINGTON 38
BRUSSELS 83 - ALL ROUTINE
LD : SFA (ADM, SEC, EUR, LGL, CCO, CMS)
SUBJ: ITALY: NEW PROCEDURES AT AIRPORTS AND FRONTIERS GOVERNING DIPLOMATIC BAGS AND BAGGAGE

OUR 892 AND 893.

WE HAVE NOT ACKNOWLEDGED RECEIPT OF THE ITALIAN NOTE VERBALE., AND YOU WILL NO DOUBT BE CONSIDERING WHAT SHOULD BE YOUR REACTION TO THE FORMALISATION BY A WESTERN GOVERNMENT OF A RIGHT BY A RECEIVING STATE TO SEARCH ELECTRONICALLY THE DIPLOMATIC BAGS AS WELL AS PERSONAL BAGGAGE OF OTHER COUNTRIES' REPRESENTATIVES ENTERING IN ITS TERRITORY. THE LARGER POLITICAL DIMENSION DESERVES FULL ATTENTION, GIVEN INCREASING WORLD SYMPATHY FOR INNOVATIVE MEASURES AGAINST TERRORISM. IT HAS ALSO TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT THAT ITALY HAS BEEN ACUTELY AFFLICTED WITH INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN RECENT YEARS (THOUGH LATELY NOT AS MUCH AS FRANCE) AND ITS NEED TO ACT IN ITS OWN DIRECT VITAL INTERESTS MUST BE RATED VERY HIGH IN VIEW OF ITS CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE MIDDLE EAST/NORTH AFRICA SCENE. THOUGH IT MAY BE NOTED THAT ITS CONTINUING RECORD OF DOMESTIC TERRORISM IS JUST AS FORMIDABLE IF NOT MORE SO (MAFIA AND OTHERWISE). CERTAINLY THERE HAS ARISEN IN RECENT MONTHS AN ACUTE LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT CONCERN HERE OVER TERRORISM (MORE ESPECIALLY AFTER THE LIBYAN ATTACK ON LAMPEDUSA

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AND NOW IN LIGHT OF THE PARIS BOMBINGS AND INCREASING INDICATIONS THAT THE DIPLOMATIC CHANNEL HAS BEEN MISUSED FOR TERRORISM PURPOSES IN SEVERAL COUNTRIES.) BOTH PRACTICAL REASONS AND PUBLIC RELATIONS HAVE THEREFORE BROUGHT ABOUT THE DESIRE TO CRACK DOWN ON ANOTHER IMPORTANT FRONT I.E. DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS, INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND THEIR PERSONNEL. WHETHER SPECIFIC CLANDESTINE INFORMATION HAS CONTRIBUTED TO THE IMPOSITION OF THESE CONTROLS IN ITALY AT THIS JUNCTURE IS NOT AN ASPECT OF WHICH WE ARE AWARE.

2. THERE CAN BE LITTLE IF ANY OBJECTION TO SIZE (U/L) CONTROLS., BUT THE ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY HAS UNDOUBTEDLY STRUGGLED AT LENGTH FOR A MEANS OF BRINGING THE ELECTRONIC SCRUTINY (U/L) OF BAGS AND BAGGAGE WITHIN THE TERMS OF THE VIENNA DIPLOMATIC CONVENTION. ON THE REALLY IMPORTANT ISSUE OF DIPLOMATIC BAGS IT IS STILL AN EXTREMELY NARROW LEGAL CONSTRUCTION TO CONCLUDE THAT AS LONG AS YOU DO NOT ACTUALLY ''OPEN'' THE BAG IN THE TRADITIONAL OLD PHYSICAL SENSE, IT IS NOT ''OPENING'' THE BAG IN CONVENTION TERMS TO ARRANGE TO EXAMINE ITS CONTENTS BY A MORE MODERN METHOD. IT IS DECLARED IN THE NOTE THAT THE CONTROLS ''WILL BE SUCH AS NOT TO ALLOW THE READING OF CORRESPONDENCE''. THIS MAY BE TRUE OF WHAT THE ITALIANS INTEND. BUT THE PRECEDENT OF ELECTRONIC SCRUTINY, ONCE SANCTIONED, MUST LEND ITSELF TO THE CARRYING OUT OF MORE SOPHISTICATED (E.G. TOMOGRAPHIC) SURVEILLANCE, ON THE PART OF SOME COUNTRIES, WHICH WOULD NOT NECESSARILY LEAVE CORRESPONDENCE INVIOLATE. THAT PROSPECTIVE RISK MUST CONCERN ALL COUNTRIES.

3. THE QUESTION OF X-RAYING DIPLOMATS' PERSONAL BAGGAGE (WHETHER ACCOMPANIED OR UNACCOMPANIED) PROBABLY DOES NOT MATTER TOO MUCH. IN ORDER TO GET ON PLANES, DIPLOMATIC AGENTS NORMALLY PUT CABIN BAGGAGE, WHETHER CONTAINING DOCUMENTS OR NOT, THROUGH AIRPORT X-RAY CONTROLS., AND HONG KONG AIRPORT, FOR EXAMPLE, ALREADY REQUIRES AN X-RAY SCAN OF ALL (U/L) HOLD SUITCASES (AND NOT JUST CABIN HANDBAGS) ON FLIGHTS OUTWARD TO PEKING. THE LATTER PRACTICE HAS OBTAINED FOR SOME TIME AT ROME AIRPORT ON FLIGHTS TO CERTAIN MIDDLE EAST DESTINATIONS.

4. THE DIPLOMATIC BAG AS SUCH, HOWEVER, IS A WORRY CONSIDERING THAT (EVEN IF WE MAY FOR THE TIME BEING BE RELAXED ABOUT THE DOCUMENTARY CONTENT) IT IS PRESUMABLY PREJUDICIAL FOR COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT AND PERHAPS TOOLS TO BE DISCLOSED EVEN IN OUTLINE BY SOME FORM OF SCAN. IT IS NOT MUCH COMFORT IN THAT CASE TO HAVE THE ASSURANCE, WHICH THE ITALIAN NOTE SETS OUT, THAT THE SCRUTINY CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED ONLY IN THE PRESENCE OF THE COURIER OR DIPLOMATIC AGENT CONCERNED.

5. FROM VARIOUS ORAL COMMENTS MADE BRIEFLY BY ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY CONTACTS TO OURSELVES AND E.G. THE CANADIANS, THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT IN RESPECT OF WESTERN COUNTRIES SUCH AS THE OLD COMMONWEALTH THE VERBAL NOTE IS OF THEORETICAL EFFECT IN THAT WE ARE UNLIKELY TO HAVE OUR BAGS EXAMINED., OR (WE ASSUME) THAT SO LONG AS WE INDICATE WHEN WE MAY HAVE SENSITIVE (E.G. COMMUNICATIONS MATERIAL) OF AN NON-DOCUMENTARY KIND COMING IN, WE CAN MAKE A CAST-IRON ARRANGEMENT IN ADVANCE TO GUARANTEE THAT IT STANDS NO CHANCE OF SUBJECTION TO AN INVESTIGATIVE CONTROL. BEFORE TAKING UP SUCH QUESTIONS AND POSSIBILITIES WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, HOWEVER, WE WOULD NEED YOUR VIEWS BOTH ON THE LEGAL SITUATION AND ON THE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS (PARTICULARLY AS TO SENSITIVE COMMUNICATIONS-RELATED EQUIPMENT) THAT YOU SEE. THE LATTER IS NOT A MATTER WE ARE COMPETENT TO JUDGE.

6. AT THE MOMENT, A QUICK CHECK OF OUR FRIENDS SHOWS THAT THE AUSTRALIANS, CANADIANS AND BRITISH HAVE REPORTED THE ITALIAN NOTE BACK TO CAPITALS BUT WITHOUT AS YET SUGGESTING A RESPONSE. BUT IT IS THOUGHT THAT THE BRITISH, WHO ARE STILL DELIBERATING, MAY HOLD A STRONG POSITION IN PRINCIPLE ON IT, OF THE SORT REPORTED IN THE ENCLOSURE TO OUR MEMORANDUM OF 26 SEPTEMBER.

7. PERHAPS, IN THE INTERESTS OF COMITY, AND IN LIGHT OF THE DISTORTIONS OF TRADITIONAL INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE THAT HAVE BEEN BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE STRUGGLE AGAINST TERRORISM IN THE LAST FEW YEARS, IT MAY BE POLITIC TO MAKE LITTLE FORMAL FUSS AS LONG AS IN A PRACTICAL WAY OUR MORE ESSENTIAL INTERESTS (E.G.

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RELATION TO COMMS EQUPMENT) ARE PRESERVED BY ARRANGEMENT BEHIND THE SCENES. ANOTHER POSSIBILITY IS TO ARRANGE THE NECESSARY BACKROOM UNDERSTANDINGS, BUT NONETHELESS LODGE A POLITE FORMAL OBJECTION FOR THE RECORD (WHICH ONE WOULD HOPE THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD RECEIVE WITHOUT TOO MUCH PAIN OR PRACTICAL COUNTER-REACTION). A FORMAL OBJECTION MIGHT FOR EXAMPLE SAY THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF A GENERAL INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT ON THIS SUBJECT (AND NOTING THAT NO OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRY HAS TAKEN SUCH A STEP) WE DO NOT ACCEPT THAT IN TERMS OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION THE GOVERNMENT OF ITALY HAS THE RIGHT TO SUBJECT NEW ZEALAND DIPLOMATIC BAGS TO ELECTRONIC SCRUTINY, AND THAT WE DO NOT ACCEPT THAT OUR BAGS MAY BE SO EXAMINED, NOTWITHSTANDING OUR APPRECIATION OF THE NEEDS WHICH THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT MIGHT FEEL IN RELATION TO THE ACTIVITIES OF OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY., AND (B) THAT WE WOULD INDEED EXPECT AS A MATTER OF RIGHT TO BE INFORMED IF IT WERE PROPOSED THAT ANY OF OUR BAGS WERE TO BE EXAMINED, AND IN THAT EVENT TO TAKE WHATEVER ACTION IS NECESSARY IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES TO PRESERVE OUR OWN IMPORTANT INTERESTS.

8. OUR OWN PRESENT PRACTICAL SITUATION IS THAT THE BRITISH WHO CARRY IN OUR SAFEHAND MATERIAL BY COURIER ARE EXPERIENCING NO DELAYS., AND OUR AIRFREIGHT BAGS APPEAR TO BE COMING THROUGH NORMALLY. YOU MAY WISH TO NOTE HOWEVER THAT WITHIN A MONTH OR TWO WE EXPECT A VISIT FROM THE COMMS TECHNICIAN BASED IN LONDON WHO WOULD OF NECESSITY CARRY A SAFEHAND BAG CONTAINING RELATED MATERIALS. WEHAVE ALSO BEEN SEEKING TO ARRANGE WITH PARIS THE DESPATCH TO US OF ALL FILES, ETC CONCERNING THE ACCREDITATIONS TO SPAIN AND PORTUGAL, WHICH MAY WELL HAVE TO COME HERE MAINLY IN A BULK CONSIGNMENT THROUGH A ROAD FRONTIER.

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UNCLASS SECURE

UNCLAS SECURE 8 OCT 1986
ROME
: WELLINGTON 892 - P R I O R I T Y
TD: LONDON 137 PARIS 115 CANBERRA 53 OTTAWA 21 WASHINGTON 36
BRUSSELS 81 - ALL ROUTINE
LD : SFA (ADM, SEC, EUR, LGL, CCO, CMS)
SUBJ: ITALY: NEW PROCEDURES AT AIRPORTS AND FRONTIERS GOVERNING DIPLOMATIC BAGS AND BAGGAGE

25183
FAP.
Cmps

OUR 849. YESTERDAY WE RECEIVED THE LONG AWAITED CIRCULAR NOTE (OF 4 OCTOBER) FROM THE ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY DETAILING THE NEW CONTROLS BEING INSTITUTED AT ITALIAN AIRPORTS AND OTHER FRONTIER POSTS REGARDING DIPLOMATIC BAGS AND DIPLOMATIC BAGGAGE. IT ALSO COVERS IN SIMILAR TERMS THE BAGS AND BAGGAGE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS HERE AS WEL AS CONSULATES.
2. THE TEXT OF THIS NOTE AND OUR FULL TRANSLATION OF IT WILL BE SENT IN TOMORROW'S BAG. MEANTIME OUR IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM SETS OUT THE BEST SUMMATION WE CAN MAKE OF IT (E. & O.E.) AT THIS STAGE PENDING OUR FINDING OUT QUITE WHAT IT MAY AMOUNT TO IN PRACTICE FOR US. SOME MORE IMMEDIATE COMMENTS WILL BE SENT IN A FURTHER MESSAGE.
3. THE NOTE CONTAINS, IN ADDITION TO THE NEW PRESCRIPTIONS, AN INTRODUCTORY PAGE ON TERRORISM GENERALLY AND ITALY'S STRUGGLE AGAINST IT, AND ON THE NEED TO COMPLY WITH GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW INCLUDING THE VIENNA CONVENTIONS ON DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR RELATIONS. THE NOTE CONCLUDES WITH A PARAGRAPH WHEREBY ''THE

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ITALIAN GOVERNMENT LOOKS TO THE TRADITIONAL COOPERATION OF DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS ACCREDITED TO ITALY, AND OF THE ORGANISATIONS WITH HEADQUARTERS OR OFFICES IN ITALY, IN THE CONVICTION, GIVEN THE IMPORTANCE AND DELICACY OF THE QUESTIONS MENTIONED IN THIS NOTE, THAT THEY WILL WISH TO COLLABORATE IN THE APPLICATION OF THE VARIOUS MEASURES DESCRIBED''.

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CLAS: UNCLAS SECURE 8 OCT 1986
FROM: ROME
TO : WELLINGTON 893 - P R I O R I T Y
RPTD: LONDON 138 PARIS 116 CANBERRA 52 OTTAWA 22 WASHINGTON 37
BRUSSELS 82 - ALL ROUTINE
LD : SFA (ADM, SEC, EUR, LGL, CCO, CMS)
SUBJ: ITALY: NEW PROCEDURES AT AIRPORTS AND FRONTIERS GOVERNING DIPLOMATIC BAGS AND BAGGAGE

25184
FAP.
CMPS

FOLLOWING IS OUR SUMMARY OF THE MAIN TERMS OF THE VERBAL NOTE OF 4 OCTOBER RECEIVED YESTERDAY FROM THE ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY. WE SHOULD ADD THAT IN THIS WE HAVE REFERRED TO ''X-RAY CONTROLS'' AS A ROUGH TRANSLATION OF THE ITALIAN TEXT'S REFERENCES TO ''CONTROLLI RADIOGENI'', AN EXPRESSION WHICH OF COURSE WOULD COVER A VARIETY OF RAY-SCAN METHODS AND INSTRUMENTS. BEGINS:

A. THE NOTE STATES THAT FOR THE PURPOSE OF PREVENTING ATTACKS ON THE SECURITY OF THE STATE AND THE LIVES OF PERSONS, X-RAY CONTROLS ARE TO BE INSTITUTED BOTH ON THE PERSONAL BAGGAGE OF DIPLOMATIC AGENTS ENTERING ITALY AND ON DIPLOMATIC BAGS AS SUCH CONSIGNED TO MISSIONS HERE. THE CONTROLS WILL NOT ALOW ''THE READING OF CORRESPONDENCE'' AND THEREFORE (ACCORDING TO THE NOTE) WILL BE IN FULL COMPLIANCE WITH ART.27, PARA 2 OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

B. DIPLOMATIC BAGS MAY BE TRANSITED ONLY VIA A SPECIFIED LIST OF ITALIAN AIRPORTS, SEAPORTS, AND RAIL OR MOTORWAY FRONTIER POSTS. (THIS SEEMS A REASONABLY AMPLE LIST).

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C. DIPLOMATIC BAGS QUALIFYING AS SUCH UNDER ART.27, PARA 4 OF OF THE IVENNA CONVENTION MUST BE OF A SIZE ENABLING X-RAY CONTROL., I.E. THEY MAY NOT EXCEED 90CM WIDE BY 70CM HIGH, BUT WITH NO FIXED LIMIT OF LENGTH. IN THE CASE OF ACCOMPANIED DIPLOMATIC BAGS TRANSITING THE LISTED AIRPORTS THE BAGS MAY NOT EXCEED 60CM WIDE BY 40CM HIGH, EXCEPT AT THE ROME AIRPORTS OF FIUMICINO AND CIAMPINO WHERE THE LARGER MEASUREMENTS PREVIOUSLY INDICATED CAN APPLY.

D. IF X-RAY CONTROLS DISCLOSE THE PRESENCE OF OBJECTS WHICH THERE MAY BE REASON TO PRESUME MAY NOT BE RECONCILABLE WITH THE AGREED PROVISIONS OF ART 27, PARA 4 OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION, THE NATIONAL FRONTIER AUTHORITIES RESERVE THE RIGHT TO TAKE ''APPROPRIATE MEASURES'', BUT ''IN COMPLIANCE WITH ART.27, PARA 3'' OF THE CONVENTION. (IT IS NOT INDICATED WHAT THESE ''APPROPRIATE MEASURES'' MAY BE, BUT ON THE BASIS THAT UNDER ART.27, PARA 3, THE DIPLOMATIC BAG ''SHALL NOT BE OPENED OR DETAINED'' WE ASSUME SOME SUCH PROCEDURE APPLYING AS SENDING, OR REQUIRING TO BE SENT, THE SUSPECT BAG BACK TO THE COUNTRY OF ORIGIN.)

E. IT IS STRONGLY EMPHASISED THAT THE COMPETENT FRONTIER AUTHORITIES HAVE INSTRUCTIONS TO PROCEED TO THE X-RAY CONTROL OF DIPLOMATIC BAGS ONLY IN THE PRESENCE OF THE COURIER OR, IN ANY EVENT, OF AN AGENT FROM THE DIPLOMATIC MISSION CONCERNED.

F. IN REFERRING TO THE IMPOSITION OF THESE FRONTIER X-RAY MEASURES OF CONTROL TO THE PERSONAL BAGGAGE OF DIPLOMATIC AGENTS, THE NOTE RECALLS THAT THIS BAGGAGE CAN, UNDER ART.36, PARA 2, OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION, BE INSPECTED ''IN THE PRESENCE OF THE DIPLOMATIC AGENT OR OF HIS AUTHORISED REPRESENTATIVE'' WHERE IN THE RECEIVING COUNTRY'S JUDGEMENT THE REASONS CONTEMPLATED IN THAT PROVISION APPLY. FOR THE PERSONAL HAND-LUGGAGE OF DIPLOMATIC AGENTS ON DEPARTURE OR IN TRANSIT THERE IS NO LIMITATION AS TO THE PARTICULAR FRONTIER POSTS, PORTS, ETC, THROUGH WHICH THE BAGGAGE MAY PASS. IN THE CASE OF PERSONAL HAND-LUGGAGE OF DIPLOMATIC AGENTS ON DEPARTURE OR TRANSIT THROUGH AIRPORTS, THE VARIOUS SIZE RESTRICTIONS RELATING TO DIPLOMATIC BAGS AS SUCH WILL SIMILARLY APPLY.

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CLAS: UNCLASSIFIED 13 OCTOBER 1986
FROM: BONN
TO : WELLINGTON 1264 - PRIORITY
RP : PARIS 144 - ROUTINE
BRUSSELS 189 - ROUTINE
LONDON 305 - ROUTINE
SVGS: ROME THE HAGUE WASHINGTON NEW YORK PR
LD : SFA (SEC/EUR/DLO/LGL)
PMD
NZSIS
POLICE (PTU)
EIB
DEFENCE (DDOPS)
SUBJ: FRG : TERRORISM.

YOU WILL HAVE SEEN MEDIA REPORTS OF KILLING ON FRIDAY NIGHT OF DR VON BRAUNMUEHL, HEAD OF ONE OF THE POLITICAL SECTIONS IN THE FRG FOREIGN MINISTRY (IE EQUIVALENT OF DEPUTY SECRETARY). VON BRAUMUEHL WAS A HIGHLY RESPECTED FOREIGN POLICY ADVISER AND A CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER, WITH A LEADING ROLE ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND UN QUESTIONS.

2 THE MURDER APPEARS TO REPRESENT A WIDENING OF THE TERRORIST CAMPAIGN BY THE RAF TO ENCOMPASS UNPROTECTED TARGETS SUCH AS PUBLIC SERVANTS. WE EXPECT THAT THERE WILL NOW BE A FURTHER TIGHTENING OF GOVERNMENT SECURITY IN BONN.

3 RECENT ARRESTS OF AN RAF MEMBER AND SYMPATHISERS HAVE PROVIDED SECURITY AUTHORITIES WITH EVIDENCE THAT SEVERAL FEDERAL POLITICIANS WERE ON THE RAF 'HIT LIST' AS WERE FOUR MINISTRIES IN BONN. THE FOREIGN MINISTRY WAS HOWEVER NOT AMONG THEM AND IT IS A PUZZLE AS TO WHY THE RAF CHOSE TO TARGET A MAN WHO DOES NOT FIT INTO THE KNOWN TERRORIST CONCEPT OF ''REPRESSIVE MACHINERY''. IN THE LETTER CLAIMING RESPONSIBILITY, VON BRAUMUEHL'S WORK WITH OTHER DIRECTORS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF ''EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION'' WAS CRITICISED, ESPECIALLY HIS ''PERMANENT DISCUSSIONS AND AGREEMENT

ON POLITICAL SITUATIONS IN PARTICULAR WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT''. THE LETTER ALSO DESCRIBED HIM AS A ''CONTROL INSTRUMENT OF THE IMPERIALISTIC CHAIN, WHICH UNDER US LEADERSHIP AIMED AT STRENGTHENING THE POWER SYSTEM''.

4 CHARGE HAS SENT MESSAGE OF SYMPATHY FROM THE EMBASSY TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES WHICH HAD A CLOSE WORKING ASSOCIATION WITH VON BRAUMUEHL HAVE SENT MESSAGES AT FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL. WE SUGGEST THAT A MESSAGE FROM MR NORRISH TO HIS COUNTERPART, STATE SECRETARY MEYER-LANDRUT, MIGHT ALSO BE APPROPRIATE

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UNCLAS SECURE 09 OCTOBER 1986
FROM WELLINGTON
TO LONDON 4143 ROUTINE

SFA (PERSONAL TO WATKINS)

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ILO ONLY

PERSONAL FOR STUART PRIOR FROM MURRAY WATKINS:
TERRORISM
THANKS YOUR MEMORANDUM B66/5/1A AND B69/17 DATED 15 SEPT 86 ENTITLED ''TERRORISM''. IT WOULD MAKE THINGS EASIER HERE IF FUTURE MEMORANDA/CABLES ON THIS SUBJECT COULD INCLUDE IN APPROPRIATE CASES A WELLINGTON DISTRIBUTION ALONG THE LINES SET OUT IN ADMINISTRATION CIRCULAR 1983/45 OF 13 DECEMBER 1983 AND MR NORRISH'S ALL POSTS TELEGRAM A154 OF 21 DEMBER 1984 IE SFA (DLO, RELEVANT GEOGRAPHICAL DIVISION(S), SEC LGL), PMD, NZSIS, POLICE (PTIU), EIB, DEFENCE (DDOPS), WHERE AIRCRAFT ARE INVOLVED: TRANSPORT (AVIATION SECURITY), AND WHERE PASSPORT/VISA MATTERS ARE INVOLVED: SECLAB (IMMIGRATION).
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CLAS: CONFIDENTIAL 1 OCTOBER 1986
FROM: BRUSSELS
TO : WELLINGTON 1296 - ROUTINE
RPTD: PARIS 326 : ROME 244 : LONDON 537
SVGS: (VIA LON) ATHENS THE HAGUE BONN

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Chips

LD : SFA (EUR LGL DLO SEC)
EIB
PMD
POLICE (PTIU)
DEFENCE (DDOPS DDI)
NZSIS
TRANSPORT (AVIATION SECURITY)

SUBJ: EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION : TERRORISM, 25 SEPTEMBER

ROME'S 849 TO YOU.
ALONG WITH AUSTRALIANS WE OBTAINED A BRIEFING FROM JENARD, DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION IN THE INSPECTORATE GENERAL OF THE BELGIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ON THE RESULTS OF THE SO-CALLED TREVI GROUP COMPRISING EC INTERIOR MINISTERS, AT THEIR MEETING ON 25 SEPTEMBER ON TERRORISM. WHILE REPRESENTATIVES OF FOREIGN MINISTRIES ENJOY ONLY OBSERVER STATUS AT THESE MEETINGS, BELGIAN MFA IS TAKING A PARTICULARLY CLOSE INTEREST GIVEN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF EPC COORDINATION MACHINERY ON TERRORISM IN THE FORM OF THE ''TROIKA'' OF COUNTRIES COMPRISING THE CURRENT AND IMMEDIATE PAST AND FUTURE EC PRESIDENTS. ACCORDING TO JENARD, THE COORDINATING EFFORT ON TERRORISM WILL RELATE NOT ONLY TO THE EC TWELVE BUT LATER WILL ALSO BE EXTENDED TO LIKE-MINDED THIRD COUNTRIES.

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2. JENARD DIVIDED THE TREVI GROUP'S WORK ON 25 SEPTEMBER INTO THREE TIERS - WORK OF AN IMMEDIATE, PRACTICAL NATURE., WORK ON WHICH FURTHER COORDINATION WILL BE REQUIRED AMONG EC., AND WORK MORE APPROPRIATELY PURSUED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE. AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE RECENT INCIDENTS IN PARIS, THERE WAS UNANIMITY ON THE NEED TO STRENGTHEN INFORMATION SHARING PROCEDURES AMONG TWELVE. JENARD DID NOT GO INTO DETAILS, BUT AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, THE MEASURE SIMPLY COMES DOWN TO THE MAINTENANCE OF A BLACKLIST OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS, AND THEIR ACTIVITIES, REGULARLY UPDATED AND SHARED VIA A SECURE COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK. AN OFFICIALS GROUP WILL MEET ON 9 DECEMBER TO TAKE THIS WORK FURTHER. THIS MEASURE SUPPLEMENTS, OF COURSE, THOSE ESTABLISHED IN 1984/85 TO POOL INFORMATION ON TERRORIST ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED UNDER DIPLOMATIC COVER WITH WHICH NEW ZEALAND ASSOCIATED ITSELF. ACCORDING TO JENARD, THAT PROCEDURE IS NOW WELL ESTABLISHED AND OPERATING EFFECTIVELY. IT IS PERHAPS NOTEWORTHY THAT FRANCE WHICH IN THE PAST HAS STOOD ASIDE FROM THIS FULLY COORDINATED APPROACH, ADVOCATED WITHIN THE TREVI GROUP THAT LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES (JENARD MENTIONED UNITED STATES, NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIA) SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO PARTICIPATE IN AND TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE BROADER INFORMATION POOL.

3. THE SECOND TIER OF ACTION DISCUSSED IN THE TREVI GROUP CONCERNED THE PREVENTION OF ABUSES OF DIPLOMATIC STATUS AND MORE BROADLY, OF VISAS. BECAUSE THESE MATTERS FALL OUTSIDE THE COMPETENCE OF TREVI GROUP MINISTERS THERE WILL NEED TO BE FURTHER CONSULTATION BETWEEN THEM AND THEIR RESPECTIVE MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. THE FORMER, HOWEVER, RELATES TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF DIPLOMATIC BAGS. JENARD ACKNOWLEDGED THE DIFFICULTY OF ESTABLISHING STRICTER CONTROL MEASURES ON DIPLOMATS WITHOUT PREJUDICING THE VIENNA CONVENTION, AND IT WAS FOR THIS REASON HE SAID THAT FURTHER DISCUSSION IS REQUIRED. MEANWHILE THERE IS, OF

COURSE, NOTHING TO IMPEDE THE ADOPTION OF NATIONAL MEASURES, AS ITALY HAS ANNOUNCED ITS INTENTION TO DO, PENDING ANY EC TWELVE DECISION.

4. ON THE QUESTION OF VISAS, JENARD WAS DISMISSIVE OF PRESS SPECULATION IN THE WAKE OF THE PARIS BOMBINGS THAT A COMMON EUROPEAN VISA WAS IN PROSPECT TO ENSURE COMMON STANDARDS OF BORDER CONTROL. HE CITED SPANISH TOURIST INTERESTS (SOME 2 MILLION MOROCCANS VISIT ANNUALLY) AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE FORMIDABLE NATIONAL INTERESTS THAT ALWAYS COLLIDE WITH PROPONENTS OF A SINGLE VISA. THAT SAID, HOWEVER, JENARD NOTED TREVI GROUP HAD LOOKED AT PRACTICAL WAYS TO MAKE THE POLICING OF VISAS MORE EFFECTIVE. ONE WAY WAS SIMPLY TO TIGHTEN UP BORDER SECURITY. ANOTHER IS TO PREVENT TERRORISTS FROM TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE ''TWO AIRPORT'' PROBLEM (PARIS) BY DISAPPEARING IN TRANSIT BETWEEN THEM.

5. THE THIRD LEVEL OF ACTION RELATES TO EXTRADITION. TREVI GROUP DECIDED THAT GIVEN THE EXISTENCE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON EXTRADITION, AN INSTRUMENT OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, PROPOSALS TO STRENGTHEN IT OR HARMONISE PROCEDURES PURSUANT TO IT SHOULD BE LEFT TO THAT FORUM WHEN IT MEETS AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL ON 14 AND 15 NOVEMBER. JENARD IMPLIED THAT CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS WOULD MAKE THE QUESTION OF EXTRADITION ONE ON WHICH CONSENSUS WOULD BE HARD TO ACHIEVE. OF EC MEMBER STATES, ONLY IRELAND AND FRANCE ARE NOT PARTIES TO EUROPEAN CONVENTION, THOUGH THE FORMER HAS APPARENTLY SIGNIFIED ITS INTENTION SOON TO RATIFY. CHIRAC'S INDICATION RECENTLY REPORTED IN THE PRESS THAT FRANCE MAY FOLLOW SUIT WAS DISMISSED BY JENARD AS A ''FRENCH WALTZ''.

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7. JENARD MENTIONED SOME BILATERAL PRESSURE FROM THE UNITED STATES ON SOME EUROPEAN COUNTRIES INCLUDING BELGIUM TO TAKE ANOTHER LOOK AT THE POLITICAL EXCEPTIONS TO EXTRADIITION AND TO WITHDRAW THEIR RESERVATIONS TO THE RELEVANT ARTICLE IN THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION. WITHOUT DIVULGING FURTHER DETAILS OF THE BILATERAL APPROACH, JENARD SAID THAT CONSISTENTLY WITH OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (THE HIJACKING CONVENTIONS) BELGIUM ALREADY COMPLIED WITH AMERICAN WISHES ON THAT SCORE.

8. JANARD SAID THAT AMONG OTHER IDEAS RAISED IN THE TREVI GROUP BUT NOT TAKEN ANY FURTHER AT THIS STAGE, WAS THE CIRCULATION OF WANTED POSTERS OF TERRORISTS, EXAMINING THE QUESTION OF ECONOMIC REFUGEES AND LOOKING AT THE LINKS BETWEEN TERRORISM AND ORGANISED CRIME.

9. IN CONCLUSION, JENARD CHARACTERISED THE MEETING AS A GOOD, POSITIVE ONE IN WHICH MINISTERS CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED A POLITICAL WILL TO TAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES. IN PURSUANCE OF THE ROLE THAT BELGIUM SEES ITSELF PLAYING IN THE TROIKA AND LATER AS EC PRESIDENT, JENARD WELCOMED OUR INTEREST IN THE TREVI GROUP MEETING, AND INVITED FURTHER DISCUSSION AS THE SEQUENCE OF MEETINGS ROLL ON.

COL 1296
BRU 385
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B66/5/1B.

30 September 1986

Mr A D Watts CMG
Deputy Legal Adviser
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Whitehall SW1

Dear Arthur

I understand that during your meeting in New Zealand you expressed interest in obtaining some material about the Rainbow Warrior affair and that Chris promised to let you have copies of the Chief Justice's comments in passing sentence on Mafart and Prieur and of the Secretary-General's ruling. These are now enclosed. Also enclosed are copies of the New Zealand/France bilateral agreements which complemented the ruling. Chris thought that you might also be interested in seeing those agreements.

Finally, Chris asked me to pass on his best regards.

I look forward to seeing you for lunch on Thursday week. I hope also that we may see you for the reception on Wednesday 8 October.

Regards

L. J. W. Ludbrook

Julian Ludbrook

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

WELLINGTON

16 September 1986

Mr Julian Ludbrook
New Zealand High Commission
LONDON

Dear Julian,

By the time that you get this letter you will have learnt officially that the recent Antarctic Minerals meeting in Whangaroa was a very considerable success.

In the course of the meeting Arthur Watts expressed an interest in laying his hands on some material relating to the Rainbow Warrior affair. I promised him

a a copy of the Chief Justice's comments in passing sentence on Mafart and Prieur; and

b a copy of the Secretary-General's ruling.

It occurs to me that he might also be interested, although he didn't specifically ask for it, in

c the New Zealand/France bilateral agreements which implemented the ruling.

... I attach a copy of (a), (b) and (c) and would be grateful if you could pass the material on to Arthur when you next see him. Please also give him my best regards.

Yours sincerely,

(Chris Beeby)

B 86/1/2A
c.c. B 66/5/1A

26 September 1986

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs
WELLINGTON

(Att : EUR)

c.c. External Intelligence
Bureau, WELLINGTON

TERRORISM - COORDINATION OF EC EFFORT

Interior and Justice Ministers of the Twelve (the Trevi Group) held an emergency meeting in London on 25 September to review how better to coordinate joint activities against terrorism.

2. The Ministers agreed to the setting up of secure communications links among the EC's police forces, and to reviews of visa and extradition procedures and of airport security measures. In addition they agreed to examine the possibility of measures to curb abuses of diplomatic immunity. As the meeting's Chairman, Mr Douglas Hurd, indicated, these could include the scanning of diplomatic bags in circumstances where the receiving country believed diplomatic privilege was being abused.

... 3. Copies of press reports of the meeting are attached for your information.

4. The Ministers are scheduled to meet again next month and in early December to examine progress on the reviews they have set in train.

S. W. PRIOR

S.W. Prior
for High Commissioner

European code agreed to curb terror leaders

By Michael Evans, Whitehall Correspondent

Mr Douglas Hurd, the Home Secretary, yesterday announced important steps for improving co-operation within the EEC to help to seek out and "disrupt" the terrorist organizations in Europe.

After the emergency meeting of the Trevi Group of EEC interior ministers in London, Mr Hurd and his European counterparts expressed optimism that the measures agreed would produce more speedy and effective action against the terrorists.

In particular, the 12 ministers have agreed that all the European police forces must share a new communications system for alerting one another on the movement and activities of known terrorists.

Officials at the conference disclosed that this will mean the introduction of a special classified coded system to which only the police and security authorities will have access.

There will also be new arrangements within the Trevi Group for regular up-to-date assessments of terrorist threats and to target the main leaders and organizations.

Mr Hurd, who chaired the conference, made it clear that the police forces in Europe would select from the "thousands of suspects" a small number identified as "really dangerous and significant". Those suspects would be given priority treatment by the police throughout the EEC.

Mr Hurd said:"As terrorists have become better organized, so governments and their counter-terrorist forces are having continually to improve their knowledge and co-operation if they are to prevent terrorist attacks and take effective counter-action if they occur."

He added: "These new measures will help us to target terrorists' movements supplies of money, arms and equipment, so that we can harry and disrupt them."

Mr Hurdlisted instances where European co-operation had brought successes in recent months: stopping the IRA bombing campaign last summer before it began, the interception in France of an arms shipment for Irish terrorism, the arrest of members of the Irish National Liberation Army in Paris and the arrest of Provisional IRA members in Amsterdam.

The EEC ministers reaffirmed their determination not to make any concessions to terrorists and to intensify their efforts against terrorism.

Other measures which are now to become the focus of urgent discussion will include an examination of visa arrangements and a study of extradition procedures to stop terrorists from slipping through any legal loopholes.

There was also unanimous agreement to review security checking systems at airports and to examine more ways of eliminating diplomatic abuses.

The EEC ministers concentrated their efforts on taking steps that would bring quick results. That was in response to the crisis faced by the French Government after the bomb attacks in Paris.

Officials last night emphasized that for the first time all EEC countries seemed ready for the fullest possible cooperation to combat the terrorists threat.

One official said that the French would now be prepared to put up posters of wanted terrorists from other countries, something which in the past they have refused to do.

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ACTION COPY

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FAP

CLIPS

CLAS: CONFIDENTIAL 25 SEPT 1986
FROM: ROME
TO : WELLINGTON 849 - ROUTINE
RPTD: LONDON 132 CANBERRA 49 OTTAWA 29 WASHINGTON 34
BRUSSELS 89 PARIS 109
LD : SFA (EUR, LGL, MEA, AMER, CLO, SEC) EIB, PMD, POLICE (PTIU)
DEFENCE (DDOPS, DDI) NZ SIS
SUBJ: ITALY: TERRORISM: NEW PROCEDURES AT AIRPORTS AND ITALIAN FRONTIERS

OUR 798 AND 808 (NOT TO BRUSSELS AND PARIS). WE, LIKE OTHER EMBASSIES, STILL AWAIT ADVICE FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AS TO EXACTLY WHAT NEW MEASURES ARE TO BE INTRODUCED HERE IN REGARD TO DIPLOMATIC BAGGAGE AND BAGS. THE FACT OF THE MATTER IS THAT WHEN EARLIER THIS MONTH THE ITALIAN COUNCIL OF MINISTERS DECIDED IN BROAD TERMS THAT SOME ACTION MUST BE TAKEN TO COPE WITH THE POSSIBLE CONVEYANCE OF TERRORIST MATERIAL IN DIPLOMATIC BAGS OR BAGGAGE, THEY THREW IT OVER TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY TO WORK SOMETHING OUT. THE MINISTRY IS OBVIOUSLY MUCH MORE CONSCIOUS OF THE DIFFICULTY OF PROCEEDING WITH MORE RIGOROUS CONTROLS, BUT WE GATHER THAT SOME NEW PROCEDURES ARE BEING SUBMITTED TO ANDREOTTI, WHICH IF APPROVED MAY BE DISSEMINATED AFTER A FEW DAYS.
2. ON OUR ENQUIRING, THE BRITISH EMBASSY TELL US THEY ASSUME THIS TOPIC (LIKE THAT OF FRANCE'S NEW BORDER CONTROLS) WILL COME UP IN THE COURSE OF TODAY'S MEETING OF EC MINISTERS OF THE INTERIOR IN LONDON, BUT LARGELY IN THE SENSE THAT (IN ITALY'S CASE) OTHER COUNTRIES WILL BE ASKING WHAT THE ITALIANS ARE UP TO. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN, HOWEVER, WHETHER MINISTER SCALFARO WILL BE IN A POSITION TO RESPOND ACCURATELY.

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3. OUR UNDERSTANDING IS, INCIDENTALLY, THAT AN EC INTERIOR MINISTERS MEETING HAD ORIGINALLY BEEN PLANNED FOR NEXT MONTH BUT BROUGHT FORWARD TO NOW AT THE REQUEST OF FRANCE AND THE FRG ON THE ARGUMENT THAT, IN LIGHT OF THE PARIS BOMBINGS, IT SHOULD TAKE UP THE THEMES OF SECURITY AND TERRORISM. THE BRITISH SAY THERE IS LITTLE GENERAL ENTHUSIASM FOR THE DISCUSSION, OR EXPECTATION THAT ANYTHING VERY USEFUL WILL EMERGE. THE MEETING'S ESSENTIAL PURPOSE WILL BE TO REGISTER POLITICAL SYMPATHY WITH FRANCE IN ITS HOUR OF NEED, AND DISPLAY COMMON BACKING FOR ITS STAND.
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CLAS: CONFIDENTIAL 23 SEP 86

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FROM: PARIS
TO : WELLINGTON 2158 ROUTINE
RPTD: ATHENS 90 - ROUTINE : BONN 159 - ROUTINE :
BRUSSELS 226 - ROUTINE : GENEVA 148 - ROUTINE :
THE HAGUE 163 - ROUTINE : LONDON 351 - ROUTINE :
NEW YORK PM 134 - ROUTINE : ROME 156 - ROUTINE :
VIENNA 49 - ROUTINE : WASHINGTON 136 - ROUTINE :
LD : PMD
EIB
DEFENCE (DDOPS, DDI)
NZSIS
POLICE (PTIU)
SFA (EUR, LGL, MEA, AMER, DLO, SEC)

FAP
CIPS

2385S

SUBJ: FRANCE : TERRORISM

FRANCE, AND PARIS IN PARTICULAR, REMAINS IN A STATE OF SHOCK AS A RESULT OF THE WAVE OF TERRORIST BOMBINGS WHICH HAS STRUCK THE CAPITAL CITY IN THE PAST TWO WEEKS KILLING EIGHT PEOPLE TO DATE AND MAIMING AND INJURING MORE THAN 150. THE ATTACKS IN PARIS HAVE BEEN CLAIMED BY GROUPS CALLING THEMSELVES THE CSPPA (COMITE DE SOLIDARITE AUX PRISONNIERS POLITIQUES ARABES) AND THE PDL (PARTISANS DU DROIT ET DE LA LIBERTE) IN COMMUNIQUES ISSUED THROUGH WESTERN NEWS AGENCIES IN BEIRUT. MORE ATTACKS HAVE BEEN PROMISED. IN ADDITION TO THE BOMBINGS, THE FRENCH MILITARY ATTACHE IN BEIRUT WAS MURDERED OUTSIDE HIS EMBASSY A FEW DAYS AGO AND THERE HAVE BEEN PERSISTENT ATTACKS ON THE FRENCH CONTINGENT OF THE UN FORCE IN LEBANON. THREE FRENCH SOLDIERS WERE BLOWN UP BY A CAREFULLY PLACED LAND MINE WHEN THEY WERE JOGGING NEAR THEIR BASE IN LEBANON ABOUT TWO WEEKS AGO. FIVE MORE WERE INJURED LAST FRIDAY, COINCIDING WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE ON UNIFIL. FINALLY THOUGH TWO FRENCH NATIONALS WHO WERE HELD HOSTAGE IN LEBANON BY EXTREMIST GROUPS WERE RELEASED IN JULY FOLLOWING INTENSIVE FRENCH DIPLOMACY IN MIDDLE EAST CAPITALS, SEVEN OTHER FRENCH CIVILIANS ARE STILL HELD - TWO OF THEM NOW FOR 18 MONTHS - WITH NO EARLY RESOLUTION IN SIGHT.

2. THIS ADDS UP TO WHAT MIGHT BE DESCRIBED AS A CONCERTED ATTACK ON FRENCH INTERESTS IN THE CONTEXT OF THEIR MIDDLE EAST POLICY

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PARTICULARLY ITS POLICY ON THE LEBANONS AND HAS, NOT SURPRISINGLY, GIVEN RISE TO MUCH SOUL-SEARCHING HERE AS TO THE WISDOM OF SOME PAST DECISIONS E.G. SUPPORT FOR IRAQ AND THE MANNER OF HANDLING OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE RELEASE OF THE FRENCH HOSTAGES. THE NOW WIDESPREAD CONVICTION OF ANALYSTS IS THAT THERE IS A GOOD DEAL MORE BEHIND THE LATEST ROUND OF ANTI-FRENCH ACTIONS THAN A SERIES OF OPERATIONS BY SMALL GROUPS OPPOSED TO THE FRENCH FOR EITHER POLITICAL OR, IN THE CASE OF THE LEBANESE TERRORIST IMPRISONED IN FRANCE, GEORGES IBRAHAM ABDALLAH, FAMILY REASONS. (ABDALLAH IS PRESUMED LEADER OF THE FARL: FRACTIONS ARMEES REVOLUTIONNAIRES LIBANAISES.) THE CONCLUSIONS IS THAT THE CHARACTER OF THE RECENT ATTACKS IS SUCH THAT THEY COULD ONLY BE THE RESULT OF SOPHISTICATED PLANNING BY A TERRORIST APPARATUS WITH A LEVEL OF RESOURCES AND SUPPORT WHICH COMES FROM GOVERNMENTS. THE TWO REGIMES THOUGHT MOST LIKELY TO BE PLAYING A ROLE ARE THOSE IN TEHRAN AND DAMASCUS WHERE THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS TO NORMALISE RELATIONS APPEAR AT LEAST FOR THE MOMENT TO HAVE RUN INTO SERIOUS ROAD BLOCKS.

3. WHAT ARE THE FEATURES OF THESE RECENT INCIDENTS WHICH MARK THEM OUT FROM THE FAIRLY REGULAR BOMB ATTACKS WHICH HAVE BEEN PART OF THE PARIS SCENE FOR SOME YEARS NOW? FIRST, THEY ARE DESIGNED TO BRING THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE POLITICAL PRESSURE TO BEAR ON THE GOVERNMENT BY TARGETTING THE CIVILIAN POPULATION IN PLACES DENSELY FREQUENTED BY ORDINARY CITIZENS AT PEAK HOURS - IN THIS WAY THE ENTIRE POPULATION APPEARS TO BE AT RISK - 'NEXT TIME IT MAY BE WHERE I(U/L) GO SHOPPING'. SECOND, THEY HAVE BEEN EXECUTED ACCORDING TO A PRECISELY CALCULATED TIMETABLE.

- AT THE VERY MOMENT ON 21 MARCH WHEN JACQUES CHIRAC WAS TAKING OVER POWER FORMALLY FROM HIS PREDECESSOR IN THE WAKE OF THE RIGHT-WING VICTORY IN THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS A BOMB WENT OFF IN A CROWDED SHOPPING ARCADE ON THE CHAMPS ELYSEES. AFTER THE GOVERNMENT MOVED TO DEAL WITH RENEWED THREATS THE TERRORISTS STRUCK ON 8 SEPTEMBER AT THE HOTEL DE VILLE ITSELF, CHIRAC'S RESIDENCE AS MAYOR.

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- AFTER THE RESTAURANT BOMBING AT THE 'LA DEFENSE' COMPLEX ON 13 SEPTEMBER A POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION WAS QUICKLY MADE OF ONE OF GEORGES ABDALLAH'S BROTHERS AND THE POLICE DISTRIBUTED 'WANTED' POSTERS FOR HIM AND ANOTHER BROTHER INDICATING THAT THEY WERE ON FRENCH TERRITORY AND PRIME SUSPECTS IN THE CRIME. EVEN AS THE POSTERS WERE GOING UP BOTH BROTHERS PRESENTED THEMSELVES TO THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS IN THEIR HOME VILLAGE KOBEYAT IN NORTHERN LEBANON DENYING ANY PART IN THE PARIS OPERATION AND OFFERING THEIR SERVICES TO HELP IN THE ENQUIRY. THE POLICE HAVE NOT RULED OUT THEIR INVOLVEMENT - THE TIMINGS WERE SUCH THAT THEY COULD JUST HAVE MADE THE ATTACK AND FLOWN BACK TO LEBANON IN TIME FOR THEIR MEETING WITH THE PRESS.
- ON 14 SEPTEMBER CHIRAC WAS IN THE TELEVISION STUDIO TO ANNOUNCE THE PACKAGE OF NEW GOVERNMENT MEASURES INTENDED TO MEET THE TERRORIST CRISIS WHEN ANOTHER BOMB WENT OFF ON THE CHAMPS ELYSEES KILLING THE POLICEMAN WHO WAS TRYING TO REMOVE IT.
- SUBSEQUENT ATTACKS HAVE ESCALATED THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE AS WELL AS UNDERLINED A CAPACITY TO CHOOSE TARGETS AT WILL. THE DAY AFTER CHIRAC'S ANNOUNCEMENT AND WITH THE PRESIDENT THEN ON A LONG PLANNED STATE VISIT TO INDONESIA, IT WAS THE HEARH OF A CENTRAL PARIS POLICE STATION WHERE PEOPLE WERE QUEUEING FOR DRIVERS' LICENCES - THE AREA IS ALWAYS HEAVILY POLICED. ON 17 SEPTEMBER A BOMB WAS DEPOSITED FROM A CAR IN A NARROW STREET ON THE LEFT BANK - IT WENT OFF OUTSIDE A POPULAR CHEAP CLOTHING DEPARTMENT STORE AT RUSH HOUR. ANOTHER ABDALLAH BROTHER WAS POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED AS BEING AT THE SCENE OF THE ATTACK AND HE TOO TURNED UP IN KOBEYAT THE DAY AFTER. IN ADDITION TO THE THREE ABDALLAH BROTHERS, THE FRENCH POLICE HAVE 'WANTED' NOTICES OUT IN CONNECTION WITH THE PARIS BOMBINGS FOR SIX OTHERS, THREE OF THEM WOMEN TWO OF THOSE ALSO TURNING UP SINCE IN KOBEYAT.

4. THE QUESTIONS ALSO BEING POSED IS WHY THE CAMPAIGN IS BEING

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SO CLEARLY DIRECTED AT THE ADMINISTRATION IN ITS EARLY STAGES. CHIRAC HAS ENOUGH DIFFICULTIES ON HIS PLATE IN THE DELICATELY BALANCED 'COHABITATION' SITUATION WITHOUT HAVING TO FACE A CRISIS ON SECURITY MATTERS WHICH IS EXACTLY THE MOST SENSITIVE AREA IN WHICH CONSTITUTIONAL THEORISTS HAVE SPECULATED A SERIOUS CONFLICT OF ROLES BETWEEN PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER MIGHT OCCUR. EVEN MORE IMPORTANTLY, AS WE HAVE REPORTED ELSEWHERE, THE POLITICAL RIGHT IN FRANCE, CORRECTLY IT SEEMS, PICKED THAT A HARD LINE ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS HAD CONSIDERABLE ELECTORAL APPEAL. AS A CONSEQUENCE, WHEN HE CAME TO POWER, CHIRAC MADE A GREAT DEAL OF HOW HE WAS, WITH HIS TOUGH INTERNAL AND POLICE MINISTERS, GOING TO CLEAN UP THE INTERNAL SECURITY OF THE COUNTRY (THIS INCLUDED VIOLENT CRIME AS MUCH AS IT DID POLITICAL TERRORISM). IN THIS FORWARD POSITION ON SECURITY MATTERS THEREFORE, THE CHIRAC GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN SEEN AS A RIPE TARGET FOR THE PRESSURE BROUGHT TO BEAR BY THE LATEST UNBRIDLED OUTBURST OF TERRORISM.

5. THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THEREFORE IN THE MINDS OF MANY OBSERVERS THAT WHAT WE ARE NOW WITNESSING IS AN ALL OUT EFFORT BY ISLAMIC INTERESTS KEEN TO DOMINATE IN THE MIDDLE EAST (MOST PROBABLY IRAN AND SYRIA IN THE VANGUARD), BY MEANS OF SOPHISTICATED TERRORIST ACITVITY TO PUT PRESSURE ON FRANCE TO PULL BACK FROM ITS HIGH PROFILE MIDDLE EAST INVOLVEMENT. THIS ACTION, THE ANALYSIS RUNS IS RELATED TO A PERCEPTION BY ISLAMIC INTERESTS THAT MOVEMENT ON THE CENTRAL PROBLEMS IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS NOW ON THE HORIZON AND THAT NEGOTIATIONS MAY NOT BE FAR OFF WHICH WILL LEAD TO A SHAKE-DOWN IN THE SHARING OF POWER AND INFLUENCE IN THE REGION DETERMINING THE SHAPE OF THINGS TO COME. IT IS A MOMENT TO TRY AND TAKE THE FRENCH PIECE OFF THE BOARD.

6. THE GOVERNMENT'S PUBLIC RESPONSE HAS BEEN RESOLUTE. IT HAS REJECTED ANY CONCESSION TO THE BLACKMAIL IMPLICIT IN THESE ATTACKS AND PROMISED THAT NEITHER THE TERRORISTS NOR THOSE WHO MANIPULATE THEM WILL GO UNPUNISHED. THE PRESIDENT HAS UNDERLINED HIS ONENESS WITH THE GOVERNMENT IN THIS EFFORT. CHIRAC

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WENT ON TELEVISION AGAIN AFTER THE LATEST ATTACK WITH AN ALMOST CHURCHILLIAN APPEAL FOR NATIONAL SOLIDARITY IN THE FACE OF ADVERSITY. ACCORDING TO OPINION POLLS, THE APPEAL HAS EVOKED A STRONGLY POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM THE FRENCH PEOPLE AND THERE HAS BEEN A DEGREE OF CLOSING OF THE RANKS AT LEAST IN PUBLIC AMONG THE LEADERS OF THE MAIN POLITICAL PARTIES. IN PARIS ITSELF THERE IS NO VISIBLE PANIC AND THERE IS GOOD CIVIC COOPERATION WITH THE SECURITY CHECKS BEING ENFORCED AND WITH STORES AND SUPERMARKETS, CINEMAS, SCHOOLS, COOPERATING WITH THE POLICE BY INTRODUCING THEIR OWN SECURITY CHECKS. THE THINNING OF THE CITY'S CROWDS IS HOWEVER APPARENT IN ANTICIPATION OF A FURTHER ATTACK OR ATTACKS TO COME.

7. OUR OWN ADVICE TO EMBASSY PERSONNEL AND NEW ZEALAND VISITORS WHO HAVE CONTACT WITH THE EMBASSY IS TO BE AWARE OF AND COOPERATE WITH THE SECURITY MEASURES AND TO USE CAUTION IN VISITS TO HEAVILY FREQUENTED AREAS ESPECIALLY DURING PEAK HOURS. (NATURALLY THIS IS AN AREA WHERE SENSATIONAL REPORTING ABONDS AND WE HAVE SEEN OURSELVES MISQUOTED ON THIS SCORE IN A REPORT FROM LONDON IN THE ''EVENING POST'' OF 19 SEPTEMBER.)

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B66/5/1A

The wages of fear, and of terror

The most faithful reflection abroad of the maze of interconnected crises in the Middle East is the French entanglement in them, which lies behind the current wave of terrorism and consequential fear across the Channel. The assertion of the police that the onslaught is exclusively aimed at the release of the Lebanese terrorist Georges Ibrahim Abdallah cannot any longer be taken seriously. Under successive governments France has ventured more deeply into the labyrinth even than the superpowers, both of which have had their fingers burned (and are much less vulnerable to attack at home). We can be sure that if the French had not voluntarily become involved they would not be suffering now. For all the evil and unspeakable brutality, there is a sense in which the present crisis in France increasingly emerges as a self-inflicted wound.

The French have willingly supplied Iraq with sophisticated weapons to sustain its war against Iran, but in recent months have also sought to improve contacts with Tehran. This unpromising attempt to have it both ways is related to the seven French hostages held by Muslim extremists in Lebanon, over whom only the Iranian Mullahs seem to have influence. The fate of the hostages in turn is linked with the rash decision by Paris in February to deport two Iraqi dissidents back to Baghdad. While this may have been beneficial to the French arms industry (although it operates in the briskest of seller's markets), it also provoked Iran's friends in Lebanon. Now Paris is trying to get the two Iraqis back, but not swiftly or earnestly enough to appease the Beirut kidnappers, who have just added a renewed threat against the hostages to the enormous pressure on the French government. As the Paris newspaper Liberation recently observed, nearly all the protagonists in the Middle East suddenly seem to have a score to settle with France. The reason for that can only be that the French have tried to be nearly all things to nearly all men in the region, the surest way eventually to antagonise all the mutually hostile groups, who survive by being suspicious of everyone and quick on the draw.

To a much greater extent than Britain, France has sought since the end of empire to retain influence in the many countries it once directly ruled. This policy was designed to benefit everything from French linguistic and cultural prestige to trade and France's sustained attempt to retain an important role in the world. In Africa, on the whole, the strategy has worked; in the Middle East it has sunk, like the aspirations of other outside powers, into the regional morass of factionalism and wars. Lebanon was always the most likely place for French policy to founder because it is the most unstable state in the area, because everybody from the Israelis to the Iranians is involved as well and because the French have maintained an extraordinarily high profile there. It can be no coincidence that the French contingent in the UN force in Lebanon (the largest) should have been singled out for attack at the same time as the Lebanese terrorists ran wild in Paris.

The terror campaign seeks to humiliate the French Government and Mr Chirac, the Prime Minister, in particular. For the moment it has had the opposite effect, uniting the Socialist President Mitterrand and his conservative premier, and all parties except the National Front, which demands even tougher action to serve its racialist goals. Mr Chirac is right to resist the call for the return of the guillotine, which would immediately become a martyr-machine, and equally right to look for ways to improve security. France's allies should offer unstinted aid, an opportunity which the European Community will soon be able to take up. But the French Government has shown flimsy respect for civil liberty from the moment it took office six months ago, and nothing would serve the terrorists (or the National Front) quite so well as more of the same, the greatest social threat to France in the present crisis. Like terrorism in many other countries, this campaign needs to be tackled at its root, which is French Middle Eastern policy. Consistency would help; dignified disengagement would be better.

"YELLOW"

New Zealand High Commission

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Reference B66/5/1A

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Wellington.
(EUR)

22 September 1986

c.c. E.I.B.
c.c. PARIS

We forward herewith the under-mentioned material:

Date	Nature of Material	Remarks
21 September 1986	press clippings: terrorism /Paris bombings Observer and Sunday Times commentaries	

"J W PRIOR"

S.W. Prior
for High Commissioner

CHIRAC'S THE TARGET OF TERROR

● The presidential ambitions of Jacques Chirac, France's prime minister, may rest on his ability to fight the terrorists. BRIAN MOYNAHAN reports

8/9/12
Times

THE terrorists waited until the Parisians had streamed back from the beaches and reclaimed the city from tou[illegible] at the beginning of the month. Bistros reopened, summer tans faded and a tinge of brown appeared on the trees in the Luxembourg Gardens. Autumn was here. So was terrorism.

The first victims, on September 4, were lucky. A bomb was placed under a seat in a tube train during rush-hour at the Gare de Lyons.

Passengers actually saw it detonate, but the 19 sticks of plastic explosive failed to explode.

Four days later, a bomb went off in the post office at the city hall, killing a woman and spraying blood and glass across the counters. After another four days, people queuing for lunch at a self-service restaurant five miles to the west were scythed down.

Despite increasing security, and the deployment of police and the paramilitary Compagnie Republicaine de Securité in stations and outside stores, the Champs Elysées was the next target. A man ordered an orange juice in the crowded bar of the Renault showrooms. He walked out without drinking it, leaving a bouquet of flowers and a parcel behind. The parcel was taken to a basement, where it exploded, killing a policeman.

Impotence, anger and fear increased last week. A blast destroyed the driving licence office in the main police headquarters near Notre-Dame. On Wednesday, when schools had closed and mothers were taking their children shopping, a bomb was thrown on the pavement outside a clothing store in Montparnasse. Five people died.

Paris is not riddled with panic, but it is edged with anxiety. There is more traffic during the day, as people avoid the Metro, and less at night; tables are free at restaurants that are normally packed.

Flowerpots that could conceal a bomb are being removed from the boulevards. There are rumours that schools or museums will be next. And there is the fear that comes from the indiscriminate nature of the attacks. No social class, no colour, no district has been singled out. It is enough to be Parisian.

In Lebanon, as shown by Thursday's murder of the military attaché in Beirut and the continued detention of the seven hostages and the attacks on Unifil troops, it is enough to be French.

The bombings are part of a campaign to free a convicted Lebanese terrorist, Georges Abdallah, from a French jail. But they also play a pivotal role in the political aspirations of the prime minister, Jacques Chirac.

The bombings could break him. Or, depending on his handling of them, they could make him the next president.

PARIS is Chirac's fief. He as been mayor since 1976, the first since the office was abolished after the Commune rising of 1871. It is his showcase for the 14-hour days, the restless energy and the can-do confidence that he trusts will take him to the presidency.

He is called the "Caesar mayor". He has brought the city "cleanliness agents" who bestride specially-built machines to obliterate graffiti and dog excrement; he has brought new gardens stocked with roses named after his wife and new sports halls that serve as a base for his bid for the 1992 Olympics.

In return, Paris has given him a reputation while in opposition and the public exposure he needs to move to the presidential Elysée Palace by 1988. Appointed prime minister after the narrow conservative victory in March, he has stayed on as mayor.

The Solidarity Committee for Arab Political Prisoners, the name used by the group that claimed responsibility for the bombings, greeted his inauguration with a bomb on the Champs Elysées.

This month's wave of bombings has seen one explosion within 100 yards of his office in the city hall. Another was in the Paris police headquarters, another coincided with his announcement of anti-terrorist measures, another happened as he chaired an inner-cabinet security meeting.

So Chirac faces a dual pressure. As premier, he is a preaching conservative committed to a law-and-order platform to oust the Socialist president, Francois Mitterrand, when elections are held within two years. He created a security minister in his new cabinet, custom-made to deal with terrorism. Charles Pasqua, his hardline Corsican interior minister, lost no time in March in saying that he would "terrorise the terrorists".

That raised expectations of efficiency that have not been realised. The Paris police have been bombed in their own HQ. The Interior Ministry printed 200,000 Most Wanted posters last week of two of Abdallah's brothers, believed to have set one of

the recent bombs. The pair gave a press conference in Lebanon, before the posters were distributed, denying their involvement.

Chirac's reputation is also at stake as mayor of the target city. Its presentation for the 1992 Olympics claims that "Paris exports security. It is the HQ of Interpol. It regularly sends security advisers throughout the world". It is a city where "people from all countries may come without the slightest fear".

But these past days, the reality, in a crowded cafeteria, a queue for driving licences, a shopping district, has been different.

The responsibility for responding to the attacks has fallen squarely on Chirac. Mitterrand was absent most of last week on a state visit to Indonesia. When he flew home to France on Friday he was met by Chirac and the two men drove straight to the Elysee Palace for a meeting with security chiefs. In the uneasy cohabitation between the Socialist president and his conservative premier, Chirac remained centre-stage despite the president's return.

He is working rapidly to impress himself on France. With rivals on the right as well as left to outpace, this is part necessity. It is also his style: fretful, chain-smoking and liable to react vigorously before asking questions.

Loyal and tolerant in private, he can still appear harsh and facile in public.

That tendency is in for harsh examination in the present crisis, where he is finding it difficult to translate television toughness into action on the ground. On the outcome, the French will judge whether he is presidential material.

THE challenge is fierce and Chirac's success by no means guaranteed. He has inherited a double-edged legacy from the Socialists that heavily stacks the odds against him. France under Mitterrand welcomed political refugees of varying revolutionary hues and intensity from throughout the Middle East.

The concept of France as a "land of asylum", was dear to Mitterrand. Paris became a haven to exiles, such as Ayatollah Khomeini, and to Arab, Armenian, Irish, Basque and Italian terrorists.

Basque separatists were tolerated provided they did their business on the other side of the Spanish border. Mitterrand even flew to Crete to talk to Colonel Gadaffi. A deal was arranged through Iran and Syria this summer for the release of two of the French hostages in Lebanon. American bombers were refused permission to use French airspace on their way to Libya.

Such a policy was always likely to lead to internal trouble. Now, when France has discovered the need to adopt a hardline approach to troublesome, even murderous factions within, Chirac has been left with few weapons in his armoury.

France's security services were badly rundown and demoralised under the Socialist government – as demonstrated by the incompetent and ludicrous attack on Greenpeace's flagship, Rainbow Warrior, in Auckland last year.

The shambles of the French intelligence services has been illuminated further by recent disclosures by former high-ranking officials. The former head of the secret service, Alexandre de Marenches, has just published a bestselling memoir in which he claims that the previous Socialist government sent some of its best operatives "to the abattoir".

He also noted that the man designated by Mitterrand to replace him in 1981, Pierre Marion, "never showed the slightest desire to see me nor to hear how the organisation I had built up and run for 11 years worked".

In this, he has been backed by a former interior minister, Michel Poniatowski, who said this month: "Marion massacred our secret services by wanting to make them a machine for political warfare. In a few months, he destroyed an exceptional instrument."

Poniatowski added for good measure that, while visiting the Shah of Iran in 1978: "I proposed to him that he should look after Khomeini's destiny himself. In other words, he was free to act."

Khomeini was then in political asylum in France. Poniatowski appears not to have considered what effect his invitation to assassination, which the Shah turned down, may now have on Khomeini's disciples.

Marion has been defending himself in public. As evidence that he was as hardline as Marenches and Poniatowski, he has said that he suggested to Mitterrand that the secret services should assassinate six major terrorist contacts in France in 1982.

"I proposed to Francois Mitterrand to have them physically eliminated by my men," he has told the magazine, Le Nouvel Observateur. "The president refused. I then turned to other contacts we had identified in neighbouring countries. I again suggested elimination. The president again refused."

Marion, who said that his service calls such a homicide an "operation homo", also revealed that Mitterrand turned down a proposed commando raid on a terrorist training camp in west Beirut.

Marion was replaced by Admiral Pierre Lacoste in 1983. Lacoste has at least maintained some secrecy in the secret service by keeping silent this month, but was himself sacked last year in the aftermath of the Greenpeace affair. General René Imbot now has the job of restoring morale in the service.

WITH THE confused state of the intelligence-gathering machine, Chirac's problems are further exacerbated by geography. Simple policing cannot prevent terrorism in an open city such as Paris. Into its airports fly 200 airlines from 260 cities throughout the world, disgorging 30m passengers a year. It has six international railway stations.

The black BMW believed to have been used in Wednesday's bombing could have taken a direct motorway to Belgium, West Germany, Italy, Switzerland or Spain. A terrorist staying in Paris has a choice of 82,000 hotel rooms.

Chirac's imposition of visas may not be much more than an irritant to the professional terrorist, although it will further hurt the already battered French tourist industry. Abdallah, whose imprisonment has sparked the current round of terrorist atrocities, for example, was found to have five genuine passports when he was arrested.Genuine visas for terrorists backed by Middle East governments are unlikely to be too great a problem.

And France, with almost 1,000 border crossing points, is vulnerable to any laxity in neighbouring countries.

The solidarity committee says that the bombings will continue until Georges Abdallah and two other terrorists are released.

Chirac's presidential hopes now rest on how quickly he can marshall the limited forces available to him to combat the bombers. Paris has been buzzing with speculation that a Reagan-style response is imminent. But there is little prospect of Mirage jets bombing the Lebanon. Though France has the military capability, Mitterrand would be unlikely to permit it, nor is he inclined to let the secret service loose abroad again after the Rainbow Warrior fiasco.

If he is to fulfil his government's promise to terrorise the terrorists, and move nearer to the Elysée Palace, he will have to find the vengeance he promises on French soil.

So far Chirac is riding high. He has cross-party and public support; an opinion poll shows that 75% of the French consider they are at war and 70% support the government's actions. One French commentator speculated that terrorism could do for Chirac what the Falklands did for Mrs Thatcher. But for that to happen, the terrorists have to be beaten – and quickly, because difficult questions are already being raised.

One newspaper, Libération, has asked: "Why has the French government so few friends and so many enemies?" Le Monde asked an even more poignant question: "It is one thing to declare war. But who are we fighting?"

THE OBSERVER, SUNDAY 21 SEPTEMBER 1986

TERROR IN BEIRUT

PARIS BOMBS

TERROR IN-SURRECTION SEIZES PARIS

The sixth terrorist bombing in a fortnight killed five people and wounded 58 in a crowded Paris street last week. It brought President Mitterrand hurrying home from Indonesia and convinced Parisians they are now at war.

ROBIN SMYTH reports on the impact of the terror campaign and the hunt for the mysterious killers.

THE BALL of flame which rose five storeys high from the crowded pavement of the Rue de Rennes on Wednesday finally convinced the people of Paris that they are at war.

It was the sixth bomb within two weeks — the 15th since last December—and it opened up a new dimension of horror. As usual, when schools are closed on Wednesday afternoon, the crowd was dense at the Montparnasse end of the broad street running south from St Germain-des-Prés. Mothers trailed their children round the counter of Tati, the bargain clothes shop. And teenagers poured in and out of FNAC, the cut-price record and book store.

Dropped into a pavement litter bin by a man who stepped from a black BMW, the bomb, which exploded at 5.26 p.m., was aimed not at the rich or powerful but at mothers, children, Latin Quarter students and immigrants. The explosion hurled people into the air. Under a pall of black smoke, the injured lay among the scattered limbs of the dead. Screaming mothers ran in the road looking for their children; weeping children sat beside prostrate injured parents.

Sealed off from traffic, the street was a battlefield, strewn with blood-stained debris. The silence that fell after the explosion was broken by helicopters landing in the crossroads opposite Montparnasse Station to lift off the wounded. Five dead and 58 injured—the Rue de Rennes bomb was the most lethal of the whole series and the one which reflected most clearly the cold determination of France's mysterious Lebanese enemies to bring the French State to its knees.

Fear, rage and bewilderment are the feelings uppermost in Paris this weekend. There is also approval for the Government's determination to refuse to yield to the assassin's blackmail. 'Both united and Churchillian' was how *Le Monde* described the public mood.

'The struggle against terrorism is a battle,' Jacques Chirac, the Prime Minister, told the nation on TV Thursday night. 'This battle could last some time.'

The two poles of cohabitation at the head of the French State —the Socialist President, François Mitterrand, and the conservative Chirac — who have been on increasingly bad terms throughout the summer, have now drawn together to face the crisis. President Mitterrand hurried home on Friday from a state visit to Indonesia which dwindled into bleak formality, shorn of its festivities, as the bad news accumulated from Paris. The President told reporters in Bali: 'Although there is a President of the Republic drawn from the Left, he is still the President of all the French, and I have no qualms about leading the fight against terrorism with the Government.'

Met by Chirac at Charles de Gaulle airport, Mitterrand presided at an immediate emergency Cabinet meeting at the Elysée Palace. Earlier in the day, Chirac had separate meetings with leaders of the political parties and gave them secret details about the present state of the investigation.

Afterwards, the political establishment, from Communists to conservatives, was united in support of the Prime Minister. However, Jean-Marie Le Pen, leader of the extreme right-wing National Front, was holding himself a little aloof.

The National Front is preparing to exploit the frustration of the public by demanding a harder line against the terrorists. A *France-Soir* opinion poll last week showed that 77 per cent of the French are in favour of restoring the death penalty for terrorism and 61 per cent feel that French secret agents should be free to assassinate terrorists.

Chirac, who sees the danger of challenging militants only too willing to be martyrs to a death duel, has refused to consider the return of the guillotine.

Paris under siege—Beirut-sur-Seine, as the left-wing *Le Nouvel Observateur* sadly calls it—is like London under the buzz bombs, with the very important difference that Parisians have no clear idea who is launching the attack and why. Their rulers have a number of ideas, but for the moment these are unclear and conflicting.

Symbol of fear

Parisians are stripping their city of ornaments that could be used to hide a bomb and have adopted a wartime routine. The tubs of plants have gone from the Champs Elysées, the emptiness of post offices makes them look like the bare rooms of people about to move house. With no chairs and tables to break the view, the standing customers can watch for the symbol of fear, a parcel propped against the wall or wedged in among telephone directories.

After the pot plants, the people have disappeared. Few Parisians want to stroll in the streets, to sit on café terraces or to shop at large stores. Small local shops find that they have suddenly won back a lot of customers they thought they had finally lost to the supermarkets. Buses, where anyone who leaves a parcel will be immediately spotted, are crowded to the doors. The Métro, where surveillance is difficult in the long corridors, is half empty. Large restaurants and well-known cafés are deserted. Night life has almost come to a stop.

Asking the public to cooperate in the hunt has its drawbacks. Police are occupied each day in pursuing scores of false alarms. All day sirens cross the city as police cars converge on either a real disaster site or a street which must be cordoned off for an hour, while police examine a suspicious-looking parked car or a shopping bag abandoned on a windowsill.

In an exultant communiqué in Beirut at midweek, the terrorists vowed: 'We will soon destroy the outer wall of the Palace of King Mitterrand.' The Elysée Palace has been turned into a fortress, with no parking in the streets around its walls. And only in the daytime is one slow-moving line of cars allowed to pass the front gate. Police have tightened their defences round the Hotel Matignon, Jacques Chirac's residence as Prime Minister, and his headquarters as Mayor of Paris, the Hotel de Ville, which has already been bombed once.

Chirac says that as soon as he is certain who the terrorists are and who is pulling the strings, France's counter-attack will be 'devastating.'

In the eyes of the police, who are having a bad time making their story stick, France is the target of a Lebanese village vendetta waged by a Christian Marxist clan who are determined to obtain the release of their leader, Georges Ibrahim Abdallah from a French jail. Their violence is sharpened by a desire to punish France for going back on earlier promises to free him.



Abdallah : Jailed terrorist.

But belief in this theory has worn thin in Government circles. There is a forbidding smoothness about the succession of bomb attacks, the politically significant timing and the bold choice of such targets as the inside of the Paris police headquarters. The feeling in the Government is that the offensive is aimed at French policy in the Middle East by an organisation with a far more sophisticated infrastructure than the Abdallahs of Koubeyat, a small village in northern Lebanon, could muster.

The Government seems not to have ruled out the possibility of an Arab country, or a sizeable faction in one, being behind the onslaught. Libya is this time cleared of suspicion. About Syria there have been some doubts. The Syrians look with displeasure on French influence in Lebanon. But when the Syrians strike, they kill once; the French consider that it is not in their character to indulge in such a sustained campaign of savagery.

France, which has long been close to Iraq, has started a reconciliation with Iran which is encountering obstacles. But the hitch seems hardly serious enough to goad Iran into such a virulent reaction, unless this is the work of one powerful extremist faction in Tehran—the Revolutionary Guards of Rafic Doust—which has been excluded from the negotiations.

The likeliest explanation is that the organisation claiming responsibility for the Paris bombs, which calls itself CSPPA, the Committee of Solidarity with Arab and Middle East Political Prisoners, is an alliance of extremist groups in southern Lebanon. Drawing perhaps on sponsors from outside, this coalition has taken over the cause of the friends of Abdallah and two other terrorist prisoners in France, which it is using as a pretext to punish and humiliate the French Government.

'I do not think that there is a single conductor,' Mitterrand told reporters in Indonesia before taking his plane to Paris. 'There are several orchestras and several conductors holding the baton.'

To silence differences between Chirac and the Socialists, who lost power in the election in March, Mitterrand pointed out that both French Governments—the conservatives and their left-wing predecessors—were reviled in the terrorist communiqués.

The Paris daily, *Libération*, wrote on Friday: 'What seems to have happened is that almost all the protagonists of the Middle Eastern scene have, for different and sometimes divergent reasons, scores to settle with France. Or at least they were not unhappy to see France confronted with one of the worst ordeals of its recent history.'

Libération felt that the seven French hostages held by Shia extremists in Beirut and the recent killings of French members of the United Nations peacekeeping force in Lebanon, followed up by the murder of the French military attaché in Beirut, are all part of the same 'monstrous puzzle.'

The French police have been doggedly staking their reputation on a much simpler explanation. The bearded Christian revolutionary Georges Ibrahim Abdallah has been sitting in a French jail cell for nearly two years. His five brothers, many cousins and the

neighbours he formed into a ruthless terrorist network called FARL, the Armed Forces of the Lebanese Revolution, are set on winning his release.

But twice—once under the Socialists, and again under Chirac — negotiations have broken down in a way which Abdallah saw as treacherous. First Abdallah was to have been exchanged for Gilles Peyrolles, a French cultural attaché in Lebanon, who had been seized as a hostage for that purpose. But Mitterrand found out about it and was furious. 'I have never pardoned a terrorist,' he said last week. Peyrolles was freed but Abdallah stayed where he was.

He saw his second chance disappear this summer, when the US embassy and the family of its murdered military attaché, Charles Ray, brought their own case against him, after the gun which killed Ray was found in a Paris flat rented by Abdallah.

When the bomb attacks suddenly escalated this month, the police were certain that Abdallah's brothers were behind it. An eye witness identified the young man who left the bomb in a white box under his chair, which blew up the Casino cafeteria 10 days ago, as Abdallah's 20-year-old brother, Robert.

Charles Pasqua, the Minister of the Interior, had 200,000 copies of a poster printed with pictures of Robert and his brother Maurice and offered, for the first time in France, a £100,000 reward for information leading to their capture.

But the brothers promptly turned up at a press conference in Tripoli, Lebanon, saying that they had not set foot in France for two years. They had time to plant the bomb and get home, but only if the sealing of France's frontiers by the police and army, newly ordered by Chirac, was a failure.

Then a motorist identified the man who planted the bomb in the Rue de Rennes as another brother, Emile. And the day after the explosion, Emile surfaced in Lebanon too. The police protested, in the face of increasing scepticism, that it was still possible for him to have done it.

Warped eye

Whoever is responsible for the parcels that kill and maim appears to be looking at the Paris scene from the inside with a warped student's eye. The Gilbert bookshop in the Place Saint Michel, where students exchange books, was an early choice for a bomb.

And when the uglier attacks started this month, the first bomb which fizzled in a Métro carriage without exploding was in a Gilbert bag. Had the terrorist been back there, a killer now but keeping to the old student's habits?

Some self-hatred perhaps forces these assassins — men probably aided by women — to plant bombs where they will hurt their sort of people. The CSPPA claims to be acting for the 'disinherited of the earth,' but the victims seem hardly to fit the picture of capitalist oppressors. The Hotel de Ville post office bomb killed a West Indian woman; at the police headquarters, it was a Greek student renewing his driving licence; a black African woman was among the dead in the Rue de Rennes.

Jacques Chirac knows that his own future depends on the outcome of the struggle with the invisible assailant. His career is the main target of the violence. The explosions are timed to coincide with his speeches and Cabinet meetings on the crisis.

As Prime Minister, Chirac takes all the decisions. For the time being, he has the confidence of the public, but he knows that he must score an early victory to hold their support. Defeat would end his hopes of being the right-wing candidate for the presidency in 1988.

PT6615/1A

Hurd to boost fight on terror

By Robin Oakley
Political Editor

Mr Douglas Hurd, the Home Secretary, is to press Britain's EEC partners at an emergency meeting this week to redouble their efforts against terrorism.

He is to chair a meeting in London on Thursday of the Trevi Group of interior ministers and security chiefs, called at the request of the French Government, where Britain will press for tighter visa controls, a wider agreement on extradition of terrorist suspects and increased scrutiny of diplomatic bags.

Mr Hurd will try to persuade his counterparts in other states to seal their borders with non-EEC countries more effectively. There is particular concern about terrorists slipping into Europe through Greek ports and airports.

The meeting has been called after the recent wave of terrorist attacks in Paris, but Britain, as the country currently in the presidential chair of the EEC, has been pressing for more concerted moves to combat terrorism. In particular Mr Hurd wants to see greater co-operation in some countries between their foreign and interior ministries and a wider exchange of intelligence information on terrorist activities.

Mr Hurd will also urge all Britain's European partners to ratify a Council of Europe convention which smoothes the way to easier extradition of terrorist suspects by removing a 'supposed political motive for their offence as ground for denying their extradition.

After a report by the Commons foreign affairs select committee, which recommended the scanning of diplomatic bags to prevent the smuggling of weapons, the British Government ruled out routine scanning but said it was ready to scan diplomatic bags on particular occasions.

This system has now been in operation in Britain for some months. Where it is decided that there are sufficient grounds for scanning a diplomatic bag a representative of the embassy concerned is contacted and allowed to be present. If the country refuses to have the bag scanned it has to be sent back. Mr Hurd is expected to commend this example to his European colleagues.

Europe to narrow its doors

Observer 2/9/82

by PAUL ROUTLEDGE

TIGHTER controls on non-EEC nationals entering Europe are expected to be approved at a ministerial summit on counter-terrorism in London this week.

In the wake of the Paris bomb outrages, governments of 12 countries are urgently reappraising security arrangements at points of entry.

The 'Trevi conference', which brings together Ministers of Interior and security chiefs from EEC countries, has been summoned to an emergency session on Thursday at the request of Jacques Chirac, the French Prime Minister.

The top-level gathering, to be chaired by British Home Secretary Douglas Hurd, will also order tighter surveillance of several hundred known suspects already in Europe and agree on a more comprehensive exchange of intelligence data on terrorists.

Reform of extradition laws to make it easier for terrorists to be arrested is another measure on the agenda.

Hurd, taking the chair during Britain's six-month presidency of the EEC, will argue the need for governments to act on tightening lax controls at air and sea ports and other points of entry to stop the movement of terrorists, their arms, equipment and money into Europe.

Officials argue it is better to keep terrorists out by more careful screening of visitors than to keep track of them once they are inside Europe, where barriers to free travel are coming down. France has already imposed visa requirements on non-EEC nationals.

X-raying of diplomatic baggage from countries known or suspected to have sponsored terrorism is also under review.

■ **Paris bombings, page 13; Focus on terror, page 14.**

B66/5/11A Mr Lucas Copied to WJ

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Times 22 Apr 86

Mitterrand and Chirac bury the hatchet in face of terrorist threat

From Susan MacDonald, Paris

In the spirit of national unity emerging since the wave of terrorist bombings began in Paris two weeks ago, President Mitterrand and M Jacques Chirac, the Prime Minister, held a series of top-level security meetings over the weekend.

Paris yesterday had its fourth day free from bomb attacks, but the "Committee for Solidarity with Middle Eastern and Arab Political Prisoners", which has claimed responsibility for the Paris bombings, stated in Beirut on Saturday that the attacks would continue and would not be confined to Paris.

The statement also referred to Italy as a terrorist target. Last week, Italian authorities requested the extradition of Georges Ibrahim Abdullah, whom the "Committee for Solidarity" wants released from prison in France, to face terrorist charges in Italy.

Abdullah, who is serving a four-year term for terrorist offences, was moved over the weekend from Fleury-Mérogis prison in Essonne to the Santé prison in Paris for "reasons of security".

His lawyer, Maître Verges, sent a telegram to President Mitterrand, saying he had been refused access to his client and feared for Abdullah's safety and his life.

M Mitterrand had talks with M Chirac and the ministers of the interior and security as soon as he arrived at the Elysée Palace on Friday night after his three-day visit to Indonesia. There was strict security at the airport and the palace.

On Saturday morning, M Chirac chaired a meeting of the Council of Internal Security, the third in a week, which the economy, interior, security, justice, defence and foreign ministers attended.

In the evening M Mitterrand held a meeting with M André Giraud, the Defence Minister, and the head of the external intelligence agency, General Imbot.

No statements were issued after any of the three meetings, although the Interior Minister, M Charles Pasqua, said on Saturday that inquiries into the bombings were proceeding, and he believed they were making progress.

M Mitterrand has declared his intention to address the nation on television, but no date has been set.

An underground Muslim group said in Beirut yesterday that Paris was stalling over the return to France of two Iraqi dissidents expelled in February, and issued a warning that harm could come to the French hostages in Lebanon (Reuter reports). The threat came in a typewritten message delivered to an international news agency in Beirut. It bore yesterday's date and the name of the pro-Iranian "Islamic Daawa (Call) Party – Middle East section".

The Government is under pressure from the right to take offensive action against terrorists and the countries that support them.

On Saturday the newspapers *Le Figaro* and *France-Soir* accused Syria of being behind the latest attacks and talked of a link between Middle East terrorist groups and the French left-wing extremist organization, Action Directe.

Syria issued a firm denial of any involvement in the bombings, stating that these criminal acts had nothing to do with the liberation struggle and pointing the finger at Washington and Tel Aviv.

B66/5/1A

THE GUARDIAN Monday September 22 1986

Heathrow 'target'

By Paul Brown

Security services at Heathrow Airport, London, have been warned of an imminent terrorist attack on an American airliner.

With the bombings in Paris and an expected retaliation for the British role in the US attack on Libya, Heathrow is on maximum alert. The tip-off has come from the Middle East.

Israeli agents say that the other possible target is the Charles de Gaulle Airport, outside Paris. Heathrow security has been told to pay special attention to black or grey Samsonite suitcases.

The latest warning follows a series of pieces of information about groups of terrorists operating in Europe. In June three groups of terrorists travelling on false Libyan or Tunisian passports were said to be preparing to attack American or Israeli airlines.

B66/5H-1A

Terrorists use Swedish haven

CHRIS MOSEY ■ Stockholm

EVIDENCE is hardening that Middle East terror gangs are using Sweden as a 'safe base' for European operations.

After more than 40 kilos of Swedish explosives were found by French police following the recent wave of bombings in Paris, it was revealed yesterday that more than 700 kilos of explosives have been stolen from military depots in Sweden in well-organised raids spread over several years. It has been taken from apparently unguarded depots of Nobel Industries, the company founded by Alfred Nobel of Nobel prize fame.

In addition to the explosives, Swedish hand grenades, detonators and fuses were found by French police. They could well be part of the large quantities of ammunition which the authorities admit have been stolen from Swedish military depots recently.

Sweden is under heavy diplomatic pressure from the United States to tighten its checks on Middle Eastern refugees in the country.

Other European police forces believe the refugees are taking advantage of Swedish liberal attitudes and legislation to harbour terrorist hit-men and supply arms and explosives to operatives elsewhere in Europe, notably France.

French police found the Swedish explosives after last Wednesday's bombing in the Rue de Rennes.

Each package was labelled in Swedish '125 gram *sprängdeg*' (125 grammes explosive paste). This is thought by the Stockholm authorities to be part of the 700 kilos stolen from military depots. None of the explosives had previously been found by the police.

Mr Ingvar Eriksson, information chief for the National Police Authority, said: '1982 was the worst year. Then we lost 460 kilos of explosives after three robberies at different depots in Sweden.'

The discovery of the Swedish connection with the French wave of terror is a severe embarrassment to Sweden's Socialist Government, which, with the governments of Denmark, Norway, Finland and Iceland, is seeking exemption for Nordic citizens from the visa requirements introduced by France last week.

Danish police say a terrorist gang which bombed the offices of the US airline, Northwest Orient, in Copenhagen last year, later escaped by ferry to Sweden. The men have never been found.

With the French crackdown on terrorism, there are fears that some of the Swedish-based groups may launch actions in Scandinavia. Police are seeking three men who threatened to kill US tourists aboard ferries between Stockholm and Helsinki. One ferry was evacuated last week as police searched for possible bombs. It was prevented from sailing for more than nine hours.

The most likely haven for Middle East terror gangs would be the quiet university city of Uppsala where many Palestinians have settled in recent years. In 1982, four Palestinians, suspected of having terrorist links, were deported.

Sweden's Social Democratic Government is sympathetic to the Palestinian cause and PLO leader Yasser Arafat paid an official visit to Stockholm three years ago.

Earlier this year, the Government, aware of the terrorist threat and sensitive to criticism from abroad, particularly the US, appointed senior diplomat Vidar Hellners, 58, to co-ordinate Swedish efforts to beat the menace.

'The risk is that Sweden will be generally understood to be a safe haven for different terrorist groups,' Mr Hellners said. 'Sweden may be taken as being far too passive in the fight against terrorism. The Foreign Ministry needs a better international overview of this problem.'

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Financial Times Wednesday September 17 1986

Chirac tries to avoid humiliation

Paul Betts reports ... rts to cope with

The French Government offered yesterday a FFr 1m (£100,000) reward to any person providing important clues on the Arab-backed terrorists behind the recent wave of bombings in Paris.

Reward notices will be posted throughout France and will feature the photographs of two wanted Lebanese citizens, Mr Robert Ibrahim Abdallah and Mr Maurice Ibrahim Abdallah, the police authorities said last night.

The two wanted men are brothers of Mr Georges Ibrahim Abdallah, the suspected head of the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Factions currently imprisoned in France. The so-called Solidarity Committee of Arab Prisoners which has claimed

DURING the past 48 hours there has been a perceptible change in the living habits of many Parisians, for the unprecedented wave of terrorist attacks in the capital has provoked fear, anger and concern among most residents.

Since the beginning of the year, four people have been killed and more than 200 injured in 14 different bomb attacks. Three serious attacks have taken place in the past week, including the bombing of a Paris supermarket, a cafe on the Champs Elysees and the Paris police headquarters.

More and more people are driving to work and avoiding the metro or the rapid urban transit system," said a young executive working for Renault. The company's Champs Elysees cafe and car showroom was bombed last Sunday by Arab terrorists. She was sitting in the dining room of the Intercontinental Hotel off the fashionable Rue de Rivoli, where security was visibly stepped up following the bombings, as of most big Parisian hotels, department stores, official buildings, schools and other public places.

A cinema buff said: "I went to the cinema on Sunday and I was amazed to see how empty it was." In Paris, queuing to go to the cinema remains a popular Sunday pastime.

Scores of false alarms are continuing to plague the overstretched Paris fire brigade and police forces. On Monday there were more than 100 bomb scares. "It was crazy," remarked a police inspector. "We had to evacuate schools and cafes and often it provoked tensions with the public." The Paris bourse was the target of a false alert yesterday.

The Government anti-terrorist measures have also frayed nerves at airports as a result of the new requirement for all foreigners except EEC and Swiss citizens, to have visas to enter France.

Travellers without visas now have to wait an hour and travel agents yesterday criticised the disorganised way in which the visa requirement had been introduced.

In general however, French public opinion has approved the efforts of Mr Jacques Chirac, the conservative Prime Minister, to tighten security in an effort to combat terrorism in the capital. Apart from the extreme right National Front, the political parties have sought to close ranks behind the Government in its efforts, although the opposition Socialist Party has expressed worries that anti-terrorist legislation could restrict civil liberties.

President Francois Mitterrand, while calling for "implacable action" against terrorism, noticeably refrained from openly backing the conservative Government's latest measures before leaving on a state visit to Indonesia.

Mr Jean Marie Le Pen, whose National Front has everything to gain from the climate of insecurity, has openly criticised the Government's approach. "It's not by talk that we will defeat terrorism," he said yesterday, demanding the return of the death sentence and the expulsion from the UN of all countries involved with terrorists.

With Mr Le Pen, who originally campaigned successfully on security and immigration issues, calling for firmer action and the Socialist opposition cautioning the Government not to engage in repressive action, the use of the army, or the expulsion of suspected extremists, Mr Chirac is now faced with a big political dilemma.

At present he seems to have managed to win the confidence of the country at large, but unless he is able to produce results relatively soon and stop the current bombings, he will face increasing pressure at a time when he is already engaged in a difficult exercise in cohabitation with President Mitterrand.

The bomb on Monday inside the Paris police headquarters on the Ile de la Cité near Notre Dame cathedral was especially humiliating for the Government. Coming the day after Mr Chirac's announcement of new

as French fears grow

the surge of bomb attacks

responsibility for the latest bombings has demanded the release of Abdallah together with two other suspected terrorists. Yesterday it said in Beirut it would launch further bomb attacks in

Mr Jacques Chirac, the conservative Prime Minister, decided yesterday to postpone a visit to Canada next week because of the situation.

anti-terrorist measures to combat a series of bomb attacks, the terrorists struck at the very centre of the Government's law and order effort.

The prefecture bomb also overshadowed Mr Chirac's first budget, an occasion which under other circumstances would have enabled the new Government to boast about its economic reforms, privatisation and the improvement in France's overall economic performance.

Further clouding Mr Chirac's efforts to resolve the current domestic security crisis is the long drawn out saga of the French hostages in Lebanon. For months now, the French government has been trying to negotiate the release of the French hostages.

If that were not enough, the latest incidents against the French contingent in the UN peacekeeping force in southern Lebanon, including the killing of a soldier last Saturday, have further heightened French perceptions about Arab terrorism.

The events of the past few days have revived the worst racist sentiments in those large parts of the French population who have tended to see the problems of insecurity and terrorism as intrinsically linked with the large population of Arab immigrants in France.

Fearing a potential unjustified backlash, a group of young North African immigrants and intellectuals appealed yesterday to Ibrahim Abdallah, the suspect Arab terrorist held by France, to urge his supporters to stop the Paris bombings. The Solidarity Committee of Arab Prisoners which has claimed responsibility for the latest French bomb attacks has made the release of Mr Abdallah its main condition to halt its terror wave.

At the same time, there are growing fears among many French citizens, traditionally sensitive over incursions by the state into their individual freedoms, that the latest terrorist events will inevitably lead to a further increase in police powers.

However much he appeals for vigilance, after his promises before the elections to improve the general security of French citizens, Mr Chirac risks losing face if his police and security forces cannot prevent bombings in places like the police headquarters or his own town hall.

Financial Times Wednesday September 17 1986

France pays heavy



Mr Georges Ibrahim Abdallah: in French jail

THERE MAY be some regrets in the minds of French security officials that Mr Georges Ibrahim Abdullah, the 35-year-old Lebanese at the centre of the bloody campaign of bombing in Paris, was ever caught or that he was not released when only minor charges were levelled against him.

The cost of his detention has been appalling—six killed and more than 200 injured in a series of 14 terrorist incidents.

The Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Factions (Larf), a miniscule Arab fringe group believed to have a membership of only a few dozen people is driving a major capital city to edge of a nervous breakdown.

Even more alarming are indications that its ability to cause mayhem in its campaign to obtain Mr Abdallah's freedom has been made possible by its links with a network of international terrorist organisations all dedicated to attacking US, Israeli and capitalist interests.

The Committee of Solidarity with Arab Political Prisoners, in whose name the claims and demands have been made, probably represents a ruthless radical alliance undoubtedly including France's own Action Direct.

Mr Abdallah was detained on October 26 1984 on charges of possessing three false passports and "association with criminals." The trail that had led to him had begun with the arrest over two years before on June 21 1982 at Rome airport of Miss Christian Margo Fraulisch, an Austrian,

NEWS

price for holding terror suspect

BY RICHARD JOHNS

who was carrying seven false passports.

Her connection with a previous Paris bombing was quickly established and French police were able to confirm that she had rented from Hertz in Ljublana, Yugoslavia, the Opel car with Austrian number plates which had exploded outside the Paris-based magazine Al Watan al Arabi on April 22 1982.

It was more than two years later, after two more arrests by the Italian police of collaborators, that the flat in Lyons was traced where Miss Fraulisch had rested on her way to Paris in the Opel.

It had been rented by Mr Abdallah under the name of Abdul Kader Saadi. He was detained, and nearly five months later a group calling itself the "Arab Revolution Movement" warned on March 22, 1985, that French blood would be spilt if he were not released.

Four days later M. Gilles Peyrolles, director of the French cultural institute in Tripoli, Lebanon, was kidnapped. He was subsequently released under an Algerian-brokered agreement whereby Mr Abdallah would also have been freed. But the French authorities reneged on their part of the deal after police raided a Paris flat used by him and discovered documents relating to Larf and a cache of weapons.

Among them was a gun of the kind used in the murders of Colonel Charles Ray, the US military attache in Paris in January 1982 and Mr Iacov Barsimatov, an Israeli diplomat now generally reckoned to have been a Mossad secret service agent, in April of the same year.

Mr Abdallah has been under investigation for these killings as well as involvement in the attempt the previous year on the life of Mr Christian Edison Chapman, the US charge d'affairs.

Larf was formed in 1980 and the French authorities presume Abdallah to have been its leader. Mr Peyrolles's kidnappers described themselves to him as "Marxist Maronites." All the members are said to come from the same village of Qibayat in the north of Lebanon's Christian enclave.

The group probably grew out of Mr Georges Habbash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Marxist group responsible for most of the aircraft hijacks in the Middle East in the early 1970s.

Both the French and Italian security services seem convinced of Larf's association with Action Directe in France, West Germany's Red Army Faction, Italy's Red Brigades and Belgium's Communist Combatant Cells. Larf is also calling for the release of a Shia terrorist who led the assassination attempt against Mr Shapour Bakhtiar, the former Iranian Premier, in 1982 and an Armenian whose anarchist bomb at Orly Airport in 1983 killed eight people.

Their inclusion in the same bracket as Mr Abdallah can only be explained within the context of the complex and obscure alliance that has become known as "International Terror Inc."

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SVGS: (VIA WELLINGTON) PEKING MOSCOW TOKYO LONDON
LD : SFA (AAD, DLO CON)
P/S MINISTER OF F.A.
DEP. SEC. INTERNAL
EIB
SUBJ: SEOUL : KIMPO AIRPORT BOMBING

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IT IS STILL NOT CLEAR WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR SUNDAY'S BOMBING INCIDENT AT SEOUL INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT. ROK AUTHORITIES HAVE PUBLICLY ACCUSED NORTH KOREA OF BEING INVOLVED BUT ARE NOT RULING OUT POSSIBILITY OF SOUTH KOREAN RADICALS, OR PYONGYANG ORIENTED KOREANS RESIDENT IN JAPAN.

2 CASE FOR ACTION BY RADICALS MAY GAIN SOME SUPPORT FROM FACT THAT DEVICE WAS SMALL, AND RELATIVELY UNSOPHISTICATED. CONTACTS IN MFA, IN CONTRAST TO AGENCY FOR NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING OFFICIALS (ERSTWHILE C.I.A.) HAVE BEEN CAREFUL TO AVOID OPENLY POINTING FINGER AT NORTH KOREA. N.K. RADIO BROADCASTS MONITORED SO FAR HAVE DONE NO MORE THAN DESCRIBE INCIDENT.

3 IF, HOWEVER, IT COULD BE PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT N.K. IS DIRECTLY IMPLICATED, THEN IT SEEMS FAIRLY CLEAR THAT, HAVING FAILED SO FAR IN ITS BID TO CO-HOST 1988 OLYMPICS, AND TO WIN SUPPORT FOR CO-HOSTING PROPOSAL AT NON ALIGNED SUMMIT IN HARARE LAST MONTH, N.K. IS NOW BENT ON USING ASIAN GAMES TO DEMONSTRATE TO WORLD THAT R.O.K. AUTHORITIES CANNOT GUARANTEE SECURITY FOR PARTICIPANTS AT MAJOR INTERNATIONAL SPORTS MEETINGS.

4 CHUN'S GOVERNMENT ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO SUCCESSFUL STAGING OF ASIAN GAMES, AS CURTAIN RAISER FOR OLYMPICS IN 1988 WHICH IS SEEN AS A MAJOR TRIUMPH FOR ROK DIPLOMACY. IT HAS LONG BEEN SUGGESTED BY ROK AUTHORITIES THAT N.K. WOULD ENDEAVOUR TO TAKE SOME ACTION TO DISRUPT OLYMPICS AND POSSIBLY ASIAN GAMES, SHOULD IT NOT PARTICIPATE. (N.K. HAS DECLINED TO TAKE PART IN ASIAN GAMES, FOR WHICH IT IS ELIGIBLE, AND QUESTION OF OLYMPICS STILL HANGS IN BALANCE.)

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5 ON HYPOTHESIS THAT N.K. WISHES TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF PRESENT INTERNATIONAL SPOTLIGHT ON SEOUL TO CREATE THREATS TO SECURITY WHICH WOULD HAVE EFFECT OF DISCOURAGING ATTENDANCE AT OLYMPICS, ONE BOMB MIGHT NOT BE ENOUGH. HAVING PROVED THAT EXTRA SECURITY MEASURES NOW IN FORCE CAN BE BREACHED, THEY ARE LIKELY TO WISH TO PROVE IT CAN BE DONE AGAIN. WE ARE, THEREFORE, INCLINED TO EXPECT THAT THERE COULD BE FURTHER INCIDENTS OVER THE NEXT WEEK OR TEN DAYS, POSSIBLY DIRECTED AT ROK GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE PARTY FACILITIES (WHICH, HOWEVER, ARE WELL PROTECTED), OR PERHAPS MORE LIKELY AT MAJOR HOTELS OR CROWDED SHOPPING AREAS FREQUENTED BY FOREIGNERS. WE WOULD NOT RULE OUT POSSIBILITY OF RIOTOUS ACTIVITIES BY SMALL STUDENT RADICAL GROUPS, IN ADDITION TO FURTHER BOMB INCIDENTS.

6 IF N.K. IS DIRECTLY INVOLVED (AND THEY MAY OF COURSE BE ONLY GIVING MORAL ENCOURAGEMENT TO ACTUAL PERPETRATORS) WE WOULD NOT EXPECT THEM TO MOUNT AN INCIDENT SUCH AS AN ATTACK ON OLYMPIC STADIUM DURING OPENING CEREMONIES NEXT SATURDAY, WHICH WE AND MOST OTHER FOREIGN MISSIONS ARE ATTENDING, SINCE THIS COULD INVOLVE REPRESENTATIVES OF COUNTRIES FRIENDLY TO NK, AND THUS BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. WHILE THIS CANNOT BE RULED OUT WE TENTATIVELY ASSUME THAT NK WOULD NOT WISH TO BE LANDED WITH INTERNATIONAL OPPROBRIUM OF ANOTHER RANGOON. HOWEVER, A BLOW AT THE STADIUM WOULD BE A STRIKING EXAMPLE OF THE CAPACITY TO BREACH ROK SECURITY, AND THE NORTH KOREANS ARE NOTED FOR THEIR ERRATIC BEHAVIOUR.

7 ON THE WHOLE, WE THINK IT MORE LIKELY THAT INCIDENTS WILL BE SMALLER SCALE AND PROBABLY DIRECTED AT ROK AND FOREIGN TARGETS AWAY FROM THE SITES WHERE COMPETITORS FROM COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH N.K. ARE PARTICIPATING.

8 WE HAVE REPORTED FROM TIME TO TIME POSSIBILITY OF INCIDENTS BEFORE THE GAMES (MOST NOTABLY OUR MEMO 88/1/1 OF 22 APRIL COVERING DISCUSSIONS WITH SWISS GENERAL JORDAN OF THE NNSC). IN THAT MEMO YOU WILL HAVE NOTED THE RATHER OMINOUS PROGNOSTICATION OF CHINESE GENERAL TIAN SHENG TO GENERAL JORDAN OF NNSC EARLIER THIS YEAR, THAT FAILURE TO ACCOMMODATE NORTH KOREA OVER THE OLYMPIC GAMES COULD PRECIPITATE TROUBLE. HE SAID ''IF THEY LOSE FACE THEY WILL ACT''.

9 WE HAVE ALREADY WARNED INTENDING TRADE VISITORS THAT THE PERIOD OF THE ASIAN GAMES WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT BECAUSE OF SCARCE ACCOMMODATION, TRAFFIC CONGESTION THROUGH INCREASED SECURITY, AND A HEAVY AND ALMOST UNIVERSAL PREOCCUPATION WITH THE GAMES DURING PERIOD 20 SEPTEMBER - 5 OCTOBER. WE WOULD THINK OTHER NEW ZEALANDERS WHO HAVE TIMING OPTIONS MIGHT BE PRUDENT TO AVOID THIS PERIOD AS WELL.

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B 69/17

15 September 1986

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs
WELLINGTON

(Att : UNC, AAD)

c.c. External Intelligence
Bureau, WELLINGTON

(Att : Southern Section

TERRORISM

... We have received the attached advice of the establishment of an "Institute for the Study of Terrorism" in London. The Institute will, it is claimed, formally announce its establishment later this year, with advice to the public about its constitution, work, and aims.

2. As an indication of the work the Institute intends to do we
... enclose (not for EIB) its booklet "Tamil Terrorism in Sri Lanka", which argues that the "groups of Tamil militants are dedicated Marxist revolutionaries aiming to establish a Sri Lankan People's Republic encompassing the whole island".

3. We shall try to ascertain more about this new Institute. In the meanwhile we should appreciate knowing whether you would be interested in seeing further of its publications.

233-7488.
John Ashton

S. W. PRIOR

S.W. Prior
for High Commissioner

Att's

INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM

Address for the receipt of mail only. • 65 Blandford Street, • London W1H 3AJ • Tel 01-487 4858

The Institute for the Study of Terrorism has been functioning since the 1st June, 1986. Later this year we shall formally announce our establishment, and we shall provide detailed information about our constitution, work and aims.

In general the activities of the Institute will include:

1. Collecting, classifying, and analysing information.

2. Supplying information and analysis on request

3. Publishing books and papers.

4. Sponsoring public lectures, discussions and conferences.

5. Providing a centre for persons engaged in the study of terrorism, or in counter-terrorist activity, to contact or meet each other.

6. Building an archive for the Institute's own purposes, and as a facility for students, scholars and other researchers.

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PRESS RELEASE

Embargoed until Thursday, 11 September 1986.

TAMIL TERRORISM IN SRI LANKA

The recent arrival by lifeboat of 155 Sri Lankan Tamils in Canada has brought Sri Lanka and its problems into the world headlines.

The background to the situation in Sri Lanka and information on the terrorist groups operating in the island are contained in the first publication of the Institute for the Study of Terrorism "Tamil Terrorism: Nationalist or Marxist ?" by Penelope Tremayne and Ian Geldard published today.

There is a growing terrorist threat to Sri Lanka. Recent information indicates that the major terrorist groups have moved a further 2,000 armed men from their training camps in southern India to bases in northern Sri Lanka in preparation for a major resurgence of terrorist activity.

The Tamil movement in Sri Lanka has been-presented as essentially nationalist, but this is misleading. Very few Tamils see the creation of Tamil Eelam as a viable or even desirable state. Some see it as a stepping-stone to a full scale "people's revolution" and to the eventual seizure of the whole island before exporting the revolution to southern India. Others see Tamil nationalism as a means of enlisting sympathy and establishing a foothold in other, more prosperous countries.

Penelope Tremayne, who was captured and held hostage by the terrorists on a recent visit to Sri Lanka addresses the question of what is the true nature of the Tamil political movement that has opted for violence in pursuit of its aims. Her personal experience and extensive research into the subject leads her to conclude that these groups of Tamil militants are dedicated Marxist revolutionaries aiming to establish a Sri Lankan People's Republic encompassing the whole island.

In addition to this important essay, additional information is provided by Ian Geldard on the strategic significance of Sri Lanka to the West, the economic consequences of the war on the Sri Lankan economy, a history of the conflict, and a survey of all the major terrorist groups active on the island.

B66/5-1/1A

16/9/82

TIMES PAST
THE TIMES
1 Pennington Street, London E1 9XN Telephone: 01-481 4100

CORDON SANITAIRE

Less than 24 hours after Prime Minister Jacques Chirac declared war on terrorism, the terrorists demonstrated their contempt for Gaullist resolve by blowing up police headquarters in Paris. For a government dedicated to the enforcement of law and order, this was perhaps the cruellest blow of a deeply embarrassing campaign.

In recent years the French have reacted to international terrorism in much the same way as has everyone else, in shocked bewilderment – blundering from conciliation to confrontation and back again. In 1982 the government of the day did a deal with Abu Nidal when it released two prisoners on parole at the earliest opportunity. A year later it retaliated after the horrific slaughter of French troops in Lebanon, by bombing the Bekaa Valley. But earlier this year American F-111s raiding Libya had to fly in an expensive arc across the Atlantic to avoid French air space – a lack of hospitality which they bitterly resented.

Now an extremist group demanding the release of a jailed Lebanese, serving four years on an arms charge (while awaiting trial for murder), inflicts almost daily carnage in the streets of the French capital. What should the Chirac government do?

One thing it should not do, of course, is to give in. For the government to treat with the terrorists would win it only temporary respite – until the next time that they wanted its "cooperation." (Surprising though it might be, there have been reports that some weeks ago M. Chirac was on the point of giving in by freeing the imprisoned Georges Abdallah, and had to be restrained by President Mitterrand himself.)

Nor should the government allow French policy in the Levant to be dictated by Shi'ite Arab extremists who continue to exact a toll on French and other troops stationed there with the UN.

So far the French counter-terrorist forces have been less than impressive. Internal rivalries and a preoccupation with public image-making have misdirected their efforts, leading too often to abortive operations. But the Chirac government's measures announced on Sunday should strengthen their hand.

These measures will admittedly impose inconvenience on those entering France and those who move around the country. That it is a small price to pay for greater public safety, and the steps taken have been generally welcomed. But they will need to be accompanied by better intelligence than has so far been evident, and executed by a patient and vigilant police force. In these respects the French could learn from this country, whose public and police – particularly in Ulster – have learnt by hard experience.

There is no panacea, as Sir Geoffrey Howe rightly pointed out in Brussels yesterday while confirming that European internal ministers, at the special behest of France, would hold a special "Trevi Group" meeting on counter-terrorism on September 25. But the measures announced by M Chirac, restricting entry to France from all except EC countries, will be of limited value unless other Community countries implement something similar.

Until comparatively recently, extremist groups acted directly, so that the men who laid the plans then planted the bombs themselves. This meant that when forces captured the guilty men they cut out the cancer altogether – at least for a time. But the experience of recent years has led to a greater sophistication among the pursued as well as the pursuers. The men behind the atrocities of today are many miles away from the scene of the crime, surviving to plan the next one.

Such men cannot be conclusively beaten by one country alone – not even by the European Community. But EC collaboration is a pre-requisite which the French are now learning to appreciate. It is one for all and all for one – in a French tradition.

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CLAS: CONFIDENTIAL 15 SEPT 1986
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RPTD: LONDON 127 CANBERRA 48 OTTAWA 19 WASHINGTON 32
LD : SFA (EUR, LGL, MEA, AMER, DLO, SEC) EIB, PMD, POLICE (PTIU)
DEFENCE (DDOPS, DDI), NZSIS
SUBJ: ITALY: TERRORISM: NEW PROCEDURES AT AIRPORTS AND ITALIAN FRONTIERS

OUR 798. THE FOREIGN MINISTRY ARE STILL NOT ABLE TO OFFER A RESPONSE, AND THE AUSTRLIAN, CANADIAN AND BRITISH EMBASSIES ARE LIKE US STILL WAITING TO LEARN PRECISELY WHAT IS INVOLVED (THE LATTER, OF COURSE, COURIER OUR SAFEHAND MATERIAL IN AND OUT OF ITALY). NONE OF THEM HAVE YET BEEN INSTRUCTED TO MAKE ANY DEMARCHE TO MFA A STEP WHICH OF COURSE MUST DEPEND ON THE PRECISE SCOPE OF THE ITALIAN ACTION.

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CLAS: CONFIDENTIAL 19 SEPT 1986
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- ALL ROUTINE (VIA LON)
CANBERRA 46 - ROUTINE (VIA WLN)
THE HAGUE 88 BONN 78 - ROUTINE (VIA ROM)
LD : SFA (EUR, LGL, MEA, AMER, DLO, SEC), EIB, , PMD,
POLICE (PTIU) DEFENCE (DDOPS, DDI), NZSIS
SUBJ: ITALY: TERRORISM

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SUMMARY

THE RECENT TERRORIST ATTACKS AT KARACHI, ISTANBUL AND PARIS HAVE LED TO A GOOD DEAL OF PUBLIC (PARTICULARLY NEWSPAPER) SPECULATION AS TO WHETHER ITALY MAY FACE SOME RESURGENCY OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM HERE. THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOW HELD INTERNAL CONSULTATIONS ON THE MATTER AND APPEARS TO HAVE SLIGHTLY TIGHTENED UP ITS SECURITY MEASURES. ONE OF THESE WILL AFFECT THE BAGGAGE OF FOREIGN DIPLOMATS AT ITALIAN AIRPORTS AND FRONTIERS. REPORT

2. SINCE THE AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN LIBYA AND THE ABORTIVE LIBYAN ATTACK ON LAMPEDUSA, THE ITALIAN AUTHORITIES HAVE BEEN NOTABLY NERVOUS ABOUT THE PROSPECT OF SOME NEW TERRORIST INCIDENT IN ITALY THAT WOULD ONCE MORE EMBROIL THEM IN MAINTAINING THE DIFFICULT TRIANGLE OF RELATIONSHIPS THEY MUST SEEK TO PRESERVE BETWEEN THEMSELVES, AND THE USA, LIBYA, AND THE REST OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY RESPECTIVELY. THEIR RISKY GEOGRAPHICAL PROXIMITY TO

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NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST, AND THE TROUBLESOME BALANCING ACT THEY MUST TRY TO PERFORM IN SUCH CASES HAVE MADE THEM VERY LEERY OF PROCEEDING, WITHOUT THE BEST POSSIBLE PROOF, ON THE BASIS THAT ANY PARTICULAR INCIDENT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF A COUNTRY LIKE LIBYA. IT IS UNDERSTANDABLE THEREFORE THAT THEY PUT CONSIDERABLE EMPHASIS ON A PREFERENCE FOR ''COMMON'' RATHER THAN INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY MEASURES, AND FOR ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLICITY BEFORE ANY SUCH STEP AS AN INTERVENTION INTO LIBYA WERE CONTEMPLATED AGAIN. BY THE SAME TOKEN, HOWEVER, PREMIER CRAXI STATED AT THE TIME OF THE LAMPEDUSA AFFAIR THAT ANY REPETITION OF CERTAIN LIBYAN ACTIVITIES WOULD RESULT IN ITALIAN RETALIATION, IF NECESSARY BY ARMED MEANS. HE HAS PUBLICLY REPEATED THIS POSITION WITHIN THE LAST FEW WEEKS.

3. AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE RECENT INCIDENTS IN KARACHI AND OTHER PLACES WE CALLED FOR A BRIEFING YESTERDAY ON FERRARIN, OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY'S GENERAL SECRETARIAT FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, WHO IS EFFECTIVELY THEIR PRINCIPAL DESK OFICER FOR TERRORISM ISSUES AND REPRESENTS ITALY AT RELEVANT DISCUSSIONS WITH THEIR EC AND OTHER PARTNERS. WHAT HE HAD TO SAY ABOUT THE VISIT TO ROME BY U.S. REPRESENTATIVE WALTERS LAST WEEK (JUST BEFORE THE RECENT SPATE OF ATTACKS ELSEWHERE) SHOWS THAT WALTERS TOOK MUCH THE SAME STANCE AS BONN HAS REPORTED ABOUT HIS VISIT THERE (BONN'S 1121 TO YOU). IN SHORT, WALTERS HAD ''SOME INDICATIONS'' BUT ''NOT SUBSTANTIVE EVIDENCE'' THAT LIBYA WAS PLANNING FRESH TERRORIST ATTACKS, IN LIGHT OF WHICH THE U.S. DID NOT ''BRING ANY PROPOSALS FOR SPECIFIC MEASURES'' BUT SET OUT ''SOME EXAMPLES'' OF WHAT COUNTRIES SUCH AS ITALY COULD TAKE. FERRARIN CHARACTERISED THESE AS INCLUDING SUGGESTIONS FOR THE REDUCTIONS OF THE IMPORTS OF OIL FROM AND AIR TRAFFIC WITH LIBYA. MORE PARTICULARLY WALTERS REFERRED TO THE POSSIBLE DIFFICULTIES OF THE U.S. IMPORTING ITALIAN PRODUCTS CONTAINING LIBYAN OIL., AND IT SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN LEFT THAT THERE COULD BE CONSULTATIONS AT THE EXPERT LEVEL ON THIS TOPIC. FERRARIN DENIED HOWEVER THAT WALTERS HAD MADE ANY ATTEMPT TO PUSH ITALY TOWARDS DIVESTING ITSELF OF THE CONSIDERABLE LIBYAN INTEREST IN FIAT.

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4. AS TO THE LONDON CONFERENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS, FERRARIN CONFIRMED THAT THE MINISTERS HAD REINFORCED THE USEFULNESS OF CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION IN RELATION TO TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. FROM WHAT FERRARIN SAID, IT DID NOT APPEAR THAT ANDREOTTI HAD TAKEN ANY VERY DISTINCTIVE STANCE AT THE CONFERENCE, STRESSING MAINLY THE NEED FOR COLLECTIVE AND INDIVIDUAL MOVES TO ASCERTAIN, WITHOUT PREJUDGEMENT, WHO EXACTLY IS RESPONSIBLE FOR TERRORIST ATTACKS, AND ACT THEN ACCORDINGLY.

5. YESTERDAY'S ITALIAN PRESS REPORTED ON ARRANGEMENTS THAT CRAXI HAD MADE FOR A MEETING ON THAT DAY OF HIS MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND INTERNAL SECURITY IN ORDER TO BRACE UP THE ITALIAN SYSTEM AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY OF TERRORIST ATTACKS HERE IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. THIS REPORT REFERRED TO RUMOURS THAT THE ITALIAN SECURITY FORCES HAD PICKED UP INDICATIONS THAT BEFORE TAKING ACTION AT KARACHI THE TERRORISTS HAD PLANNED ASSAULTS AT ROME AND MILAN AIRPORTS. THE NEWS THAT ONE OF THE KARACHI TERRORISTS HAD RECEIVED ITALIAN LANGUAGE TRAINING WITHIN ITALY WOULD OBVIOUSLY HAVE GIVEN FUEL TO THE ASSUMPTION THAT ARAB TERRORIST CELLS ARE STILL ACTIVE IN THIS COUNTRY.

6. FERRARIN WAS NOT INCLINED TO ASCRIBE OVER MUCH SIGNIFICANCE TO THE CRAXI MEETING. HE DESCRIBED IT AS A PRECAUTION IN ORDER TO EXAMINE THE GENERAL SITUATION IN THE AFTERMATH OF KARACHI AND ISTANBUL., AND HE WAS NOT INCLINED TO SAY ANYTHING MORE ABOUT THE NEWSPAPER RUMOURS APART FROM COMMENTING THAT THE POLICE AND OTHER SECURITY FORCES CONSTANTLY RECEIVE INFORMATION ABOUT POSSIBLE ATTACKS.

7. TODAY'S PRESS ACCOUNTS OF THIS INTER-MINISTERIAL MEETING BROADLY CONFIRM WHAT FERRARIN SAID. AFTER THE MEETING PREMIER CRAXI HAS DESCRIBED THE SITUATION AS ''NOT A GOOD ONE'': THERE WAS A GENERAL STATE OF ALERT IN ITALY, ALTHOUGH ''SPECIFIC INFORMATION AFFECTING ITALY WAS NOT IN EXISTENCE''. HOWEVER, HE ADDED THAT A STATE OF CONCERN WAS WELL JUSTIFIED.

8. CONSISTENTLY WITH ITALY'S PREFERENCE FOR COMBINED MEASURES, THE MEETING DECIDED TO SEND THE MINISTER FOR INTERNAL AFFAIRS (SCALFARO) FORTHWITH TO ISRAEL, MOROCCO AND TURKEY IN ORDER TO DISCUSS A UNIFIED ANTI-TERRORIST STRATEGY. THE REPORT OF THE MEETING ALSO REFERS TO A VIEW TAKEN THAT ABU NIDAL WAS THE KEY FITGURE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ATTACK ON THE ISTANBUL SYNAGOGUE AS ALSO FOR THE ATTACK ON A SYNAGOGUE IN ROME SOME YEARS AGO.

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9. AS ANOTHER PRACTICAL MEASURE, YESTERDAY'S MEETING DECIDED THAT, WITH IMMEDIATE EFFECT, FOREIGN DIPLOMATS WILL NOT BE PERMITTED TO USE DIPLOMATIC EXITS OR ENTRANCES WHERE BAGGAGE IS NOT CHECKED. DIPLOMATS BAGGAGE WILL HAVE TO GO THROUGH METAL DETECTORS IN THE SAME WAY AS THE LUGGAGE OF ALL OTHER PASSENGERS. AFTER REFERRING TO THE BELIEF THAT DIPLOMATIC BAGGAGE HAD MORE THAN ONCE BEEN USED FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF ARMS FOR TERRORIST PURPOSES, MR ANDREOTTI IS QUOTED AS SAYING ''I AM VERY HAPPY THAT THIS MEASURE WAS ADOPTED BECAUSE WE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING IT WITH OUR ALLIES FOR A LONG TIME. FOR THE TIME BEING WE WILL START DOING THIS, AS THE OTHERS HAVE NOT YET MADE UP THEIR MIND. IT'S ALWAYS BETTER TO PUT YOUR GUARD UP.''

10. BECAUSE THE ITALIAN WORDING IS BOTH BRIEF AND OBSCURE, IT IS NOT CLEAR TO US WHETHER THIS RULING APPLIES ONLY TO BAGGAGE OR EXTENDS TO THE DIPLOMATIC BAG ITSELF, AND WE AWAIT ELUCIDATION FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTRY WHICH HAS NOT YET ITSELF RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS AS A RESULT OF YESTERDAY'S MEETING. WE SHALL FOLLOW UP FORTHWITH AND ADVISE YOU FURTHER ASAP.

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84/1/1
84/19/1

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

WELLINGTON

10 September 1986

NEW ZEALAND
LONDON
19 SEP 1986
CENTRAL REGISTRY
HIGH COMMISSION

The Permanent Representative, GENEVA
The High Commissioner, LONDON
The Ambassador, PARIS
The Ambassador, BONN
The Ambassador, ROME
The Ambassador, THE HAGUE
The Ambassador, ATHENS
The Ambassador, BRUSSELS
The Ambassador, MOSCOW
The Ambassador, VIENNA

cc Director of Security
NZSIS

Attention: Coordinator T.I.C.

THE TERRORIST THREAT IN EUROPE

We conveyed with our memorandum 109/1/4(W) and 84/1/1 of 16 May 1986 a copy of the NZSIS assessment 25/10/11 of 11 May 1986 entitled "The Terrorist Threat to New Zealand Interests in Europe".

2 We have had some feedback from a few posts, for which thanks. We (and the NZSIS) should like to invite posts which have not so far commented to comment on the NZSIS assessment referred to in the light of recent developments. It would be appreciated if responses could be given an appropriate distribution in line with that set out in Mr Norrish's All Posts telegram A154 of 21 December 1984 and paragraph 3 of our memorandum to you 109/1/4(W) and 84/1/1 of 16 May 1986.

(M F Watkins)
for Secretary of Foreign Affairs

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CLAS: CONFIDENTIAL 9 SEPT 1986
FROM: ROME
TO : WELLINGTON 798 - ROUTINE
RPTD: LONDON 126 CANBERRA 47 OTTAWA 18 WASHINGTON 31
LD : SFA (EUR, LGL, MEA, AMER, DLO, SEC) EIB, PMD, POLICE (PTIU), DEFENCE (DDOPS, DDI), NZSIS
SUBJ: ITALY: TERRORISM: NEW PROCEDURES AT AIRPORTS AND ITALIAN FRONTIERS
OUR 792, PARAS 9-10.

DESPITE REQUESTS FOR ELUCIDATION, THE ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY HAVE NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO RESPOND TO QUERIES FROM EMBASSIES, AND CONFESS THAT THEY ARE STILL TRYING TO SETTLE THE TERMS OF ADVICE TO THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS ON THIS SUBJECT. WE HAVE PARTICULARLY SOUGHT CLARIFICATION AS TO ANY EFFECT ON DIPLOMATIC BAGS WHETHER UNACCOMPANIED OR COURIERED (CONSIDERING THAT THE MEDIA INDICATIONS ARE THAT BAGS ARE TO BE ELECTRONICALLY SURVEYED). MFA HAVE PROMISED TO RESPOND SOONEST.

2. ACCORDING TO THE PRESS THERE IS ALSO A GENERAL NEW INTENSIFICATION OF ROME INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT SECURITY MEASURES INVOLVING 24-HOUR POLICE AND DOG PATROLS, THE USE OF HELICOPTER SURVEILLANCE OF SELECTED FLIGHTS AND A 24 HOUR REQUIREMENT FOR ALL ENTRANTS TO THE AIRPORT TO SHOW AN IDENTITY DOCUMENT (THE LAST HAD BEEN ENFORCED BEFORE MAINLY AT PERIODS INVOLVING SENSITIVE FLIGHTS).

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9/1700Z
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8/9/86

TIMES PAST
THE TIMES
1 Pennington Street, London E1 9XN Telephone: 01-481 4100

THEY MUST NOT SUCCEED

General Vernon Walters, President Reagan's special envoy in the campaign against international terrorism, set off rather too soon on his European tour. Last week the Old World allies were shivering with apprehension over what the Americans might do next. This week he might have found them more receptive.

The tragic end to the Karachi hijacking and the cruelty of the massacre in Istanbul have happened just when the world seemed to be staging something of a recovery from this disease of the later Twentieth Century. That it should have suffered a relapse will come as no surprise. The ruthless fanatic, careless of his own survival, is a difficult organism to eradicate or even deter. But one can make life difficult for him and we have clearly not yet made it difficult enough. What is to be done?

One thing that governments should *not* do is to lose their way in an orgy of recrimination and dissent. This is sadly what has happened in the wake of both events this weekend. That the Pakistan authorities have not yet perfected their counter-terrorist techniques was obvious from the moment that the hijackers boarded the plane. Nor can the authorities look back with any pleasure on what followed thereafter.

Similar doubts surround the decision of the Pan American crew to abandon ship, thus immobilising their Boeing and stranding the terrorists – but at the cost of further destabilising the situation. Airlines like the Pakistan army and Karachi airport need to look at their tactics again

To draw up precise "do's" and "don'ts" for crises which never quite repeat themselves, is however to attempt the near-impossible. The method of attack by the terrorists this time differed from that of most of their predecessors, the hijackers driving across the tarmac disguised as security men. Security measures at airports need to be comprehensive but the minds of those in charge need to be flexible.

Moreover, for all the tragic consequences of the crime, the Pakistani government and the Pan Am crew ensured at least that the gunmen failed to achieve their main objective. That kind of determination must remain the central characteristic of any counter-terrorist policy. Crticism of the kind heaped upon Pakistan by Mr Rajiv Gandhi at the summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in Harare, is therefore destructive and unhelpful.

Meanwhile in Jerusalem yesterday the Israeli Cabinet broke up in disarray, divided by the murders in the Istanbul synagogue, at a time when they should be united. If the coalition allows itself to be split by a crisis of this kind it is awarding the terrorists half the victory they crave - and if the faltering Middle East peace process is halted for similar reasons - their triumph is total. In the end the only way to beat the gunmen is to ensure that they do not succeed.

This is not to argue the case against retaliation should Israeli intelligence identify those responsible. But the difficulty of doing that is notorious. Even if it succeeds in doing so a government has to locate its quarry or punish its hosts to deter them from offering shelter. The case for carrying out an operatuon which is less than surgical is always more questionable. Colonel Gadaffi has insisted on his innocence. He would wouldn't he – but in this instance most people believe him. The assumption that the hand of Abu Nidal lies behind one if not both of the outrages raises questions about the indirect responsibility which must be borne by Syria among others – despite a newspaper report yesterday that the Syrians were expelling his organization. Should the Americans act against Syria? These are complex issues at a time when Washington is once more trying to stitch together the threads of a Middle East peace process.

One thing needed is a more coordinated approach against terrorism by the Third World. Terrorism is not confined to the under-developed countries, as this country knows to its cost. But it is their less sophisticated security screens that terrorist find easiest to penetrate. Most countries need each other in the campaign against terrorism and there should be much greater cooperation between them. If the Non-Aligned Movement in Harare had spent more time discussing this instead of losing themselves in their anti-American rhetoric or listening (admittedly without much pleasure) to the strident Gadaffi, they might have won more friends and influenced more people – and had a better conference too.

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